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Khudai Law Associates, Plot No. 172-G, Block 2, P. E. C. H. S. Main Tariq Road. Ahmed Shopping Mall. , Suite No. 3-B, Karachi (2026)

01/06/2026

Preamble. Existence of landlord and tenant relationship being the deriving factor conferring jurisdiction upon the Rent Tribunal. Scope. The 2009 Act proceeds on the assumption that there is a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties in an eviction petition. The object behind the enactment of the 2009 Act is set out in its Preamble, viz., "to regulate the relationship of landlord and tenant, to provide a mechanism for settlement of their disputes in an expeditious and cost effective manner and for connected matters". Where there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties before the Rent Controller, it would have no jurisdiction to proceed with the matter.

2026 SCMR 208.
SUPREME-COURT.

Ss.2(l) & 15-Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.8, 12 & 54-Eviction petition-Landlord and tenant relationship, denial of-Proof Payment of rent as the determining factor Significance Petitioner (the purported buyer and landlady) claiming to have purchased the demised property from respondent No.1 (purported tenant) through agreement to sell. Effect. Brief of the matter was that the respondents "FN" and "FS" were married in 2004, and "FS" had earlier purchased a house which became the "demised premises"; over the years, multiple agreements to sell were executed between the petitioner and respondent No.1 "FN", followed by a civil suit filed by the petitioner (purported buyer and landlady) in 2008 that was decreed in her favour upon conceding statement of respondent No.1 "FN", leading to a registered sale deed---Thereafter, applications under Section 12(2) C.P.C. were filed by "FS" and "PN", resulting in the decree and sale deed being set aside through order dated 25.02.2016, which order was later set aside on 26.08.2020, reviving the earlier decree and sale deed; meanwhile, in 2017 the petitioner (purported buyer and landlady) filed eviction proceedings under Section 15 of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009, claiming respondent No.1 was her tenant, which were dismissed by the rent controller and the appellate court on the ground that landlord-tenant relationship was not proved, and thereafter, the High Court upheld these concurrent findings. The legal issue before Supreme Court was as to"whether the petitioner had established the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship so as to justify eviction under Section 15 of the 2009 Act"? Held: The rent controller as well as the appellate court and the High Court concurrently held that neither had the petitioner (the purported buyer and landlord) been able to prove the existence of such the agreement to sell, nor the payment of rent at any material stage by respondent No.1 (purported tenant) to her. The conclusions drawn by three courts below did not suffer from misreading or non-reading of evidence and therefore warranted no interference. Eviction could not be sought before the rent controller without establishing the relationship of landlord and tenant. It was emphasized that the relationship of landlord and tenant usually came into existence as a result of a tenancy agreement One of the most important circumstances from which inference as to the existence of such relationship could be drawn was payment of rent-The fact that no rent was paid by the person in possession of the premises would negate the existence of such relationship. Payment of rent was not just a normal incidence of tenancy but a sine qua non for the relationship of landlord and tenant. To show that respondent No.1 was the petitioner's tenant, the latter had to prove that respondent No.1 either undertook or was bound to pay rent as consideration for the possession or occupation of the demised premises. This could have been done through the production of rent receipts or witnesses deposing as to the payment of rent in their presence to respondent No.1. However, the non-payment of rent in the presence of a rent agreement, oral or written, would not by itself be sufficient to hold that there did not exist such relationship. The existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant could come into existence on ex*****on of a rent agreement. The petitioner (the purported buyer and landlady) did not produce witnesses in whose presence a tenancy agreement with respondent No.1 (purported tenant) was created. There was no reason to interfere with the three concurrent orders / judgments passed by the rent controller, appellate court and the High Court. Leave to appeal was declined and the petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Ss.2(l) & 15. Landlord and tenant relationship, existence of. Proof. Onus to prove the existence of a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties is on the landlord who seeks the eviction of a tenant.

