Khan Law Associates

Khan Law Associates We provide services in Legal matters, Court matters & Consulting. Law firm

20/11/2025

2025 C L D 543

[Lahore (Multan Bench)]

Before Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi and Raheel Kamran, JJ

Messrs AL-HARMAIN & CO. through Sole Proprietor and 2 others---Appellants

Versus

M.C.B. BANK LIMITED through Manager / Attorney---Respondent

E.F.A. No.26 of 2023, heard on 16th April, 2024.

(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---

----Ss.19 & 22---National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance (VIII of 2000), S. 18---Execution proceedings---Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC), blocking of---Appellants / judgment debtors were aggrieved of direction issued by Executing Court to block their CNICs during ex*****on proceedings---Validity---CNIC is essential for enjoyment of a number of fundamental rights, therefore, no person can be deprived of it without due process---Agricultural land of appellants / judgment debtors had already been redeemed and another agricultural land was under mortgage---Executing Court could have passed an order regarding property under mortgage which was permissible under law---High Court set aside direction issued by Executing Court, as there was no justification of such order and the same was illegal, unlawful and was passed without observing prerequisites---Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.

Messrs Azhar & Co. and others v. National Bank of Pakistan 2018 CLD 830; Muhammad Asif v. Standard Chartered Bank (Pakistan) Limited through Manager 2022 CLD 1021; Muhammad Umar v. Federation of Pakistan, through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and 2 others PLD 2017 Sindh 585; Hafiz Awais Zafar v Judge Family Court, Lahore and 2 others PLD 2022 Lah. 756 and Urooj Tabani v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and 2 others PLD 2021 Isl. 105 ref.

Habib Ahmad v. Haji Munir Ahmad 2004 YLR 1540; Messrs 3-A Trade Impex through Partner and 2 others v. Askari Commercial Bank Ltd, through Branch Manager 2005 CLD 1379; Abdul Basit Zahid v. Modaraba Al-Tijarah through Chief Executive and 2 others PLD 2000 Kar. 322 and Muhammad Kaleem v. Arslan Aslam and others 2023 CLC 796 rel.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 9 & 14---Right to identity---Scope---Right to identity is also associated to right to life (Article 9) and would also be read into Art. 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees dignity of man.

Muhammad Suleman Bhatti for Appellants.

Respondent fEx parte.

Date of hearing: 16th April, 2024.

JUDGMENT

MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, J.----Through instant appeal, appellants have assailed vires of order dated 26.04.2023, passed by learned Judge Banking Court-I, Multan, whereby non-bailable warrants of arrest of appellants were issued and CNICs of appellants Nos. 2 and 3 were blocked.

2. Brief facts of the case are that respondent-bank filed suit for recovery of Rs. 51,28,534.37 along with mark up, cost and cost of funds from the date of expiry of finance till realization of dues. The suit was contested by appellants by filing petition for leave to defend the suit. Learned Judge Banking Court-II, Multan, after hearing the arguments of learned counsel for the parties, dismissed said application and passed judgment and decree dated 06.07.2010 for recovery of Rs.51,28,533.59 with costs of suit and cost of funds till the date of its realization. During ex*****on proceedings, respondent moved application for issuance of warrants of arrest and blockage of CNIC of the judgment-debtors. Learned Judge Banking Court-I, Multan, vide impugned order dated 26.04.2023 issued non-bailable warrants of arrest against appellants Nos.2 and 3 along with direction to block their CNICs. Hence, instant appeal.

3. Learned counsel for appellants submits that neither any inquiry was conducted nor show cause notice was issued prior to issuance of non-bailable warrants of arrest, within the meaning of Order XXI, Rules 37 and 40 read with Section 51, C.P.C., therefore, impugned order is absolutely illegal and without lawful authority. In support, he has inter alia relied upon Messrs Azhar & Co. and others v. National Bank of Pakistan (2018 CLD 830) and Muhammad Asif v. Standard Chartered Bank (Pakistan) Limited through Manager (2022 CLD 1021).

4. None is present on behalf of respondent-bank to rebut the above submissions, since it has already been proceeded against ex parte vide order dated 21.09.2023.

5. Heard. Available record perused.

6. The order of learned Judge Banking for issuance of warrant of arrest and blockage of CNICs of appellants Nos.2 and 3 are under-challenge before us.

