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28/02/2026

28/02/2026

HIGH COURT UPHOLDS LUSAMBO CONVICTIONS AS ALL SIX GROUNDS OF APPEAL STAND DISMISSED

Lusaka | February 27, 2026 - The Economic and Financial Crimes Division of the High Court has today dismissed all six grounds of appeal filed by former Lusaka Province Minister Bowman Lusambo, fully upholding his convictions for corruption, possession of property suspected to be proceeds of crime, and tax evasion.

A panel of three judges, Lady Justices S. M. Wanjelani, P. K. Yangailo, and A. Malata-Ononuju, heard the appeal, with Lady Justice Malata-Ononuju delivering the judgment.

The State was represented by Senior State Advocate Mrs. Susan Mwamba-Besa from the General and Appeals Department in the National Prosecution Authority. She was assisted by Ms. Tendai Shumba, Senior Prosecutions Officer from the Anti-Corruption Commission and Ms. Lorraine Tembo a state Advocate from the NPA’s Economic and Financial Crimes Department.

The Appellant was represented by Mmes. D. Findlay & Associates and Makebi Zulu & Partners.

Mr. Lusambo challenged his convictions on six grounds:

1. That the trial court lacked sufficient evidence to convict him of corruptly acquiring public property.

2. That there was no evidence linking him to property reasonably suspected to be proceeds of crime.

3. That his tax evasion convictions were against the weight of evidence. As argued in the Appellant’s grounds 3, 4 and 6.

4. That the trial court erred in evaluating and weighing the evidence.

5. That the court’s analysis was unbalanced or biased.

The State opposed all grounds of appeal, and the Court agreed fully with their submissions. In opposition to the Appellant’s first ground of Appeal, Mrs. Besa argued that the evidence presented at the trial clearly demonstrated that Mr. Lusambo, in his capacity as Copperbelt Province Minister, orchestrated the allocation of Lot 39876/M to Frontier Management Services Limited (FMSL), a company in which he had no legal interest. The State submitted that the trial court had correctly convicted Lusambo for corruptly acquiring public property contrary to section 34(1)(a) as read with section 41 of the Anti-Corruption Act, No. 3 of 2012.

According to the State, Mr. Lusambo abused his ministerial office to acquire land through FMSL, effectively bypassing the company’s directors and shareholders. Evidence before the trial court showed that in April 2017, PW1, Enerst Malangazo Sumani, then Town Clerk for Ndola City Council, was summoned to Lusambo’s office and instructed to allocate the land to FMSL.

The company’s directors and shareholders were completely unaware of the transaction, and the Chief Surveyor, Dr. Chisala, confirmed that none of the director or shareholders had contacted council officials regarding the property. Instead, Mr. Lusambo personally handled the land application, exerting pressure on council officers and threatening them with transfers should they fail to comply.

The State further highlighted that Mr. Lusambo subsequently sold the land to Jignesh Soni Prosecution Witness number 7 (PW7) for K880,000, routing the payment through Sylvia Mutale Prosecution Witness number 20 (PW20), from whom Mr. Lusambo purchased a Range Rover. Mrs. Besa emphasised that Mr. Lusambo did not dispute these facts during cross-examination, and the combined testimonies of PW1, PW7, and PW20 painted a compelling picture of fraudulent acquisition and direct abuse of ministerial authority. The Court agreed with the State that these actions clearly demonstrated the corrupt and unlawful use of public office for personal gain.

In ground two, the Appellant argued that the trial court had erred in convicting him of possession of property, namely the Range Rover, reasonably suspected to be proceeds of crime, asserting that there was no evidence linking the transaction in Kitwe, the purchase of the vehicle, to the sale of property to Jignesh Soni, which he claimed was owned by Mr. Lusambo’s sister-in-law.

