Serrano Law Office - Atty. Janny Carlo Serrano

24/04/2026

The (SC) has ruled that ISCO Holding Corporation (ISCO) cannot register its “𝐍𝐈𝐊𝐎𝐍 & 𝐃𝐄𝐒𝐈𝐆𝐍” mark as it constitutes Nikon Corporation’s trade name and is confusingly similar to the well-known “𝐍𝐈𝐊𝐎𝐍” trademark of the said corporation.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division denied ISCO’s petition and affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA), which rejected ISCO’s trademark application.

ISCO filed an application for a trademark for its home and household goods containing the design of an anchor enclosed in a circle with the word “𝐍𝐈𝐊𝐎𝐍”.

Nikon Corp., a foreign corporation and prior registrant and user of the “𝐍𝐈𝐊𝐎𝐍” mark in the Philippines, opposed the application, arguing that ISCO’s mark is confusingly similar to its own mark.

The Intellectual Property Office–Bureau of Legal Affairs (IPO‑BLA) agreed with Nikon Corp. and denied ISCO’s application. Although the IPO Office of the Director General later reversed this ruling, the CA reinstated the IPO-BLA’s decision, prompting ISCO to elevate the case to the SC.

ISCO claimed that its goods are unrelated to Nikon Corp.’s and that differences, such as the image of an anchor enclosed in a circle and the color scheme, prevent consumer confusion.

The SC upheld the CA’s ruling and held that ISCO’s mark cannot be registered. It explained that trademarks are used to identify and distinguish goods or services. Under Section 147 of the 𝘐𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘭𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘶𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, one of the rights of a trademark owner is to exclude others from using their trademark in a way that would confuse consumers and cause financial harm to the owner.

If a well‑known trademark is registered in the Philippines, no other party may register an identical or confusingly similar mark—even if the goods are different.

In this case, the SC found that Nikon Corp.’s trademark is well‑known. The NIKON mark has long been used, promoted, and registered worldwide, including in the Philippines, with the company enjoying significant global sales and market presence.

The SC also found NIKON to be a highly distinctive trademark. It is a coined or invented word with no ordinary meaning in English or Filipino and is not commonly used in the Philippines except as a trademark.

Analyzing the two marks, the SC found that ISCO’s trademark is confusingly similar to NIKON’s. It applied the 𝐃𝐨𝐦𝐢𝐧𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐲 𝐓𝐞𝐬𝐭, which focuses on the most noticeable and memorable part of the marks. Minor differences in design, color, or layout are disregarded.

Both ISCO’s and Nikon Corp.’s marks prominently use the word “𝐍𝐈𝐊𝐎𝐍.” This word is the dominant feature of both marks. They are spelled the same, appear in bold capital letters, and sound exactly the same when pronounced. Because of this, the SC ruled that the two marks create the same visual and auditory impression.

The SC explained that if ISCO were allowed to use its NIKON mark, consumers would likely assume a connection with Nikon Corp. Given its reputation for cameras, the public might believe that ISCO’s household appliances are made, approved, or endorsed by Nikon Corp., or that it has expanded into household products.

The SC also warned that ISCO’s use of the NIKON mark would damage Nikon Corp.’s interests because it would weaken its mark’s ability to uniquely identify a single source of goods. The law protects famous trademarks from such uses to prevent the blurring of their distinctiveness and to preserve their value and reputation.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164274

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164266

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy

31/03/2026

27/03/2026

The SupremeCourtPH (SC) has clarified that a complaint or petition may only be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action after an examination of the complaint or information itself, together with its annexes—strictly excluding the pleadings or submissions of other parties, reconciling conflicting rulings on the issue.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division ruled that the lower courts erred in dismissing a petition for quieting of title for supposedly failing to state a cause of action and in interchanging this concept with “dismissal for lack of cause of action.”

A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another, the three elements of which are:

1. a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;

2. an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and

3. an act or omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.

The case arose from a land dispute between the groups of Inocencio Taganile and Filomena Delos Santos Dolar.

Taganile’s group claims that it has occupied a portion of land along Dr. Sixto Antonio Avenue in Rosario, Pasig City, since 1970. After learning that the land had been registered in the name of Dolar’s group, they filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to challenge the title.

Dolar’s group, on the other hand, claims that Taganile’s group were mere lessees. They filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing that it did not state a cause of action because it lacked supporting documents.

The RTC dismissed the case after considering both the petition and the evidence presented by Dolar’s group. It ruled that the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not include proof of the Taganile’s group’s claim to the land. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed this ruling.

The SC disagreed. It clarified the difference between failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action.

