Utah Family Law, LC

09/14/2026

When “Erring on the Side of Caution” Becomes a Substitute for Proof

There is a powerful argument for caution in family court, and it deserves to be taken seriously. When a judge or commissioner is confronted with an allegation that a parent poses a danger to a child, the consequences of underreacting can be terrible. If the allegation turns out to be true, an erroneous decision to allow unrestricted contact could expose a child to harm that cannot simply be undone later.

That asymmetry helps explain why courts sometimes say, expressly or implicitly, that they will “err on the side of caution.” In some procedural settings, the law itself permits precautionary action before the facts can be fully tested. Utah Code § 78B-7-603(1)(a), for example, permits a court to issue an ex parte cohabitant abuse protective order without notice when it appears from the petition that abuse or domestic violence has occurred or is substantially likely to occur. The statute deliberately distinguishes that emergency procedure from a protective order issued “upon notice” and “after a hearing.”

The problem arises when emergency caution survives into the adjudicative stage and quietly substitutes for the burden of proof.

That problem is particularly important in child custody disputes. Utah Code § 81-9-204(2) provides that a court determines whether a custody or parent-time order is in the child's best interests by a preponderance of the evidence. Even more pointedly, subsection (11) provides that, absent a showing by a preponderance of real harm or substantiated potential harm, frequent, meaningful, and continuing access to each parent is presumed to be in the child's best interest.

That is not merely a preference for careful judging. It tells the court what to do when uncertainty remains.

Consider a simple example. A child has a bruise on his arm after a parent-time exchange. Mother says Father became angry, grabbed the child hard, and caused it. Father says the child stumbled off a curb and he caught him by the arm to keep him from falling. Both stories are plausible, and neither witness is obviously lying.

Now suppose the child's school nurse photographed the same bruise that morning, before the exchange occurred. The apparent choice between Story A and Story B was false. Neither explanation caused the bruise.

Litigation tends to make reality look binary: petitioner or respondent, accusation or denial, abuse or fabrication. Real life is not obliged to conform to those choices. There may be a third explanation, or several, and sometimes neither party understands exactly what happened.

That is why a credibility determination is not quite the same thing as applying the burden of proof. A judge may reasonably distrust one witness without thereby proving the opposing witness's account. Disbelieving Father's explanation does not, by itself, establish Mother's allegation by a preponderance.

The preponderance standard does not demand certainty. If the court concludes that a proposition is more likely true than not, the burden has been met even though reasonable doubt remains. But if the court genuinely cannot determine which account is more likely, the party bearing the burden has not prevailed. The burden of proof is, among other things, a rule for allocating the consequence of unresolved uncertainty.

That is where “better safe than sorry” becomes dangerous as a judicial principle. Suppose the court says, “I cannot tell whether this parent actually presents the alleged danger, but I do not want to take the chance, so I will impose supervised parent-time.” The court has then converted uncertainty into evidence against the restricted parent.

The burden has effectively shifted. Instead of requiring the proponent of the restriction to establish the danger the law requires, the responding parent must demonstrate that the danger does not exist. In many cases, that amounts to requiring someone to prove a negative.

The stakes make that especially troubling. The Supreme Court has described the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children as “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests” it recognizes. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). That does not make parental rights absolute, and it certainly does not disable courts from protecting children. It means serious interference with the parent-child relationship deserves serious fact-finding rather than speculation dressed up as caution.

Nor should the word “temporary” make us complacent. Six months of severely restricted parent-time is six months of childhood, six months of stigma, and temporary arrangements have an inconvenient habit of becoming the status quo from which later decisions are made.

A useful discipline for lawyers and judges alike is what I call the third-story test. When the parties present two incompatible accounts, ask whether there is another reasonable explanation and, more importantly, what evidence actually distinguishes among them. That does not prevent credibility findings; it makes them more rigorous.

Utah appellate law likewise requires findings adequate to disclose the reasoning that connects the evidence to the ultimate decision. See Shuman v. Shuman, 2017 UT App 192. A restriction should therefore rest on findings showing why the evidence satisfies the governing legal standard, not merely on the observation that the court remains concerned.

Courts cannot eliminate all risk. Underprotection can harm children, but unnecessary restrictions on a safe and loving parent can harm children too. The law does not ask judges and commissioners to pretend those risks do not exist; it gives them burdens and standards of proof precisely because certainty often does not exist.

When the evidence establishes danger, courts should act. When it establishes real or substantiated potential harm by the required standard, Utah law authorizes the consequences that follow. But when the court is left saying, “I simply cannot tell which story is true,” that uncertainty cannot itself supply the missing proof.

“Better safe than sorry” may be excellent advice for deciding whether to carry an umbrella. It is not a substitute for a burden of proof.

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

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09/13/2026

Marital vs. Separate Property: Who Keeps the Gifts You Received During Marriage?

Are gifts received during marriage yours to keep after a Utah divorce? Not necessarily. This video explains how Utah courts distinguish between separate and marital property, why the donor's intent matters, and how commingling, transmutation, tracing, and documentation can determine who ultimately keeps a gifted asset. Learn why a strong paper trail often carries more weight than conflicting memories.

09/12/2026

The Weaponization of Victimhood: A Candid Look at the Inexcusable Bias in Family Courts

Can family courts remain fair if victimhood is presumed instead of proven? This video examines how gender-based assumptions can influence domestic abuse allegations in divorce and child custody cases, why prior statements and conduct matter, and why every claim—whether made by a husband or a wife—should be evaluated under the same evidentiary standard. Justice requires protecting genuine victims while ensuring that accusations are tested by evidence, not stereotypes.

09/11/2026

If a PGAL Can Interview a Child, So Can a Judge or Commissioner

Utah Courts Should Stop Paying an Intermediary to Tell the Factfinder What the Factfinder Can Hear Directly

When a child's wishes, concerns, experiences, or perceptions matter in a Utah child custody dispute, courts often act as though appointing a private attorney guardian ad litem (PGAL) is somehow safer, wiser, or more sophisticated than having the judge or commissioner speak directly with the child. That premise deserves more skepticism than it gets.

A PGAL is a lawyer, not a psychologist by virtue of the appointment, and not a custody evaluator (the Utah Office of Guardian ad Litem itself says so expressly), not even a witness (expert or otherwise). The current PGAL program requires scant and basic training. If (if) that training is needed to make a PGAL competent to interview a child, there's an obvious fix available to judges and commissioners too: give them the same training, and then compare the two methods honestly.

One method has a lawyer allegedly interview the child privately (hence, the interview will always be “alleged” because it’s private and thus unverifiable) and later tell the judge what the lawyer believes the child said, meant, wanted, or needed. The other method has the actual decision-maker speak with the child directly, ask follow-up questions in real time, hear the child's own words, preserve the exchange on the record, and decide for himself or herself what weight it deserves. For the purpose of learning what a child actually thinks, knows, fears, wants, and has experienced, the second method isn't just less expensive and less time-consuming. It's better by every meaningful measure.

None of this means PGALs have no legitimate role; investigation and advocacy are different functions. The point is that when the court needs to know what a child actually thinks or wants, inserting a lawyer between the child and the factfinder usually makes the information worse, not better.

The Supposed Expertise Gap Is Thinner Than It Looks

A stock objection to judicial interviews of children is that judges aren't specially trained child interviewers. I submit that’s not true. But if a lack of training is the defect, then train the judges. Utah doesn't impose anything close to a clinical degree requirement on PGALs. Applicants need Bar membership, recommendations, background checks, and practice-based PGAL training, but nothing approaching a mental-health credential. The training is minimal and nothing that a judge or commissioner could not competently obtain by a few hours of self-study.