The State, however, contended that both the K880,000, representing the sale price of the land unlawfully acquired as discussed under ground one, and the Range Rover were inextricably linked to the corrupt acquisition of the land. This connection, the State argued, was sufficient to meet the legal definition of property reasonably suspected to be proceeds of crime. Mr. Lusambo’s efforts to dissociate himself from these transactions, the State emphasised, were unsupported by any credible evidence, and the trial court had correctly inferred his possession and use of the funds for personal gain.

In relation to grounds three, four, and six, the Appellant stated that the trial court had erred in convicting him of tax evasion, claiming the convictions were against the weight of the evidence.

The State, however, maintained that Mr. Lusambo had willfully evaded property transfer tax on three distinct properties. These included S/D B of Farm No. 288a, Lusaka, on which $7,500 was unpaid; Lot No. 19884/M, Lusaka, with $4,250 evaded, where the sale had been falsely represented as conducted by Apache Trading Limited; and MASAI/LN-1003028/218, Masaiti, for which K7,500 remained unpaid.

The State’s position on these grounds was that Mr. Lusambo had deliberately structured the sales to avoid tax liabilities and had failed to provide any credible evidence to explain the transactions. This conduct, the Court concluded, demonstrated a clear and willful intent to evade his tax obligations.

In ground five, the Appellant argued that the trial court got it wrong in law and fact by analysing the evidence in an unbalanced manner.

In opposing this ground, the State submitted that the trial court had properly and impartially assessed the evidence before reaching its conclusions. Counsel for the Respondent argued that to sustain a conviction for possession of property reasonably suspected to be proceeds of crime, it was necessary to prove that the accused possessed the property and that there were articulable facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion that it was derived from criminal conduct.

The State emphasised that possession was not in dispute, as the Appellant admitted purchasing properties identified and marked in court and directing that they be registered in his wife’s name. The central issue was the source of the funds. The Appellant failed to provide a credible, logical or verifiable explanation for the substantial cash and dollar payments used to acquire the properties, and the documents he relied upon did not constitute proof of payment.

The State, therefore, maintained that the trial court’s findings were grounded in objective evidence and established legal principles. The Court agreed with this argument, holding that the evidence had been analysed in a balanced and legally sound manner.

Verdict

All six grounds of appeal were dismissed. Mr. Lusambo’s convictions and sentences remain intact, reinforcing the judiciary’s commitment to holding public officials accountable for corruption, abuse of office, and financial crimes.

This judgment sends a strong signal that no one is above the law, and that attempts to manipulate public office for personal gain will be met with the full force of justice.


Justice. Integrity. Accountability.
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12/02/2026

The People v Constance Nalishebo Muleabai (SC/FC/02/25) [2026] ZMSUB 1 (2 February 2026)
Criminal Law - credibility of evidence - the prosecution bears the burden of proving every element of an offence.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused corruptly received K180,000 as gratification for facilitating remission of property rates and whether inconsistencies in the evidence created reasonable doubt.

The Court held that material inconsistencies in prosecution evidence such as amounts, circumstances, and purpose of alleged gratification are substantial and if not proved, they undermine the credibility of the prosecution’s case.
The Court found contradictions on key facts of the evidence and thus resolved doubt in favour of the accused. The accused was found not guilty of the offence of Corrupt Practices with a Private Body, contrary to Section 20(1), read together with Section 41, of the Anti-Corruption Act No. 3 of 2012. The accused was acquitted.
Full judgment: eng@2026-02-02" rel="ugc" target="_blank">https://zambialii.org/akn/zm/judgment/zmsub/2026/1/eng@2026-02-02

22/01/2026

Tresford Chali v The Judicial Complaints Commission and Ors (2024/CCZ/0019) [2026] ZMCC 1 (20 January 2026)
Removal of Judges -Judicial Complaints Commission (JCC) Proceedings-Whether the Constitutional Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine a challenge to the proceedings or findings of the JCC, or whether such a challenge is subject to judicial review and therefore within the jurisdiction of the High Court.
The Constitutional Court held that its jurisdiction is limited to constitutional interpretation or violation of the Constitution. Challenges to the actions of the JCC are administrative actions by an administrative body and therefore subject to judicial review in the High Court. The court dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction.
Full Judgment: eng@2026-01-20" rel="ugc" target="_blank">https://zambialii.org/akn/zm/judgment/zmcc/2026/1/eng@2026-01-20

18/12/2025

Land Law Insight
Actual and Constructive Notice: Presence of a Tenant

Ombera was a sitting tenant of Plot No. 4483, Katima Mulilo Road, Kalundu, Lusaka, and had formally applied to purchase the house from Lusaka City Council. While her application was pending, the Council offered the same house to Tavunji, who accepted the offer and claimed to be a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.