7. As regards blockage of the CNICs, we feel it appropriate to go through the provisions of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 ("FIO, 2001") dealing with the powers of a Banking Court while executing a decree. Section 19 of the FIO, 2001 mainly provides that mortgaged, pledged or hypothecated property and other assets of the judgment-debtor would be the subject matter of the ex*****on. Section 19(2) provides various modes / actions to be taken by the Banking Court to execute a decree coupled with powers given in various sub-sections of Section 15 of the FIO, 2004 and bestows it with powers of Executing Court provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or any other law for the time being in force. We have a glimpse to the afore-referred provisions of the FIO, 2001 together with the provisions of CPC dealing with powers of the Executing Court, however are unable to find any direct provision empowering to block CNIC of a judgment-debtor.

8. Section 18(1) of the National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 empowers NADRA to cancel, impound or confiscate a CNIC, after giving notice in writing to the holder of CNIC to show cause as to why such order should not be passed. Section 18(2) enumerates the instances / circumstances in which such action can be taken, which includes (a) the card has been obtained by a person who is not eligible to hold such card, by posing himself as eligible; (b) more than one cards have been obtained by the same person on the same eligibility criteria; (c) the particulars shown on the card have been obliterated or tampered with; or (d) the card is forged. Apparently, no instance of blocking a CNIC, pertinently while conducting executing proceedings by a court of law, is visible in the afore-referred provision. Section 18(3) provides right of appeal to aggrieved person before the Federal Government against the order passed against him and again notice providing of hearing is expedient before deciding the appeal. We are mindful of the fact that the legislature has made it obligatory upon the NADRA authority as well as the appellate authority to have given a fair opportunity of hearing to lead the defence to the affected person in terms of Section 18 ibid. We have gone through the impugned order and proceedings being conducted before passing the said order and are astonished to observe that no such exercise of issuing a show cause notice to appellants to explain their position was undertaken by the learned Judge Banking Court.

9. In the case reported as Muhammad Umar v. Federation of Pakistan, through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and 2 others (PLD 2017 Sindh 585), NADRA had blocked the petitioner's CNIC by issuing a notice under Section 23 instead of Section 18 of the NADRA Ordinance. The Sindh High Court observed that while the term 'block' was alien to the NADRA Ordinance, Section 18 did allow the authority to impound a card under certain conditions. The act of impounding a document is completed by taking possession of the document, thus, if NADRA decides to impound a card under the directives of the Federal Government, they may direct the person to deposit their CNIC to NADRA. It was further observed that, it is mandatory that NADRA issues notice to the concerned person of the same under the relevant section, and gives them a fair and proper chance of hearing. Therefore, 'blocking' of a CNIC without giving a chance of hearing was held to be illegal as the same was not warranted under the law.

Likewise, this Court in the case reported as Hafiz Awais Zafar v. Judge Family Court, Lahore and 2 others (PLD 2022 Lahore 756), held that an individual cannot be deprived of his identity card without due process and "In as much as cancellation, impounding or confiscation of CNIC impacts the fundamental rights of a person, the provisions of section 18 of the Ordinance must be strictly construed and scrupulously followed. Any order passed or action taken on a consideration other than those stipulated therein cannot sustain."

Similarly, in the judgment reported as Urooj Tabani v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and 2 others (PLD 2021 Islamabad 105), NADRA had issued a notice to the petitioner that she had obtained her CNIC through unfair means, and then subsequently impounded her CNIC as well as segregated her from the family tree. The Islamabad High Court held that NADRA did not have the authority to 'block' a CNIC upon receiving the complaint of a third party as presumption of truth is attached to the CNIC and the particulars recorded therein. It was further observed that the powers of impounding, cancelling or confiscating a card under Section 18 are explicitly confined to the four grounds prescribed.

