09/07/2026
2026 LHC 3278
Writ Petition No. 55956 of 2020
(اختر حسین اعوان وغیرہ بنام نصیر اختر اعوان وغیرہ)
یہ ججمنٹ لاہور ہائی کورٹ کا ایک انتہائی تاریخی اور انقلابی فیصلہ ہے
اس فیصلے میں ہائی کورٹ نے فیملی لا (Family Law)، بچوں اور بیوی کے نان نفقہ (Maintenance)، معاہداتِ سمجھوتہ (Compromise Deeds)، اور قانونِ میعاد سماعت (Limitation Act) کے حوالے سے مروجہ روایتی طریقوں کو یکسر مسترد کرتے ہوئے قرآنی احکامات اور آئینی فریم ورک کے تحت نئے اصول وضع کیے ہیں۔
ذیل میں اس اہم ترین فیصلے کے اہم قانونی نکات (Key Legal Takeaways) کا آسان اور تفصیلی خلاصہ پیش ہے:
1. نان نفقہ سے مستقل دستبرداری کا معاہدہ "باطل" ہے (Section 28 Contract Act)
کیس کا تنازع: فریقین کے درمیان ماضی میں ایک معاہدہ/سمجھوتہ ہوا تھا جس کے تحت مسماة سادیہ اعوان اور نابالغ بچے نصیر اختر اعوان پر یہ شرط عائد کی گئی تھی کہ وہ مستقبل میں کبھی بھی نان نفقہ کا دعویٰ دائر نہیں کریں گے اور اپنے اس قانونی حق سے دستبردار ہوتے ہیں۔
عدالتی فیصلہ: عدالت نے Contract Act, 1872 کی دفعہ 28 کا حوالہ دیتے ہوئے قرار دیا کہ کوئی بھی ایسا نجی معاہدہ جو کسی بھی شہری کو اس کے قانونی حقوق کے لیے عدالت جانے سے روکتا ہو، وہ قانوناً باطل (Void) ہے۔
نابالغ کا تحفظ: عدالت نے واضح کیا کہ ماضی کے جمع شدہ (Accrued) نان نفقہ پر تو سمجھوتہ ہو سکتا ہے، لیکن کسی بھی نابالغ بچے کے مستقبل کے نان نفقہ کو مستقل طور پر ختم یا معاف نہیں کیا جا سکتا۔ اگر والدین یا سرپرست ایسا کوئی معاہدہ کرتے ہیں جو بچے کے مفاد کے خلاف ہو، تو وہ بچے پر بائنڈنگ (لاگو) نہیں ہوگا۔
2. امرِ طے شدہ (Res Judicata) کا اصول بچوں کے نان نفقہ پر لاگو نہیں ہوتا
مستقل وجہِ عناد (Continuing Cause of Action): عدالت نے تشریح کی کہ Res Judicata (دفعہ 11 CPC) کا اصول وہاں لاگو ہوتا ہے جہاں تنازع فائنل ہو کر ختم ہو چکا ہو۔ لیکن بچے کا نان نفقہ کوئی ختم ہو جانے والا معاملہ نہیں ہے۔
باپ کی طرف سے نابالغ بچے کی کفالت کی ذمہ داری روز مرہ اور ماہانہ بنیادوں پر جنم لیتی ہے اور تب تک جاری رہتی ہے جب تک بچہ قانونی طور پر خود کفیل نہ ہو جائے۔
اس لیے، ماضی کا کوئی بھی عدالتی فیصلہ یا سمجھوتہ مستقبل میں دوبارہ نان نفقہ کا دعویٰ دائر کرنے کی راہ میں رکاوٹ (Res Judicata) نہیں بن سکتا۔
3. ماضی کے نان نفقہ پر میعادِ سماعت (Limitation) کا خاتمہ: ایک انقلابی موڑ
پہلے مروجہ قانون کے تحت عام طور پر یہ سمجھا جاتا تھا کہ Limitation Act, 1908 کے آرٹیکل 120 کے تحت ماضی کا نان نفقہ (Past Maintenance) صرف 6 سال تک کا کلیم کیا جا سکتا ہے۔ عدالت نے اس نظریے کو یکسر تبدیل کر دیا:
آرٹیکل 120 کا نفاذ ظالمانہ ہے: ہائی کورٹ نے قرار دیا کہ آرٹیکل 120 کو نابالغ بچے یا بیوی کے ماضی کے نان نفقہ پر نافذ کرنا ظالمانہ، نقصان دہ اور ناانصافی پر مبنی ہے، کیونکہ بچہ معذوری (Legal Disability) کی حالت میں ہوتا ہے اور وہ خود عدالت نہیں جا سکتا۔
حتمی اصول: عدالت نے حتمی نتیجہ اخذ کیا کہ آرٹیکل 120 کا اطلاق بچے کے ماضی کے نان نفقہ اور شادی برقرار رہنے کے دوران بیوی کے نان نفقہ پر نہیں ہوتا۔ محض وقت گزرنے یا تاخیر کی بنیاد پر باپ کو اس کی ذمہ داری سے بری الذمہ نہیں کیا جا سکتا۔
