Asebias Law Office

19/09/2026

The has reiterated that what Republic Act No. 9262, or the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘪𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘈𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵 𝘞𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘛𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘳 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2004, criminalizes is not marital infidelity by itself but the psychological violence that goes with it causing mental or emotional suffering to the wife.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, the SC’s Second Division affirmed the conviction of a husband for violation of Section 5(i) of the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘈𝘞𝘊 𝘈𝘤𝘵, which penalizes the act of causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to a woman or her child.

Married in 1999, the husband and wife’s marital problems began in 2009, when the husband started coming home late and grew distant from his family. In January 2010, the husband sent his wife text messages saying he would no longer return home, wanted to start a new life alone, and intended to seek the nullity of their marriage. The wife later discovered that her husband was living with another woman.

The husband was charged with psychological violence before the Regional Trial Court. During trial, the wife claimed that her husband’s actions caused her severe mental and emotional suffering, and loss of self-esteem and dignity. She said she experienced depression and attempted to take her own life several times.

The psychologist who evaluated the wife found signs of depression, including feelings of inferiority, sleep problems, difficulty concentrating, and problems relating with others. The psychologist linked these emotional difficulties to the wife’s conflict with her husband and his abandonment of the family for another woman.

The SC affirmed in full the finding that the husband is guilty of psychological violence under the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘈𝘞𝘊 𝘈𝘤𝘵, sentencing the husband to up to eight years in prison and ordering him to pay a PHP 100,000 fine and PHP 30,000 in moral damages to his wife. The SC also directed him to undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment.

The SC explained that, depending on the circumstances, an extramarital relationship may or may not cause mental or emotional anguish to the wife. Infidelity may be one of the acts through which psychological violence is committed, but the resulting mental or emotional suffering must still be proven.

In this case, the SC held that the wife’s testimony, psychological evaluation, and other witness testimonies sufficiently proved that her husband’s acts caused her mental and emotional suffering.

Read the full text of the Press Release at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=173362.

Read the full text of the Decision: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/268619-###-vs-people-of-the-philippines/.

Read the Dissenting Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168031.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

02/09/2026

The (SC) has ruled that homeowners’ associations (HOAs) may impose sanctions or penalties on members who fail to pay association dues, but it cannot deprive them of their right to use common areas, including subdivision roads.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, the SC’s Third Division dismissed the petition filed by the former directors and officers of La Costa Brava Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (Association).

Spouses Linley and Juvy Retirado failed to pay their monthly association dues from 2016 to 2021. Consequently, the Association declared them delinquent and enforced several penalties.

Among the sanctions were banning of grass-cutting or maintenance within five meters from the property; reducing the frequency of garbage collection; prohibiting food, package, appliance, and gas deliveries to their residence; preventing taxis, tricycles, and ride-hailing vehicles from entering the subdivision to fetch them; barring guests from entering the subdivision to visit them; and imposing delivery fees on trucks and vehicles bringing supplies and materials to their construction site.

The spouses filed a complaint before the Human Settlements Adjudication Commission (HSAC), which ruled that the sanctions violated Republic Act No. (RA) 9904, or 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘔𝘢𝘨𝘯𝘢 𝘊𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘢 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘏𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘰𝘸𝘯𝘦𝘳𝘴 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘏𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘰𝘸𝘯𝘦𝘳𝘴’ 𝘈𝘴𝘴𝘰𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴. The HSAC also permanently disqualified the officers responsible from holding any position in the Association.

The officers appealed to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed their petition.

The SC affirmed the HSAC’s ruling on the penalties.

Section 7(a) of RA 9904 grants homeowners two distinct rights: the right to enjoy basic community services and facilities, and the right to use common areas.

The SC clarified that HOAs may impose sanctions on delinquent members under their bylaws. However, this authority is not absolute. HOAs can restrict delinquent members from accessing or enjoying certain community services and facilities, but they cannot deny the right to use common areas like roads.

Applying this distinction, the SC held that restricting deliveries, transportation, and guests effectively violated the spouses’ right to use the subdivision roads.

The SC also rejected the officers’ claim that their violation was not grave enough to warrant permanent disqualification from holding office in the Association. The SC ruled that restricting access to subdivision roads for basic needs such as the delivery of goods and transportation caused great harm and dangerous consequences—a violation serious and grave enough to justify the permanent disqualification.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-homeowners-associations-may-sanction-delinquent-members-but-cannot-restrict-use-of-subdivision-roads/

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/278137-reuben-mikhail-p-sabig-et-al-vs-court-of-appeals-18th-division-cebu-city-and-spouses-linley-and-juvy-retirado/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