So training itself isn't the problem. What makes no sense is treating a relatively short training program as though it transforms one lawyer into someone uniquely capable of speaking with children, while treating judges and commissioners as permanently incapable of learning the same skills. Judges and commissioners already spend their careers questioning people: assessing confusing accounts, asking follow-up questions, separating firsthand knowledge from assumption, dealing with frightened, angry, traumatized, immature, evasive, or unsophisticated witnesses, age-appropriate questioning, avoiding suggestive questions, asking neutral follow-ups. Utah also already requires judicial education on child abuse, domestic abuse, trauma, and coercive control in custody proceedings. No reasonable person can maintain that judges and commissioners, by virtue of holding judicial office, are somehow incapable of interviewing children competently.

But if there are additional techniques that don’t already get enough attention and are worth teaching, then go ahead and teach those to judges too, if they don’t already know them. It's hard to maintain with a straight face that judges and commissioners can't acquire the same competence as a PGAL in the same or similar way that a PGAL does.

Compare the Two Interview Methods

Here's the comparison that ought to happen before a court appoints another intermediary just because someone says the court needs to "hear the child's voice."

Issue -- PGAL interview -- Recorded in-camera judicial interview -- Better method for hearing the child

Who actually hears the child? -- An intermediary -- The person who will decide the case -- Judicial interview

Transmission of the child's words -- PGAL allegedly hears them, interprets them, then reports or argues about them -- Judge hears the child's actual words (and on the record, so we know it to be true) -- Judicial interview

Risk of information loss -- Question, answer, tone, qualification, context, and uncertainty may be compressed into the PGAL's later account -- Original exchange is preserved for the record -- Judicial interview

Immediate follow-up questions -- PGAL decides what follow-up to ask; judge cannot react to the child's answer at the time -- Factfinder can follow up immediately -- Judicial interview

Ability to distinguish knowledge from assumption -- Judge receives the PGAL's characterization after the fact -- Judge can ask, "Did you see that?" "Who told you that?" "What happened next?" “What do you want, and why?” -- Judicial interview

Child's own wishes versus somebody else's view of them -- PGAL represents "best interests," which can differ from what the child wants -- Judge hears what the child wants and separately determines best interests -- Judicial interview

Accurate appellate record -- PGAL's private interview itself ordinarily is not the court record -- Interview recorded verbatim -- Judicial interview

Cost to parents -- PGAL fees and related expenses are assessed against the parties -- No additional privately billed professional is necessary -- Judicial interview

Delay -- Appointment, assignment, interviews, document collection, conferences, and later reporting can take weeks at best, and usually takes months -- Court can schedule a limited interview directly much faster -- Judicial interview

Risk of intermediary influence -- Child knows the PGAL has his/her own opinions and an ongoing role in the litigation -- Interview occurs with the neutral factfinder, and on the record -- Judicial interview

Decision-making authority -- PGAL recommends; PGAL does not decide -- Judge receives information and decides -- Judicial interview

Need to translate the child's meaning for the court -- Built into the process -- Usually unnecessary—the court itself heard it directly and unfiltered, unparsed -- Judicial interview

Interviewing training -- PGAL training is minimal, basic, and takes but hours to complete. -- Give judges and commissioners equivalent training, if they need it at all. -- Tie at best—and therefore no justification for the intermediary

Custody-evaluation expertise -- PGAL expressly is not a qualified custody evaluator merely by being a PGAL -- Judge is not pretending to be an evaluator; judge is gathering information relevant to adjudication -- Judicial interview avoids the false-expert problem

For the specific task of conveying a child's own information to the person who must decide the case, adding a PGAL generally adds distance, cost, delay, interpretation, and information loss. It's worth asking plainly what that buys in return.

Utah Law Already Recognizes Direct Judicial Inquiry

Utah law doesn't treat a judicial interview as some foreign practice. Utah Code § 81-9-204 expressly recognizes a child's stated wishes and concerns as relevant to custody, authorizes the court to inquire into a child's desires concerning future custody and parent-time, and requires such interviews to be conducted in camera. A child's wishes aren't controlling, and the wishes of a child age fourteen or older get added weight without becoming dispositive.

But framing the child purely as a preference-witness undersells what's actually at stake. A child old enough to be interviewed is frequently one of the most percipient witnesses available to the family's actual history and dynamics—who was present for what, how each parent behaves day to day, what the household environment is actually like. The child also has the largest personal stake in the outcome of any party in the case, and no one else's. Treating that person as someone whose voice is worth hearing only through a lawyer's secondhand summary, when the child is capable of competently communicating for herself, isn't merely cautious. It's genuinely hard to defend.

That doesn't mean the interview should turn into a fact-finding session on contested allegations against a parent—a child's account of disputed conduct, offered without the accused parent present to test it, raises real due-process problems, and nothing here argues around those. The point is narrower and doesn't need to be stretched that far: on the question the interview is already lawfully authorized to ask—what does this child think, want, and perceive about custody and parent-time—there's no good reason to let a PGAL stand between a competent child and the person deciding children’s futures.

The PGAL Has a Built-In Translation Problem

Utah's PGAL statute illustrates the problem well. A PGAL must personally meet with and interview the child when appropriate and, to the extent possible, determine the child's “intent and desires” (Utah Code § 78A-2-705) regarding custody or parent-time—but that same PGAL is also charged with representing what the PGAL determines to be the child's best interests. Utah law expressly contemplates that the child's own wishes may differ from the PGAL's best-interest determination, and when that happens, the PGAL generally communicates both to the court, subject to statutory limitations.

That means the PGAL is performing at least three different mental operations: what did the child actually say, what does the PGAL think the child really means or wants, and what does the PGAL believe is nevertheless in the child's best interest. Those are different questions, but in practice they can (and obviously do) blur together. A judicial interview helps keep them separate—the judge can hear the answer to the first question directly, while the PGAL, the parents, the lawyers, and properly qualified experts (if needed, and experts rarely are, but I digress) can help the court work through the third. There's no good reason to degrade the first question by routing it through the second before it ever reaches the court.

And a PGAL Is Not a Custody Evaluator

This point deserves emphasis, because family-law practice has a habit of conferring quasi-expert status on anyone with a specialized title. The Utah Office of Guardian ad Litem's own PGAL page states, in capital letters, that a PGAL does not meet the qualifications to act as or be appointed as a custody evaluator; Utah's custody-evaluation rule imposes separate professional qualifications and training requirements. (Utah Office of Guardian ad Litem - PGAL)

That distinction should be taken seriously. Courts shouldn't treat PGAL recommendations as though the PGAL has some special ability to discern truth, detect manipulation, diagnose family dynamics, or determine what parenting arrangement will produce the best developmental outcome. A lawyer can investigate, advocate, make arguments, and interview a child—but if interviewing a child is the qualification that supposedly makes the PGAL indispensable, that's circular. Judges (and regular old attorneys) can interview children too.

What About Coaching?

Another common response is that children may be coached. They may. So may adults—witnesses of all kinds may misunderstand, exaggerate, minimize, repeat things they were told, align themselves with someone they love, or form inaccurate conclusions. And appointing a PGAL does not prevent or even mitigate coaching. Coaching possibilities argue for careful questioning, not for refusing to speak with the witness at all. Direct questioning can be especially useful precisely when coaching is suspected: a judge can ask what happened, where the child was, who else was there, whether the child saw it directly or was told about it, when the child first heard it, what made the child feel a certain way, and whether anyone has talked with the child about what to say in the interview.

None of those questions magically detects coaching—no interviewer has that power. But direct inquiry preserves opportunities for clarification that get lost when the court receives only someone else's summary. If anything, concerns about coaching argue for careful firsthand inquiry, not for adding another intermediary to the process.

