ACFV Law

26/05/2025

LIBRENG LEGAL NA SERBISYO PARA SA LAHAT!

Mga ka-barangay, inaanyayahan ang lahat sa isang mahalagang IBP Seminar and Legal Aid, isang pagtutulungan ng Lupon Tagapamayapa ng Barangay Santa Lucia sa pangunguna ni Kap Aldwin Ilagan at ng Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) RSM-Rizal Chapter.

Ito ay gaganapin sa Hunyo 7, 2025 (Sabado), mula 9:00 AM hanggang 5:00 PM, sa 2nd floor ng Barangay Hall ng Santa Lucia.

Ang unang bahagi ng programa ay ang IBP SEMINAR mula 9AM hanggang 12NN kung saan tatalakayin ang topic na neighbor and family disputes.

Magkakaroon naman ng LIBRENG LEGAL NA KONSULTASYON ng 1PM-5PM para sa mga sumusunod na usapin:

*Mga kasong sibil
*Small claims cases
*Ejectment o pagpapaalis ng nangungupahan
*Mga alitang pampamilya
*Mga kasong kriminal
*Mga isyung may kinalaman sa paggawa o trabaho

Huwag palampasin ang pagkakataong ito na makakuha ng libreng legal na payo mula sa mga eksperto sa batas! Bukas ito sa lahat ng residente ng Barangay Santa Lucia.

Magdala ng mga dokumentong may kinalaman sa inyong kaso para mas mapadali ang inyong konsultasyon.

Tayo na't magkaisa para sa isang mas maayos at makatarungang komunidad. Kita-kits, ka-barangay!

03/01/2025

The Supreme Court emphasized that search warrants must clearly define the location to be searched; otherwise, they are invalid for violating the right against unlawful searches and seizures.

Thus, the SC acquitted an accused due to a defective search warrant and its irregular ex*****on.

The case stemmed from a 2017 operation by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), which implemented a search warrant against Lucky Enriquez (Enriquez) to search for and seize dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia. The address in the search warrant states, “Informal Settler’s Compound, NIA Road, Barangay Pinyahan, Quezon City.”

PDEA agents, guided by an informant, entered a house where Enriquez was located. Without knocking or announcing their presence, they immediately rushed through the open door, apprehended Enriquez, and seized sachets containing shabu.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Enriquez, and the Court of Appeals upheld the decision.

The SC reversed these rulings, declaring the search warrant invalid. The Constitution requires a valid search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched. This requirement is crucial to prevent enforcing officers from deciding on their own where to search and whom and what to seize.

The SC ruled that the search warrant was too broad and essentially a general warrant, which is prohibited by the Constitution. This lack of detail gave the PDEA agents unlimited power to search the entire compound.

The SC also found that the search warrant was not carried out properly. According to the Rules of Court, government agents must first identify themselves and ask for permission to enter the place they want to search. They can only force their way in if they are denied entry.

Additionally, searches must be made with the lawful occupants of the house as witnesses, or, if they are unavailable, two residents in the same area. In this case, Enriquez was the lawful occupant of the house but was not able to witness the search.

The Decision was from the Supreme Court Second Division written by Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen.

Read the full text of the press release at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-search-warrants-must-clearly-specify-location-to-be-searched/

Read the full text of the Decision at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/264473-people-of-the-philippines-vs-lucky-enriquez-y-casipi/



Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/

03/01/2025

The Supreme Court has ruled that foreign divorce decrees do not require judicial proceedings abroad to be recognized in the Philippines.

The Court ruled that Filipinos who were previously married to foreigners can seek judicial recognition of their foreign divorce under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The type of divorce, whether administrative or judicial, does not matter. As long as the divorce is valid under the foreign spouse's national law, it will be recognized in the Philippines for the Filipino spouse.

The Court emphasized that Article 26(2) aims to prevent a situation where a foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse remains bound by the marriage.

The Court also clarified that under Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) Circular No. 157-2022-A, the OCA’s compilation of foreign divorce laws serves only as a preliminary reference for courts but does not dispense with the requirements of proving foreign divorce laws under the Revised Rules on Evidence.

Read the full press release: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-recognition-of-divorce-not-limited-to-those-decreed-by-foreign-courts/

Read the full text of the Decision: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/249238-republic-of-the-philippines-vs-ruby-cuevas-ng-a-k-a-ruby-ng-sono/

03/01/2025

The Supreme Court has ruled that demotion, verbal abuse, and indifferent behavior by an employer that forces an employee to resign constitute constructive illegal dismissal.

