Atty. VA Zara O. Dollolasa-Estoque

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Atty. VA Zara O. Dollolasa-Estoque Bearer of Truth☝️and Justice ⚖️

10/08/2026

SC: Banks Cannot Invoke Internal Record-Retention Policies to Escape Their Fiduciary Duty

The Supreme Court has ruled that a bank cannot refuse to render a complete accounting of a borrower's loan payments or withhold pertinent loan documents by merely invoking its internal record-retention policy. Stressing the fiduciary nature of banking, the Court held that banks are bound to exercise the highest degree of diligence in maintaining accurate records of their clients' transactions.

Where discrepancies exist in a customer's loan account, a bank must be able to explain how payments were applied because its duty to account arises from the trust and confidence reposed in it by the public.

Learn more: [https://dlsurf.com/.1006/sc-banks-cannot-invoke-internal-record-retention-policies-to-escape-their-fiduciary-duty]

10/08/2026

TWO SUPREME COURT VACANCIES SET TO OPEN IN 2026, INCLUDING CHIEF JUSTICE POST

Two Supreme Court Justices will be stepping down this 2026 as they reach the mandatory retirement age, giving President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. an opportunity to exercise his sole appointment discretion in the Judiciary.

Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo, the 27th Chief Justice of the Philippines, will retire on November 6, 2026, as by that time he already reached the mandatory retirement age of 70.

He has been in the highest bench for roughly eight years and was appointed as the Chief Justice in 2021 after serving as Associate Justice from 2017 until 2021. During his tenure, the Supreme Court introduced the Strategic Plan for Judicial Innovations (SPJI), which started significant reforms in the judicial system by incorporating modern technology.

Another position will be vacant due to the retirement of Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier on November 16, 2026. She was appointed as associate justice in March 2019. Lazaro-Javier also served as Chairperson of the 2025 Bar Examinations.

04/08/2026

Atty. Dante B. Gatmaytan, a Member of the Constitutional Law Department of the Philippine Judicial Academy and a professor at the University of the Philippines College of Law, discusses press freedom, fair trial, and contempt in 𝐄𝐩𝐢𝐬𝐨𝐝𝐞 𝟏𝟐𝟖: 𝐌𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐚 𝐂𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐠𝐞 𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐬𝐮𝐬 𝐅𝐚𝐢𝐫 𝐓𝐫𝐢𝐚𝐥: 𝐖𝐡𝐞𝐧 𝐍𝐞𝐰𝐬 𝐑𝐞𝐩𝐨𝐫𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐒𝐩𝐚𝐫𝐤𝐬 𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐦𝐩𝐭. A former public interest lawyer, he previously served as head of the Information and Publication Division and as director of the Institute for the Administration of Justice of the UP Law Center.

What is qualified privilege and what are the speeches that fall under it? What restrictions on free speech should litigants and their counsels keep in mind? What can be done to prevent a trial by publicity in high-profile cases?

This week's podcast is available on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, YouTube, Facebook, and the website.

LISTEN to the FULL episode of this Podcast on

Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/episode/5QrhU8mmBl1IRhQDeI8Ksm?si=mdy2u8kfTvSEFzA9UbJCOw

Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/ph/podcast/supreme-court-ph-podcast/id1852172756?i=1000779236630

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1962n6ax4S/

YouTube: https://youtu.be/EVHc6bngldI

SC website: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/podcasts/

04/08/2026

The (SC) has declared unconstitutional the Department of Agriculture’s (DA) directive to commercial Philippine-flagged fishing vessels to be tracked and monitored, and to report and send fisheries data, as it violates rights against unreasonable searches, seizures, due process, and equal protection under the law.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 dismissed the petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DA and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), and upheld the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declaring Fisheries Administrative Order (FAO) No. 266 unconstitutional for failing to pass the rational basis test.

In 2020, the DA, through the BFAR, issued FAO No. 266 requiring all commercial Philippine-flagged fishing vessels to adopt Vessel Monitoring Measures (VMM). These measures include a Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) to track and monitor vessels, and an Electronic Reporting System (ERS) to record and transmit fisheries data. FAO No. 266 also mandated the securing of Maritime Mobile Service Identity numbers from the National Telecommunications Commission.

Royale Fishing Corporation, Bonanza Fishing and Market Resources, Inc., and RBL Fishing Corporation (Royale Fishing et al.), operators of Philippine commercial fishing vessels, challenged FAO No. 266 before the RTC through a petition for declaratory relief. They argued that the continuous monitoring requirements violated their constitutional rights, exposed confidential business information and trade secrets, and denied them equal protection because only commercial fishing vessels were required to comply, even though the Fisheries Code also covers municipal and distant-water fishing vessels.