There Are Things a PGAL Can Do That a Judge Cannot

This is where intellectual honesty matters. A PGAL has legitimate functions that an in-camera interview can't replace. Utah law directs a PGAL to conduct an independent investigation, interview witnesses, review medical, psychological, and school records, attend proceedings, present evidence where necessary, identify resources, and advocate for the child's best interests. A judge obviously shouldn't become an investigator or an advocate, so where a case genuinely requires an independent lawyer to investigate collateral information or provide the child with ongoing representation, a PGAL can serve those real functions.

But that proves something narrower than it might sound like it proves. It shows a PGAL may sometimes be needed for investigation or advocacy—not that a PGAL is a better vehicle than the judge for communicating the child's own words to the judge. Those are different propositions, and the practice of family law tends to run them together.

The Cost Difference Is Not Trivial

A judicial interview isn't literally free—judges are paid, courtrooms cost money, and so do recording systems. But those costs already exist regardless of how a given case is handled. The relevant question for litigants is whether the court needs to bring in another professional whose fees may then be assessed against the parents. Utah law specifically contemplates assessing PGAL fees, court costs, paralegal costs, staff costs, and volunteer expenses against the parties, subject to indigency and other provisions.

So when the actual need is simply "we need to know what this fifteen-year-old thinks and why," the first response doesn't have to be "appoint another lawyer." A judge or commissioner can speak with the child privately, record it, let the lawyers propose appropriate areas of inquiry, protect the record from public dissemination, and then let the judge judge. That can take forty-five minutes. The alternative can (and almost always does) take months and cost thousands of dollars.

There Is an Accountability Difference Too

A sound-and-visual recorded judicial interview leaves an unusually clean trail. We can know exactly what the judge asked, exactly what the child answered, whether questions were leading, whether qualifications were ignored, whether the child claimed firsthand knowledge, whether the judge fairly characterized the child's statements afterward, and whether the information actually supports the eventual findings. That's accountability.

It also captures more than the bare transcript would. Tone of voice, pacing, hesitation, whether a question needed to be repeated or rephrased, whether the child sounded coached or rehearsed versus spontaneous—a sound-and-visual recording preserves the texture of the exchange, not just its words. A cold transcript can flatten all of that into something that reads far more confident or far more uncertain than the interview actually was.

It also captures more than the bare transcript would—tones of voices, seating and body language, who else was in the room, whether the child seemed at ease or on guard. A cold transcript can flatten all of that into something that reads far more confident or far more uncertain than the interview actually was.

By contrast, when the important conversation happens privately between a PGAL and a child, the court typically receives the output of that conversation without a verbatim record of the input. Utah law now requires a PGAL who makes a best-interest recommendation at a hearing to disclose the factors forming the basis for the recommendation, which is an improvement—but "here are the factors I relied on" isn't the same as "here is exactly what I asked, and here is exactly what the child said." Courts should prefer the latter whenever it's practicable.

Conclusion

Family law has a bad habit of turning ordinary human tasks into specialties, and talking with children is one of them. Children aren't miniature adults—their age and maturity matter, questions should be age-appropriate, leading and coercive questioning should be avoided, and a frightened or conflicted child should be handled carefully. None of that establishes that a lawyer who attends PGAL training has some aptitude unavailable to a judge. If a few hours of additional training genuinely improves judicial interviews, Utah should require it of every domestic-relations judge and commissioner; the expense would be small compared to the accumulated cost of appointing PGALs year after year on the assumption that courts can't safely speak with children themselves. Utah has no shortage of practitioners and CLE providers who could deliver that training at minimal cost — this isn't a budget problem dressed up as a competence problem.

The unexamined assumption worth testing isn't whether PGALs should exist—there are cases where a child genuinely needs independent legal representation. It's the assumption that appointing a PGAL is inherently superior to direct judicial communication whenever a child's voice matters. Measured against the questions that actually count—who gets the child's actual words, who avoids an extra layer of interpretation, who can follow up immediately, who produces the cleanest record, who costs the parents less, who avoids turning an ordinary lawyer into a quasi-expert by title alone, and who leaves the decision where our system says it belongs—the PGAL doesn't come out ahead of a recorded in-camera judicial interview.

If the legitimate objection is training, train the judges. If the objection is child protection, structure the interview properly. If the objection is coaching, ask careful questions. If the objection is appellate review, record it. If a case separately requires investigation or a true advocate for the child, appoint one for that reason. But courts shouldn't spend parents' money inserting a human relay station between a child and the person whose job it is to decide the case. Sometimes the best way to hear a child's voice is the obvious one: hear the child.

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

Expert divorce lawyers in Utah. Simplify your divorce with clear, legal advice from the experts with Utah Family Law LC. Book your consultation today!

09/10/2026

2026 UT App 131

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CHARLES DAHL,

Appellee,

v.

KIM DAHL,

Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20240740-CA

Filed August 27, 2026

Fourth District Court, Provo Department

The Honorable Robert A. Lund

No. 064402232

Steve S. Christensen and Clinton R. Brimhall,

Attorneys for Appellant

Rosemond G. Blakelock and Megan P. Blakelock,

Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE JOHN D. LUTHY authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES RYAN M. HARRIS and AMY J. OLIVER concurred.

LUTHY, Judge:

¶1 Charles Dahl and Kim Dahl divorced in 2010. At the time of the divorce, the marital home and some other marital assets were held in a trust. But the trust was not joined as a party in the divorce action. Because the trust was not a party, the divorce court lacked authority to adjudicate the Dahls’ respective rights in the trust’s assets, and the court therefore did not consider those assets in distributing the marital estate. Instead, issues regarding the trust were litigated in a separate action, which concluded with the district court ruling on summary judgment that Ms. Dahl[1] had no enforceable interest in the trust’s assets.

¶2 Ms. Dahl appealed both the divorce decree and the summary judgment order from the trust litigation to this court. We certified the two appeals to the Utah Supreme Court, which consolidated the two cases “for the purposes of appeal and remand” and held that Ms. Dahl retained an enforceable interest in the marital property held by the trust. Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶¶ 1, 8, 11, 37, 459 P.3d 276. Accordingly, the supreme court reversed the grant of summary judgment in the trust litigation and remanded the consolidated case to the district court that handled the divorce case, instructing the court to “determine what property contained in the [t]rust [was] properly characterized as marital property and either credit Ms. Dahl with an offset equal to the value of that property or allow Ms. Dahl to withdraw her share of the property.” Id. ¶ 212.

¶3 On remand, the district court made determinations as to which of the assets in the trust were properly characterized as marital property, valued the relevant portion of that property as of the date of the divorce decree, and distributed the marital property that had been held in the trust. The court also distributed funds that had been deposited with the court—following remand—after the sale of certain marital property that had not been held in the trust. Ms. Dahl now appeals a number of the court’s rulings associated with the foregoing distributions. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.



BACKGROUND

The Marriage, the Trust, and the Relevant Assets

¶4 The Dahls married in 1992 and remained married for nearly eighteen years. Prior to the marriage, Dr. Dahl had “accumulated substantial assets” that “included stocks, mutual funds, and insurance policies, totaling $356,201.” During the marriage, Dr. Dahl and his brother established the Dahl Family Irrevocable Trust (the Trust). Ms. Dahl “had nothing to do with the preparation of the Trust agreement and did not sign the Trust or any related documents,” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 37, 459 P.3d 276 (cleaned up), but she “conveyed her interest in the couple’s marital home to the Trust via a warranty deed,” id. ¶ 27. Dr. Dahl conveyed his interest in the marital home to the Trust as well. In addition to the marital home, the Trust held “an investment account at Fidelity called ‘Marlette’” (the Marlette account). The Marlette account contained both marital assets and Dr. Dahl’s premarital assets. During the marriage, the parties also acquired marital assets that were not placed in the Trust, including (as relevant here) two parcels of investment property known as Pheasant Run.

