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25/08/2026

Article 199 is not intended to replace the ordinary criminal process. If factual controversies exist the High Court ordinarily will not conduct a mini-trial or weigh competing evidence in constitutional jurisdiction. The judgment specifically mentions remedies including:
* investigation by the police;
* approaching higher police authorities;
* cancellation/discharge mechanisms;
* Section 249-A Cr.P.C.;
* Section 265-K Cr.P.C.;
* bail/further inquiry under Section 497(2) Cr.P.C.;

ORDER SHEET
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH, CIRCUIT COURT, HYDERABAD
C.P. No.D-544 of 2025.

08.04.2025.

J U D G M E N T
Syed Fiaz ul Hassan Shah, J: The Counsel for the petitioner has mainly argued that a false case has been registered by the police, therefore, it may be quashed. We have noticed that FIR No.05 of 2025 PS Manjhand District Jamshoro was registered for offence under Section 353, 324 PPC. Since, the FIR has been registered having statutory backing under Section 154 Cr.P.C, For the sake of convenience, the same is reproduced hereunder:
“154. Information in cognizable cases. Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable
offence if given orally to an officer in-charge of a police-
station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his
direction, and be read over to the informant, and every
such information whether given in writing or reduced to
writing as aforesaid shall be signed by the person giving it
and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be
kept by such officer in such form as the provincial
Government may prescribe in this behalf.”
Undoubtedly, the constitutional jurisdiction conferred under
Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,
1973, a High Court can quash an FIR but such power cannot
unstintingly and frequently exercise in the Constitutional or inherent
jurisdictions by this Court to quash an FIR and it can exercise sparingly
in exceptional cases within parameters settled by the Supreme Court
of Pakistan. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in case “Ajmeel
Khan v. Abdul Rahim and others” (PLD 2009 SC 102) held:
“6. Needless to emphasis, that functions of the judiciary
and the police are complementary not overlapping and the
combination of individual liberty with a due observance of
law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to
exercise its own function. If a criminal liability is spelt out
from facts and circumstances of a particular case, accused
can be tried upon a criminal charge. Quashment of FIR
during investigation tantamount to throttling the
investigation which is not permissible in law. However, FIR
can be quashed by High Court in its writ jurisdiction when
its registration appears to be misuse of process of law or
without any legal justification. The police are under a
statutory duty under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure and have a statutory right under Section 156 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure to investigate a
cognizable offence whenever a report is made to it
disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence. To
quash the police investigation on the ground that the case
is false would be to act on treacherous grounds and would
tantamount to an uncalled for interference by the Court
with the duties of the police.”
[Emphasis added]
In another case “Gulam Mustufa v. State” (2008 SCMR 76) the
Supreme Court held that:
"High Court has no jurisdiction whatsoever to take the role
of the investigating agency and to quash the FIR, while
exercising constitutional power under Article 199 of the
Constitution or under section 561-A Cr. P.C. unless and
until very exceptional circumstances existed."
These exceptional grounds have been rendered down by the
apex Court, for instance in case “FIA, Director General FIA and
others v. Syed Hamid Ali Shah and others” (PLD 2023 SC 265), the
Supreme Court of Pakistan highlighted that High Court can quash FIR
under its writ jurisdiction when FIR is patently illegal or contrary to law
or it did not constitute a cognizable offence. Although, there is no
restriction has put on the High Court to invoke the provision of writ
jurisdiction for quashment of FIR, however, the said obstruction or
rampart thrown up across a way or relief to check the balance and
importance of provision of section 154 Cr.P.C and recognized
principles that no disputed facts can be resolved in the constitutional
jurisdiction and it must proceed within the operative statutes. Notably,