The SC upheld the RTC’s ruling that FAO No. 266 is unconstitutional.

It explained that courts apply different standards in reviewing government regulations. While stricter standards apply to regulations affecting fundamental rights and certain classifications, the rational basis test applies to cases that do not fall under those standards.

Under this test, the government must show a legitimate interest and a reasonable connection between that interest and the methods used. The SC found the Republic failed this because it did not adequately prove that the VMS and ERS requirements were reasonably connected to preventing illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing.

In particular, the SC found that the VMS was not effective in detecting IUU fishing violations other than fishing within protected or restricted areas. It also noted that the expected output from VMS is no longer different from existing reporting requirements already being complied by the fishing vessels.

The SC likewise ruled that FAO No. 266 authorized monitoring beyond what RA 8550, as amended, allows. The Fisheries Code defines “monitoring” as the continuous observation of fishing effort, expressed through factors such as “number of days or hours of fishing, characteristics of fishery resources, and resource yields.”

According to the SC, this definition does not extend to the continuous tracking of the locations or destinations of commercial fishing vessels. It emphasized that RA 10654 does not require operators to disclose their location 24/7, recognizing that fishing grounds constitute proprietary business information.

While recognizing that combating illegal fishing and protecting the country’s marine resources are legitimate and compelling State interests, the SC emphasized that these objectives cannot justify measures that unnecessarily infringe constitutional rights, particularly when the same goals may be achieved through lawful and less restrictive means.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=170021

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169871

Read the Dissenting Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169872

Read the Separate Opinion of Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169884

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169898

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169910

Read the Concurrence and Dissent of Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169918

Read the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169926

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

25/07/2026

The (SC) has ruled that the infliction of psychological violence, if done through Facebook, is considered done through information and communications technology, which warrants the imposition of a higher penalty pursuant to Section 6 of RA 10175 or the 𝘊𝘺𝘣𝘦𝘳𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘦 𝘗𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2012.

In a Resolution penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, the SC’s First Division affirmed with modification its October 22, 2025 Decision (assailed Decision), which upheld the conviction of an individual (###) for committing psychological violence under Section 5(i) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9262, or the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘪𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘈𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵 𝘞𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘛𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘳 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2004 (Anti-VAWC Act) against his ex-girlfriend (AAA) by posting derogatory statements about her on Facebook.

The SC, however, resolved to raise the penalty by one degree, considering that the offense was committed through Facebook, as adequately alleged in the Information and established during trial.

AAA filed the VAWC case against her former partner ### after he posted a statement on Facebook calling her a dirty woman and an animal, and threatening to box her when he sees her. He repeated the insults in the comments to the post, which was public.

During trial, AAA presented screenshots of the Facebook post and testified that she had created for ### the Facebook account which made the post. Her two siblings testified that the account was ###’s and that they received messages from him through the same account.

Despite ###’s denial, the SC, in its assailed Decision, affirmed the decisions of the Family Court and the Court of Appeals (CA) convicting ###, stressing that in criminal cases, the prosecution must prove not only the elements of the crime but also the identity of the offender. The SC also upheld the penalty imposed by the CA, consisting of imprisonment for six months and one day to eight years and one day, a fine of PHP 100,000, and psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment.

Resolving ###’s Motion for Reconsideration, the SC held that ###’s authorship of the Facebook post was established beyond reasonable doubt, using the guideposts it established in its assailed Decision:

𝟏. 𝐀𝐝𝐦𝐢𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐨𝐟 𝐨𝐰𝐧𝐞𝐫𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩 𝐨𝐫 𝐚𝐮𝐭𝐡𝐨𝐫𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩;
𝟐. 𝐁𝐞𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐬𝐞𝐞𝐧 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭 𝐨𝐫 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐭;
𝟑. 𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐢𝐧𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐤𝐧𝐨𝐰𝐧 𝐨𝐧𝐥𝐲 𝐭𝐨 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐨𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐫 𝐚 𝐟𝐞𝐰 𝐩𝐞𝐨𝐩𝐥𝐞;
𝟒. 𝐋𝐚𝐧𝐠𝐮𝐚𝐠𝐞 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐰𝐢𝐭𝐡 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐨𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫’𝐬 𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐬;
𝟓. 𝐑𝐞𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐝𝐬 𝐟𝐫𝐨𝐦 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐢𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐞𝐭 𝐬𝐞𝐫𝐯𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐯𝐢𝐝𝐞𝐫, 𝐭𝐞𝐥𝐞𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐦𝐮𝐧𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐧𝐲, 𝐨𝐫 𝐬𝐨𝐜𝐢𝐚𝐥 𝐦𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐚 𝐬𝐢𝐭𝐞, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐮𝐥𝐭𝐬 𝐟𝐫𝐨𝐦 𝐝𝐞𝐯𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐜 𝐚𝐧𝐚𝐥𝐲𝐬𝐢𝐬 𝐬𝐡𝐨𝐰𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐠𝐞𝐨𝐥𝐨𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐟𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐞𝐬, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐚𝐭𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐛𝐮𝐭𝐞𝐬 𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐤𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭 𝐭𝐨 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐨𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫;
𝟔. 𝐀𝐜𝐭𝐬 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐰𝐢𝐭𝐡 𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐯𝐢𝐨𝐮𝐬 𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐬; 𝐨𝐫
𝟕. 𝐎𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐢𝐧𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞𝐬 𝐬𝐡𝐨𝐰𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐨𝐰𝐧𝐞𝐫𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩, 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐞𝐬𝐬, 𝐨𝐫 𝐚𝐮𝐭𝐡𝐨𝐫𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩.