10. Needless to say that Section 19 of the NADRA Ordinance, 2000 specifies a few circumstances when the CNIC is compulsorily required, which include passport, permit or other travel documents for going out of Pakistan and identification of a voter at various elections. Section 19(3) empowers the Federal Government to specify any other purpose for which the production of any card issued by NADRA shall be necessary. Presently, the need for the CNIC has increased manifold. Almost every government and private organization requires CNIC from a person before attending them. CNIC is also expedient to get admission in higher education programs, apply for a job, open a bank account, get a driving license or arms license, get utility connections, purchase railway and air tickets, execute any instrument, stay in a hotel or lodge, appear in a court proceedings and enter in certain buildings and premises etc. CNIC is essential for enjoyment of a number of fundamental rights, hence, a person cannot be deprived of it without due process. The superior Courts have expanded the right to life over time (provided in Article 9 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973) and held that it includes the right to legal aid; the right to speedy trial; the right to bare necessities of life; protection against adverse effects of electro-magnetic fields; the right to pure and unpolluted water; the right to access to justice; the right to livelihood; the right to travel; the right to food, water, decent environment, education and medical care. Personal identity of a person comprises all those aspects of his profile which are significant to him. Right to identity is also associated to the right to life (Article 9) and would also be read into Article 14, which guarantees dignity of man.

11. According to the provisions of Order XXI, Rule 37, C.P.C. where an application for the arrest and detention is made, the Court instead of issuing warrant for arrest, may issue a notice calling upon the judgment-debtor to appear on a date specified in the notice and show cause as to why he should not be detained in prison. If the judgment-debtor does not appear in response to notice, the Court shall issue warrant for the arrest of judgment-debtor as provided under Rule 37(2). Rule 40, C.P.C. provides that where the judgment-debtor appears in the Court in pursuance of the notice or is brought before the Court after being arrested, the Court shall hear the decree-holder, take all such evidence as may be produced by him in support of his application and shall then give judgment-debtor an opportunity of showing cause why he should not be detained in prison and that pending conclusion of inquiry the Court, in its discretion, order to release the judgment-debtor on furnishing of security to the satisfaction of the Court for his appearance, when required, and that on conclusion of inquiry, the Court can subject to the satisfaction of provisions of Section 51, C.P.C., make an order in respect of detaining the judgment-debtor in prison. These rules and procedure therein have been considered in a number of cases and the consistent view taken is that before passing an order for arrest and detention of judgment-debtor, the Court shall after due inquiry and affording opportunity of evidence to parties, determine that the pre-conditions for the issuance of such directive have been satisfied by the decree-holder. Reference can be made to Habib Ahmad v. Haji Munir Ahmad (2004 YLR 1540), Messrs 3-A Trade Impex through Partner and 2 others v. Askari Commercial Bank Ltd., through Branch Manager (2005 CLD 1379), Abdul Basit Zahid v. Modaraba Al-Tijarah through Chief Executive and 2 others (PLD 2000 Karachi 322) and Muhammad Kaleem v. Arslan Aslam and others (2023 CLC 796).

12. It is pertinent to mention here that agricultural land of the judgment-debtors has already been redeemed and another agricultural land measuring 195-K 02-M, situated at Mouza Turbet Haji Shah, Tehsil and District Jhang, is under mortgage and order could have been passed regarding said property as permissible under the law, therefore, there appears no justification to pass impugned order, especially when prerequisites have not been observed.

13. For the foregoing reasons, instant appeal is allowed. Consequently, impugned order dated 26.04.2023 is set aside being illegal and without lawful authority. However, learned Executing Court shall be at liberty to initiate fresh process as per law and the above observations of this Court.

MH/A-8/L Appeal allowed.

22/10/2025

Citation Name: PLJ 2024 Law Note (Civil) 166
Appelant Side: FAISALABAD ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY through SDO, Satellite Town, Sub-Division Sargodha
V e r s u s
Opponent Side: Ch. MUHAMMAD ASAD ULLAH, etc
Judge Name: ABID HUSSAIN CHATTHA

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908)-- ----O.###IX Rr. 1 and 2--Specific Relief Act, 1877, S. 42--Suit for declaration--Electricity connection was disconnected--Excessive bill --Application for interim relief--Accepted--FESCO has itself admitted to had charged Respondent with excessive units in electricity bill which fact was affirmed in report of M&T--The Respondent had paid complete dues till July, 2022--Therefore, Trail Court had passed fair and just Order which did not suffer from any illegality--Counsel for the Petitioner could not point out any illegality or infirmity in the impugned Orders--Petition dismissed. [Para 2 & 3] A & B