01/06/2026

Quashing of FIR. Prior Bail Not Mandatory

2019 PLD 380.
LAHORE HIGH COURT LAHORE.

Ss. 154 & 497. Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199. Quashing of FIR in constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. Scope. Office objection requiring the petitioner to bring on file bail granting order before seeking quashing of FIR through Constitution petition. Legality. Obtaining bail from a court of competent jurisdiction before approaching the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction for quashing of FIR may be a practice for facility or preference but surely it was not a requirement of any law.

S. 154. Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 365-B. Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199. Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. Scope-Quashing of FIR-'Aggrieved person' Whether an abductee or prosecution witness of an FIR could seek quashing of FIR in Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. Held, that an abductee/witness of an FIR, was not an "aggrieved party" within the meaning of Art. 199 of the Constitution, as such, writ petition filed for quashing of same FIR on their behalf was not maintainable.

31/05/2026

Order I, Rule 10 C.P.C. Necessary parties.
The court may add necessary parties at any stage of proceedings; however, upon such impleadment, their substantive rights must be protected by granting them a fair opportunity to participate in the proceedings.

2026 YLR 536.
LAHORE HIGH COURT LAHORE.

Courts should provide parties a full and fair opportunity to prove their case. These procedural safeguards govern the proceedings to ensure fairness and strict adherence to procedures in mandatory. Non-compliance can attract legal consequences. No one should be condemned unheard. This fundamental principle of law guides Court to protect the rights of all parties involved. The process must uphold the principles of natural justice and fair trial, ensuring that no party suffers prejudice during adjudication.

S.107, O.XLI, Rr. 23, 24 & O.I, R.10. Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.42. Claim of share in grandfather's property. Failure to implead all legal heirs of grandfather. After impleadment of all legal heirs appellate court remanded the matter to Trial Court to allow newly added parties to submit their pleadings. Legality-Remand order, challenge to Appellate court should have decided the lis itself, plea of Scope-Brief facts of the matter were that the appellants (plaintiffs) filed a suit for declaration claiming entitlement to inherit shares in the estate of their grandfather, "DM", and sought correction of revenue entries and mutations relating to the suit property. Trial Court dismissed the suit partly on the ground that all legal heirs of "DM" had not been impleaded as necessary parties. The appellants then filed an appeal and also moved an application before the appellate court for impleadment of additional legal heirs, which the appellate court allowed and consequently remanded the case to the Trial Court for a fresh decision. The appellants challenged the remand order through the present appeal wherein a pivotal question was raised for determination as to "whether the appellate court acted lawfully in remanding the matter for a fresh decision after allowing impleadment of new parties, or whether it was required to decided the appeal itself under S.107 and O. XLI R. 24 C.P.C."? Held: It was an admitted position that certain parties were impleaded at the appellate stage, yet they neither filed their written statements nor adduced any evidence, thereby depriving them of a fair opportunity to contest the case. Under S.107 & O. XLI R. 24 of C.P.C., the appellate court could decide the case itself if sufficient material was available on record---Furthermore, the court could add or remove parties under O. I, R. 10 C.P.C., either suo motu or on a party's application, however, the court had to ensure that the rights of all parties, especially those added at the appellate stage, were protected and afforded a fair opportunity to present their case. In case new parties were added at the appellate stage, they had to be given a fair opportunity to present their case. Given the importance of pleadings in civil disputes, and to ensure justice was served, the case was rightly remanded to the Trial Court under O. XLI, R. 23 C.P.C., allowing the new parties to file their pleadings and participate in the proceedings. No legal infirmity or jurisdictional error in the impugned remand order passed by the appellate court was found and the same was based on sound legal reasoning, ensures adherence to due process, and upholds the principles of fair trial. Present appeal being devoid of merit was dismissed in limine.

30/05/2026

Bail Further Inquiry Attempt to Commit Qatl-i-Amd . Non-vital Injuries . Absence of Motive. In the circumstances, the alleged act would, at the most, fall within Section 337-F(i), P.P.C., which does not attract the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Cr.P.C.