Posted by Legal Luminaries
4. اسلامی فقہ اور قرآنی احکامات کا اطلاق (Concept of واجب)
عدالت نے اپنے فیصلے کو مضبوط کرنے کے لیے اسلامی اصولوں اور قرآن پاک کا تفصیلی حوالہ دیا:
نان نفقہ "واجب" ہے: سورہ البقرہ کی روشنی میں بچے اور ماں کو نان نفقہ دینا باپ پر واجب (Obligatory) ہے۔ اسلامی فقہ کے مطابق 'واجب' وہ عمل ہے جس کے کرنے والے کو ثواب اور نہ کرنے والے کو دنیا و آخرت میں سزا اور ملامت ملتی ہے۔
باپ کی استطاعت (سورہ الطلاق): اسلام کے مطابق صاحبِ استطاعت اپنی حیثیت کے مطابق خرچ کرے گا اور تنگی والا اپنے رزق کے حساب سے، لیکن باپ کو اس ذمہ داری سے فرار یا اس کا سودا (Barter away) کرنے کی اجازت بالکل نہیں دی جا سکتی۔
عوامی فلاح (مصلحت): اسلامی قانون سازی کا بنیادی اصول "عوامی فلاح" (Maslaha) پر ہے، اور حاکمِ وقت کا کوئی بھی قانون یا اس کی تشریح قرآنی احکامات کے منافی نہیں ہو سکتی۔
5. آئینی فریم ورک (Articles 2, 31, 227)
عدالت نے قرار دیا کہ آئینِ پاکستان کے تحت:
آرٹیکل 2: اسلام ریاست کا سرکاری مذہب ہے۔
آرٹیکل 227: تمام مروجہ قوانین کو قرآن و سنت کے سانچے میں ڈھالا جائے گا۔
لہٰذا، کسی بھی ایسی قانونی دفعہ یا تکنیکی ضابطے (جیسے لیمیٹیشن ایکٹ) کی ایسی تشریح نہیں کی جا سکتی جو قرآن پاک کے واضح احکامات کو شکست دے دے۔ آئینی تقاضوں کے تحت قرآنی احکامات کو برتری حاصل ہوگی۔
6. عدالت کا حتمی حکم اور قانون سازی کی سفارش
درخواست مسترد: ہائی کورٹ نے نان نفقہ کی ذمہ داری سے بچنے کے لیے دائر کی گئی باپ (اختر حسین اعوان) کی رٹ پٹیشن کو میرٹ پر مسترد (Dismiss) کر دیا۔
قانون میں ترمیم کی سفارش: مستقبل میں خواتین اور بچوں کے حقوق کو مزید تحفظ دینے کے لیے عدالت نے اس فیصلے کی کاپی لا اینڈ جسٹس کمیشن آف پاکستان اور وزارتِ قانون و انصاف کو بھیجنے کا حکم دیا ہے تاکہ لیمیٹیشن ایکٹ کے آرٹیکل 120 اور نان نفقہ کے قوانین پر نظرِ ثانی کی جائے اور انہیں اسلامی اصولوں کے مطابق ہم آہنگ کیا جا سکے۔
خلاصہ برائے فیملی وکلاء: یہ ججمنٹ ان کیسز میں ایک بہترین ہتھیار ہے جہاں باپ ماضی کے کسی نجی سمجھوتے کا سہارا لے کر بچوں کا خرچہ بند کر دیتا ہے، یا فیملی کورٹ میں یہ اعتراض اٹھاتا ہے کہ ماضی کا خرچہ 6 سال سے زیادہ کا کلیم نہیں کیا جا سکتا۔
VVVVVI. MUST READ JUDGEMENT
Upon plain reading of the terms of compromise placed on record, it appears that a restriction was sought to be imposed upon respondent Mst. Sadia Awan as well as the minor Naseer Akhtar Awan to the effect that no claim for maintenance would be raised in future and no legal proceedings relating thereto would ever be instituted. Such a stipulation requires examination in the context of Section 28 of the Contract Act, 1872, which declares that every agreement by which a party is absolutely restrained from enforcing his legal rights through ordinary legal proceedings is void to that extent. The object of the said provision is to ensure that no person is deprived, by private arrangement, of recourse to a Court of competent jurisdiction for enforcement of a lawful and vested right.