the intent of legislatures is clearly understandable as various provisions
are available under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 with the
Investigation Officers or Prosecutor or even Judicial Magistrate of area
while supervising investigation or even during the trial by the Court of
Judicial Magistrate or Court of Sessions under the provisions of
Sections 63, 249-A or 265-K and in the presence of such alternate
remedies, the quashment of FIR in writ jurisdiction for the grievance
which can conveniently be attributed under the statutory provision,
cannot be invoked or this Court does not appreciate as per the settled
legal principles of power and scope under the Constitutional
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Pakistan has highlighted the
fundamental points; “exceptional circumstances” and “alternate
remedy” or “disputed facts”, where a High Court ought not to not
interfere with the FIR and prefer to proceed the investigation or trial to
its logical way, in a landmark case “Col. Shah Sadiq versus
Muhammad Ashiq and others” (2006 S C M R 276)
“7. It is also a settled proposition of law that if prima facie
an offence has been committed, ordinary course of trial
before the Court should not be allowed to be deflected by
resorting to constitutional jurisdiction of High Court. By
accepting the constitutional petition, the High Court erred
in law to short circuit the normal procedure of law as
provided under Cr.P.C. and police rules while exercising
equitable jurisdiction which is not in consonance with the
law laid down by this Court in A. Habib Ahmad v. M.K.G.
Scott Christian PLD 1992 SC 353. The learned High Court
had quashed the F.I.R. in such a manner as if the
respondent had filed an appeal before the High Court
against order passed by trial Court. The learned High
Court had no jurisdiction to quash the impugned F.I.R. by
appreciation of the documents produced by the parties
without providing chance to cross-examine or confronting
the documents in question. Respondents had alternative
'remedy to raise objection at the time of framing the
charge against them by the trial Court or at the time of final
disposal of the trial after recording the evidence. Even
otherwise, respondents have more than one alternative
remedies before the trial Court under the Cr.P.C. i.e.
section 265-K, 249-A or to approach the concerned
Magistrate for cancellation of the case under provisions of
Cr.P.C. The respondents have following alternative
remedies under Cr.P.C.:-
(a) To appear before the Investigating Officer to prove
their innocence.
(b) To approach the competent higher authorities of the
Investigating Officer having powers vide section 551 of
Cr.P.C.
(c) After completion of the investigation, the Investigating
Officer has to submit case to the concerned Magistrate
and the Magistrate concerned has power to discharge
them under section 63 of the Cr.P.C. in case of their
innocence.
(d) In case he finds the respondents innocent, he would
refuse to take cognizance of the matter.
(e) Rule 24.7 of the Police Rules of 1934 makes a
provision for cancellation of cases during the course of
investigation under the orders of the concerned
Magistrate.
(f) There are then remedies which are available to
accused persons who claim to be innocent and who can
seek relief without going through the entire length of
investigations.
8. The learned High Court erred in law in accepting
constitutional petition by quashing the F.I.R. at the initial
stage which was not in consonance with the law laid down
by this Court in the following judgments:-
(i) Ghulam Muhammad v. Muzammal Khan and 3 others
PLD 1967 SC 317; (ii) Mohsin Ali and another v. The State
1992 SCMR 229; (iii) Abdul Rehman v. Muhammad Hayat
Khan and others 1980 SCMR 311; (iv) Marghoob Alam
and another v. Shamas Din and another 1986 SCMR 303;
(v) Sheikh Muhammad Yameen v. The State 1973 SCMR
622; (vi) Bashir Ahmad v. Zafar-ul-Islaam and others PLD
2004 SC 298; (vii) Kh. Nazir Ahmad's case AIR 1945 PC
p.18; (viii) Shahnaz Begum v. The Honourable Judges of
the High Court of Sindh and Balochistan and another PLD
1971 SC 677; (ix) Brig. (Retd.) Imtiaz Ahmad v.
Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Interior
Division, Islamabad and 2 others 1994 SCMR 2142.
9. According to provisions of Cr.P.C. it is for the
Investigating Officer to collect all the facts connected with
the commission of offence and if he finds that no offence is
committed, he may submit a report under section 173,
Cr.P.C. to the Allaqa Magistrate. On the other hand, if on
the basis of his investigation he is of the opinion that the