The Divorce Proceedings

¶5 In 2006, Dr. Dahl filed for divorce and the parties separated. “The divorce proceedings were extremely contentious,” and the “discovery process was rife with abuses on both sides, which delayed trial.” Id. ¶ 5. “[T]he divorce court conducted a bench trial over fourteen nonconsecutive days, beginning in September 2009,” id. ¶ 4, and ending in November 2009. “Despite years of pretrial proceedings in the divorce action,” Ms. Dahl’s counsel “failed to join the Trust as a defendant.” Id. ¶ 9. Instead, “just weeks before the start of the divorce trial,” id., Ms. Dahl initiated a separate lawsuit against the Trust, Dr. Dahl, Dr. Dahl’s brother, and a real estate investment company owned by Dr. Dahl (collectively, the Trust Defendants), see id. ¶ 7. “The divorce court refused to consider the Trust assets in distributing the marital estate, ruling that the eve of trial was too late to join a new party and that it could not consider Trust assets that were the subject of other pending litigation.” Id. ¶ 9. Thus, in July 2010, the divorce court issued a decree that did not address the Trust assets but otherwise distributed the marital estate. See id. ¶¶ 4, 9, 118.

¶6 In the decree, the divorce court ordered, among other things, that Pheasant Run was to “be immediately liquidated and any proceeds, or loss, divided equally between the parties.” Relatedly, the court directed that “until such time as [Pheasant Run was] sold,” Dr. Dahl was to “continue to pay the monthly payment on” Pheasant Run and that he would “be entitled to a credit against [Ms. Dahl’s] share of the proceeds for one-half of the payments he [made from the date of the court’s findings and conclusions] until such time as [Pheasant Run was] sold.” The decree also noted that the marital home and some other marital assets were part of the Trust and stated that the divorce court was issuing “no orders in regard to” the Trust.

The Trust Litigation

¶7 Meanwhile, in her action against the Trust Defendants, Ms. Dahl sought “a declaration of her rights in the Trust assets and request[ed] an accounting of the Trust’s activities and a copy of the Trust agreement.” Id. ¶ 12. Following discovery, “both [sides] moved for summary judgment,” and “[u]ltimately, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Trust Defendants.” Id. In its November 2011 order, the “district court held that the Trust was irrevocable and that Ms. Dahl had no enforceable interest in the Trust assets.” Id. ¶ 13. After the district court made this ruling, Dr. Dahl began commingling certain of his personal assets with the assets already in the Marlette account.

The Initial Appeal

¶8 Ms. Dahl appealed—to this court—both the divorce decree and the summary judgment order from the Trust litigation. Id. ¶ 8. We certified the appeals to the Utah Supreme Court, which consolidated the two cases. Id. ¶¶ 1, 8. As to the Trust litigation, the supreme court held that the Trust was “revocable under Utah law”; that Ms. Dahl was a settlor of the Trust, “regardless of the fact that she [was] not so named in the Trust agreement”; and that because she was a settlor, she could “revoke that portion of the Trust funded with either her separate or marital property.” Id. ¶¶ 16, 35–38.

¶9 Regarding the divorce case, the supreme court did “not fault the divorce court for refusing to consider the Trust assets” where Ms. Dahl had “fail[ed] to join the Trust as a defendant in the divorce action.” Id. ¶ 9. But the supreme court determined that because “[t]he Trust assets included marital property” and the divorce court lacked “the power to consider and distribute the Trust assets, the [divorce] court lacked the authority to fully and fairly distribute the marital estate.” Id. ¶ 11. Thus, the supreme court held that “the Trust should have been joined as a party to the divorce action.” Id.

¶10 The supreme court ordered a remand of the consolidated case to the divorce court with instructions that it “join the Trust as a party to the divorce action.” Id. It further ordered that “[o]n remand, the district court [was to] determine what property contained in the Trust [was] properly characterized as marital property and either credit Ms. Dahl with an offset equal to the value of that property or allow Ms. Dahl to withdraw her share of the property.” Id. ¶ 212. The supreme court remitted the consolidated case to the district court in early 2015.

The Sale of Pheasant Run

¶11 Not long after the supreme court remitted the consolidated case, the parties sold Pheasant Run. Although the divorce decree—which issued in 2010—required the “immediate[] liquidat[ion]” of Pheasant Run, and although the parties had contracted with “a qualified realtor” to facilitate a sale, the parcels making up Pheasant Run did not sell until August and November 2015, netting $1,289,575.74. “Those funds were deposited with the [district] court at the time of sale.”

The Appointment of a Special Master

¶12 In January 2017, the district court—proceeding on remand—ordered the appointment of an accounting firm to serve as a special master.[2] The special master was to “have complete and unfettered access to all financial records of [the Trust] and any records that [had] been or [were] associated with [the Trust],” and it was ordered to “report to the [c]ourt the contributions to the [T]rust, management of those assets and the current value and nature of [the Trust’s] assets.”

The Sale of the Marital Home

¶13 In the meantime, Dr. Dahl had continued to live in the marital home. But the home was sold in June 2019, netting $805,845.05. “Those funds were [also] deposited with the court at the time of sale.”

The Proceedings on Remand

¶14 In December 2019, nearly three years after its appointment, the special master produced its report. Following a hearing in October 2021, the district court determined that the report was “dissatisfactory and not helpful for ascertaining what money [was] in the [T]rust and how it should be divided.”[3] At the same time, the court granted a request by Ms. Dahl for additional discovery, with the court explaining that there was “no way to fill [the] gaps [in the special master’s report] without discovery.”

¶15 More discovery disputes then ensued, including the filing by Ms. Dahl of two statements of discovery issues. At a status hearing in May 2023, the court considered, among other things, one of Ms. Dahl’s statements of discovery issues. In response to that statement of discovery issues, the court approved an order requiring Fidelity—the entity maintaining the Marlette account—to comply with a subpoena Ms. Dahl had served upon it but with which it had thus far failed to comply. The court otherwise reserved ruling on Ms. Dahl’s statements of discovery issues and, instead, ordered the matter to proceed to an evidentiary hearing that had already been scheduled for two days in August 2023.

¶16 At the evidentiary hearing, the parties offered evidence and argument regarding (1) the outstanding issues raised by Ms. Dahl’s statements of discovery issues; (2) the marital versus nonmarital status of the Trust assets; (3) the distribution of the marital property held by the Trust, including the marital portion of the Marlette account and the proceeds of the sale of the marital home; and (4) the distribution of the proceeds of the sale of Pheasant Run. During the hearing, the court heard testimony from Dr. Dahl, Ms. Dahl, and two forensic accountants—one for each side.

¶17 Among other things, Dr. Dahl testified that his premarital assets originally included stock in several companies, that the stock in one of those companies was sold in 2000 and the stock in another was sold in 2001, and that the cash proceeds of those sales were “mixed in with all of the . . . other money in [the] Marlette [account].” When asked whether he would “be able to trace those amounts,” Dr. Dahl did not provide a definitive response, saying instead, “You could look at the dollar amount and see if it stayed the same.”

¶18 Also during Dr. Dahl’s testimony, Ms. Dahl’s counsel introduced an exhibit containing account statements that showed transfers from the Marlette account to accounts outside the Trust. In connection with that exhibit, Ms. Dahl’s counsel asked Dr. Dahl whether he remembered “making wire transfers out of [the] Marlette [account] in the summer and fall of 2009 in the amount of $31,200.” Dr. Dahl responded that he could not recall. After Ms. Dahl’s counsel drew Dr. Dahl’s attention to another transfer from the Marlette account of “about $17,000”—this one to an account number ending in 0442—Dr. Dahl said that he could not recall what the transfer was for but that it looked like it went to a mutual fund labeled “DWS Latin America.”

¶19 The forensic accountants each testified regarding a reasonable rate of return on the assets in the Marlette account between 2010 and 2023. Dr. Dahl’s expert opined that a rate of 7.23% compounded annually would be reasonable, while Ms. Dahl’s expert opined that a rate of 11% compounded annually would be reasonable.