27/08/2026

Fyi

The 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤, during its session on August 26, 2026, acted on G.R. Nos. 260219 and 260231, 𝘋𝘢𝘵𝘶 𝘗𝘢𝘹 𝘈𝘭𝘪 𝘚. 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘶𝘥𝘢𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘶 𝘷. 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘮𝘮𝘪𝘴𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘯 𝘌𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴, 𝘚𝘩𝘢𝘳𝘪𝘧𝘢 𝘈𝘬𝘦𝘦𝘭 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘶𝘥𝘢𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘶, 𝘈𝘻𝘦𝘭 𝘝. 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘶𝘥𝘢𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘶, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘉𝘢𝘪 𝘈𝘭𝘪 𝘈. 𝘜𝘯𝘵𝘰𝘯𝘨, by denying with finality the motion for reconsideration filed by Datu Pax Ali S. Mangudadatu, affirming its earlier ruling that upheld the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for Governor of Sultan Kudarat and abandoned the “second placer rule.”

The SC held that the resulting vacancy should be filled by the Vice-Governor.

The “second placer rule” refers to the practice of declaring the candidate who received the second highest number of votes as the winner after the candidate with the highest number of votes is later found disqualified or ineligible.

Mangudadatu, in his motion, insisted that the second placer rule has clear basis in law and should not be abandoned.

The SC reiterated that no law authorizes the second placer rule. It emphasized that the 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 recognizes as elected only the candidate who received the highest number of votes.

The SC explained that when the winning candidate is later found ineligible to hold office, a permanent vacancy arises. For local elective positions covered by the 𝘓𝘰𝘤𝘢𝘭 𝘎𝘰𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘯𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 (LGC), that vacancy is filled through the rule on succession, not by proclaiming the second placer as the winner. Accordingly, the Vice-Governor succeeds to the position of Governor for the remainder of the term.

The SC clarified that its ruling is limited to local elective positions covered by the LGC. The case did not address the application or non-application of the second placer rule or succession rules for national elective positions, as these issues were not raised before the Court.

However, the SC stressed that succession for national elective positions like the President and Vice-President is governed exclusively by Article VII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯, which prescribe the order of succession when the President or Vice-President fails to qualify, dies, or is permanently disabled, removed from office, or resigns.

The SC also clarified that its ruling applies to pending cases, emphasizing that second placers have no vested right or entitlement to be declared the winner.

The full text of the August 26, 2026 Resolution in G.R. Nos. 260219 and 260231 will be uploaded to the Supreme Court website once available.

Read the full text of the Press Briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171947.

Read the full text of the SC’s April 25, 2025 Decision in G.R. Nos. 260219 and 260231 at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=146486.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attributionon-policy.

24/08/2026

The Supreme Court (SC) has ruled that a bank cannot require a depositor to return money they already withdrew on the ground of unjust enrichment when the loss was caused by the bank’s own gross negligence.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC’s Third Division denied the petition filed by BDO Unibank, Inc. (BDO), holding that the bank’s disregard of its own banking policy amounted to gross negligence.

The case stemmed from Cristina Barcellano’s (Barcellano) deposit of a regional check worth PHP 151,200 from an Albay branch of Landbank into her savings account at BDO’s Lucena City branch.

The BDO teller mistakenly validated the check as local instead of regional, allowing the amount to be credited after only three banking days instead of the required seven.

Believing the funds were available, Barcellano withdrew PHP 76,000. Shortly after, BDO received a stop payment order on the check and demanded that she return the money. Although Barcellano initially agreed, she never repaid the amount. BDO later refused to release the remaining balance and filed a criminal complaint for estafa.

Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals acquitted Barcellano, finding no fraud, deceit, or abuse of confidence on her part and blamed BDO’s own negligence.

Before the SC, BDO asked for a review of the civil aspect of the case, arguing that despite Barcellano's acquittal, she should still be required to return the money. BDO argued that her refusal amounted to unjust enrichment and that since the funds were released due to its error in processing the check, Barcellano was required to return them based on the principle of 𝘴𝘰𝘭𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰 𝘪𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘣𝘪𝘵𝘪, which requires the repayment of money received by mistake.

The SC disagreed, ruling that there was no unjust enrichment because BDO failed to prove that Barcellano knowingly received and retained a benefit to which she was not entitled.

SC declared that the bank did not explain why the stop payment order was issued or show that Barcellano knew the check would not be honored. Instead, the evidence showed that she withdrew the money in good faith after BDO itself made the funds available in her account.

The SC also ruled that BDO’s own gross negligence caused its loss. It found that the bank credited the check before it had properly cleared it, incorrectly treated a regional check as a local check, and failed to detect the error until after receiving the stop payment order. These lapses showed a failure to observe basic safeguards meant to protect the bank from the risks of invalid checks.