offence has in fact been committed, he has to submit
report accordingly. However, the report of the Investigating
Officer cannot be the evidence in the case. The
investigation is held with a view to ascertaining whether or
not an offence has been committed. The inquiry, or trial,
as the case may be has to be conducted by the
Magistrate. If the police is restrained from investigating the
matter, their statutory duty, it will in our opinion be
tantamount to acting against the law as held in Kh. Nazir
Ahmad's case AIR 1945 PC. p.18. The relevant
observation is as follows:
"Just as it is essential that everyone accused of a crime
should have free access to a Court of justice so that he
may be duly acquitted if found not guilty of the offence with
which he is charged, so it is of the utmost importance that
the judiciary should not interfere with the police in the
matters which are within their province and into which the
law imposes upon them the duty of enquiry. In India as
W.P No. 1976-Q of 2022 7 has been shown there is a
statutory right on the part of the police under sections 154
and 156 to investigate the circumstances of an alleged
cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the
judicial authorities, and it would as their Lordships think,
be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to
interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the
inherent jurisdiction of the Court under section 561-A. The
functions of the judiciary and the police are
complementary not overlapping and the combination the
police are complementary not overlapping and the
combination of individual liberty with a due observance of
law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to
exercise its own function, always of course, subject to the
right of the Court to intervene in an appropriate case when
moved under section 491, Criminal Procedure Code, to
give direction in the nature of habeas corpus. In such a
case as the present, however, the Court's functions begin
when a charge is preferred before it and not until then."
The mere statement of petitioner or assertion alone that a false case or
FIR is registered against him is insufficient to establish constitutional
jurisdiction and to adjudicate the lis under the Constitutional jurisdiction
of this Court. The judicial propriety does not permit to quash the FIR of
cases which are not squarely fall within defined parameters of the rules
laid down by the Supreme Court of Pakistan and which involve
disputed facts or controversial facts requires a full probe, inquiry or
investigation and such procedure culminated in the shape of police
report under section 173 Cr.P.C. The involvement of disputed facts or
factual controversies cannot be adjudicated in exercise of its
constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 as held by this court in the
cases of “Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen and another v. Shafqat Ali
Kiyani and another (2023 SCMR 246), “Amir Jamal and others v.
Malik Zahoor-ul-Haq and others” (2011 SCMR 1023) and “Fida
Hussain v. Mst Saiqa and others” (2011 SCMR 1990), “State Life
Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Pakistan To***co Co. Ltd.”
(PLD 1983 SC 280).
The other contraceptive barrier for the petitioner to establish the
constitutional jurisdiction is alternative remedy. The constitutional
jurisdiction can only be invoked if the petitioner has no other efficacious
and effective remedy available under the statutory provisions. The
operative statutes and sub-ordinated legislation provide alternative
avenues for the reliefs what have urged before us. Under the scheme
of criminal jurisprudence in every criminal case, a criminal investigation
terminated into a police report1 or charge sheet2 or reference3 or
confidential final report4 or challan solely depends upon formation of
independent views by a Judicial Magistrate as required under section
190(3) Cr.P.C. or by a Anti-Terrorism Court while accepting or rejecting
challan on evaluation of investigation report and material together
collected thereto. Comparatively, the alternate remedy can
1 As in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898
2 As in the Police Rules, 1934
3 As in the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999
4 As in the Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974 or the Anti-Corruption Act, 1991
or its Rules of 1993
conveniently accomplish the purpose of petitioner and is equally
effective and efficacious and in this situation it again effectively bars
the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. Reliance can be placed on