At the time of the purported sale, Ombera was in open and continuous occupation of the house. Tavunji, however, failed to visit the property or make inquiries regarding the tenant’s rights before proceeding with the purchase, and later demanded vacant possession, prompting eviction attempts.

The Supreme Court held that although equitable interests generally do not bind a bona fide purchaser without notice, the presence of a tenant in occupation constitutes constructive notice. A prudent purchaser must inquire into the nature of such occupation. Relying on Nawakwi v Lusaka City Council and Another, Appeal No. 26 of 2001 [unreported] (S.C.), the Court emphasized that purchasing land “cannot be taken as casually as purchasing household goods.”

Tavunji was therefore not equity’s darling, as she had constructive notice of Ombera’s equitable interest and failed to exercise due diligence. She was bound by that interest.

Key Takeaway:
Open occupation by a tenant is constructive notice; failure to inquire defeats a claim to be a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.

Disclaimer⚠️
This scenario is fictional and for educational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice.

15/12/2025

Criminal Law Insight
Protecting Our Boys: A Case of Trust Betrayed

In a quiet neighborhood of Lusaka, Mr. and Mrs. Bandaniwa were both dedicated professionals. With busy schedules, they hired a live-in housemaid, Deepsource, to care for their home and their 15-year-old son, BigN'gono. Deepsource was warm, helpful, and seemed dependable. The Bandaniwas trusted her completely.

One week, Mrs. Bandaniwa had to travel urgently to care for her ailing mother in Livingstone. Mr. Bandaniwa was also away on a work assignment. Deepsource was left alone with BigN'gono for three days.

When Mrs. Bandaniwa returned, she noticed BigN'gono was unusually quiet and withdrawn. After gentle questioning, BigN'gono tearfully revealed that Deepsource had come into his room at night, touched him inappropriately, and threatened him not to tell anyone. Shocked and heartbroken, Mrs. Bandaniwa immediately reported the matter to the police.

BigN'gono was taken to the hospital for examination. The medical report showed signs of physical trauma and, devastatingly, he tested positive for a sexually transmitted infection. When Deepsource was examined, she was found to have the same infection. During police questioning, Deepsource initially confessed but later claimed BigN'gono had “initiated the act.”

The State charged Deepsource with Defilement of a Child, contrary to Section 138(1) of the Penal Code of Zambia. At trial, medical evidence and Deepsource’s own earlier confession were presented. Despite her attempt to shift blame onto the child, the court found the evidence overwhelming. The judge emphasised that a child cannot consent to sexual activity, and the abuse was a severe breach of trust.

Relying on the judgement of the Supreme Court of Ndhlovu v People (Appeal 124 of 2011) [2015] ZMSC 72, Deepsource was convicted and sentenced her to a 25 years term of imprisonment by the High Court. On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and even commented on the gravity of the offence, highlighting that boys, like girls, are vulnerable to sexual abuse and deserve equal protection under the law. The court stated that caregivers, especially those in positions of trust, who exploit children will face severe penalties.

Key Takeaway:
*Boys are equally vulnerable and deserve the same legal protection as girls. The law does not tolerate the abuse of minors, especially by those entrusted with their care.
*The Constitutional Court in the case of The People v John Sinkamba and Ors (2025/CCZ/R001) [2025] ZMCC 14 defines a child as any person below the age of eighteen years.