22/10/2025

2025 CLC 1217
PLJ 2025 Lahore 1011
S.162 of Land Revenue Act clearly manifests that ninety days are prescribed in filing of appeal against the order of the Commissioner to the Board of Revenue. Pertinently, provision of Section 167 of the “Act” having expressly providing that limitation shall be governed by the provisions of Limitation Act, 1908 in filing of appeal, review or revision filed under this Act.
The exercise of constitutional jurisdiction in terms of Article 199 of the “Constitution” is discretionary which can only be invoked in extraordinary and exceptional circumstances. The Petitioners have badly failed to point out any illegality or material irregularity in the impugned order, warranting interference by this Court in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction. This Court while invoking its constitutional jurisdiction always exercises restraint in interfering with the judgment or order passed in exercise of revisional jurisdiction unless some perversity or patent illegality is floating on the surface of record. The constitutional jurisdiction can only be exercised in such an eventuality if the impugned judgment or order suffers with certain legal infirmities or patent illegalities, resulting into failure of justice.
Writ Petition No.4078 of 2021
Muazzam Ali Goraya etc. V/S Member (Judicial-I) etc.

22/10/2025

PLJ 2025 Lahore 1016
The legal question involved was to examine whether filing of appeal against a conditional decree, by the decree holder, in itself amounts to suspension of the condition attached thereto and the decree holder is absolved from depositing the balance sale consideration? Held that mere filing of appeal against a conditional decree, by the decree holder, in itself does not amount to suspension of the condition attached thereto and the decree holder is not absolved from depositing the balance sale consideration when the consequences of his failure to comply with condition is specified in the decree itself making the said decree final

22/10/2025

PLJ 2025 Lahore 1003
Dismissal of a suit under Order XVII Rule 3 CPC for want of evidence amounts to a decision on merits; the subsequent suit will attract Section 11 CPC.

22/10/2025

PLJ 2025 Lahore 965
A mother's remarriage, however, does not ipso facto render her ineligible for custody of the minor

22/10/2025

PLJ 2025 Lahore 968

Canal & Drainage Act, 1873, Punjab Irrigation, Drainage and Rivers Act, 2023. Bar of jurisdiction explained. Retrospective effect explained. Held that where allegation of malafide action has been made in the plaint, the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to examine the acts even though there is bar of jurisdiction

15/10/2025

لے پالک (Adopted) بچے کی قانونی حیثیت قانونی گود لینا
پاکستان میں کوئی باقاعدہ قانونی "Adoption Law" موجود نہیں۔ اس لیے لے پالک بچے کو اصلی بیٹا یا بیٹی کی قانونی حیثیت حاصل نہیں ہوتی جیسا کہ مغربی ممالک میں ہوتا ہے۔ Guardians and Wards Act 1890:
اگر کوئی جوڑا یا فرد بچے کی سرپرستی (Guardianship) حاصل کرنا چاہے تو اسے عدالت میں درخواست دینی ہوتی ہے۔
یہ وراثتی حق نہیں دیتا، صرف پرورش کا حق دیتا ہے۔
وراثت (Inheritance):
لے پالک بچہ شرعی و قانونی وارث نہیں ہوتا۔ اگر آپ چاہتے ہیں کہ وہ بچہ آپ کی جائیداد سے حصہ پائے تو:۔
نادرہ قوانین کے مطابق، بچے کا باپ کے خانے میں اصلی والد کا نام درج کیا جانا ضروری ہوتا ہے۔
لے پالک بچہ قانونی طور پر آپ کے نام سے شناختی دستاویزات حاصل نہیں کر سکتا، جب تک کہ قانونی گارڈین شپ نہ ہو
(سورہ احزاب کی آیات 4 اور 5)
کسی آدمی کے سینے میں اللہ تعالٰی نے دو دل نہیں رکھے اور اپنی جن بیویوں کو تم ماں کہہ بیٹھتے ہو انہیں اللہ نے تمہاری ( سچ مچ کی ) مائیں نہیں بنایا ، اور نہ تمہارے لے پالک لڑکوں کو ( واقعی ) تمہارے بیٹے بنایا ہے یہ تو تمہارے اپنے منہ کی باتیں ہیں اللہ تعالٰی حق بات فرماتا ہے اور وہ ( سیدھی ) راہ سجھاتا ہے کے مطابق کوئی بچہ گود لے سکتا ہے، لیکن کوئی اپنا ولدیت تبدیل نہیں کر سکتا، گود لینے والے بچے کو اس کے حقیقی باپ کے نام سے مخاطب کرنا ضروری ہے اور اگر کسی کو گود لینے والے بچے کے والد کا نام معلوم نہ ہو، تو اللہ سبحانہ و تعالیٰ نے فرمایا کہ اسلام میں ان کے ساتھ بھائیوں جیسا سلوک کیا جائے۔
2023 PLD FC 1