2010 PCrLJ 1917.
KARACHI HIGH COURT SINDH.

S. 497(2) Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.324, 405, 337-F(i), 147, 148 & 149. Attempt to commit qatl-e-amd, criminal breach of trust, damiyah. Bail, grant of Further inquiry. Injuries on the person of injured were on non-vital part of the body, which prima facie showed lack of intention of accused to cause qatl-e-amd. Question of applicability of S.324, P.P.C. as mentioned in F.I. R. was still to be determined at trial after examination of complainant and prosecution witness-No motive had been assigned by the complainant for the alleged attack on him and others-Alleged offence against accused at the most would fall under S.337-F(i), .P. C. C., which did not fall under prohibitory clause of S.497, Cr.P.C.. Case of accused requiring further inquiry, he was admitted to bail, in circumstances.

28/05/2026

Section 12(5): The “time requisite” for obtaining a copy shall be deemed to be the period intervening between: The date on which the application for copy was made, and The date on which the copy was actually intimated to the applicant as ready for delivery.

2026 CLC 432.
LAHORE HIGH COURT LAHORE.

S.12-Exclusion of time in legal proceedings for the purpose of computing the limitation period-Mechanism-Limitation of appeal-Computation-"Time requisite"-Connotation and scope-From the perusal of subsection (2) of S.12 of Limitation Act, 1908, it is clear that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, the day on which the judgment complained is pronounced, and the 'time requisite' for obtaining a copy of the decree, or order appealed from shall be excluded---Subsection (5), thereof, on the other hand, ordains that for the purposes of subsections (2), (3) and (4), the 'requisite time' for obtaining a copy of decree, sentence, order, judgment or award shall be deemed to be the time intervening between the day on which an application for the copy is made and the day actually intimated to the applicant to be the day on which the copy will be ready for delivery.

S.19-Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.12-Limitation of appeal-Computation and starting point-Ejectment petition was allowed-Appeal against decision of Rent Tribunal was dismissed being barred by time-Certified copy not prepared on stipulated date, plea of-Whether limitation to be computed from date of preparation of certified copy or from date of its delivery to the applicant?-Exclusion of time in legal proceedings for the purpose of computing the limitation period-Mechanism and scope-Pivotal issue in the present Constitutional petition was about limitation in filing appeals-The petitioners (tenants) had been ordered to be evicted by the Rent Tribunal, and when they tried to challenge that order, their appeals were dismissed being time barred-The main legal question for determination before the High Court was: "from what point should the limitation period for filing an appeal be counted; either from the date the certified copy of the order was prepared, or from the date it was actually delivered to the petitioners?" Held: 'Time requisite' for obtaining certified copy of order within the meaning of S.12 of the Act, 1908 meant only the interval between the date of application for supply of copy and the date when it was ready for delivery-Even during this interval, due diligence on the part of the litigant was required by law and no delay, unless such as was caused by the circumstances, which he had no control and which could not by due diligence be avoided, form part of 'time requisite' for obtaining certified copy-The time between the date on which the copy was ready for delivery and the date on which the applicant chose to take delivery thereof was not a limb of the 'time requisite' for obtaining certified copy-Therefore, petitioners failed to prefer their appeals within prescribed period and time, as such the appellate court had rightly adjudged the same, being barred by time-Resultantly, present and connected writ petition, being bereft of any merits, were dismissed, in circumstances.

28/05/2026

Where vendor was required to obtain NOC, clear encumbrances, settle liabilities and complete mutation before receiving balance consideration, vendee could not be held in breach prior to fulfillment of such obligations.

2025 SCMR 495
SUPREME-COURT.

Context of contract. Contra proferentum, rule of. Applicability. Reasonable person, considering the context of contract, ought to be able to identify its meaning without any ambiguity and if ambiguity persists, the meaning that accords best with common sense would prevail.