Any contractual term having the effect of absolutely barring a party from pursuing a lawful remedy before a Court of law is hit by Section 28 of the Contract Act and is un-enforceable to that extent.8. Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts of the present case, even if it is assumed that the parties were competent to settle the maintenance claim relatable to the period then accrued, any condition purporting to permanently waive or extinguish the future right of the minor to claim maintenance during the period of legal dependency would be contrary to law and incapable of enforcement. A distinction must, therefore, be drawn between settlement of an accrued claim and waiver of a future and continuing legal right, the latter being impermissible where the rights of a minor are involved.
Any agreement entered into on behalf of a minor, if prejudicial to his vested rights, cannot bind the minor merely by reason of consent given by others. No doubt, the law recognizes limited exceptions where an arrangement concerning a minor may be upheld if demonstrably for his welfare and benefit; however, no such beneficial element is discernible from the compromise in question. Rather, the stipulation seeks to deprive the minor of his continuing right of maintenance for the entire period of dependency, which is ex facie adverse to his welfare and legal interest. Consequently, such a condition cannot be specifically enforced and is void to that extent.
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 have generally been excluded from proceedings before the Family Courts, except to the limited extent of Sections 10 and 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The legislative intent behind retaining the applicability of Section 10 of the Code is to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and to discourage parties from simultaneously invoking multiple forums in respect of substantially the same cause of action. Likewise, Section 11 embodies the well-settled principle of res judicata, which bars reagitation of an issue that has already been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or persons claiming through them, litigating under the same title, and has been finally and conclusively determined by a Court of competent jurisdiction.
The principle of res judicata applies only where the cause of action is complete, final, and incapable of recurrence. A claim for maintenance of a minor, by its very nature, does not constitute a concluded or exhausted cause of action; rather, it gives rise to a recurring and continuing cause of action, as the obligation of the father to maintain his minor child accrues from day to day and month to month basis so long as the child remains legally dependent and incapable of self-support. Consequently, while a compromise or adjudication in a former suit may regulate or settle the claim relatable to a particular period, it cannot, in the absence of express statutory authority, extinguish the future and vested right of a minor to seek maintenance during the subsistence of such dependency.
The rule of res judicata is founded upon the principles of finality in litigation, public policy, and protection against double vexation, so that no person may be harassed twice over the same concluded cause and that there may be an end to litigation. However, the said principle cannot be extended in a manner that defeats a continuing statutory and divinely imposed obligation, particularly where the beneficiary is a minor suffering from legal disability and incapable of protecting his own vested rights.
Under the law, every father is under a legal as well as moral obligation to maintain his wife and minor children in all respects. Such obligation is neither optional nor contingent upon the will of the father, rather it is a continuing responsibility imposed by law as well as by the injunctions of Islam. A father, therefore, cannot be permitted to evade or contract himself out of such responsibility, particularly where the rights of a minor are involved, who, being under legal disability, is neither competent to enter into any compromise adverse to his interest nor can his vested right of maintenance be bartered away by any arrangement prejudicial to his welfare. The right of maintenance belonging to a minor is an independent and continuing right, and any compromise or private arrangement having the effect of permanently extinguishing such right would, to that extent, be unenforceable being contrary not only to settled principles of law but also to the injunctions of the Holy Qur’an and Sunnah. The obligation of a father to maintain his minor child encompasses provision for food, clothing, shelter, education, healthcare, security, and all such necessities reasonably required for the upbringing and dignified development of the child.
There can be no cavil with the settled proposition that the law of limitation, being a statute of repose, is enacted to ensure certainty in civil claims and to compel litigants to pursue their remedies within the time prescribed by law. It is equally settled that the law of limitation assists the vigilant and not the indolent; that its provisions are to be construed strictly; and that, by virtue of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1908, the question of limitation can be examined at every stage of judicial proceedings, including appellate, revisional, and constitutional jurisdiction. It is further settled that limitation is not a mere technical rule of procedure but creates a legal bar to the enforcement of an otherwise enforceable civil remedy. At the same time, it is equally well recognized that the law of limitation ordinarily bars the remedy and does not extinguish the underlying right, unless the statute expressly provides otherwise.