لے پالک بیٹا اور بیٹی متوفی کے شرعی وارث نہ ہیں مگر نان و نفقہ کے حقدار ہیں
PLJ 2023 LAHORE(NOTE) 111
2018 MLD 407
2010 YLR 1327 lahore

اسلام میں گود لینے (adoption) کا کوئی تصور نہیں ہے۔ لے پالک اولاد وراثت میں حصہ دار نہ ہے۔
2020 YLR 2317

لے پالک (گود لیے گئے) بچے کی شرعی و قانونی حیثیت کے بارے لاہور ہائیکورٹ کا نہایت معلوماتی رہنما فیصلہ
2024 YLR 1073
اپنے الفاظ کا وزن پہچانیں، لے پالک کو اپنی بیٹی یا بیٹا قرار دینے کے بعد انکار کی گنجائش نہیں!
📖 قانون آپ کے الفاظ کو گواہی سمجھتا ہے!
📚 PLJ 2005 SC 785

گود لیا گیا بچہ دو سال سے کم عمر کا ہو، اور اسے گود لینے والی ماں کی طرف سے کم از کم ایک دن رات براہ راست دودھ پلایا جاتا تھا جس سے رضاعی "رجائی" تعلق پیدا ہوتا تھا اور اس طرح بچہ محرم اور خاندان کے لیے کسی نئے بچے کی ضرورت نہیں تھا۔ گود لینے والے والدین کی حقیقی اولاد--- وراثت کی صورت میں، تاہم، ایک رضائی بچے کو بھی گود لینے والے والدین کی جائیداد پر کوئی حق نہیں تھا، حالانکہ گود لینے والے والدین اپنی جائیداد کا ایک تہائی حصہ اپنے گود لینے والے بچے کے لیے لکھ سکتے ہیں۔
2015 PLD 336 lahore
مدعا علیہ خاتون اس کی حقیقی بہن نہیں تھی بلکہ اسے اس کے والدین نے گود لیا تھا-قانون شہادت کی دفعہ 128، 1984 --- آرٹیکل 128 میں دیے گئے وقت کے اندر صرف ایک قابل باپ ہی بچے کی ولدیت کو چیلنج کر سکتا ہے--- فریقین کے والد نے کبھی مدعاعلیہ کی ولدیت کو چیلنج نہیں کیا تھا--- قانون شہادت کی دفعہ 128 کے مطابق ایک بہن نے اپنے بھائی کو چیلنج نہیں کیا۔ ولدیت--- مدعی کی طرف سے دائر مقدمہ سپریم کورٹ نے خارج کر دیا تھا۔
2019 PLD 449 SC
غیر مسلم معاشرہ میں گود لینے کے تمام حقوق موجود ہیں،
گود لینے والے والدین کو، معاشرے میں سرکاری اور نجی سماجی تنظیموں نے بھی قبول کیا اور ایسی سماجی تنظیموں اور کلبوں وغیرہ میں حقوق اور مراعات کو تسلیم کیا، جس میں تنظیم یا کلب کی رکنیت بھی شامل ہے، جیسا کہ معاملہ ہو سکتا ہے ایک گود لیا ہوا بچہ اپنے گود لینے والے والدین کی جائیداد بھی حاصل کر سکتا ہے۔
2015 GBLR 38 SUPREME-
متوفی کی بہنیں ہونے کے ناطے اس نے گود لینے والے بیٹے کے ڈی این اے ٹیسٹ کے مواد کے ساتھ درخواست دائر کی تھی۔ اور وراثت کا حقدار نہیں تھا-ڈی این اے ٹیسٹ کرانے کی پٹیشن اور اعتراضات کو خارج کر دیا گیا تھا اور درخواست گزاروں کے حق میں جانشینی کا سرٹیفکیٹ جاری کر دیا گیا تھا---درخواست گزاروں کی جانب سے پیش کیے گئے دستاویزات سرکاری تھے جن سے جواب دہندگان نے اختلاف نہیں کیا تھا- جواب دہندگان کو رائے کی موت کے بعد ان قانونی دستاویزات کا اعلان اور منسوخی کا مطالبہ کرنا چاہیے تھا۔ ماں---بچے کی قانونی حیثیت یا متوفی کے بیٹے کے طور پر اس کی حیثیت کو کسی زبانی ثبوت سے غلط ثابت نہیں کیا جا سکتا
گود لینے والا بچہ وراثت کا حقدار ٹھہرایا گیا
2020 CLC 1670
نابالغ عیسائی تھی اور اس کے والدین نے اجازت دی تھی- ہائی کورٹ نے درخواست گزار کو نابالغ کو امریکہ لے جانے کی اجازت دی تھی اور اسے گود لینے کے لیے سرکنڈیشن کی اجازت دی گئی تھی۔ امریکہ جا کر بچی کا نام وہاں کے قوانین کے مطابق درج کروا لے گود لی ہوئی بچی بیرون ملک چلی گئی PLD 2011 Islamabad 06

