25/01/2026
Our view, the trial court’s judgment in the Imaan Mazari and Hadi Ali Chatha tweets case contains several serious flaws, which we outline below:
Under Section 9 (Glorification), the court wrongly equates criticism of state policy with promotion of terrorist objectives. This is a doctrinal error, as mere criticism does not meet the statutory threshold of glorification. The Supreme Court in District Bar Association, Rawalpindi v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2015 SC 401) stressed the need for strict interpretation of penal statutes.
Under Section 10 (Cyber Terrorism), the judgment infers intent largely from tone, frequency, and political alignment of tweets, without establishing imminent violence, a call to arms, operational coordination, or a likely terrorist outcome. This fails both the mens rea and proximity tests.
Under Section 11 (Hate Speech), the court itself concedes in para 43 that inter-faith or sectarian hatred was not proven, yet still upholds culpability—an internally inconsistent finding.
The repeated reliance on the phrase “anti-state narrative” is problematic, as this is not a defined offence under PECA or ATA.
The judgment cites Colozza v. Italy and certain UK/EU cases but ignores key precedents such as Handyside v. UK (protecting speech that offends, shocks, or disturbs), Erbakan v. Turkey (political speech enjoys the highest protection), and Sürek v. Turkey (No. 1) (distinguishing advocacy of violence from harsh political critique).
Screenshots were admitted without forensic verification, and no independent metadata analysis or chain-of-custody review was undertaken.
Retweets were treated as endorsements per se, contrary to established digital speech doctrine.
In several paragraphs, the burden of proof was improperly shifted onto the accused to disprove inferences, violating Article 10-A (fair trial).
Taken together, these defects suggest that both human rights activists have strong grounds for appeal.