Constructive dismissal happens when an employer creates such unbearable working conditions that the employee feels forced to resign.

The Supreme Court’s Second Division, in a Decision penned by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, stressed that actions demonstrating extreme dislike and hostile behavior, such as demotion, uttering insulting words, and apathetic behavior toward an employee, constitute constructive illegal dismissal when such actions cause the employment conditions to be so unbearable that there is no other choice but to resign.

The Court held that the standard for constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt forced to give up their employment under the circumstances.

While the Court said that strong words may be exchanged in the workplace where there are bound to be disagreements, these should not degrade the dignity of employees to avoid a hostile work environment.

Read the full press release: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-employers-insulting-words-hostile-behavior-toward-an-employee-constitute-constructive-dismissal/

Read the full text of the Decision: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/254465-jonathan-dy-chua-bartolome-vs-toyota-quezon-avenue-inc-lincoln-t-lim-esteban-dela-paz-jr-josefina-de-jesus-and-pauline-bacaling/

03/01/2025

The Supreme Court reiterated that while lenders can acquire properties used as loan collateral, ownership cannot automatically transfer to them.

The SC explained that pactum commissorium occurs when (1) a property is used as collateral for a loan; and (2) the loan agreement includes a provision automatically transferring ownership of the collateral to the lender if the borrower fails to pay.

The SC emphasized that pactum commissorium is prohibited to protect borrowers from losing properties that may be worth more than their debt. Ownership can only be transferred through foreclosure and a public auction.

However, the SC clarified that this prohibition only applies to automatic transfers of ownership. Borrowers are free to voluntarily sell their collateral to lenders as repayment.

In this case, the realty corporation willingly entered into a separate agreement to sell its properties to the lenders as payment for the loan. The SC ruled that this was not an automatic transfer and, therefore, did not violate the prohibition against pactum commissorium.

The Decision is from the SC First Division, penned by Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo.

Read the full text of the press release at:
https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-automatic-transfer-of-collateral-for-loan-repayment-prohibited/

Read the full text of the Decision at:
https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/217368-ruby-shelter-builders-and-realty-development-corporation-vs-romeo-y-tan-et-al/



Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/

16/12/2024

16/12/2024

The Supreme Court En Banc has approved The Rules on Unified Legal Aid Service (ULAS Rules) which mandates covered lawyers to render at least 60 hours of pro bono legal aid every three years in favor of indigent Filipinos.

Under the ULAS Rules, any person who has no sufficient means to afford adequate legal services, as assessed by a covered lawyer in accordance with guidelines to be issued by the ULAS Board, may be a qualified beneficiary.

The legal service itself will be free for such qualified beneficiary and the necessary expenses for the rendering of the service will be borne by the Court through the ULAS Fund, to be set up for this purpose. Qualified beneficiaries shall be exempt from payment of docket and other fees.

Pro bono legal aid services can come in many forms, such as representation in court, legal counselling, drafting legal documents, developmental legal assistance, and participation in accredited legal outreach programs.

The ULAS Rules is a product of extensive deliberations and studies made over the course of more than a year by the ULAS Rules Technical Working Group (TWG). In drafting the same, the TWG solicited the invaluable inputs of the Court En Banc, as well as the ULAS Rules' stakeholders—its covered lawyers.

Comments and feedback were gathered in the four-leg ULAS Regional Consultations held last April 12 to May 31, 2024 where the TWG, the Court En Banc, and various Court employees visited major cities in the country to consult lawyers in the local regions.

An online feedback form was likewise published throughout the same period so that the public, including the potential beneficiaries of the ULAS Rules, can likewise be heard. All these channels were opened to ensure that the final version of the ULAS Rules is responsive and accessible.

The ULAS Rules takes effect on February 3, 2025, following its complete publication in the Official Gazette or in two newspapers of general circulation.