08/10/2025
Order vi Rule 17 CPC
08/10/2025

Order vi Rule 17 CPC

05/10/2025

PLJ 2000 Lahore 941

Present: MAULVIANWAR-UL-HAQ, J. MAHMOOD KHATOON-Petitioner

versus

MUHAMMAD KHAN ete.«Respondents

Civil Revision No. 2711 of 1989, allowed on 15.10.1999.

Contract Act, 1872 (IX of 1872)--

—S. 25-Civil Procedure Code, 1908, S, 115~Suit for declaration-Dismissal of-Appeal against was also dismissed-Revision against-Ingedients of a "Gift"~An examination of plaint shows that petitioner denied making any declaration and categorically stated that she never delivered possession of suit land to respondents under gift-There is no mention in written statement that gift was made for natural love and affection, neither it was suggested in cross-examination to petitioner that she had made gift out of love and affection for respondents-U/S. 25 of Contract Act, all contracts without consideration are void-In present case, said consideration has not even alleged-There was no valid gift either under principles of Mahomadan Law or within meaning of S. 25 of Contract Act-Mere fact that lower Courts were fully satisfied that petitioner put her thumb impressions on mutation, would be no substitute for proof of three known ingredients of a valid gift or a gift contemplated by S. 25 of Act, 1872-Impugned judgments set aside-Petition allowed.

[Pp. 942 to 944] A to D 1994 SCMR 818 and PLD 1990 SC 1 ref.

Mr. Muhammad Farooq Qureshi Chishti, Advocate for Petitioner. Khan Zahid Hussain Khan, Advocate for Respondents. Date of hearing: 15.10.1999.

judgment

The petitioner filed a suit against the respondents, who are sons of her brother, alleging that she is the owner of the suit land; that she has never gifted away the same to the respondents; and that Mutation No. 146 attested on 18.9.1973 purporting to evidence gift of the suit land by her in favour of the respondents is illegal. The respondents filed a written statement denying the allegations of the petitioner. Issues were framed by the learned trial Court. Evidence of the parties was recorded. The suit was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 26.2.1989. An appeal filed by the petitioner was heard by the learned District Judge, Khushab, who dismissed the same on 13.6.1989.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner argues that the ingredients of a valid gift under the Muslim Law have not been proved in the present case and the learned Courts below acted with material irregularity in the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, while dismissing the suit and appeal of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, tries to support the impugned judgment and decree.