¶20 Prior to issuing its ruling following the evidentiary hearing, the court received written closing arguments from the parties. In her closing argument, Ms. Dahl contended that Dr. Dahl had dissipated assets of the Trust, stating, “At trial, Ms. Dahl asserted that Dr. Dahl dissipated Trust assets. Dr. Dahl did not provide any adequate response or explanation. This dissipation totals $92,391.18 worth of Trust assets . . . .” Ms. Dahl asserted that the $92,391.18 total consisted of these amounts:

• “$44,844.92 [in] Wire Transfers from Fidelity 2482 to Fidelity 0442”;

• “$16,290.00 [in] Checks from Fidelity 2482 to Unidentified Recipients”; and

• “$31,289.26 in Wire Transfers from Fidelity 2481 to Unidentified Recipients.”

The District Court’s Ruling on Remand

¶21 In November 2023, the district court issued its Ruling and Order Regarding Property Distribution, which addressed the following issues.

1. Discovery

¶22 The court first addressed the outstanding issues related to Ms. Dahl’s statements of discovery issues, saying:

Regarding the history of the case at bar, the [Utah] Supreme Court noted that the “divorce proceedings were extremely contentious,” and the “discovery process was rife with abuses.” [Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 5, 459 P.3d 276.] Lamentably, contentious discovery disputes have persisted, despite the [Utah] Supreme Court’s observations. The passage of 14 years since the original trial and 9 years since the remand from the [Utah] Supreme Court [has] exacerbated the [in]ability to comply with certain discovery demands and the [in]ability of the court to manage the discovery disputes. The available records do not allow for forensic tracing of every financial transaction that occurred over a period of many years and that occurred many years ago. Therefore, the court must decide the matter based on the available records.

Before trial, Ms. Dahl filed two separate Statements of Discovery Issues. The court denied the requested relief in each instance.[[4]] In ruling on the matters, the court found that Dr. Dahl produced in discovery all the documentation that he possessed that was relevant to the proceedings. In addition to those materials, Ms. Dahl received by way of subpoena to Fidelity Investments and [the special master] a combined 13,843 pages of financial records. One of the accounts for which Ms. Dahl sought records did not belong to Dr. Dahl, rather it belonged to Fidelity, and the records corresponding to that account are not relevant to the instant proceedings. The court determine[s] that materials Ms. Dahl did receive were sufficient for her to fairly address the issues at trial. The court further determine[s] that requiring the production of any additional materials sought by Ms. Dahl would be disproportionate to the needs of the case and would be unreasonably burdensome to attempt to produce . . . .

2. The Trust Assets

¶23 The court then addressed the question of which assets in the Trust were marital property and which assets in the Trust were Dr. Dahl’s separate property. The court began by finding that “[a]t the time of divorce, the Trust held two assets: the family home . . . and [the Marlette account].” Regarding those assets, the court further determined as follows.

a. The Marlette Account

¶24 As to the Marlette account, the court noted that the divorce decree had already “established that Dr. Dahl accumulated substantial assets before the marriage,” which were held in the Trust in the Marlette account and totaled $356,201. The court found that “Dr. Dahl did not intend to commingle those assets with marital assets.”

¶25 The court then valued the Marlette account as of the date of the divorce decree. It explained:

Consistent with the [Utah] Supreme Court’s admonition, the court determine[s], to the extent possible, that it [will] value the [T]rust assets as of the date of the divorce decree. [Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 131, 459 P.3d 276] (“And it is well-settled that assets should be valued at the time of the divorce decree.” (citing Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1319 (Utah Ct. App. 1990))). Ms. Dahl suggests that the court should value the Marlette account assets as of the date of trial. However, the commingling by Dr. Dahl of his separate property with the [T]rust property, after entry of the order awarding the [T]rust assets to him, together with the lack of certain records, makes the calculus using that method too speculative for the court to make a fair estimation of the value [of the Marlette account as of the date of trial]. Furthermore, that determination would likely require expert testimony. The parties offered no evidence in that regard. Based on the evidence in the record, the court can more easily determine the value of the property at the time of divorce and apply the appropriate rate of return.

¶26 The court found that “[a]s of the date of the divorce decree, the Marlette account held $1,842,089.81 in assets” and that, “[e]xcluding Dr. Dahl’s separate property, the value of the marital portion of the [Marlette account] at the time of divorce was $1,485,888.81.” The court found “that Ms. Dahl’s share of the assets in [the Marlette] account [was] $742,944.41, one half of the marital portion of the [Marlette account] at the time of divorce.”

¶27 The court then awarded Ms. Dahl prejudgment interest on her portion of the marital funds in the Marlette account at the time of the divorce, explaining, “When a party proves that its damages were fixed at a particular point in time—even when it does not establish that proof until trial—that party is entitled to the benefit of its money from that time. Prejudgment interest remedies this injury.” (Quoting Highlands at Jordanelle, LLC v. Wasatch County, 2015 UT App 173, ¶ 27, 355 P.3d 1047 (cleaned up).) The court acknowledged that both parties had offered expert testimony regarding a reasonable rate of return on the assets in the Marlette account at the time of the divorce. But the court “decline[d] to follow either party’s proposal.” Instead, it applied the statutory interest rate formula for judgments not based on a contract. See generally Utah Code § 15-1-4(3)(a) (setting the interest rate for judgments not based on a contract “at the federal postjudgment interest rate as of January 1 of each year, plus 2%”). Using that formula, it arrived at an interest rate of 6.73%, which the court ordered would “remain the interest rate for the duration of the judgment.” The court also declined to award compound interest, explaining that “[c]ompound interest is not favored by the law.” (Quoting Watkins & Faber v. Whiteley, 592 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1979) (per curiam).)

¶28 Applying simple interest at the rate of 6.73%, the court found that “the applicable interest total[ed] $666,502.12.” Adding that interest to the underlying principal, the court awarded Ms. Dahl $1,409,446.53 as her share of the Marlette account. The court did not address Ms. Dahl’s contention that Dr. Dahl had dissipated assets from the Marlette account.

b. The Marital Home

¶29 Regarding the marital home, the court found that it had been sold in June 2019 and that the sale had “netted $805,845.05,” which had been deposited with the court. The court further found that over the nine-year period between the divorce and sale of the home, Dr. Dahl had paid expenses related to the family home totaling $511,293, including “mortgage payments, insurance payments, property taxes, and routine maintenance.” But the court denied Dr. Dahl’s request for reimbursement of those expenses. In denying that request, the court observed that, rather than “immediately liquidating the house,” Dr. Dahl had “decided to keep the house and use it as his residence” for nine years following entry of the divorce decree. The court then said it was denying Dr. Dahl’s request because (1) Dr. Dahl “had the exclusive use and enjoyment of the” marital home during those years, (2) Dr. Dahl “did not cover any of Ms. Dahl’s housing costs during those years,” (3) “[t]he expenses for which Dr. Dahl [sought] reimbursement represent[ed] basic living expenses that he would have incurred irrespective of where he lived,” and (4) “a significant portion of the expenses related to issues that occurred with the house several years after the divorce.”

¶30 Ultimately, the court awarded “each party one half of the sale proceeds of the home, $402,922.52.” And because the parties had elected to leave the proceeds of the sale of the marital home “on deposit with the court, rather than placing them in an interest-bearing investment vehicle, the court decline[d] to award interest on the underlying principal.”

3. Pheasant Run

¶31 Turning to Pheasant Run, the court observed that the Pheasant Run parcels had been sold in August and November 2015 and that the net sales proceeds—$1,289,575.74—had also been deposited with the court. The court explained that although it was “attempt[ing] to value all the marital property at the time of the divorce, the evidence produced at trial prove[d] insufficient to do so regarding [Pheasant Run]” and, therefore, “the actual sales price represent[ed] the only workable approach” for valuing Pheasant Run. And, as with the proceeds of the marital home, the court declined to award interest on this amount, which had been deposited with the court.