The authorship of the Facebook post and all the elements of psychological violence having been established, the SC said Section 6 of the 𝘊𝘺𝘣𝘦𝘳𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘦 𝘗𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2012 applies, which mandates the imposition of a penalty higher by one degree for crimes and offenses committed using ICT. The use of ICT can enable offenders to evade liability, reach more victims, or cause greater harm.

Citing the definition of ICT, the Court ruled that social media platforms, such as Facebook, qualify as ICT systems because they allow users to generate, send, receive, store, and process electronic data messages through computers, mobile phones, or similar electronic devices.

In this case, the Information alleged that ### made the Facebook post using his "Facebook Messenger Account… which was set to public view." The SC ruled that this statement constitutes a sufficient allegation of the use of ICT as a qualifying circumstance. Even if the term "ICT" was not stated, the Information adequately informed ### that he is being charged of inflicting psychological violence upon AAA through Facebook, which falls under the contemplation of an ICT system.

The allegation was established by the prosecution during trial.

Thus, the Court increased the penalty by one degree from six months and one day to eight years and one day to imprisonment of six years and one day to 14 years, eight months, and one day, but retained the fined PHP 100,000. He was likewise ordered to undergo psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168987

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168968

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

25/07/2026

Upholding the right to free speech, the (SC) has dismissed petitions for indirect contempt arising from public statements critical of its 2025 decision in 𝘋𝘶𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘦 𝘷. 𝘏𝘰𝘶𝘴𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘦𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦𝘴, which declared the fourth impeachment complaint against Vice President Sara Duterte unconstitutional.

In a Decision penned by Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 dismissed the consolidated petitions against political analyst Richard J. Heydarian, Representative Percival Cendaña, and Presidential Adviser for Poverty Alleviation Secretary Lorenzo “Larry” G. Gadon (respondents).

After the release of the decision in 𝘋𝘶𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘦 𝘷. 𝘏𝘰𝘶𝘴𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘦𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦𝘴, Heydarian posted on X and Facebook that former President Rodrigo “𝘋𝘶𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘦 𝘩𝘢𝘥 𝘢𝘱𝘱𝘰𝘪𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘢𝘴 𝘮𝘢𝘯𝘺 𝘢𝘴 13 𝘰𝘶𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 15 𝘚𝘶𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘮𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘵 𝘫𝘶𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘦𝘴 𝘣𝘺 2022” while Rep. Cendaña posted a video on Facebook claiming that the Supreme Court disregarded the Constitution, its own decision and the principle of separation of powers, calling it “𝘚𝘶𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘮𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘥𝘭𝘦𝘳 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘗𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘱𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘴.” Sec. Gadon, for his part, referred to the SC in media interviews as “𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘢 𝘯𝘨 𝘮𝘨𝘢 𝘋𝘶𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘦.”

These statements prompted Attys. Mark Kristopher G. Tolentino, Rolex Suplico, and Ferdinand S. Topacio to file petitions asking the SC to cite the respondents for indirect contempt. They claimed that the statements questioned the SC’s independence, undermined its decisions, and weakened public trust in the Judiciary.

The SC, however, found that the statements did not amount to indirect contempt.

Rule 71, Section 3 of the 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘵 punishes conduct that degrades the courts or damages their reputation. There must be a clear showing that the speaker intended to impede or obstruct the administration of justice.

While contempt proceedings help protect judicial independence and public confidence in the Judiciary, the SC emphasized that courts must also respect and uphold the freedoms of speech, expression, and the press.