cases entitled a “Gul Ahmed Textile Mills Ltd v. Collector of
Customs Appraisement”, (1990 MLD 126), “Pak. Metal Industries
v. Assistant Collector”, (1990 CLC 1022), “Allah Wasaya v.
Tehsildar/AC 1st Grade”, (1981 CLC 1202), “Syed Riaz Hussain
Zaidi v. Muhammad Iqbal”, (PLD 1981 Lah. 215) & “Abdul Hafeez
v. Chairman, Municipal Corporation” (PLD 1967 Lah. 1251).
The extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 199 of the
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 is envisioned
predominantly for affording an express remedy where the unlawfulness
and impropriety of the action of an executive or police or Investigation
Officer could be substantiated with the very action when it is patently
illegal, unlawful or ultra vires or done or performed in colorable
exercise of jurisdiction vested in such authority or officer or propriety
demands or permit that it is without any convoluted inquiry or in other
words when it does not involve disputed or controversial facts which
may without any question assuredly avoid necessitation of adoption of
normal course of trial or adjudication by a Court of law. The expression
“adequate remedy” signifies an effectual, accessible, advantageous
and expeditious remedy which obviously must have statutory
adherence with or requirement of such statutory mandate which is
generally called as “jurisdiction”. Since the statutes provides more
adequate remedy remedium juris and expressive adequate remedy
and ways are more efficacious, beneficial, convenient, effective,
speedy and appropriate within criminal jurisdiction of the inferior courts,
for instance the trial Court would have to reach at certain conclusion
after recording of evidence, testimonies of prosecution witnesses
together with record, material or documents, if any, produce by
prosecution side and during the course of trial, the statutes permit the
court to grant bail as per recognized judicial principles or exemption
from personal appearance, or discharge when charge is groundless or
release as a case of further inquiry under section 497(2) Cr.P.C. or
acquit under section 249-A or 265-K of the Cr.P.C., therefore, in the
presence of adequate remedy which is more efficacious, speedy and
effective, the petition is not entertainable. Reference can be placed on
the case “Dr. Sher Afgan Khan Niazi Vs. Ali S. Habib & others”
(2011 SCMR 1813). To sum up the discussion, the petitioner has failed
to point out any of the ingredients for the quashment that may modify
this Court to quash the FIR. Therefore, the constitution petition stands
dismissed in limine. We are very well aware that in the cases of alleged policeencounter and ineffective firing, the Honorable Supreme Court of
Pakistan while hearing case of “Zeeshan Shani v. The State” (2012
SCMR 428) has ruled that standard of proof should be far higher in the case of police encounter and ineffective firing as compared to any other criminal case as well as the same police cannot be allowed to investigate the offences with obvious reason of impartiality. The Relevant para is re-produced hereunder:
“11. The standard of proof in this case should have
been far higher as compared to any other criminal case when according to the prosecution it was a case of police encounter. It was, thus, desirable and even imperative that it should have been investigated by some other agency. Police, in this case, could not have been investigators of their own cause. Such investigation which is woefully lacking independent character cannot be made basis for conviction in a charge involving capital sentence, that too when it is riddled with many lacunas and loopholes listed above, quite apart from the after thoughts and improvements. It would not be in accord of safe administration of justice to maintain the conviction and sentence of the appellant in the circumstances of the case.” Keeping into consideration the doctrine of “conflict of interest” and dictum, the Inspector General of Police being Head of Police has already framed a policy that the cases of police encounter with ineffective firing are to be investigated by the police of other district and police officers of same District when an alleged incident is taken place are barred to investigate the alleged offence(s). While dismissing the above-said petition, we direct the Deputy Inspector General of Police to depute the investigation constituting a JIT comprising officers other than the District Jamshoro where the instant FIR No.05 of 2025 has been
registered. the Constitution petition is dismissed with above
observations