A cause of action exists when a legal right is violated. Courts cannot hear a civil case unless there is a cause of action. A case may be dismissed if the complaint does not state one, or if the party later fails to prove it with evidence. These are different grounds.

To determine whether a complaint fails to state a cause of action, the court looks only at what is written in the complaint and assumes the allegations are true. If, even assuming those facts are true, the court still cannot grant the relief asked for, it can dismiss the complaint on this ground.

In contrast, to determine whether a case lacks a cause of action, the court looks at the evidence presented.

The SC noted that confusion arose from past rulings that allowed courts, in some instances, to look beyond the complaint, such as when the allegations appear to be legally impossible or unfounded. This blurred the difference between failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action.

To settle the issue, the SC ruled that courts may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action only by examining the complaint and its attachments—nothing more. Courts must not consider other pleadings or submissions at this stage.

The SC explained:

“Once the trial court considers other pleadings submitted by the parties or evidence admitted during the proceedings, it is no longer determining a failure to state a cause of action, but rather the very existence of one. In doing so, the ground for dismissing the complaint or petition ceases to be ‘failure to state a cause of action’ and becomes ‘lack of cause of action.’”

Applying this rule, the SC found that the RTC and CA improperly relied on the submissions and evidence of Dolar’s group. They prematurely ruled on the existence of a cause of action without giving Taganile’s group the chance to present evidence.

The SC also found that, based on the allegations alone, the petition was able to establish a case for quieting of title, noting Taganile group’s claims of long-standing possession and houses built on the property since the 1970s.

The SC directed that the case be returned to the RTC to continue the proceedings and receive evidence on the parties’ claims.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162612

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162606

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

13/01/2026

07/01/2026

24/09/2025

The (SC) has reiterated that preventing employees from entering company premises and doing their jobs, without a valid reason, is considered illegal dismissal.

In a Decision written by Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, the SC’s Second Division upheld the labor arbiters’ ruling that 12 workers from Constant Packaging Corporation (Constant Packaging), a company that prints packaging materials, were illegally dismissed.

Constant Packaging hired the workers as sorters and packers on a 𝘱𝘢𝘬𝘺𝘢𝘸 basis (paid per output).

The workers later raised concerns about their below-minimum wage earnings, 12-hour work day, 7-day work week, non-remittance of their SSS, PhilHealth, and PAG-IBIG contributions, and delay in the release of their salaries. Constant Packaging responded by telling them to leave if they were unhappy with their working conditions.

The workers filed a complaint with the Department of Labor and Employment. Soon after, the company security guard prevented them from entering the company premises, leading the workers to file a complaint for illegal dismissal.

Ruling in favor of the workers, the SC clarified that an employee who is able and willing to work is considered illegally dismissed if they are prevented from entering the workplace without a valid or lawful reason.

In this case, the company’s security guard blocked the workers from entering the company premises without any valid reason. This action amounts to dismissal.

Moreover, as the workers were suddenly dismissed without following the required procedures, their dismissal was unlawful.

The SC thus ordered Constant Packaging to pay the workers separation pay, back wages, service incentive leave, and holiday pay.

However, since the workers were hired on a 𝘱𝘢𝘬𝘺𝘢𝘸 basis, the SC ruled that they are not entitled to 13th month pay.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-preventing-employees-from-reporting-to-work-without-valid-reason-is-illegal-dismissal/.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph?p=152126.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

04/09/2025

The (SC) has reiterated the rules in determining the appropriate legal actions for recovery of possession and/or ownership of land and the corresponding prescriptive periods in filing them. These remedies are: 𝙖𝙘𝙘𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙞𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙘𝙩𝙖𝙡 or ejectment, 𝙖𝙘𝙘𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙥𝙪𝙗𝙡𝙞𝙘𝙞𝙖𝙣𝙖, and 𝙖𝙘𝙘𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙧𝙚𝙞𝙫𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙞𝙘𝙖𝙩𝙤𝙧𝙞𝙖.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, the SC 𝙀𝙣 𝘽𝙖𝙣𝙘 held that Lea Victa-Espinosa (Espinosa) correctly filed an 𝙖𝙘𝙘𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙥𝙪𝙗𝙡𝙞𝙘𝙞𝙖𝙣𝙖 to recover possession of her land within a year from dispossession. It explained that 𝙖𝙘𝙘𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙥𝙪𝙗𝙡𝙞𝙘𝙞𝙖𝙣𝙖 may be filed not only when the dispossession lasted for a year but also when it lasted for a year or less when there is no allegation that the deprivation is by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.