S. 55-Time as essence of contract-Scope-Whether time is essence of contract always depends upon wordings of an agreement, intention of parties and above all is a question of fact-Agreements where time is not essence of contract does not become voidable by failure to do such thing at or before specified time and only remedy available to promisee is compensation from the promisor.

Ss. 12, 39, 42 & 54-Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell, cancellation of document, declaration and injunction. Willingness to perform agreement-Proof. Petitioner/vendor was aggrieved of judgments and decrees passed by High Court decreeing suit for specific performance of agreement to sell filed by respondent/vendee and dismissing his suit seeking cancellation of contract. Validity-Property in question was mortgaged to bank serving as collateral for loan at the time the contract was executed-Responsibility for balance payment by respondent/vendee depended on petitioner/vendor fulfilling specific obligations, which included (i) securing a clearance certificate or no objection certificate from bank; (ii) settling all outstanding dues, debts, claims, loans, mortgages, taxes and any other liabilities associated with the property; (iii) ensuring that property's mutation was duly processed in petitioner / vendor's name; and (iv) completing all necessary sale formalities, which encompassed registration of sale deed or granting a General Power of Attorney in favour of respondent/vendee or his nominee-All such conditions were expected to be fulfilled by petitioner/vendor on or before the deadline-Only after successfully meeting such prerequisites, respondent/vendee was obligated to pay outstanding amount-Respondent/vendee was consistently ready and willing to fulfill his contractual obligations, leading to equitable inference that scales of justice leaned favourably towards the respondent/vendee in such matter-Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgments and decrees passed by High Court-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Ss. 12, 39, 42 & 54-Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell, cancellation of document, declaration and injunction-Willingness to perform agreement-Proof-Petitioner/vendor was aggrieved of judgments and decrees passed by High Court decreeing suit for specific performance of agreement to sell filed by respondent/vendee and dismissing his suit for cancellation of contract-Validity-When petitioner/vendor fell short of funds to pay liability, he owed to bank, he approached respondent / vendee for payment, which was done so by respondent/vendee to the bank of petitioner/vendor to enable him to obtain no objection certificate-Such conduct of respondent/vendee showed that he was ready at all relevant times to conclude the agreement and acquire the property but was hindered by the conduct of petitioner/vendor, who had repeatedly tried to establish breaches on the part of respondent/vendee and then tried to use Courts to get a rubber stamp of approval on self-serving interpretations of agreement-There was no breach on the part of respondent/vendee rather it was on the part of petitioner/vendor, therefore, recourse to a suit for specific performance was the appropriate remedy for respondent/vendee-Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgments and decrees passed by High Court-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

28/05/2026

The case lays down an important principle under the rent laws that where the relationship of landlord and tenant itself is disputed and title of the premises is under serious controversy, the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to decide such questions, and the matter must be adjudicated by the Civil Court.