The SC explained that political speech, which includes statements about government actions, public officials, and matters of public concern, enjoys the highest level of constitutional protection. It is not automatically punishable even if it is harsh or inaccurate.

Applying the stricter incitement test, the SC said political speech may be restricted only if it is intended and likely to cause imminent lawless action. In making this determination, courts look beyond the literal meaning of the words and consider their performative aspect: the speaker’s intent, the context in which the speech was made, and its likely effect.

Under this standard, a person may be held liable for contempt only if the speech advocates lawless conduct that threatens the administration of justice.

Applying these principles, the SC found that the respondents’ statements were political speech relating to the impeachment case of Vice President Duterte, a matter of significant public interest involving public accountability.

The SC found Heydarian’s post a fair comment on a matter of public interest and, when read together with his other posts, did not show bad faith, malice, or disrespect toward the SC. While the statement may have reflected bias, it remained protected speech.

As for Rep. Cendaña’s remarks, the SC said although they were accusatory, they only showed his disappointment with the ruling and were not meant to interfere with the administration of justice. The SC considered his statements as expressions of opinion and an understandable reaction to an unfavorable decision.

Finally, the SC found that while Sec. Gadon’s remark was disrespectful, it did not amount to contempt because it was not intended to interfere with court proceedings or influence any pending case. Instead, it was an expression of opinion on an issue that was widely debated by both supporters and critics of the SC’s decision.

Respondents were reminded, however, to encourage thoughtful and constructive public discussion of Judiciary’s decision, to show greater respect, restraint and care in publicly criticizing the Judiciary, and to express their criticisms with civility and fairness.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169021

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168894

Read the Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/e-01742-e-01747-separate-opinion-justice-alfredo-benjamin-s-caguioa/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

25/07/2026

Atty. Reinier Paul R. Yebra, an examiner in Commercial and Taxation Laws during the 2023 Bar examinations, discusses loans and their corresponding interest rates in 𝐄𝐩𝐢𝐬𝐨𝐝𝐞 𝟏𝟐𝟔: 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐋𝐨𝐚𝐧 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐭 𝐓𝐫𝐚𝐩. A graduate and class valedictorian of the San Beda University College of Law in 2009, he also topped the Bar Examinations that same year. He served as Undersecretary for Legal Affairs of the Department of Transportation from 2017 to 2024 and as Acting Deputy Director in the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas from 2011 to 2017. He is a law professor and a Bar reviewer.

Can a borrower still challenge an excessive or unconscionable loan interest rate in court even after agreeing to it? If a loan is declared fully paid by the court, does the mortgage securing it automatically become ineffective, or is a separate cancellation required?

This week's podcast is available on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, YouTube, Facebook, and the website.

LISTEN to the FULL episode of this Podcast on

Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/episode/5LYvM7H100RrHfGj3C5WlN?si=pseiVE2gTDeqgdq_KEhbIg

Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/ph/podcast/supreme-court-ph-podcast/id1852172756?i=1000777192378

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1PfNZbHcWY/

YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Po1GdSsl9yo&feature=youtu.be

SC website: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/podcasts/

25/07/2026

The (SC) has reiterated that the loss or non-presentation of ransom money in court does not prevent a conviction for kidnapping for ransom, so long as the prosecution is able to prove that ransom was demanded for the victim’s release.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, the SC’s First Division affirmed the conviction of Jose Olbato, PO3 Clayton Patingan, and others (the accused), except for SPO4 Romeo Ayson who died during the pendency of the appeal, for kidnapping for ransom.

PO3 Patingan and SPO4 Ayson flagged Genevieve Ong Sy (Sy) while she was on board her car and, together with the other accused, forcibly took her and detained her in a house. They demanded PHP 50 million from her father in exchange for her release. After negotiations, the amount was reduced to PHP 500,000.

Acting under police surveillance, Sy’s family driver delivered marked ransom money to the accused. The police then rescued Sy, arrested the accused, and recovered the marked money.

The Regional Trial Court found that the accused worked together to kidnap and detain Sy for ransom. It rejected their defenses of denial and alibi. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

Before the SC, the accused argued that their guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt because the prosecution failed to present the ransom money in court after it was allegedly lost while in police custody.

The SC disagreed and explained that kidnapping for ransom is committed when a private individual illegally kidnaps, detains, or deprives another of liberty for the purpose of demanding ransom.

The SC stressed that actual payment or receipt of the ransom money is not important to prove the crime.

In this case, the SC found that the prosecution proved that ransom was demanded, negotiated, and delivered. Sy’s father testified that the kidnappers called him repeatedly, demanding PHP 50 million for his daughter’s release, later reducing the amount to PHP 500,000 after negotiations. Evidence also showed that the ransom money was delivered and received during the police operation.