11/08/2026

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01/08/2026

The High Court held that the Rent Controller was not devoid of jurisdiction to recall or set aside an ex parte order. The power to do so could be traced to the provisions of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and the contrary view taken by the Rent Controller and the appellate court did not represent the correct legal position.

ORDER SHEET
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH, KARACHI
C.P. No.S-154 of 2021.
This case seems to have a very complicated lengthy history. It is the case of the respondent that he has purchased property via conveyance deed available at page 71. Though he was an attorney of the previous owner but all such permissions were obtained from the principal and consequently this conveyance deed was executed. A rent case bearing No.527/2019 was filed and High Court of Sindh it is claimed that a notice under section 18 was issued before filing eviction application. The notice claimed to have been served and vakalatnama was filed, however, it is claimed that on account of the illness of the petitioner and perhaps because of the pandemic health issues before the lower judiciary, civil
work for a number of months remained suspended. The work began on 03.08.2020 as stated and the matter was put on 13.08.2020. Brother of the opponent/petitioner claimed to have appeared on the said date and obtained a date of 24.08.2020, however, record shows that it was not adjourned for 24.08.2020 but it was adjourned for 20.08.2020. He was perhaps debarred from
filing written statement and declared exparte. Application for setting aside of Mr. Mian Mushtaq Ahmed, learned counsel for respondent, conceded to only to the extent that the Rent Controller was not deprived under the law from passing an order for setting aside of an exparte order. He, however, further submits that there was a lethargic and leniency shown by the petitioner in filing
written statement and in pursuing the matter. Be that as it may, he submits that even the observation of the appellate court to the extent that the Rent Controller was not empowered to set aside the exparte order was not a good law as the relevant provisions of the General Clauses Act, 1897, does permit a Rent Controller to pass appropriate orders including the one whereby he may recall
his own order of exparte. The respondent may have to prove the ownership of the property and then the relationship of landlord and tenant has to be established independently. It has to be proved through reliable evidence and documents that apart from the fact that the applicant/respondent was the owner, he was also the landlord of the occupant. Learned counsel for respondent submits that since an exparte affidavit was filed therefore there was
no reason for the Rent Controller and the appellate Court to disbelieve the version. We agree to such an extent as far as statement of Mr. Mian Mushtaq Ahmed is concerned, however, we are not satisfied with the reason assigned by the Rent Controller and the appellate Court in declining the application of the
petitioner for setting aside / recalling the order dated 20.08.2020 (exparte order). Learned counsel for the respondent submits that he has been deprived of the rent since last more than one decade. We are equally conscious of the fact that he himself demanded rent after almost 10 years so his urgency in this regard has not inspire the confidence of this Court. Be that as it may, since the
valuable interest of the respondent is at stake i.e. the outstanding rent. Learned counsel for the respondent conceded to the extent that the Rent Controller be directed to decide the application under Section 16(1) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, after hearing the parties as well as objections to thisthe exparte order dated 20.08.2020 was filed on 08.09.2020 which too was
dismissed vide order dated 21.09.2020 with the reason that Section 19(2) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, does not provide power and jurisdiction to rescind and recall the order passed by the Rent Controller. regard in a week’s time. In addition to this application, it is also expected that the petitioner shall file written statement in a week’s time. In this consensus view, the two orders of the lower courts impugned in these proceedings are set aside with direction to the Rent Controller to proceed with the matter expeditiously. It is expected that the tentative rent order if required and permissible under the law be passed in a week’s time after taking into consideration all the relevant law in this regard, including but not limited to deciding an issue of relationship of landlord and tenant first. It is expected that the rent matter be disposed of on merits within six months’ time.

10/07/2026

Held: that a tenant’s pending claim of ownership does not negate the landlord–tenant relationship nor bar eviction proceedings until the tenant successfully establishes title in a competent civil court.

