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LucasAlex Law Office, 259 Union Street, Hackensack, NJ (2026)

08/23/2021

LANDLORD TENANT COURT IN NEW JERSEY - HACKENSACK 07601 | 201-646-3333

Hi, I'm Vanessa. I recommend Rafael Gomez as a lawyer to everyone if you need help with anything, for simple cases, actually for anything you need.

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CHARLES W. STRUNCK, III, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CARMEN M. FIGUEROA, Defendant-Respondent.
No. A-1224-14T4.
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.
Submitted October 20, 2015.
Decided May 3, 2016.
Begelman, Orlow & Melletz, attorneys for appellant (Marc M. Orlow and Daniel S. Orlow, on the briefs).

The Micklin Law Group, attorneys for respondent (Brad M. Micklin and Richard M. Muglia, on the brief).

Before Judges Fisher and Espinosa.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff Charles W. Strunck, III, appeals from an order that denied his motion to enforce litigant's rights. We affirm.

On August 31, 2011, plaintiff and defendant Carmen M. Figueroa were granted a divorce by the Court of Common Pleas in Pennsylvania. The divorce decree awarded plaintiff the sum of $23,369 to be transferred from defendant's "Fidelity account" by way of a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO). The divorce decree directed that plaintiff be responsible for the preparation and cost for the QDRO. However, defendant withdrew all funds from the Fidelity account before the divorce decree was entered and filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on December 6, 2011.

Schedule F (Creditors Holding Unsecured Nonpriority Claims) of defendant's bankruptcy petition lists plaintiff as a creditor, states the $23,269 claim was incurred in August 2011 and provides the following description: "Matrimonial judgment — This judgment is not a domestic support obligation under Section 523(a)(5) of the Code." Plaintiff does not dispute that he received notice of the bankruptcy petition and the inclusion of the $23,369 as an unsecured claim in that petition.

Plaintiff states he consulted with a bankruptcy attorney who advised him that, "as a practical matter, [he] was better off not pursuing legal action against the Defendant for her failure to comply with the terms of the [divorce decree]."

Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, a creditor may contest the dischargeability of a debt by filing "a complaint . . . objecting to the debtor's discharge . . . no later than 60 days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors under § 341(a)," or as extended by the court. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4004(b).

Plaintiff did not file an adversary complaint to challenge the dischargeability of the $23,369 claim. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(a). Defendant was granted a discharge of this and all other debts listed on her petition in March 2012. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 727.
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Hi, I'm Vanessa. I recommend Rafael Gomez as a lawyer to everyone if you need help with anything, for simple cases, actually for anything you need.

Hi, I'm Vanessa. I recommend Rafael Gomez as a lawyer to everyone if you need help with anything, for simple cases, actually for anything you need.----------...

08/18/2021

NEW JERSEY EVICTION LAWYER DURING AND AFTER COVID-19 | 201-646-3333

THIS ARTICLE IS REMOVED FROM THE SITE:

https://legalfaq.org/covid/nj

FOR INFORMATION AND ASSISTANCE FROM A LAWYER CALL 201-646-3333

Are there any special protections for New Jersey renters during the COVID-19 emergency?

Yes, New Jersey has passed a law that renters making less than 80% of area median income are protected from eviction through December 31, 2021. This is for eviction s based on non-payment of rent, for rent due during the COVID emergency.
Other renters (with income above 80% of area median income) are protected from eviction through August 31, 2021.
Earlier, Governor Murphy had issued a moratorium on evictions throughout the emergency period. That has since expired. The Governor's Executive Order 106 had gone into effect on March 19, 2020.
Some renters are also eligible for U.S. national protections through October 3, 2021.

What do the protections mean for renters in New Jersey?