¶32 As to expenses related to Pheasant Run, the court found that “Dr. Dahl incurred $522,683.61 in expenses related to maintenance of [Pheasant Run], including mortgage payments, taxes, and fees,” following entry of the divorce decree. In this instance, the court determined that Dr. Dahl was “entitled to reimbursement of one half of the expenses he incurred” because (1) Pheasant Run “was an investment property, not Dr. Dahl’s residence, and he did not have exclusive use and enjoyment of the investment property like he did with his home” and (2) “Dr. Dahl made a good faith effort to sell [Pheasant Run] in a timely manner” but, due to “factors beyond his control, the property took [five] years to sell.”

¶33 The court further ruled that Dr. Dahl was entitled to interest on the amount he had paid in expenses, with the interest running “from the sale of the property in November of 2015 to the date of entry of the [court’s order] in November of 2023.” The court calculated the interest amount to be $281,412.86. The interest and underlying principal together “produce[d] an ending balance of $804,096.47” of reimbursable expenses associated with Pheasant Run. The court determined that the parties were each entitled to half of the Pheasant Run sale proceeds and were each responsible for half of the ending balance of reimbursable expenses incurred by Dr. Dahl for maintenance of Pheasant Run.

4. The Total Award

¶34 Based on the foregoing, the court awarded Ms. Dahl “$1,409,446.53 for the Marlette account, $402,922.52 for the marital home, [and] $433,516.07 for the Pheasant Run property,[5] totaling $2,245,885.12.” From that total, the court deducted “$402,048.24 for her share of the Pheasant Run costs, resulting in a total award of $1,843,836.88.” The court authorized the clerk of court “to release to Ms. Dahl all of the funds [then] held with the court,” which “result[ed] in a balance owing to Ms. Dahl in the amount of $40,661.65.” Thus, the court entered “judgment against Dr. Dahl in favor of Ms. Dahl in the amount of $40,661.65.”

Ms. Dahl’s Post-Judgment Motion

¶35 Ms. Dahl filed a post-judgment motion seeking additional findings regarding (1) the court’s rulings on certain discovery issues she raised before trial, (2) the court’s determination that assets could not be traced, (3) the court’s decision to not use the date of trial as the valuation date of the Marlette account, and (4) the court’s determination that Dr. Dahl’s premarital assets had not been commingled with the marital assets in the Marlette account in light of “evidence . . . that it would be impossible to separate them now.” Ms. Dahl also reasserted her claim that Dr. Dahl had dissipated marital assets from the Marlette account.

¶36 Except as to one item that is not relevant here, the court denied Ms. Dahl’s post-judgment motion. Regarding Ms. Dahl’s request for additional findings on the discovery issues she raised before the evidentiary hearing, the court reiterated that Ms. Dahl had received more than enough discovery to make her case, and it declined to make additional findings. As to asset tracing and the court’s decision to value the Marlette account as of the date of divorce, the court repeated its reasoning from its original order and concluded that “those findings sufficiently addressed the issues.” With respect to potential commingling of Dr. Dahl’s premarital assets with the marital assets in the Marlette account, the court simply said that its existing findings were supported by the record. The court again did not address Ms. Dahl’s dissipation claim.

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶37 Ms. Dahl now appeals. She asserts that the district court committed various errors in identifying, valuing, and distributing the marital assets in the Marlette account and in distributing the Pheasant Run assets. “Determining and assigning values to marital property is a matter for the trial court, and an appellate court will not disturb those determinations absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion.” Mintz v. Mintz, 2023 UT App 17, ¶ 12, 525 P.3d 534 (cleaned up). We will likewise “not disturb a court’s distribution of marital property unless it is clearly unjust or a clear abuse of discretion.” Ouk v. Ouk, 2015 UT App 104, ¶ 10, 348 P.3d 751 (cleaned up).

ANALYSIS

I. Valuing the Trust Assets in the Marlette Account

¶38 Ms. Dahl first contends that the district court abused its discretion by valuing the Trust assets in the Marlette account “as of 2010 (instead of 2023)” and by awarding Ms. Dahl “only simple interest on her share of the [Trust assets in the Marlette account] as of 2010.” We disagree on both fronts. Ms. Dahl further asserts that the offset the district court awarded to Dr. Dahl based on his premarital assets was not adequately supported by the court’s findings and that the district court abused its discretion by repeatedly overlooking her dissipation claims. Ms. Dahl’s arguments in these regards are well taken. We address each of Ms. Dahl’s arguments related to the Marlette account in turn.

A. Valuation Date

¶39 “Generally, the marital estate is valued at the time of the divorce decree or trial.” Knowles v. Knowles, 2022 UT App 47, ¶ 62, 509 P.3d 265 (cleaned up). “In its discretion, however, the trial court may value the parties’ marital assets at a different time, such as that of separation, if it determines that the circumstances so warrant.” Godfrey v. Godfrey, 2024 UT App 156, ¶ 42, 560 P.3d 151 (cleaned up). “But any deviation from the general rule must be supported by sufficiently detailed findings of fact that explain the trial court’s basis for such deviation.” Id. (cleaned up). On the other hand, if a court “follow[s] the general rule,” then it is “not required to articulate any additional findings of fact explaining its decision.” Knowles, 2022 UT App 47, ¶ 65.

¶40 Here, not only did the district court follow the general rule and value the Marlette account as of the date of the divorce decree,[6] but it also provided findings to explain that decision. Specifically, the court stated that “the commingling by Dr. Dahl of his separate property with the [T]rust property, after entry of the order awarding the [T]rust assets to him, together with the lack of certain records,” made calculating the present value of the marital assets in the Marlette account “too speculative.” The court further explained that a present-value determination “would likely require expert testimony” that the parties had not provided. Additionally, the court noted that the supreme court opinion precipitating the remand in this case reiterated the “well-settled” general rule “that assets should be valued at the time of the divorce decree.” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 131, 459 P.3d 276. Where the district court followed the general rule and provided findings and an explanation reasonably supporting its decision, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion by valuing the Marlette account as of the date of the divorce decree.

¶41 Ms. Dahl pushes back by pointing to the following instructions by the supreme court in this case:

Ms. Dahl is entitled to withdraw her share of the marital property she contributed to the Trust as a settlor. On remand, the district court should determine what property contained in the Trust is properly characterized as marital property and either credit Ms. Dahl with an offset equal to the value of that property or allow Ms. Dahl to withdraw her share of the property.

Id. ¶ 212. Ms. Dahl contends that this language amounted to a mandate that the district court perform a “present-day valuation” of the Marlette account. In so asserting, she says it is “important . . . to remember that part of the reason the supreme court ruled this way was that [Ms. Dahl] was effectively a settlor of a revocable trust.” This is important, Ms. Dahl asserts, because when “a trust is revoked, the trust property (including appreciation realized during the trust’s existence) goes back to the settlor.” We are not persuaded.

¶42 Given the supreme court’s reiteration prior to remand (albeit while addressing an issue other than the Marlette account), of the “well-settled” rule that “assets should be valued at the time of the divorce decree,” id. ¶ 131, we believe that had the supreme court intended to limit the district court’s discretion on that front when it came to the Trust assets in the Marlette account, the supreme court would have used more explicit language of limitation than the language Ms. Dahl points us to. Additionally, following the supreme court’s ruling and remand, Ms. Dahl took no action to revoke her portion of the Trust and withdraw her share of the property. Thus, while Ms. Dahl is correct that she was a settlor of the Trust and that when a trust is revoked, the settlor is entitled to any appreciation realized during the trust’s existence, here the district court’s decision to value the Marlette account as of the time of divorce effectively set the revocation date for Ms. Dahl’s portion of the Marlette account as the date of the divorce decree.