Disclaimer:
This story is a fictional scenario created for educational purposes only. It is intended to raise awareness about child protection laws in Zambia and is not legal advice. If you or someone you know is affected by similar issues, please contact the police, a social welfare officer, or a qualified legal practitioner for assistance.

10/12/2025

Criminal Law Insight

Kris K, a 32-year-old resident of Kanyama, lived with his wife, who had recently undergone a difficult medical procedure. She was bedridden and experiencing heavy post-operative bleeding. As a result, she urgently needed sanitary towels—an item Kris could not afford because he had been unemployed for months. Desperate and emotionally overwhelmed, Kris walked into Coperite Shopping centre on Cairo Road. After failing to secure help from anyone, he took a pack of sanitary towels worth K28 and attempted to leave without paying. He was stopped by store security and later charged with theft contrary to section 272 of the Penal Code.

When his case came before the Subordinate Court, Kris did not waste time. He immediately pleaded guilty, explaining that the offence arose out of desperation to care for his sick wife. He told the court this was his first offence and asked for forgiveness. However, the magistrate took a strict view. Citing the need for deterrence, the court sentenced Kris to the maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment with hard labour, despite his guilty plea, remorse, and humanitarian motive.

Kris appealed to the High Court, arguing that the sentence was harsh and excessive for a first offender who acted out of necessity.

The appellate court agreed. Referring to the reasoning in Simbeye v The People (2018) ZMSC 28, where the Supreme Court held that first offenders who plead guilty should receive genuine lenience unless aggravating factors exist, the judge ruled that the maximum sentence “comes with a sense of shock.” The court emphasised that deterrence cannot override fairness, proportionality, or compassion—especially in cases involving low-value items and offenders driven by genuine human need. The High Court substituted the sentence with a wholly suspended three-month term, allowing Kris to return home and care for his recovering wife.

Key takeaways:
-First offenders who plead guilty are generally entitled to leniency, not maximum punishment.
-Courts must consider humanitarian motives, low-value items, and personal circumstances when passing sentence.
-The principle of deterrence should never override proportionality or justice, especially where the offender acts out of desperation.

Disclaimer: This content is for educational purposes and does not constitute legal advice. For legal advice, consult a qualified lawyer.

10/12/2025

Contract/Commercial Law Insight

Celzi, a successful entrepreneur in Lusaka known for his luxury lifestyle, faced a sudden family crisis when his younger sister called about a legal dispute threatening their family home. Desperate for immediate funds, he approached White Book Loan Ltd, a reputable lending institution. The company offered him a loan of $100,000, but required valuable collateral. Celzi pledged his Rolls Royce Phantom, valued at $500,000. The loan agreement was signed quickly. While it outlined repayment terms and collateral, it also stated that the company could “take possession of the car in case of default.” Celzi believed he was entering a standard loan contract and left with the funds to resolve the family emergency.

Months later, Celzi’s business ran into difficulties, and he defaulted on the loan. White Book Loan Ltd seized the Rolls Royce and shockingly re-registered it as their property, treating the collateral as if it had been sold. Feeling wronged, Celzi took the matter to court.

The court, relying on the Supreme Court judgement of Kasempa v New Future Financial Co SCZ/08/23/2023 (eng@2025-01-10)" rel="ugc" target="_blank">https://zambialii.org/akn/zm/judgment/zmsc/2025/3/eng@2025-01-10) held that:

-A loan remains a loan; pledging collateral does not transfer ownership.
-Any attempt to disguise a loan as a sale to bypass borrower protections is void.
-Celzi’s Rolls Royce remained his property; the lender could only claim repayment of the $100,000 plus interest.
The lender’s attempt to re-register the car was invalid, and ownership had to be restored to Celzi.
Key Takeaway: Collateral secures repayment but does not confer ownership. Lenders cannot use creative drafting to convert a loan into a sale, and borrowers are legally protected from disguised appropriation.

Disclaimer: This scenario is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. Always seek guidance from a qualified legal professional regarding loans and collateral arrangements.