The protection means that for many New Jersey renters :
- Your landlord can still give you a notice to quit.
- Your landlord can still file an eviction claim against you.
- Hearings on eviction may proceed, with some cases proceeding through the courts.
- The court cannot issue a new order, judgment, or writ of eviction against you.
- Law enforcement cannot enforce an existing eviction order against you, to remove you from your home.
Check how your income compares to your area median income. If your income is above 80% of the area median income, then your protections expire on August 31, 2020. If your income is below that level, then your protections expire on December 31, 2021.

Do I still have to pay rent during the emergency?
Yes, New Jersey renters must still pay their rent.

You cannot be evicted for nonpayment of rent during the emergency, but you may be evicted as soon as special protections end.

Also, Executive Order 128 allows tenants to use their security deposit toward the rent. This is effective up to sixty days after the Public Health Emergency terminates. Tenants must replenish security deposit in full six months following the end of the Public Health Emergency.

If you cannot pay rent, take steps to protect yourself:

- Communicate with your landlord: Send a written letter or email to your landlord as soon as possible. You can also try to negotiate with your landlord to make a payment plan or get a temporary rent reduction. Get help here for drafting and mailing a letter to your landlord. Also check here. Beware, your landlord has no obligation to agree to reduce your rent or enter into a repayment arrangement.
- Get written records of all communication: Keep copies of any letter or email you send, and any responses from the landlord. Keep receipts for any payments you make, that are signed and dated. If you make a payment plan or rent agreement, make sure to get it in writing.
- Keep proof of COVID-19’s impact on you: Collect documents about your COVID-19-related employment problems, health care issues, or other issues that affect your ability to pay rent. This includes letters from your employer, doctor, insurance provider, child care provider, schools, etc.

Can my utilities be shut off during the COVID emergency in New Jersey?

New Jersey utility companies have agreed not to shut off utilities during the emergency because a customer is unable to pay.

You still have an obligation to pay your utility bill. Check for financial help.

Landlords are never allowed to engage in self-help eviction and shut off a renter’s utilities in an attempt force a tenant out. Self-help eviction is illegal. Call the police if this happens. If the police are not helpful, then you may seek court intervention. If you need legal assistance, please contact your local bar association or Legal Services of New Jersey.

What if I need repairs during COVID in New Jersey?
Tell your landlord about any repairs needed, particularly if they affect your health and safety.

The emergency may delay your landlord's ability to make repairs, but if they are urgent you should call your landlord to make the repairs as soon as possible.

Emergency repairs could be for problems with:
- Running water or hot water
- Heat or air conditioning
- Stove or oven
- Electricity
- Bathroom use
- Missing doors, locks, or windows
Pests

If your landlord doesn't make the repairs promptly, send them a written letter or email about the need for emergency repairs and keep a copy of this communication.
Contact your local code enforcement officer in your municipality for further assistance.

THIS ARTICLE IS REMOVED FROM THE SITE: https://legalfaq.org/covid/nj FOR INFORMATION AND ASSISTANCE FROM A LAWYER CALL 201-646-3333Are there any special prot...

08/17/2021

LAWYER TO HELP YOU WITH PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE PANDEMIC IN NJ - BANKRUPTCY - EVICTION 201-646-3333

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THESE CLIENTS ARE 100% SATISFIED WITH THE SERVICES OF BANKRUPTCY LAWYER RAFAEL GOMEZ. HELPS CUSTOMERS WITH BANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS, STUDENT LOANS, TENANT EVICTIO...

08/16/2021

FAIL TO PAY RENT - HACKENSACK EVICTION ATTORNEY 201-646-3333

If you need to win your case and need the money Mr Gomez will win the case for you or do the best he can to do it and my name is John Goren and he did it for me.

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THIS IS JUST AN EXAMPLE OF CASES OCCURRING IN THE COURTS OF NEW JERSEY. OUR LAWYER DID NOT ACT AS A LAWYER IN THIS CASE. REMEMBERING THAT YOU SHOULD ALWAYS OBTAIN THE SERVICES OF A RELIABLE ATTORNEY

TALMADGE VILLAGE LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.KEITH WILSON, Defendant-Respondent.
Docket No. A-0590-20.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.
Argued June 9, 2021.
Decided July 1, 2021.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. DC-008290-20.