2026 SCMR 171.
SUPREME-COURT.

Ss. 5(2), 8 & 9(a). Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009), S.15. Eviction petition. Landlord and tenant relationship, existence of. Proof. Requirement of entering the particulars of tenancy with the rent registrar, non-compliance of. Effect. Whether such defect was curable. Landlord-tenant relationship, denial of. Tenant claiming to be owner of rented property by filing a suit for declaration. Effect. Brief facts of the matter were that the appellant (landlady) filed an eviction petition before the rent tribunal seeking respondent No.3's (tenant) eviction. Rent tribunal allowed eviction and also directed payment of rent arrears. Respondent No.3 (tenant) filed an appeal and appellate court set aside the rent tribunal's findings by holding that the appellant (landlady) had not proved a landlord-tenant relationship. Against the appellate judgment the appellant filed a constitutional petition which was dismissed and the present appeal before the Supreme Court challenged that dismissal. Held: Section 8 of the 2007 Ordinance provided that an existing landlord and tenant as soon as possible, but not later than two years from the date of coming into force the said Ordinance, had to bring the tenancy in conformity with the provisions of the said Ordinance, whereas, Section 9 of the said Ordinance provided inter alia that if a tenancy did not conform with the provisions of the said Ordinance the rent tribunal could not entertain an application under the said Ordinance on behalf of the landlord, unless he had deposited a fine equivalent to ten percent of the annual value of the rent of the premises in the government treasury. Appellant(landlady) and respondent No. 3 (tenant) had until 16.11.2010, to enter the particulars of the tenancy with the rent registrar so as to make it compliant with the requirements of Section 5(2) of the 2007 Ordinance. This requirement, remained unfulfilled till the present day. The vital question that needed to be determined was whether as a result of such non-compliance, the eviction petition was to be dismissed at the alter or whether an opportunity was to be given to the eviction petitioner to cure such defect. When the eviction petition was filed on 09.01.2008, the two-year grace period within which the tenancy agreement was required to be presented before the rent registrar had not lapsed. Omission to present the tenancy agreement before the rent registrar in accordance with Section 5(2) of the 2007 Ordinance within the two-year grace period could neither render the party seeking eviction of a tenant liable to pay the penalty/fine nor could the eviction petition be rejected on this ground. In the present case, the two-year grace period expired on 16.11.2009 and by that time, the appellant's eviction petition had not been decided. It was at this stage that either the rent tribunal could have required the appellant (landlady) to bring the tenancy in conformity with the requirements under Section 5(2) or Respondent No. 3 (tenant) could have taken objection as to the non-compliance with the requirements of the said provisions. Neither was done. Once such omission on the appellant's (landlady's) part was brought to the notice of the High Court, it ought to have given an opportunity to the appellant to cure the defect by paying the fine in terms of Section 9(a) of the said Ordinance. Impugned judgment of the High Court was not sustainable on this score. With respect to the tenant/respondent No. 3 claiming to be the owner of the rented property, if and when he would succeed to get a decree from the civil court he could have the same executed by getting the possession of the rented property, however, until then he (tenant) could not arrogate to himself the status of the owner. Appellate court erred by requiring the appellant (landlady) to defend her title in the civil suit and unlawfully made this the basis for setting aside the eviction order passed by rent tribunal. It was deemed not proper to remand the matter to the rent tribunal. Impugned judgment passed by the High Court as well as the judgment passed by the appellate court were set aside and the matter was remanded to the appellate court instead of the rent tribunal to decide Respondent No.3's (tenant) appeal after affording him opportunity to pay the fine contemplated by Section 9(a) of the 2007 Ordinance for not having shown compliance with the requirements of Section 5(2) of the said Ordinance. Present appeal was allowed, in circumstances.

Ss.5(1), 5(2), 5(3) & 5(5). Relationship of landlord and tenant, existence of. Proof. Ex*****on and presentation of a tenancy agreement before the rent registrar. Pre-requisite. Requirement. Section 5(1) of the 2007 Ordinance mandated that a landlord shall not rent out a premises to a tenant except by a tenancy agreement, whereas Section 5(2) required a landlord to present the tenancy agreement before the rent registrar. Additionally, Section 5(3) required the rent registrar to enter the particulars of the tenancy in a register, affix his official seal on the tenancy agreement, retain a copy thereof and return the original tenancy agreement to the landlord. It is the entry of the tenancy agreement in the office of the rent registrar which Section 5(5) of the said Ordinance treated as proof of the relationship of landlord and tenant.

S.15. Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.42. Tenant claiming ownership over rented property by filing a suit for declaration. Repercussions. Pendency of a civil suit filed by a tenant claiming to be an owner of rented premises cannot be a ground in an eviction petition either to dismiss or stay the proceedings before the rent tribunal.

Art.84. Comparison of handwriting or signatures by court. Scope. Court making comparison on its own motion without any expert. Cautious approach. Courts have the power to compare the admitted signatures with the ones in dispute. But the rule of prudence is that comparison of signatures by courts as a mode of ascertaining the truth should be used with great care and caution. Where a Judge compares the handwriting or signatures with other documents which are produced before him and which are not challenged as fabricated, such a process of comparison by the court upon its own initiative and without the guidance of an expert is hazardous and recognizably inconclusive.

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