20/08/2026
Executive Power Under the Law!!!
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer and the Constitutional Jurisprudence of Pakistan.
⚖️ Adv. Zulfikar Khan Nasir
Former Judge • Amicus Curiae • Forensic Criminologist • Criminal Defence Mentor • Honorary Researcher (Neurolegal Sciences) • Trustee – Mundi Societas Professionalum Ultimam ad Justitiam
A Constitutional Lesson on the Limits of Executive Power.
Few constitutional decisions illustrate the principle of limited government more powerfully than the judgment of the United States Supreme Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
The case arose during the Korean War, when President Harry S. Truman, apprehending that a nationwide steel strike would seriously impair the war effort, ordered the Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate the country’s steel mills.
The President considered the action necessary. But the constitutional question was not whether the seizure was desirable or even necessary.
The question was:
Where did the President derive the legal authority to do it?
The Supreme Court answered that the power could not be found in the Constitution or in an Act of Congress. The seizure was therefore unconstitutional.
The decision established a proposition of enduring importance: executive necessity cannot, by itself, create executive power.
Justice Jackson’s Constitutional Framework
Justice Robert H. Jackson’s celebrated concurrence provides perhaps the most useful analytical framework for understanding executive power.
He identified three situations.
First, when the President acts with the express or implied authorization of Congress, presidential power is at its maximum.
Second, where Congress has neither granted nor denied authority, there exists a “zone of twilight” in which the distribution of power may be uncertain.
Third, where the President acts contrary to the expressed or implied will of Congress, presidential power is at its “lowest ebb.”
The steel seizure fell within the third category.
Justice Jackson’s broader warning was that constitutional government cannot survive if executive power gradually escapes legal restraints. His famous formulation therefore deserves to remain at the heart of constitutional education:
“The Executive be under the law.”
Youngstown in the Supreme Court of Pakistan
What makes Youngstown particularly interesting for Pakistani students is that its central constitutional principle has actually been discussed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan.
In Constitution Petition No. 21 of 2007, concerning the suspension of the Chief Justice of Pakistan, the Supreme Court expressly referred to Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579. (Yumpu)
The Court referred to the American Supreme Court’s observation that if the President possessed authority to seize the steel mills, that authority had to be found in some provision of the Constitution. (Yumpu)
The Pakistani Court then placed this principle within our own constitutional framework.
It observed, in substance, that the written Constitution is the source from which governmental power emanates, defines its scope and confines each constitutional functionary to his respective sphere. Consequently:
“No power can, therefore, be claimed by any functionary which is not to be found within the four corners of the Constitution
That is an extraordinarily important constitutional proposition.
It transforms Youngstown from a purely American precedent into a useful comparative authority for understanding constitutional supremacy in Pakistan.
Pakistan’s Own Doctrine: No Inherent Constitutional Power
The Supreme Court went further by invoking its earlier judgment in Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan, PLD 1993 SC 473.
There, the Court rejected the proposition that the President possessed unspecified “inherent or implied powers” beyond those expressly conferred by the Constitution. The Court emphasized that, given the detailed scheme of Pakistan’s written Constitution, there was no room for a generalized reservoir of residual or enabling powers inherent in a constitutional authority.
This is the precise point at which Youngstown and Pakistani constitutional jurisprudence converge.
The American formulation
If executive power exists, it must have a constitutional or legal source.
The Pakistani formulation
No constitutional functionary can claim a power outside the four corners of the Constitution.
The terminology differs, but the constitutional philosophy is remarkably similar.
The Constitutional Principle
The significance of Youngstown therefore extends beyond the American presidency.
It raises a fundamental question applicable to every constitutional system:
Does holding constitutional office confer unlimited authority, or does the Constitution itself define the limits of that office?
A constitutional democracy necessarily adopts the second proposition.
The office-holder does not possess power because of the importance of the office.
He possesses only the power that the Constitution or law confers upon that office.
This distinction is fundamental.
Power is not inherent merely because the office is powerful.
Why This Matters in Pakistan
Pakistan’s Constitution establishes numerous constitutional offices and distributes governmental authority among the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary.
Articles 4 and 5, among others, embody the broader philosophy that governmental action must remain subject to law, while the constitutional allocation of powers among institutions prevents any single organ from becoming the unrestricted source of governmental authority.