Kevin G. Desai argued the cause for appellant (Ehrlich, Petriello, Gudin, Plaza & Reed, attorneys; Derek D. Reed and Kevin G. Desai, on the brief).

Keith Wilson, respondent, argued the cause pro se.

Before Judges Ostrer, Accurso and Enright.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

ENRIGHT, J.A.D.

In this one-sided appeal, plaintiff Talmadge Village LLC challenges only the trial court's stay of the October 8, 2020 order ejecting defendant Keith Wilson from the apartment he shared with Talmadge's former tenant and restoring possession to the landlord. Because we do not believe the governor's moratorium on evictions extends to persons having the legal status of squatters, we vacate the stay.

On March 19, 2020, Governor Philip D. Murphy signed Executive Order 106, which prevents property owners from evicting tenants during the public health emergency of COVID-19. More specifically, the order states, "[a]ny lessee, tenant, homeowner or any other person shall not be removed from a residential property as the result of an eviction or foreclosure proceeding.“

Governor Murphy signed the Executive Order shortly after approving legislation explicitly authorizing him to declare the eviction moratorium. L. 2020, c. 1, codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:18-59.3. The statute included language identical to that in Executive Order 106, defining who is protected under the moratorium. Ibid. The bill statement provides that the statute's purpose is to establish that "whenever a public health emergency or a state of emergency is declared by the Governor and is in effect, the Governor may issue an executive order to declare that a lessee, tenant, homeowner or any other person would not be removed from a residential property as the result of an eviction or foreclosure proceeding." Bill Statement to A. 3859 (Mar. 16, 2020).

There is no dispute that as of July 31, 2020, the lease for the apartment where defendant was staying expired. Further, it is uncontroverted defendant's name was not on the lease when his former girlfriend rented the apartment, and he never notified plaintiff he lived there. Moreover, he did not pay any monies to his former girlfriend or to plaintiff toward the cost of the rental after June or July 2020. Therefore, when the trial court issued its stay order, no one was renting the apartment, and defendant had no right, title or interest therein.

We also note that Executive Order 106 bars removal of an individual from a residential property "as the result of an eviction or foreclosure." Here, plaintiff initiated neither an eviction nor foreclosure action, but instead pursued defendant's ejectment, given that defendant had no agreement with plaintiff to allow him to occupy the apartment.

Since defendant neither rented nor owned the subject premises when the trial court issued its October 8, 2020 order, and plaintiff sought defendant's removal from the residential property by way of an ejectment, rather than an eviction or foreclosure proceeding, we are convinced defendant's removal from the apartment was not barred under Executive Order 106. Accordingly, we vacate the stay of the October 8 order. All other provisions of that order remain in effect.

If you need to win your case and need the money Mr Gomez will win the case for you or do the best he can to do it and my name is John Goren and he did it for...

08/13/2021

BERGEN COUNTY EVICTION LAWYER - HUDSON COUNTY - PASSAIC COUNTY - ESSEX COUNTY 201-646-3333

My name is Julio Ospina. I recommend you Rafael Gomez, he took me out of debt and he'll take you and be relief. God bless.

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THIS IS JUST AN EXAMPLE OF CASES OCCURRING IN THE COURTS OF NEW JERSEY. OUR LAWYER DID NOT ACT AS A LAWYER IN THIS CASE. REMEMBERING THAT YOU SHOULD ALWAYS OBTAIN THE SERVICES OF A RELIABLE ATTORNEY.

MIRFAT DAHER, Plaintiff-Respondent,v.ANDIAMO RESTAURANT and HAZEM SHALBY, Defendants-Appellants.

No. A-3555-15T2.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.
Submitted March 27, 2017.
Decided June 15, 2017.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Special Civil Part, Passaic County, Docket No. LT-1945-16.

Steven C. Schechter, attorney for appellant.