The SC also ruled that Espinosa’s action is not 𝙖𝙘𝙘𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙧𝙚𝙞𝙫𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙞𝙘𝙖𝙩𝙤𝙧𝙞𝙖 as she did not seek in her complaint the recovery of ownership of the land.

After purchasing the property, Espinosa found that Spouses Noel and Leny Agullo were occupying a part of it. When they refused to leave despite her demand, Espinosa filed a complaint for recovery of possession in the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

The RTC dismissed the complaint for being filed too early. It explained that Espinosa may still file forcible entry, an ejectment suit, within one year from the time she learned of the deprivation of physical possession of the land. Since an 𝙖𝙘𝙘𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙥𝙪𝙗𝙡𝙞𝙘𝙞𝙖𝙣𝙖 can only be filed after that one-year period, RTC ruled that her complaint was premature.

The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s decision, finding that Espinosa’s complaint was not an 𝙖𝙘𝙘𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙥𝙪𝙗𝙡𝙞𝙘𝙞𝙖𝙣𝙖 but an 𝙖𝙘𝙘𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙧𝙚𝙞𝙫𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙞𝙘𝙖𝙩𝙤𝙧𝙞𝙖, as she sought to recover possession based on her ownership of the property.

In their Petition before the SC, Spouses Agullo sought to reinstate the ruling of the RTC dismissing the case and insisted that Espinosa’s case was an 𝙖𝙘𝙘𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙥𝙪𝙗𝙡𝙞𝙘𝙞𝙖𝙣𝙖 that was filed prematurely, as less than a year had passed since the alleged dispossession.

The Court denied the Petition but clarified that the action is not accion reivindicatoria but accion publiciana. It reiterated the actions available for recovery of possession and/or ownership of land:

• 𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙞𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙘𝙩𝙖𝙡 or a summary ejectment case;
• 𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙥𝙪𝙗𝙡𝙞𝙘𝙞𝙖𝙣𝙖; and
• 𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙧𝙚𝙞𝙫𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙞𝙘𝙖𝙩𝙤𝙧𝙞𝙖.

𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙞𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙘𝙩𝙖𝙡 or summary ejectment proceeding is filed to recover physical possession of land when the dispossession was due to force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth and has not lasted for more than a year.

𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙥𝙪𝙗𝙡𝙞𝙘𝙞𝙖𝙣𝙖 is filed when the dispossession lasted for more than a year, or even for a year or less, if it is not due to force, intimidation, or similar means.

𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙧𝙚𝙞𝙫𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙞𝙘𝙖𝙩𝙤𝙧𝙞𝙖 is filed to recover both ownership and possession based on that ownership.

The Court explained that in 𝙖𝙘𝙘𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙥𝙪𝙗𝙡𝙞𝙘𝙞𝙖𝙣𝙖, the issue is who has the better right to possess the land, without necessarily claiming ownership. In contrast, 𝙖𝙘𝙘𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙧𝙚𝙞𝙫𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙞𝙘𝙖𝙩𝙤𝙧𝙞𝙖 involves determining who owns the land, with possession granted to the rightful owner.

As what is sought in the complaint is recovery of possession and not ownership, and there is no allegation that Spouses Agullo disputed Espinosa’s title, the action is 𝙥𝙪𝙗𝙡𝙞𝙘𝙞𝙖𝙣𝙖 and not 𝙧𝙚𝙞𝙫𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙞𝙘𝙖𝙩𝙤𝙧𝙞𝙖.

The Court also held that contrary to the findings of the RTC, the action was not premature, because 𝙖𝙘𝙘𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙥𝙪𝙗𝙡𝙞𝙘𝙞𝙖𝙣𝙖 may be filed even within one year from dispossession if no force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth was used. Since Espinosa did not claim that Spouses Agullo used any of these means, the action was correctly filed not as ejectment suit but 𝙖𝙘𝙘𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙥𝙪𝙗𝙡𝙞𝙘𝙞𝙖𝙣𝙖.

The SC thus ordered the RTC to proceed to trial and decide the case.

Read the full text of the press release at https://tinyurl.com/y7nr9hzx

Read the full text of the Decision at https://tinyurl.com/38e2xzfa

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

27/06/2025

The (SC) has ruled that a land sale made through a verbal, unwritten agreement can be considered valid and binding—as long as it has been partly or fully carried out.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the SC’s Third Division upheld the verbal sale of land between Marcos Batara (Batara) and his nephew Benedicto Ocampo (Ocampo). Even without a written contract, the SC found the sale valid because Ocampo had already received the land title, moved into the property, and made improvements on it.

The land was registered in the name of Batara, who passed away in 1974. His children, Noblesa and Ernesto, only learned of their father’s ownership of the property in 2007, when they received a notice to pay unpaid real estate taxes on the land and found out that the same was being occupied by their cousin, Ocampo.