Article 90, for example, identifies the Federal Government and its constitutional structure; Article 97 defines the extent of executive authority of the Federation; and Article 175 establishes the constitutional separation of the judiciary from the Executive and Legislature.
These provisions must be read not as isolated textual commands but as part of a larger constitutional architecture:
Governmental power is constituted by the Constitution and limited by it.
The Supreme Court’s treatment of Youngstown in Constitution Petition No. 21 of 2007 is therefore particularly instructive for students of Pakistani Constitutional Law.
Emergency Is Not a Source of Unlimited Power
Another important lesson from Youngstown concerns emergency powers.
President Truman acted against the background of war and an impending industrial crisis.
Yet the Supreme Court did not accept the proposition that an emergency itself generated the necessary constitutional power.
This principle has universal significance.
A government may confront:
* war;
* terrorism;
* political instability;
* economic crisis;
* natural disaster;
* institutional breakdown; or
* threats to national security.
But the existence of an emergency does not automatically answer the constitutional question:
Who has the power to act, and from where does that power originate?
Necessity may explain an action.
It does not necessarily legalize it.
The Judiciary’s Role
Youngstown also illustrates the essential role of judicial review.
The judiciary does not ordinarily determine whether a particular governmental policy is politically wise. Its constitutional responsibility is different.
It asks:
Is the power being exercised lawfully?
That distinction is vital.
If courts decline to examine the source and limits of executive authority merely because the Executive invokes national interest, security or necessity, constitutional limitations can gradually become meaningless.
This concern resonates with Justice Frankfurter’s reasoning in Youngstown, and has also appeared in more recent Pakistani judicial discussion. In Syed Muhammad Ali Bokhari v. Federation of Pakistan, the Islamabad High Court referred to Youngstown in discussing the danger of the gradual accumulation of unchecked governmental power and the judiciary’s vigilance against movements towards autocracy.
A Comparative Constitutional Formula
For students, the relationship between the two jurisdictions can be reduced to a simple formula:
United States
Constitution + Congress → Executive authority
Where Congress has not authorized action, presidential power becomes constitutionally vulnerable.
Pakistan
Constitution → Source and limits of governmental authority
A constitutional functionary cannot enlarge his powers merely by describing them as inherent, incidental, ancillary, implied or necessary, where the constitutional scheme does not confer them.
Thus:
Necessity cannot become a substitute for constitutional authority.
Points for Determination
For examination purposes, Youngstown and its Pakistani counterpart raise the following questions:
1. What is the source of executive power?
2. Can an executive authority exercise a power not expressly conferred by the Constitution or statute?
3. Can emergency circumstances enlarge constitutional power?
4. What is the difference between inherent executive power and delegated statutory authority?
5. What happens when executive action conflicts with legislative intention?
6. What is the proper role of judicial review in controlling executive excess?
7. Does constitutional necessity justify unconstitutional means?
8. What does the principle that the Executive must remain “under the law” mean in a constitutional democracy?
The Deeper Lesson
The enduring significance of Youngstown is not that President Truman lost a dispute over steel mills.
Its deeper significance is that the Supreme Court refused to accept the proposition that good intentions, national interest or emergency necessity can substitute for constitutional authority.
The same philosophy appears in the Supreme Court of Pakistan’s insistence that:
No constitutional functionary can claim a power which cannot be located within the four corners of the Constitution.
That principle is the very essence of constitutionalism.
A Constitution is not merely a document that grants power to government.
It is equally a document that restrains government.
Conclusion!!!
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer should therefore be taught alongside Pakistani authorities such as Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan (PLD 1993 SC 473) and Constitution Petition No. 21 of 2007.
Together, they teach a foundational proposition:
The holder of constitutional office possesses no authority merely because he holds the office; his authority exists only within the constitutional and legal limits of that office.
The genius of constitutional government lies precisely here.
Government must possess sufficient power to govern—but no public functionary may possess power merely because he believes that he ought to have it.
And perhaps the most enduring lesson for every student, lawyer, judge and constitutional functionary is Justice Jackson’s simple warning:
“The Executive be under the law.”
That is not a limitation upon constitutional government. It is the condition that makes constitutional government possible.