Respondent has not filed a brief.

Before Judges Haas and Currier.

PER CURIAM.

Defendants, Andiamo Restaurant and Hazem Shalby, appeal from the April 4, 2016 judgment of possession and denial of the motion to transfer the case to the Law Division. Because plaintiff Mirfat Daher was not the owner of the property, and therefore, had no cognizable right to assert an eviction action, we reverse and remand for the entry of a dismissal of the eviction proceeding.

This action arises from a dispute concerning the alleged non-payment of rent for premises owned by Jolly Clifton, LLC. In 2012, Jolly Clifton leased the property to Yummy Restaurant, LLC. Yummy Restaurant was owned by plaintiff and her husband Jehad.

In 2015, plaintiff and her husband entered into a business transaction with Shalby and his partner, selling them the liquor license and the restaurant located on the premises owned by Jolly Clifton. Shalby intended to open Andiamo Restaurant. The parties also entered into a fifteen-year sublease agreement under which Andiamo Restaurant was required to pay monthly rent. Although defendants believed the rent was going to the owner of the premises, Jolly Clifton was unaware of the existence of this sublease and never received any of the payments defendants made to plaintiff.

On March 2, 2016, Jolly Clifton commenced an eviction proceeding for the non-payment of rent against plaintiff, Jehad, Yummy Restaurant, and defendants in the Special Civil Part. Jolly Clifton asserted that the subtenancy between plaintiff and defendants was not valid. Jolly Clifton further stated that its lease with Yummy Restaurant prohibited any sublease of the premises without first providing notice to Jolly Clifton. As a result of this action, and learning for the first time that Yummy and plaintiff were not paying rent to Jolly Clifton, defendants stopped making rent payments to Yummy Restaurant.

On March 7, 2016, defendants filed a complaint in the Law Division against Jehad, Yummy Restaurant, and Jolly Clifton, seeking a declaratory judgment as to their rights in the property, the validity of the sublease and seeking reformation of the sublease. On March 8, plaintiff filed the instant tenancy action in the Special Civil Part, seeking to evict defendants for non-payment of rent. In response, defendants filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, to transfer the action to the Law Division and consolidate the matter with the pending Law Division proceeding.

On April 4, 2016, both eviction proceedings were heard at the same time. A representative of Jolly Clifton testified that it was the owner and landlord of the premises, and that there was a lease in effect between Jolly Clifton and Yummy Restaurant. Yummy had stopped making payments under the lease. Jolly Clifton was not notified that plaintiff had entered into a sublease with defendants.

Plaintiff presented testimony as to her eviction complaint against defendants. According to her, she had prepared the sublease herself and her name was used as the sublessor, not Yummy Restaurant, in the sublease of the premises to defendants. Counsel for plaintiff stipulated that plaintiff did not own the property.

After reviewing both the Jolly Clifton lease and plaintiff's sublease and hearing some testimony, the Special Civil Part judge denied the motion to transfer the matter to the Law Division and entered a judgment of possession in favor of plaintiff, awarding her the unpaid rent. The judge determined that the lease and sublease established "much more than just a sublease. It's really a business relationship." In reaching her decision, the judge reasoned that "there's no need to transfer [this case] to the Law Division.... This is just a simple nonpayment of rent case. And that's what we do here in Landlord/Tenant Court."

Therefore, we reverse the Special Civil Part's judgment of possession and remand for the entry of a dismissal of the eviction proceeding. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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My name is Julio Spina. I recommend you Rafael Gomez, he took me out of debt and he'll take you and be relief. God bless.------------------------------------...

08/12/2021

BANKRUPTCY ATTORNEY IN HACKENSACK NJ - PRIVATE STUDENT LOAN DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY 201-646-3333

United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
AUGUST TERM 2020
No. 20-1981

HILAL K. HOMAIDAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

SALLIE MAE, INC., NAVIENT SOLUTIONS, LLC, NAVIENT CREDIT FINANCE

CORPORATION,
Defendants-Appellants.1
ARGUED: MAY 19, 2021
DECIDED: JULY 15, 2021

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). This dense language means that three categories of educational debt cannot be discharged in bankruptcy: (1) loans and benefit overpayments backed by the government or a nonprofit; (2) obligations to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend; and (3) qualified private educational loans.