The SC also rejected BDO’s reliance on solutio indebiti. Although the doctrine generally requires the return of money received by mistake, it does not apply when the mistake resulted from the payor’s own gross negligence. Here, BDO’s error stemmed from its failure to exercise the extraordinary diligence and reasonable prudence required of banks.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171657

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/261264-bdo-unibank-inc-vs-cristina-barcellano-y-riego/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

24/08/2026

The (SC) has ruled that courts may determine whether a party is alive or dead in an ejectment case when necessary to resolve who has the right to possess a property. However, this finding is only provisional and applies solely to the ejectment case.

In a Decision written by Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo, the SC’s First Division emphasized this ruling as it denied the appeal filed by Belinda E. Soriano and her relatives (collectively, Belinda and others) in an ejectment case filed against them by Antonio V. Estrella (Estrella).

Estrella claimed ownership of a property in Quezon City where Belinda and others lived with his permission. When they refused his demand in 2012 to vacate the property so he could renovate it, Estrella filed an unlawful detainer case.

Belinda and others argued that the case should be dismissed because Estrella supposedly lacked the legal capacity to sue, having died in 1990. They provided his death certificate as evidence.

Ruling in Estrella’s favor, the SC held that Estrella had successfully overcome the presumption created by his death certificate. The parties themselves acknowledged that the Estrella who filed the case was the same Estrella named in the property’s title. Belinda and others never claimed that he was an impostor or disputed his identity. This, along with Estrella’s living presence, confirmed his legal capacity to sue.

​The SC clarified that while the proper remedy to cancel a death certificate or correct a civil registry entry is to file a petition for cancellation, this does not prevent courts hearing ejectment cases from provisionally determining whether a party is alive or dead when necessary to resolve the issue of possession.

Accordingly, the SC held that a court’s finding on whether a party is alive or dead in an ejectment case is limited to determining that party’s legal capacity to sue and right to physical possession of the property.

The SC also ruled that the requirements for unlawful detainer were met. Belinda and others initially had lawful possession of the property; however, it became unlawful once Estrella demanded that they vacate and they refused, leading him to file the case within the one-year period required by law.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171407.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/236333-belinda-e-soriano-et-al-vs-antonio-v-estrella/.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

20/08/2026

Hindi itinuring ng na “advertisement” sa ilalim ng PD No. 957 o 𝘚𝘶𝘣𝘥𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘰𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘪𝘶𝘮 𝘉𝘶𝘺𝘦𝘳𝘴’ 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘵𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘋𝘦𝘤𝘳𝘦𝘦 na parte ng mga “warranty” ng developer ang pangako ng ahente na mag-iisyu ng 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘤𝘵 𝘵𝘰 𝘚𝘦𝘭𝘭 matapos mabayaran ang 𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘧𝘦𝘦 ngunit inatasan pa rin nito ang 𝘥𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘭𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘳 na ibalik sa nakabili ang binayad matapos hindi tuparin ng ahente ang nasabing pangako.

Sa Desisyong isinulat ni Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, inatasan ng Ikatlong Dibisyon ng ng Korte Suprema ang Empire East Land Holdings, Inc. (Empire East) na isauli ang mga ibinayad ni John Edrem Bautista (Bautista) matapos itong mabigong mag-isyu ng ipinangakong 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘤𝘵 𝘵𝘰 𝘚𝘦𝘭𝘭 .

Nagbayad si Bautista ng PHP 130,000 para sa isang 𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘶𝘯𝘪𝘵 sa Empire East na binubuo ng PHP 20,000 𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘧𝘦𝘦 at PHP 110,000 na karagdagang bayad. Ayon kay Bautista, nagbayad siya dahil nangako ang ahente ng Empire East na mag-iisyu ng 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘤𝘵 𝘵𝘰 𝘚𝘦𝘭𝘭 kapag nabayaran na niya ang 𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘧𝘦𝘦. Nang lumipas ang mahigit isang taon at hindi pa rin naibigay ang kontrata, itinigil ni Bautista ang pagbabayad at hiniling ang pagsasauli ng kanyang mga ibinayad.

Sumang-ayon ang Korte Suprema sa naging desisyon ng Human Settlements Adjudication Commission (HSAC) at Court of Appeals na pabor kay Bautista. Pinagtibay ng Korte Suprema na karapat-dapat makatanggap si Bautista ng refund, pero nilinaw din nito na hindi saklaw ng Seksyon 19 ng PD 957 ang pangako ng ahente.

Ipinaliwanag ng Korte Suprema na ang Seksyon 19, na nag-aatas na maging totoo at hindi mapanlinlang ang mga 𝘢𝘥𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 at 𝘴𝘢𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘮𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘪𝘢𝘭, ay nalalapat lamang sa mga materyal na inilaan para sa pangkalahatang publiko, gaya ng mga inilalathala sa mga pahayagan o ipinapalabas sa radyo, telebisyon, at iba pang katulad na paraan ng 𝘮𝘢𝘴𝘴 𝘤𝘰𝘮𝘮𝘶𝘯𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯. Hindi nito saklaw ang mga pangakong ginagawa ng ahente sa mga indibidwal na mamimili.