29/11/2025

29/11/2025

HIGH COURT BAIL SETS STAGE FOR DEFINING SHOWDOWN ON CORRUPTION LAW AND PROSECUTORIAL AUTHORITY

Lusaka | November, 28, 2025 - A three‑judge panel of the High Court’s Economic & Financial Crimes Division has granted bail to former senior government official Fredson Kango Yamba, a move that transforms this case into a high‑stakes legal case that could redefine how Zambia prosecutes complex corruption offences.

Yamba, convicted on September 3, 2025 and sentenced to three years imprisonment with hard labour, was released on bail after the court isolated what it termed a “novel point of law of public importance.” That designation has effectively elevated the matter from an ordinary appeal to a test case with national implications.

The hearing exposed a sharp division in legal interpretation, driven largely by the defence’s attempt to anchour the appeal on a meticulously technical reading of the charge sheet.

Counsel for Yamba argued that because Count 1 listed several provisions of the Public Finance Management Act, specifically Sections 5, 7, 11(1), 20, 22, 23, 30 and 78, the prosecution was OBLIGATED to establish a breach of every single one for the conviction to stand.
He maintained:
“The law is set out in Count 1 of the Particulars of the Offence which alleged that Fredson Kango Yamba had breached Sections 5, 7, 11 (1) 20, 22, 23, 30 and 78 of the Public Finance Management Act. What was the actus reus (the criminal act) is the allegation that he had breached all these Sections and if they are all in one Count, they all have to be proved which the Prosecution failed to do.”

Elevating the critique further, he contended that the trial court had leaned on a non-existent holding from Miller v Minister of Pensions:
“The Appellant was convicted on the strength of a purported holding which does not exist,” he submitted.

It was a strategy designed to shift focus away from the substance of the conduct and onto the mechanical structure of the charge, an approach not uncommon in appeals involving financial-crime convictions.

The National Prosecution Authority, through Deputy Chief State Advocate Mercy Pondamali-Lungu, head of the General and Appeals Department of the NPA delivered a counter-argument rooted in legal coherence, prosecutorial consistency, and a wider understanding of how criminal liability is structured.

Her position was crisp and grounded:
“The elements the Prosecution were supposed to establish were those of the offence the Accused was charged with, and it was not correct to state that the Sections which were indicated in the particulars of offence were the elements of the offence.”

To drive the point home, she offered a practical illustration that resonated in the courtroom:
“If the Prosecution does not prove that a laptop was stolen, that cannot be a ground for acquitting a person charged with the offence of Aggravated Robbery.”
Her argument reminded the court that the heart of criminal prosecution is the essence of the offence not the inventory of referenced statutes. In doing so, she not only defended the conviction but championed a legal principle that protects corruption cases from collapsing under mechanical technicalities.

Although the court ultimately granted bail, against the NPA’s objection, the decision ushers the real contest into the appellate arena. There, the judiciary will have an opportunity to deliver an authoritative interpretation on a key question:
Must prosecutors prove each statutory reference listed in the particulars, or must they prove the actual offence alleged?

The NPA has consistently taken the latter view, anchored in both logic and precedent. The High Court’s decision to classify the issue as “novel” now gives the Authority the platform to secure a definitive ruling from a higher bench, one that will guide future prosecutions of sophisticated financial misconduct.

If upheld, the NPA’s interpretation will reinforce a prosecutorial framework that values substance over form, ensuring corruption cases cannot be derailed by technical overreach.

The High Court granted bail to Yamba in his own recognizance of K500,000, backed by two working sureties from the Civil or Public Service in like sum and manner.

For its part, the National Prosecution Authority has reiterated its full respect for the judicial process and its readiness to vigorously defend the legal standards applied at trial. This case, now positioned as a potential precedent-setter, highlights not only the evolving nature of Zambia’s legal system but also the NPA’s critical role in shaping a principled, resilient anti-corruption framework.

In the months ahead, this appeal will likely become a reference point for legal practitioners, scholars, and policymakers interested in the future of corruption law and the prosecutorial integrity that underpins it.