Navient does not argue (in this appeal, at least) that the loan it made to Homaidan falls into either the first or third categories. Nor does Navient argue the loan constitutes a “scholarship” or “stipend.” Therefore, the only question remaining is whether Navient’s loan is “an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit” under § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii).

Navient argues that its loan agreement constitutes an “obligation to repay funds” and that Homaidan obtained those funds for the purpose of advancing his education, thereby deriving from them an “educational benefit.” Navient endeavors to bolster this textual argument by pointing to a line of cases holding (without much textual analysis) that a private loan is covered by § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) if the debtor obtained the funds to pay for educational expenses. See, e.g., Benson v. Corbin (In re Corbin), 506 B.R. 287, 296–97 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2014). Finally, Navient relies on a summary order of this Court, which is by definition non-precedential, and in any event, beside the point.

According to Homaidan (and the other two circuit courts that have addressed the question), § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) excepts from discharge only a narrow category of conditional grant payments, not all private student loans.

A

Navient’s interpretation violates several rules of statutory construction. First, it is unsupported by plain meaning. Navient argues that the ordinary public meaning of “an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit” includes student loans. But as the bankruptcy court explained, that would be “an unconventional way to discuss a loan.” In re Homaidan, 596 B.R. at 102. The Tenth Circuit, less charitable, observed that “no normal speaker of English . . . would say that student loans are obligations to repay funds received as an educational benefit.” In re McDaniel, 973 F.3d at 1096 (internal quotation marks omitted). We agree: if Congress had intended to except all educational loans from discharge under § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii), it would not have done so in such stilted terms. As discussed infra, there are educational benefits that students may become obligated to repay—such as conditional grants—which fit the statutory text more naturally.

Next, Navient attempts to read “loan” into § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii); but the word is absent from that provision, which itself is sandwiched in between two others that use the word “loan” expressly.5 When interpreting a disputed statutory term, “we must not look merely to [the] particular clause, but consider [it] in connection with it the whole statute.” Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 16 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). So when Congress “includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Navient offers no compelling rejoinder to this argument, but instead proffers two structural arguments of its own. Neither is persuasive. First, Navient argues that § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) must encompass student loans because § 523(a)(8)(B) refers to “any other educational loan,” thus implying that the preceding subsections likewise cover loans. Appellant Br. at 22. But § 523(a)(8)(A)(i) expressly excepts from discharge “loan[s]” that are backed by the government or a nonprofit. The natural reading of “other” in § 523(a)(8)(B) is that it refers back to § 523(a)(8)(A)(i), not § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii).

Second, Navient points us to other statutes in which Congress has used the term “obligation to repay” in reference to loans. Appellant Br. at 21–22 (citing, inter alia, 12 U.S.C. § 1430(d)). That observation has little bearing on our analysis, which principally concerns § 523(a)(8). The question is not whether the phrase “obligation to repay” can ever be used to describe a loan, or even whether it can be an apt description. Rather, we must determine what Congress meant when it used that term in § 523(a)(8). Congress used the word “loan” several times in § 523(a)(8) but left it out of § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii), signaling that the omission was intentional. See Russello, 464 U.S. at 23.

United States Court of Appealsfor the Second CircuitAUGUST TERM 2020No. 20-1981HILAL K. HOMAIDAN,Plaintiff-Appellee,v.SALLIE MAE, INC., NAVIENT SOLUTIONS, LL...

08/09/2021

BANKRUPTCY LAWYER IN NEW JERSEY 07601 - PRIVATE STUDENT LOAN DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY 201-646-3333

Rather, it observed that some “common types of debts” including “[d]ebts for most student loans,” are not dischargeable in a Chapter 7 proceeding. App’x 59 (alterations omitted).