Noblesa and Ernesto filed a case to reclaim the land from Ocampo, saying they were the rightful heirs. Ocampo, on the other hand, claimed he bought the land from Batara while the latter was still alive. After Batara died, Ocampo kept paying installments to Marcelo, Batara’s brother.

Ocampo admitted that the sale was not evidenced by any written document because Batara died before they could execute the necessary instruments. But Ocampo provided the owner’s copy of land title as proof, claiming Batara gave it to him after the initial payment in 1972.

Ruling in Ocampo’s favor, the SC said that under the Civil Code, a sale of land must be in writing to be enforced in court. This written document serves as proof that both parties agreed to the sale.

However, the sale is still considered valid even without a written contract if it has already been fully or partly carried out. In such cases, a verbal agreement can still be legally binding, and witnesses may be allowed to testify to prove that the sale happened.

In this case, the sale was partially executed as Ocampo had partially paid for the land, taken possession of it, received the land title, and paid real property taxes. The SC thus admitted the testimonies of Ocampo and his witnesses, which proved the sale.

The SC, however, found that Ocampo’s payments to Batara’s brother Marcelo were ineffective because he was not authorized to accept them on behalf of his brother’s heirs.

Therefore, while the sale remains valid, Ocampo must pay the remaining balance of the purchase price, with interest, to Noblesa and Ernesto.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://tinyurl.com/yeapyzcd.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://tinyurl.com/msxr7hsd.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

26/06/2025

Nagpasya ang na ang kawalan ng kakayahan ng isang asawa na mahalin ang kabiyak o magkaroon ng emosyonal na koneksyon sa kanya dahil sa isang personality disorder ay maaaring ituring na ebidensya ng psychological incapacity at maging batayan para ideklarang walang bisa ang kasal.

Sa isang Desisyon na isinulat ni Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, kinatigan ng Second Division ng Korte ang naunang pasya ng Regional Trial Court (RTC) na nagdeklarang walang bisa ang kasal ng mag-asawa dahil sa psychological incapacity ng lalaki na gampanan ang kanyang mga tungkulin bilang asawa.

Nagkakilala ang mag-asawa noong 1999 at palihim na nagpakasal noong 2002. Hindi sila agad nagsama dahil nagtrabaho ang lalaki sa Saudi Arabia. Kinasal sila sa simbahan noong 2004 nang umuwi ang lalaki pero umalis ulit ito sa Pilipinas. Bumalik sa bansa ang lalaki noong 2005 at silang mag-asawa ay nagsama paminsan-minsan at nagkaroon ng dalawang anak — isang lalaki noong 2007 at babae noong 2012. Nagsama lamang sila ng halos limang taon at ang pagsasama ay puno ng paulit-ulit na pagtatalo at hiwalayan.

Noong 2016, nagsampa ng petisyon ang lalaki para mapawalang-bisa ang kasal. Nagsumite sya ng diagnosis ng isang psychologist tungkol sa kanyang Passive-Aggressive Personality Disorder na naging dahilan para mahirapan siyang mapanatili ang kanyang malalapit na relasyon.

Pinagbigyan ng RTC ang petisyon pero binaliktad nito ang naging desisyon matapos umalma ang Office of the Solicitor General dahil sa due process. Kalanaunan ay isinantabi ng Court of Appeals ang apela ng asawa.

Pero nagpasya ang Korte Suprema pabor sa lalaki at sinabing napatunayan nito ang kanyang psychological incapacity.

Sa ilalim ng Article 36 ng Family Code, ang kasal ay walang bisa kung ang isa o parehong mag-asawa ay hindi kayang gampanan pyschologically ang kanilang mga tungkulin sa pag-aasawa kahit pa ang kundisyon na ito ay lumantad lang pagkatapos ng kasal.

Ang kawalan ng kakayahang magmahal ay dapat na malalim na nakaugat sa karakter ng tao at dapat na umiiral bago pa ang kasal.

Sa kasong ito, sinabi ng Korte na ang emotional detachment ng lalaki ay dahil sa strikto at emotionally distant na pagpapalaki. Bagamat kaya niyang tustusan ang kanyang pamilya, nahirapan siyang tugunan ang emosyonal na mga pangangailangan ng kanyang asawa.

Basahin ang buong press release sa https://tinyurl.com/2zjba472.

Basahin ang buong Desisyon sa https://tinyurl.com/8e67mcme.

Basahin ang Dissenting Opinion ni Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez sa https://tinyurl.com/56e9rs43.

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.