3. Records of the learned trial Court had been summoned. I have gone through the same with the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties. I find that the learned Courts below have misread the pleadings of the parties; they have failed to read the evidence on record and have not been able to comprehend the real controversy to be resolved. An examination of the plaint shows that the petitioner specifically mentionedthat she is ' jiJjl i_>!>U>' and there was no question of gifting away the land to the respondents. She of course, denied making any declaration and categorically stated that she never delivered possession of the land to the respondents under the gift. A perusal of the written statement reveals that the respondents in reply to said specific contention did not even allege as to
why the petitioner made a gift of the suit land in their favour. There is no mention in the written statement at all that the gift was made for natural love and affection. There is no allegation in the written statement as to why the petitioner would have gifted away her property to the respondents in the presence of her own progeny. The petitioner entered the witness-box as PW. 3. She stated on oath that she has three sons; that the respondents are the sons of her brother; that she did not make any gift of the land in favour of the respondents; that she did not deliver the possession to the respondents; and that she is in possession of the land, which is being cultivated by her sons. In cross-examination, it was not suggested to her that she had made the gift out of love and affection for the respondents; that she chad made a declaration of the gift; that the gift was accepted by the respondents; and that the possession was delivered by the petitioner to the respondents. Of course, there is nothing in the cross-examination to show that the petitioner was confronted with some extraordinary circumstances, which led her to give away her land to the respondents in presence of her three sons. According to the settled legal position, it will be deemed that her statement had been accepted as it is. Ahmad Khan one of the respondents entered the witness-box as DW. 5. Even he did not state that the petitioner had so much love and affection for them that she preferred them to her own sons and made a gift of the land to them. He did state that the respondents used to serve her, but the said statement is of no help to the respondents, as it was not suggested to the petitioner while she was in the witness-box that the respondents had been serving her.
4. Under Section 25 of the Contract Act 1872 all contracts without consideration are void. An exception has been made in favour of a gift made for natural love and affection between persons standing in near relation to each other. In the present case, said consideration has not even been alleged, what to speak of its proof. I may refer here to the case ofMst. Shumal Begum vs. Mst. Gulzar Begum and 3 others (1994 S.C.M.R. 818). Mr. Justice Saeeduzzaman Siddiqui (as his lordship then was) made the following observation at page 824 of the report love and affection cannot be expressed by any attorney on behalf of the donor. The sentiments which were the consideration for gift must be established to have come from the donor. Gifts are voluntary and gratuitous transfer from the donor to the donee. The assentials of these transactions are, the capacity of donor, intention of donor to make gift, complete delivery of the gifted property to the donee and acceptance of gift by donee." Mr. Justice Muhammad Afzal Zullah (as his lordship then was) in the case of Ghulam Mi and 2 others vs. Mst. Ghulam SarwarNaqvi (PLD 1990 S.C. 1) made the following observation at page 22 of the report:-

"Section 25 declares all those agreements void which are without consideration except for the exception created by the kw itself. Amongst the exceptions it is provided that whenever the agreement is expressed in writing and is registered and is made on account of natural love and affection between the parties standing in a near relation to each other or whenever it is promised to compensate wholly or in part, a person who has already voluntarily done something for the promisor, or something which the promisor was legally compelled to do, in such like cases the agreement would be enforcible contract.

Firstly, the contract which has been declared void under Section 23 of the Contract Act cannot be revived and given life, merely because it suffered from another serious infirmity; and which other infirmity could be overcome by a resort to the aforementioned exceptions. Secondly, it might be very rare that a male co-heir would relinquish his right for a female heir. Experience shows that it has always been the reverse. The flow of love cannot be so unnatural. Therefore, the rules devised by the Privy Council for the Parda Nasheen ladies as contracting parties and the one referred to above emanating from the public policy, would lead to another principle; that in cases like the present one there will be a presumption otherwise; namely, that it was not on account of natural love but on account of social constraints which would be presently referred to, that "relinquishment" has taken place. Similarly in the light of the entire discussion the second exception would also be not attracted as the presumption would be that such easy devices are always coined to justify relinquishment by females in favour of males."
5. In the above state of pleadings and evidence, there was no valid gift either under the principles of Mahomadan Law or within the meaning of Section 25 of the Contract Act, 1872. The mere fact that the learned Courts below were fully satisfied that the petitioner put her thumb impressions on the mutation, would be no substitute for proof of the three known ingredients of a valid gift under Muslim Law or a gift contemplated by Section 25 of the Contract Act 1872. The impugned judgments are, therefore, not only contrary to law, but ar perverse. The C.R. is allowed and both the judgments and decrees under revision are set aside. The result would be that the suit of the petitioner stands decreed with costs throughout.

(MYFK)
Petition allowed.

Address

78-District Courts
Khanewal
58150

Opening Hours

Monday 08:00 - 17:00
Tuesday 08:00 - 17:00
Wednesday 08:00 - 17:00
Thursday 08:00 - 17:00
Friday 08:00 - 17:00

Telephone

00 92 321 7043441

Website

Alerts

Be the first to know and let us send you an email when Khan Law Associates posts news and promotions. Your email address will not be used for any other purpose, and you can unsubscribe at any time.

Contact The Business

Send a message to Khan Law Associates:

Share