Read the full text of the press release: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-approves-the-rules-on-unified-legal-aid-service/

Read the full text of A.M. No. 22-11-01-SC: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/22-11-01-sc-re-the-rules-of-unified-legal-aid-service/

Read more about ULAS Rules on the Supreme Court website: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/ulas/



Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/

16/12/2024

SC: Persons Convicted of Heinous Crimes Still Entitled to Good Conduct Time Allowance |

In G.R. No. 249027 and G.R. No. 249155 (Guinto et al., v. Department of Justice; Inmates of New Bilibid Prison, et al. v. Department of Justice), the Supreme Court En Banc, through Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, found that the Department of Justice (DOJ), in enacting its 2019 Implementing Rules and Regulations (2019 IRR), exceeded its power of subordinate legislation when it excluded persons convicted of heinous crimes from the benefits of Republic Act (RA) No. 10592, or the New Good Conduct Time Allowance (GCTA) law.

In finding the assailed provisions of the 2019 IRR invalid, the En Banc held that when R.A. No. 10592 amended Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code(RPC), it used the connecting conjunction “or” to express that (1) “any offender qualified for credit imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of the RPC,” and in the alternative (2) “any convicted prisoner in any penal institution, rehabilitation, or detention center in any other local jail” may avail of the benefits granted by R.A. No. 10592.

Thus, the 2019 IRR expanded the scope of R.A. No. 10592 when it excluded recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees, and persons deprived of liberty convicted of heinous crimes from earning GCTA credits when the law itself did not do so.

The Court ruled that Article 97 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 10592, is clear that any convicted prisoner is entitled to GCTA as long as the prisoner is in any penal institution, rehabilitation or detention center, or any other local jail.

Read more at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-persons-convicted-of-heinous-crimes-still-entitled-to-good-conduct-time-allowance/

16/12/2024

The Supreme Court emphasized that statements against public officers do not constitute oral defamation or slander when these concern their discharge of official duties —unless done maliciously.

In a Decision written by Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, the Supreme Court’s Second Division acquitted an accused of oral defamation for remarks against a barangay kagawad.

The barangay kagawad was walking past the accused’s house, when she yelled from her house’s terrace that the barangay kagawad was uneducated, ignorant, and biased against the accused in their barangay conciliation proceedings. The remarks were heard by many people as the terrace was beside the highway.

Under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, there is oral defamation or slander when (1) there is an allegation of a crime, fault, or flaw; (2) made orally; (3) publicly; (4) maliciously; (5) towards a person, alive or dead; and (6) such allegation tends to cause dishonor on the person defamed.

As the law assumes that a defamatory allegation is malicious, or made with knowledge that it is false, the person who made the defamatory remarks has the burden of proving there was no malice.

However, when it comes to defamation against public officers in relation to their duties, the prosecution has the burden to prove there was actual malice in the defamatory remarks. The Court recognizes that the right to free speech empowers citizens to hold public officers accountable because public office is a public trust.

In the present case, the SC said that the prosecution failed to prove there was malice in the accused’s remarks against the barangay kagawad. It stressed that while the statements may be offensive, they are not actionable by themselves: “Being ‘sensitive’ has no place in this line of service."

Read the full press release at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-statements-against-public-officers-not-slanderous-when-related-to-the-performance-of-official-duties/

Read the full text of the Decision at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/246824-argelyn-m-labargan-vs-people-of-the-philippines/

16/12/2024

The Supreme Court reiterated that using online chat logs and videos as evidence does not violate the right to privacy if they are used to determine if a crime has been committed.

The Court upheld the conviction of a man for qualified trafficking in persons under Republic Act No. 9208 or the Anti-Trafficking of Persons Act of 2003, finding that the videos and recordings of the chat logs of his conversations with an undercover agent can be admitted as evidence.

The Court rejected the accused’s arguments that they were inadmissible for violating his privacy rights. Republic Act No. 10173, or the Data Privacy Act of 2012, allows the processing of sensitive personal information to determine a person’s criminal liability and to protect the rights and interests of persons in court proceedings.

As the chat logs and videos were submitted as evidence to assess his criminal liability for qualified trafficking, his right to privacy was not violated.

The Court emphasized that the videos and chat logs were presented as evidence to show the accused’s method of reaching out to foreigners through Skype or Facebook and offering minors for sexual exploitation.

The Decision is from the Supreme Court’s Second Division, written by Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez.

Read the full text of the press release at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-chat-logs-videos-may-be-used-as-evidence-in-criminal-cases/

Read the full text of the Decision at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/263603-people-of-the-philippines-vs-eul-vincent-o-rodriguez/



Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/

16/12/2024

December 13, 2024: The Integrated Bar of the Philippines' Message of Congratulations to our New Lawyers

16/12/2024