The SC emphasized that the failure to present the ransom money in court did not disprove that ransom had been demanded and paid since the evidence clearly established both.

The accused were sentenced to 𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘭𝘶𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘱𝘦𝘳𝘱𝘦𝘵𝘶𝘢 or up to 40 years in prison. They were also ordered to pay the victim PHP 300,000 in civil indemnity and damages.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169311

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/276833-people-of-the-philippines-vs-jose-olbato-y-aurella-et-al/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

25/07/2026

The (SC) has ruled that a sale of land remains valid even if the deed of sale designates a different lot number from what was actually sold, as long as the parties’ true agreement can be clearly shown. The deed may then be corrected to match what the parties actually agreed to.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC’s Third Division upheld the sale of a 491-square-meter parcel of land in Cebu City between buyers Genara and Felipe Abay, Sr. (the Abays) and sellers Crispin Caballes and the heirs of Trinidad Caballes-Gallardo (the Gallardos), despite the mistake in the designation of the lot number in the deed of sale.

The property formed part of the estate of Margarita Lopez, who had nine children, including Crispin and Trinidad.

The Abays visited the site with Crispin and Tomas Gallardo, one of Trinidad’s heirs before buying the property. During the visit, they were showed them the land’s boundaries. Tomas even helped the Abays build a concrete fence around it.

The Abays openly occupied the property for about 20 years until their possession was disrupted when workers of spouses Jacinto and Chiok Ngo Lim Young (the Youngs), who are claiming ownership over the property, entered it, destroyed the fence, and built their own posts.

The Abays discovered that a title over the property had been issued in the Youngs’ name. This prompted them to file a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to cancel the title.

The Gallardos challenged this, arguing that the documents the Abays presented referred to a different lot, Lot No. 6036-B, and not the lot they were occupying, which was Lot No. 7. While both lots were located in the same area, they were separate properties and were not beside each other. The Youngs supported the Gallardos’ position and maintained that they were buyers in good faith.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Abays which ruling was reversed by the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA held that the documents presented by the Abays showed that they purchased Lot No. 6036-B and not Lot No. 7, which they claimed to own and possess.

The SC disagreed and reiterated its pronouncements in previous cases upholding the validity of the sale and allowing the correction of a contract to reflect the parties’ true agreement in instances where the deed of sale failed to accurately describe the land intended by the parties.

The SC stressed that a person buys property based on what they see on the ground, such as its boundaries, landmarks, and improvements, and not by its technical lot number. Ordinary buyers cannot be expected to identify property based only on survey descriptions or legal documents.

Under the 𝘊𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, a written document may be corrected when, because of a mistake, it does not express the parties’ actual agreement.

The SC explained that a contract may be reformed or corrected if: (1) the parties agreed on the transaction; (2) the written document does not express their true agreement; and (3) the error was caused by a mistake, fraud, accident, or unfair conduct.

In this case, all these requirements were present.

Thus, the Court declared deemed reformed the Deeds of Sale and Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale by changing the designation of the property sold from “Lot No. 6036-B” to “Lot 7” and the Abays as absolute owners of such property.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169523

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/266298-spouses-genera-and-felipe-abay-sr-et-al-vs-spouses-jacinto-s-young-et-al/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

09/07/2026

Atty. Marlon J. Manuel, a Labor Law examiner for the 2022 Bar Examinations, a faculty member of the Ateneo de Manila University (AdMU) School of Law, a Bar Review and Mandatory Continuing Legal Education lecturer also at AdMU, and a Coordinator of the Alternative Law Groups from 2008-2017, discusses contracting agreements in #𝐒𝐂𝐩𝐡𝐏𝐨𝐝𝐜𝐚𝐬𝐭 𝐄𝐩𝐢𝐬𝐨𝐝𝐞 𝟏𝟐𝟑: 𝐅𝐢𝐧𝐝𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐓𝐫𝐮𝐞 𝐄𝐦𝐩𝐥𝐨𝐲𝐞𝐫.

When is job contracting considered legitimate? Does outsourcing services automatically amount to labor-only contracting?

This week's podcast is available on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, YouTube, Facebook, and the website.

Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/episode/7F9vfAUNunYXumsMh9jFCA?si=-cYFk4cXQD6Gy_k3Pqc-uQ

Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/ph/podcast/supreme-court-ph-podcast/id1852172756?i=1000774330464

YouTube: https://youtu.be/16z0Z0NeGLE

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/share/v/185xfVLoKn/

SC website: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/podcasts/

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