¶43 For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion by valuing the Marlette account as of the date of the divorce decree.[7]

B. Interest

¶44 We are also not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion by awarding Ms. Dahl simple interest on her share of the marital assets in the Marlette account. As the district court recognized, “compound interest is not favored by the law.” Brady v. Park, 2013 UT App 97, ¶ 17, 302 P.3d 1220 (cleaned up). Moreover, as Ms. Dahl states in her principal brief, “[c]ompound interest was (or would have been) a substitute for determining the actual present-day value of the Trust.” Where the admitted purpose of using compound interest in this case would have been to approximate the present-day value of the Trust and we have affirmed the district court’s decision not to use present-day value, and where compound interest is disfavored in any event, we cannot say that the district court exceeded its discretion by declining to award compound interest.

C. Offset for Dr. Dahl’s Premarital Assets

¶45 Ms. Dahl argues that the offset the district court awarded to Dr. Dahl based on Dr. Dahl’s premarital assets—which were held in the Marlette account—was “not adequately supported by the [court’s] findings.” Ms. Dahl’s argument in this regard is well taken.

¶46 The district court found that Dr. Dahl’s premarital assets totaled $356,201 and that they had been deposited into the Marlette account. The district court also found that Dr. Dahl did not intend to commingle those assets with the parties’ marital assets. On that basis, after the court determined that the 2010 value of the Marlette account was $1,842,089.81, it subtracted $356,201 from that amount before evenly splitting the remaining balance ($1,485,888.81) and awarding the resulting amount ($742,944.41) plus interest (in the amount of $666,502.12) to Ms. Dahl to account for her portion of the marital assets in the Marlette account. To the extent that Dr. Dahl’s premarital assets were not commingled with the marital assets in the Marlette account, the court did not abuse its discretion by subtracting $356,201 from the 2010 value of the account before distributing the remaining balance between the parties. However, the court’s findings are not adequate to support a determination that Dr. Dahl’s premarital assets were not commingled with marital assets. See generally Lay v. Lay, 2018 UT App 137, ¶ 19, 427 P.3d 1221 (“Findings are adequate when they contain sufficient detail to permit appellate review to ensure that the district court’s discretionary determination was rationally based.” (cleaned up)).

¶47 To be sure, “one rather obvious situation in which commingling occurs is where one spouse has contributed all or part of the property to the marital estate with the intent that it become joint property.” Thorup v. Thorup, 2024 UT App 93, ¶ 24, 554 P.3d 329 (cleaned up). And the court found that Dr. Dahl did not intend to commingle his separate assets that were deposited in the Marlette account with the parties’ marital assets in that account. But the court’s ruling did not address another method of commingling potentially implicated here. Specifically, “even short of an outright intended contribution, property that started out as separate property may be considered commingled if it becomes inextricably and untraceably intertwined with marital assets.” Id. “Quite important to any commingling analysis, then, is whether the property in question has retained its separate character.” Id. (cleaned up). “[S]eparate property will be considered commingled when it has been mixed in with marital assets to such a degree that it is no longer reasonably possible to distinguish between the separate and marital property.” Id. “On the other hand, if the marital and premarital assets are still reasonably capable of being traced and identified, then the separate property retains its separate nature and will not be considered commingled.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶48 Here, Dr. Dahl testified that some of his premarital assets originally held in the form of stock were sold prior to 2010 and the cash proceeds of those stock sales were “mixed in with all of the . . . other money in [the] Marlette [account].” When asked whether he would “be able to trace those amounts,” Dr. Dahl was not definitive and said, “You could look at the dollar amount and see if it stayed the same.” Despite this testimony, the district court made no findings as to whether by 2010 Dr. Dahl’s premarital assets had become inextricably and untraceably intertwined with marital assets. Without such a finding, we are unable to determine whether the district court exceeded its discretion by crediting Dr. Dahl with an offset of $356,201 before it distributed the assets in the Marlette account. We therefore vacate the court’s distribution of the Marlette account and remand this matter for the court to make additional findings as to whether Dr. Dahl’s premarital assets retained their separate character as of July 2010.

D. Dissipation

¶49 Next, Ms. Dahl asserts that the district court exceeded its discretion by repeatedly overlooking her claims concerning dissipation. We agree.

¶50 “Where one party has dissipated an asset, . . . the trial court may, in the exercise of its equitable powers, . . . hold one party accountable to the other for the dissipation of marital assets.” Rayner v. Rayner, 2013 UT App 269, ¶ 19, 316 P.3d 455 (cleaned up). Factors that “may be relevant to determining whether a party should be held accountable for the dissipation of marital assets” include how the money was spent, including whether funds were used to pay legitimate marital expenses or individual expenses; the parties’ historical practices; the magnitude of any depletion; the timing of the challenged actions in relation to the separation and divorce; and any obstructive efforts that hinder the valuation of the assets. Id. (cleaned up). “After an initial showing of apparent dissipation by one party, the burden shifts to the other party to show that the funds were not dissipated, but were used for some legitimate marital purpose.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶51 Here, Ms. Dahl’s counsel introduced account statements showing some transfers from the Marlette account to accounts outside the Trust. When Ms. Dahl’s counsel asked Dr. Dahl whether he remembered “making wire transfers out of [the] Marlette [account] in the summer and fall of 2009 in the amount of $31,200,” Dr. Dahl responded that he could not recall. He also could not recall another transfer from the Marlette account of “about $17,000” but said that it looked like it went to a mutual fund labeled “DWS Latin America.” In her closing argument, Ms. Dahl then contended that Dr. Dahl had dissipated the Trust assets and that “Dr. Dahl did not provide any adequate response or explanation.” She asserted that the dissipation totaled $92,391.18, and she broke that total down into three line items, two of which appear to correspond to transfers about which Dr. Dahl was specifically questioned and was unable to provide an explanation.

¶52 Despite the evidence of apparent dissipation and Ms. Dahl’s assertion of a dissipation claim in both her closing argument and her post-trial motion, the district court never ruled on Ms. Dahl’s dissipation claim. For this additional reason, we vacate the court’s distribution of the Marlette account and remand this matter for the court to rule on Ms. Dahl’s dissipation claim.

¶53 In sum, as to the Marlette account, we affirm the district court’s decision to value the account as of the date of the divorce decree and its decision to award simple rather than compound interest to Ms. Dahl on her share of the marital assets in the Marlette account. We nevertheless vacate the court’s distribution of the Marlette account and remand the matter for the court to address both (1) whether Dr. Dahl’s premarital assets retained their separate character as of the date of the divorce decree and (2) Ms. Dahl’s dissipation claim as argued in her closing argument and post-trial motion. After the court addresses those issues, it should redistribute the assets in the Marlette account in light of its findings on those issues.

II. Pheasant Run Maintenance

¶54 Next, Ms. Dahl asserts that the district court’s “allowance of an adjustment in [Dr. Dahl’s] favor” based on amounts he paid to maintain Pheasant Run after entry of the divorce decree was “not adequately supported by the findings” and “ignore[d]” the fact that Dr. Dahl apparently used money from the Trust to pay at least some of the mortgage payments on Pheasant Run. We are not persuaded that the court’s findings were inadequate or that the court abused its discretion in granting Dr. Dahl an allowance for all of the amounts he paid to maintain Pheasant Run after entry of the divorce decree.