2026 CLC 594.
KARACHI HIGH COURT SINDH.

S.15. Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.42. Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.9-Ejectment petition. Oral tenancy. relationship of landlord and tenant, denial of. Burden of proof. Landlord has to be prove his land-lordship and existence of relationship with the tenant. Confusion regarding ownership of demised premises. Effect-Rent Controller lacking jurisdiction to adjudicate title disputes. Civil court being the proper forum-Delay of landlord in seeking eviction of tenant-Effect-The brief facts were that the petitioner (purported landlord) filed a rent application under S.15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (the srpo), claiming ownership demised premises, and alleging that respondent (purported tenant) was his tenant who defaulted in rent since 1994, seeking eviction and arrears-The respondents denied the relationship of landlord and tenant, contending that no written rent deed or proof of rent payment existed-Both the Rent Controller and Appellate Court dismissed the petitioner's claim, holding that the relationship of landlord and tenant was not established, leading to the filing of present constitutional petition by the purported landlord-Held: It was clear from the evidence of parties that respondent (purported tenant) did not pay any rent to the petitioner (purported landlord) in respect of demised premises and petitioner remained silent for four years and did not take any effort to vacate the premises-The parties were already under litigation over title of demised premises and rent court thus could not determine the status of ownership of parties-Petitioner lodged claim of ownership of demised premises and landing the same on rent as owner-He was burdened to prove his claim through a solid and reliable evidence that he was landlord which he failed to discharge. Moreover, he claimed that demised premises was rented out on 01.09.1994, per his claim rent for one month only was paid to him but he remained silent until 27.08.1999 when the present rent application was filed-Pleadings of parties created a confusion regarding the ownership of demised premises which could not be settled by Rent Controller and fell within the jurisdiction of Civil Court-In the said circumstances, it was incumbent upon petitioner to agitate his claim of ownership before civil court but he did not-Contrary respondents filed suit seeking declaration of ownership of demised premises-Trial Court decreed the suit partly in favor of respondents and petitioner did not challenge the decree of Trial Court by way of appeal which attained finality against him-The courts below rightly resolved that title of the demised premises was under dispute and court of Rent Controller was not the forum for adjudication of such claim It was obligatory upon the petitioner (purported landlord) to prove existence of relationship of landlord and tenant-The case of the petitioner fell outside the purview of provisions of srpo 1979 thus rent application was not maintainable and concurrent findings of courts below were in accordance with law. Constitutional petition being devoid of merits was dismissed, in circumstances.

25/05/2026

Bail in non-prohibitory clause cases is not a right. The court has discretion to grant or refuse bail after considering the facts and circumstances. Prima facie, the accused is linked with the offence. The defence grounds do not justify further inquiry at this stage under Section 497(2) Cr.P.C.

THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH AT KARACHI
Crl. Bail Application No. 344 of 2025.

ORDER
Jan Ali Junejo, J.
The applicant/accused has filed the present
criminal bail application seeking post-arrest bail in connection with FIR No. 418 of 2023, registered at P.S. Mehmoodabad, Karachi, under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC). Initially, the applicant/accused approached the learned IXth Judicial Magistrate, Karachi-South, through Bail Application No. 12 of 2024, which was dismissed by order dated 02-01-2025.
Subsequently, the applicant filed another Criminal Bail Application No. 42 of 2025 before the learned Sessions Court, which was transferred to the VIIIth Additional Sessions Judge, Karachi-South, and was also dismissed by order dated
06.01.2025.

I have given due consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant/accused, as well as the learned Additional Prosecutor General.
Furthermore, I have meticulously examined the material available on record with utmost care and judicial prudence. Upon a thorough and meticulous scrutiny of the case record, It
appears that the applicant/accused, due to a business obligation concerning the payment of a huge outstanding amount of Rs. 85 lacs, issued five cheques in favor of the
complainant. However, when the complainant deposited these cheques in his account, they were dishonored, as evidenced by the cheque return memos issued by UBL, Azam Town Branch. It is pertinent to mention that an offense under Section 489-F PPC not only affects the immediate victim but also has
repercussions on his family. In the present case, the Applicant has failed to establish that the cheques were not dishonestly issued by him for the repayment of a loan or financial
obligation. Although the offense under Section 489-F PPC does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) Cr.P.C., this does not automatically render it a bailable offense. The
discretion still rests with the Court to determine whether the accused deserves the concession of bail, based on established legal principles governing such matters. It is also significant to
highlight that the growing trend of issuing dishonored cheques has severely impacted public confidence in financial transactions. This practice has eroded mutual trust to the extent
that even credible individuals face skepticism when issuing cheques. Such fraudulent financial conduct undermine societal
stability, as no person has the right to inflict financial ruin upon another. Furthermore, it is a settled principle of law that while deciding a bail application, the Court must conduct only a
tentative assessment rather than a deeper evaluation of evidence. The applicant is, prima facie, linked to the alleged offense, and the grounds presented in his defense do not
warrant further inquiry within the scope of Section 497(2) Cr.P.C. Therefore, he does not qualify for the concession of bail. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in Shameel Ahmed v. The State (2009 SCMR 174) has categorically held that bail in cases not falling within the prohibitory clause is not a rule of
universal application and that each case must be examined on its own facts and circumstances. Similarly, in Afzaal Ahmed v.
The State (2003 SCMR 573), it was held that the mere fact that an offense does not fall within the prohibitory clause does not
automatically render it bailable, and the Court retains discretion in granting bail based on established legal principles.