Binigyang-diin ng Korte Suprema na nananatiling protektado ang mga mamimili dahil maaari pa ring managot ang mga 𝘥𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘭𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘳 sa ilalim ng kanilang mga obligasyong kontraktuwal at iba pang naaangkop na batas.

Inatasan nito ang Empire East na isauli kay Bautista ang PHP 130,000, na may interes na 6% kada taon mula nang ihain ang reklamo noong 2012, at magbayad ng PHP 260,000 bilang 𝘦𝘹𝘦𝘮𝘱𝘭𝘢𝘳𝘺 𝘥𝘢𝘮𝘢𝘨𝘦𝘴 o danyos na iginagawad ng mga hukuman para pigilan ang maling pagkilos at magsilbing babala laban sa mga katulad na gawain.

Basahin ang 𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘴 𝘳𝘦𝘭𝘦𝘢𝘴𝘦 sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171359.

Basahin ang Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/272556-1.pdf.

Sumunod sa 𝘊𝘳𝘦𝘥𝘪𝘵 𝘈𝘵𝘵𝘳𝘪𝘣𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘗𝘰𝘭𝘪𝘤𝘺 ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

05/08/2026

Morning everyone ☀️🌞

The (SC) En Banc, during its session today, August 5, 2026, issued writs of amparo and habeas data in favor of petitioners Atty. Rey A. Gorgonio, Joselito B. Macapobre, Analyn S. Mirano, and Ma. Anabelle Ilustrisimo.

Acting on G.R. No. E-05032 (In the matter of the petition for the writs of amparo and habeas data in favor of Atty. Rey A. Gorgonio et al. v. Lieutenant General Antonio G. Nafarrete et al.), the SC issued a temporary protection order directing Lieutenant General Antonio G. Nafarrete and others not to go within one kilometer of the petitioners and their immediate family members.

The SC also directed respondent military and law enforcement officers to file, within 10 days of receipt of the order, a verified return containing their lawful defenses and other relevant information, as well as their comment on the petition, before the Court of Appeals (CA).

The SC further instructed the CA to conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the petitioners are entitled to the privileges of the writs of amparo and habeas data. The CA was directed to decide the case within 10 days of its submission for resolution.

In their petition, the petitioners alleged they were red-tagged by military and law enforcement agencies and falsely labeled as members of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army because of their human rights work and involvement with Paghida-et sa Kauswagan Development Group, Inc., a non-government organization supporting farmers and rural communities in Negros Island in their pursuit of genuine agrarian reform.

Read the press briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=170190.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/

12/07/2026

Fyi

09/07/2026

Fyi

SC LAYS DOWN RULES ON PROVING OWNERSHIP OF SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS IN CRIMINAL CASES

The Supreme Court (SC) has laid down important guidelines on how courts should determine the identity of the person behind a social media account in criminal prosecutions, recognizing that online platforms have become common tools for committing crimes and that fake or dummy accounts are increasingly being used to conceal the identity of offenders.

The SC explained that ownership, control, or authorship of a social media account may be established through the following circumstances: (a) an admission by the accused that the account or post belongs to them; (b) evidence that the accused was seen accessing the account or composing the post; (c) information contained in the account or post that only the accused or a limited group of persons would likely know; (d) language, vocabulary, grammar, writing style, or other characteristics consistent with those of the accused; (e) records from internet service providers, telecommunications companies, or social media platforms, as well as forensic examination of electronic devices showing geolocation, account activity, or other identifying information; (f) acts or conduct consistent with the account's previous posts or activities; and (g) any other surrounding circumstances establishing ownership, access, or authorship. The Court emphasized that no single circumstance is conclusive, and that identity may be established through the totality of the evidence presented.

Read the full text in the comments.

04/07/2026

SC Permanently Bars Man Who Used Brother's Identity to Become a Lawyer

The Supreme Court (SC) permanently barred Richard A. Caronan from ever becoming a member of the Philippine Bar after finding that he fraudulently used his younger brother's identity, educational records, and personal information to enroll in law school, obtain a law degree, take the Bar Examinations, and gain admission to the Bar.

"WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" (respondent) is found GUILTY of falsely assuming the name, identity, and academic records of complainant Patrick A. Caronan (complainant) to obtain a law degree and take the Bar Examinations. x xx xx (3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar in the future; x xx x SO ORDERED."

-PER CURIAM

Supreme Court, En Banc
July 12, 2016