¶55 The court found that “Dr. Dahl incurred $522,683.61 in expenses related to maintenance of [Pheasant Run], including mortgage payments, taxes, and fees,” following entry of the divorce decree. In allowing an adjustment of half that amount in favor of Dr. Dahl, the district court further found that Pheasant Run “was an investment property, not Dr. Dahl’s residence,” and that “he did not have exclusive use and enjoyment of the investment property like he did with his home.” Ms. Dahl does not dispute the foregoing findings. Instead, she contends that the court should have determined the amount of Pheasant Run maintenance costs that were paid after entry of the divorce decree with money from the Trust and not allowed Dr. Dahl an offset for maintenance costs that were paid with money from the Trust. However, our determination to uphold the district court’s decision to value the Trust as of the date of the divorce decree renders Ms. Dahl’s argument as to the Pheasant Run maintenance costs wholly unpersuasive.

¶56 As Dr. Dahl explains in his brief,

Because the [c]ourt determined [Ms. Dahl’s] share of the Trust as of the date of the [divorce decree] and then elected to award [Ms. Dahl] one-half the value of the Trust at the time of the divorce plus interest, it is irrelevant where the source of the funds came from to pay the costs of Pheasant Run expenses after the divorce was granted because [Ms. Dahl’s] share of the Trust was not impacted. Therefore, no matter what funds [Dr. Dahl] used to pay for the expenses for Pheasant Run, after the divorce was granted, those funds could not possibly have come from [Ms. Dahl’s] share of the funds.

We agree with this reasoning and affirm the district court’s decision to allow an adjustment in favor of Dr. Dahl based on the amounts he paid to maintain Pheasant Run after entry of the divorce decree.

III. Interest on Funds Deposited with the Court

¶57 Finally, Ms. Dahl asserts that the district court “abused its discretion by not awarding [her] interest on the funds held on deposit with the district court,” which consisted of the proceeds of the sales of Pheasant Run and the marital home. Ms. Dahl’s argument is unavailing.

¶58 In denying Ms. Dahl’s request for an award of interest on her share of the deposited funds, the district court cited decisions from other states indicating that “[a]s a general rule, interest cannot be recovered while a fund is on deposit in the registry of the court.” Land Clearance for Redevelopment Auth. of St. Louis v. Zitko, 386 S.W.2d 69, 84 (Mo. 1964); see also Ernest B. Williams IV, PLLC v. Association of Unit Owners of Five Hundred & One Union Bldg., No. M2019-02114-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 1306875, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2021) (“As a general rule, interest on funds deposited with the court in interpleader actions is not recoverable from the unsuccessful claimant because the funds were not in his or her possession, available for investment. Awarding interest would thus act as a penalty against the claimant.” (cleaned up)); Washington Irrigation & Dev. Co. v. United States, 751 P.2d 1178, 1181 (Wash. 1988) (en banc) (“It is well established . . . that interest is not charged against the party owing a debt when the funds owed are in custodia legis.”).

¶59 Ms. Dahl does not take issue with this general rule. Instead, she says that she did “not elect[] to have the money deposited in an interest-free account,” that Dr. Dahl was the one who “insisted on [the] funds being held in escrow” with the court, and that he did so to “prevent [Ms. Dahl] from having access to” them. We are not persuaded that these asserted facts provided any basis for the district court to deviate from the general rule and award interest to Ms. Dahl on her portion of the funds deposited with the court. If Ms. Dahl wished to receive interest on the deposited funds, she could have asked the district court to deposit the funds in an interest-bearing account. See Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-301(2) (stating that when the amount of funds on deposit with the court exceeds $5,000, “the court may order or the litigant may request that such funds be deposited in an interest bearing trust account” whose interest accrues to the litigant). Ms. Dahl made no such request. For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s decision not to award Ms. Dahl interest on her share of the marital funds deposited with the court.

CONCLUSION

¶60 We affirm the district court’s decision to value the Marlette account as of the date of the divorce decree, as well as the court’s decision not to award compound interest to Ms. Dahl on her share of the marital assets in the Marlette account. We nevertheless vacate the court’s distribution of the Marlette account and remand this matter for the court to address both (1) whether Dr. Dahl’s premarital assets retained their separate character as of the date of the divorce decree and (2) Ms. Dahl’s dissipation claim as argued in her closing argument and post-trial motion. After the court addresses those issues, it should redistribute the assets in the Marlette account consistent with this opinion and in light of its findings on those issues.

¶61 We affirm the court’s decision to allow an adjustment in favor of Dr. Dahl based on the amounts he paid to maintain Pheasant Run after entry of the divorce decree. And we affirm the court’s decision not to award Ms. Dahl interest on her share of the marital funds deposited with the court.[8]

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[1] Our usual practice in divorce cases is to refer to the parties by their given names. However, because the Utah Supreme Court referred to the parties as Dr. Dahl and Ms. Dahl in its opinion resolving the prior appeals, see Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, 459 P.3d 276, we do the same for consistency.

[2] The delay between the early 2015 remittitur by the supreme court and the January 2017 appointment of a special master by the district court appears to have been due largely to Ms. Dahl filing an unsuccessful petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court; motions related to Pheasant Run that are not relevant here; and discovery disputes that arose upon remand.

[3] Both the poor quality of the report and the delay in its production appear to be due, at least in part, to several circumstances: the firm appointed as special master was purchased while it was conducting its work, a key employee left the firm, and the project was reassigned from the firm’s Salt Lake City office to its Arizona office.

[4] On the same day the district court issued its Ruling and Order Regarding Property Distribution, it also issued an Order Denying Respondent’s Statements of Discovery Issues. Therein, the court denied Ms. Dahl’s request for additional discovery, “find[ing] that the requested additional discovery [was] not proportional to the needs of the case . . . [and was] unreasonable and burdensome given documents produced and the issues remaining in the dispute.”

[5] Ms. Dahl had previously received a distribution of $211,271.80 of the Pheasant Run sale proceeds.

[6] As noted, the general rule is that the marital estate is to be “valued at the time of the divorce decree or trial.” Knowles v. Knowles, 2022 UT App 47, ¶ 62, 509 P.3d 265 (cleaned up). Here, the divorce trial occurred in late 2009, and the decree was entered in July 2010. Although the district court held a two-day evidentiary hearing on remand in 2023, that was not the trial contemplated by the general rule. See Godfrey v. Godfrey, 2024 UT App 156, ¶ 42, 560 P.3d 151 (“The general rule concerning the valuation of a marital estate is that it is valued at the time of the divorce.” (cleaned up)).

[7] In connection with her argument that the district court abused its discretion by valuing the Marlette account as of the date of the divorce decree, Ms. Dahl asserts that “[t]he district court’s decision to deny [her] request to compel [additional] fact discovery [was] an abuse of discretion.” She concedes, however, that this decision was “largely dependent on [the court’s] decision to value [the] Trust assets as of 2010.” Indeed, in this instance, the two issues are interdependent. And because we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by valuing the Marlette account as of 2010, we also conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ms. Dahl’s requests for additional discovery related to events after 2010. Moreover, the court made the following findings related to the discovery issues that arose on remand:

• “Dr. Dahl produced in discovery all the documentation that he possessed that was relevant to the proceedings”;
• “The available records do not allow for forensic tracing of every financial transaction that occurred over a period of many years and that occurred many years ago”;
• “[The] materials Ms. Dahl did receive were sufficient for her to fairly address the issues at trial”; and
• “[R]equiring the production of any additional materials sought by Ms. Dahl would be disproportionate to the needs of the case and would be unreasonably burdensome to attempt to produce.”

These findings—to which Ms. Dahl mounts no meaningful challenge—further demonstrate that the court did not abuse its discretion by declining her requests for additional discovery.

[8] Dr. Dahl asks that we grant him an award of the fees he has expended in defending this appeal. He bases his request on rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which allows us to award fees if we determine that an appeal was “either frivolous or for delay.” Because Ms. Dahl’s appeal has prompted us to vacate the district court’s distribution of the Marlette account and remand for additional proceedings, we cannot say that Ms. Dahl’s appeal was frivolous or for delay. We therefore deny Dr. Dahl’s request for an award of fees.