In light of the aforementioned reasons, the present bail application, lacking substantive merit, is hereby dismissed. It is expressly clarified that the observations and conclusions
rendered in this order are strictly limited to the disposal of the present bail application and do not constitute an opinion on the merits of the case. These remarks shall not be interpreted as
prejudicing the rights, claims, or defenses of either party. prosecution or defense during the trial proceedings. The trial Court shall adjudicate the matter independently, uninfluenced by any findings articulated herein, and solely based on evidence adduced and legal principles applicable at the appropriate stage.

23/05/2026

In criminal cases (especially r**e and abduction), when medical evidence is doubtful or contradictory, and there are material infirmities, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt.

2026 SCMR 393.
SUPREME-COURT.

Ss. 365-B & 376. Forcible abduction, r**e. Reappraisal of evidence. Benefit of doubt. Medical evidence doubtful. Accused-petitioner was charged for abduction and ra**ng the daughter of the complainant. Medical Officer had stated that the va**na of the alleged victim admitted two (02) fingers. As per Forensic Science LaboratoryReport, the va**nal swabs of victim were found to be stained with semen but no DNA test of the said semen was conducted in this case. Furthermore, there was nothing in the statement of the Medical Officer to show that the alleged victim was recently subjected to in*******se. Medical Officer had not stated that there was any sign of fresh rupture of h***n of the alleged victim. Medical Officer had further stated that no mark of violence was noted on the entire body of victim. Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove the charged against the petitioner beyond shadow of doubts. Petition was converted into an appeal and was allowed, in circumstances and petitioner was acquitted of all charges.

20/05/2026

Civil Suit is fixed only for hearing of an interlocutory application the trial court cannot dismiss the entire suit for non-appearance of the plaintiff under Order IX Rule 8 CPC. limitation does not run against a void/illegal order.

2026 PLD 43
QUETTA-HIGH-COURT.

O.IX, Rr.8 & 9. Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5. civil suit fixed for passing of order on interlocutory application. Suit dismissed for non-appearance of plaintiff-Legality-Whether the entire suit could be dismissed in circumstances. Date of "hearing", meaning of Petitioner filed a civil suit for declaration and specific performance regarding a registered sale deed along with correction/transfer of mutation and permanent injunction; suit was dismissed for non-appearance under O.IX R.8, C.P.C.; the petitioner's application for restoration under O.IX R.9, C.P.C. (with S.5 Limitation Act) was allowed and the suit was restored; the respondents filed revision petition against restoration order, whereby restoration order was set aside, leading to the filing of the present constitutional petition. Held: The case was not fixed for hearing of the main suit rather for passing of an order on a miscellaneous application under O.###IX Rr.1 and 2 C.P.C. Trial Court while dismissing the entire suit due to non-appearance of the plaintiff clearly exceeded its jurisdiction. Proceedings under O.###IX, Rr. 1 and 2 C.P.C. were of an interlocutory nature. Dismissal of such application or non-appearance of a party thereon could not entail dismissal of the main suit unless specifically fixed for hearing. Order dismissing the entire suit was illegal. As regards the question of limitation for filing application for restoration of the suit, even if the same was filed after some delay, it was rightly considered and allowed by the trial court after condoning delay as limitation did not run against the void order.

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