Concept of Islamic Jurisprudence. Considering the command of Allah Almighty as ordained in the Quran, Surah Al-Baqarah, obligation has been placed upon a father for provision of clothing and other requirements of life to maintain the child, including maintaining the mother. The obligation set forth in the Quran is to be considered obligatory (واجب (which has been defined in a concept that if a divine communication absolutely demands the performance of an act, it is called (ایجاب ( .As for the act itself, it is called (واجب ( .The lawgiver, i.e. Allah Almighty absolutely demands the performance of this act which is also called (واجب .(In Islamic jurisprudence, an act whose performer is rewarded for its performance and its neglector is punished for its omission and similarly an act whose performer is praised and whose neglector is blamed in certain aspects, gives rise to the concept of (واجب .(A person who performs واجب) obligatory acts) deserves praise and one who omits it without valid reason deserves blame and punishment. Considering this jurisprudence of Islamic law based upon the Quranic injunction, the father is under obligation to perform all such acts and there is no exception to it. Therefore, the father has to maintain the minor in all respects. As such, the law does not give any other concept of timeline unless the minor becomes an adult and is capable of taking care of himself. Before that, the father has to perform all such acts. Considering these aspects, this Court has also attended the provision of Article 120 of the Limitation Act which deals with the scenario where no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the Schedule then a six-year timeline is to be seen when the right to sue accrues, and this timeline negates the concept of the obligation imposed by the Quran on the father without any time period. In this regard, this Court has also been guided with the Considering the above principle, the elimination of the right of a child to claim past maintenance is considered to be under the concept of substantive law, and the same is not a procedural aspect. When this procedural and substantive definition is seen through the prism of Islamic law, then it reflects that the right of a child for past maintenance stands extinguished and he is not allowed to re-claim past maintenance beyond six years, whereas the father is under a continuing legal obligation (واجب(under Islamic law to maintain the minor from birth till the age of majority in a manner as afforded by the father based upon the concept of Surah Al-Talaq, where a man of wealth spends according to his means and is not put to any harm in this regard, therefore, considering the jurisprudence, it appears that the limitation provided in Article 120, if applied to the personal right of a child reflects that this Article is oppressive, harmful, and unjust, which is against the mandate of Islam and the right of the child could not be taken away in this manner. Besides the above referred concept in Islamic law, it is also settled that legislation in Islam is based upon public welfare (Maslaha). The legal maxim in this respect is that the ruling of the ruler over his subjects is based on their welfare. The principle defines the limit within which rulers can exercise their powers by formulating laws to maintain justice and protect the rights of thepeople. In this regard, guidance has also been taken from the Quranic injunction in Surah Al-Ma’idah, where it has been ordained: “For every one of you, We have ordained a divine law and an open road.” The divine law outlines the area within which the life of a Muslim may develop. Considering all these aspects of Islamic jurisprudence and the principles, it has surfaced on record through this discussion that the substantive right of a child could not be taken away, revoked, cancelled, withdrawn, or abandoned in terms of Article 120 beyond a period of six years. As a child is in a position of disability, he cannot claim his own rights, which are dependent upon a next friend or a mother in this case. Therefore, any adverse interest, if agreed by a major caregiver in the case of a child, is not allowed to perpetuate and eliminate the rights which have been ordained by Almighty Allah in the Quran.
Therefore, while the general principles embodied in the Limitation Act, 1908 may govern ordinary civil claims, the application of Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 to a claim of past maintenance involving a minor child or a wife during subsistence of marriage must be examined in harmony with the constitutional and Islamic framework governing the subject. A statutory interpretation which has the effect of defeating a divinely imposed and continuing obligation of maintenance, particularly to the prejudice of a minor, cannot be readily adopted in the absence of an express legislative mandate. The precedents cited by learned counsel were rendered in their own factual and legal context; however, the precise question from the perspective of the Islamic injunctions presently under consideration does not appear to have been directly examined therein..
Keeping in view the above discussion, this Court comes to the irresistible conclusion that Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908, is not attracted to a claim for past maintenance of a minor child, nor to the claim of a wife during the subsistence of marriage, and neither the minor nor the wife can be non-suited merely on the ground of lapse of time where the father has continuously failed to discharge his lawful obligation of maintenance, as per Quran and Sunnah.
This conclusion also finds support from the constitutional scheme. By virtue of Article 2 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, Islam is the State religion, while Article 227 mandates that all existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur’an and Sunnah. Likewise, Article 31 enjoins the State to enable Muslims to order their lives in accordance with the fundamental principles and basic concepts of Islam. Any interpretation of a statutory provision which defeats an express and continuing obligation imposed by the Holy Qur’an must, therefore, yield to an interpretation consistent with the constitutional command.
In view of what has been discussed above, the instant writ petition, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. However, in order to safeguard and further strengthen the rights of minor children and wives in matters relating to recovery of past maintenance, particularly in the light of the injunctions of the Qur'an and Sunnah, and the constitutional mandate embodied in Articles 2, 31 and 227 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, this Court is of the considered view that the question relating to the applicability of Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 in claims of past maintenance deserves legislative examination and reconsideration so as to ensure harmony of the statutory framework with the Islamic principles discussed hereinabove.
Accordingly, a copy of this judgment be transmitted to the Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan, as well as to the Ministry of Law and Justice, for such consideration, examination, and appropriate action as may be deemed proper under the law.
Writ Petition No.55956 of 2020
Akhtar Hussain Awan, etc. versus Naseer Akhtar Awan, etc.
Date of hearing 04.05.2026
Announced in open Court on:21.05.2026
2026LHC3278