After the bankruptcy proceeding was closed, Navient hired a collection firm to pester Homaidan about paying back his Tuition Answer Loans. These demands for repayment caused Homaidan to assume that the loans had not been discharged; so he paid Navient in full, allegedly “under the mistaken belief that he had a legal obligation to do so.” App’x at 26 (Compl. ¶ 51).

In 2017, Homaidan moved to reopen his bankruptcy case to seek a determination that the Navient loans were in fact discharged during the original proceeding. (This would allow him to sue Navient for violating the discharge order.) Once the case was reopened, Homaidan commenced the instant adversary proceeding against Navient, which is styled as a putative class action. According to Homaidan, Navient has employed a scheme of issuing dischargeable loans to unsophisticated student borrowers and then demanding repayment even after those loans are discharged in bankruptcy.

Navient moved to dismiss the adversary proceeding under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing, inter alia, that Homaidan’s Tuition Answer Loans were excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii). The bankruptcy court rejected that argument, concluding that “both by its terms and read in context, [§ 523(a)(8)(A)(ii)] does not sweep in all education-related debt.” In re Homaidan, 596 B.R. at 102. The district court (Block, J.) then certified the bankruptcy court’s order for interlocutory appeal.

II

We have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A). That provision gives us jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order from a bankruptcy court if: (1) the district court certifies (inter alia) that the order involves a question of law for which no controlling precedent exists; and (2) this Court authorizes the appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A); Weber v. United States, 484 F.3d 154, 157 (2d Cir. 2007). The district court so certified, and a motions panel of this Court authorized the appeal.

Our review of the bankruptcy court’s order, which involves a pure question of law, is de novo. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003).

III

The sole question is one of statutory interpretation: whether the loans at issue constitute “an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit” and were therefore excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii). Homaidan contends that Navient is estopped from advancing its interpretation of
§ 523(a)(8)(A)(ii). But we reach it for the reasons set forth in the margin, and conclude that Homaidan’s loans fall outside the scope of § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii).

Our inquiry begins (and in this case ends) with the statutory text. See Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 345 (2d Cir. 2003). The Bankruptcy Code lays out several categories of educational debt that cannot be discharged in bankruptcy absent a showing of undue hardship. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). Because the federal bankruptcy system is designed to “aid the unfortunate debtor by giving him a fresh start in life,” Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 138 S. Ct. 1752, 1758 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted), discharge exceptions such as § 523(a)(8) are “confined to those plainly expressed in the Bankruptcy Code,” Bethpage Fed. Credit Union v. Furio (In re Furio), 77

“precludes a defendant from relitigating an issue the defendant has previously litigated and lost to another plaintiff,” Bifolck v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 936 F.3d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted), cannot be applied if it would be unfair to the defendant, see Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979). Unfairness arises “if the judgment relied uponas a basis for the estoppel is itself inconsistent with one or more previous judgments in favor of the defendant.” Id. Because the Fifth and Tenth Circuit cases relied upon by Homaidan are inconsistent with earlier cases that adopted Navient’s broader reading of § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii), see, e.g., Roy v. Sallie Mae (In re Roy), 2010 WL 1523996, at *1 (Bankr. D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2010), it would be unfair to preclude Navient from advancing its view here, see Flood v. Just Energy Mktg. Corp., 904 F.3d 219, 237 (2d Cir. 2018) (affirming denial of collateral estoppel when the defendant had previously prevailed in another district court).

F.3d 622, 624 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). The creditor bears the burden of establishing that a debt is excepted from discharge. Cazenovia Coll. v. Renshaw (In re Renshaw), 222 F.3d 82, 90 (2d Cir.
2000).

Rather, it observed that some “common types of debts” including “[d]ebts for most student loans,” are not dischargeable in a Chapter 7 proceeding. App’x 59 (...

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