Atty. Rene A. Ballo, CPA

19/08/2026

Question:

In a bigamy case, which is criminal in nature, can the accused validly interpose the defense of voidness of the prior or subsequent marriage without a need of a judicial declaration of nullity?

Answer:

Yes, in a bigamy case, which is criminal in nature, the accused can validly interpose the defense of voidness of the prior or subsequent marriage without a need of a judicial declaration of nullity. In an EN Banc case of Pulido versus People, G.R. No. 220149, promulgated on July 27, 2021, the Court held that the accused is not required to obtain a decision in a civil proceeding declaring the first or subsequent marriage as void in order for him to validly interpose as a defense the voidness of the prior or subsequent marriage in a criminal case of bigamy. The requirement in the Family Code that there must be prior declaration of nullity of the previous marriage is a requirement only for purposes of contracting a subsequent marriage and not for the defense in a criminal case.

It is worth to note that the SC clearly emphasized the requirement that it must be a void ab initio prior or subsequent marriage and not voidable or valid marriages. According to the SC, void ab initio marriages are considered as non-existent and that the declaration of nullity merely confirms its non-existence. It is worth to note further that in the case of a void subsequent marriage, the voidness must rest upon a ground other than it being a bigamous marriage in order that the accused can interpose the same as a defense in a bigamy case.

31/07/2026

Mactan International Airport Authority vs. Lapu-lapu City
G.R. No. 252621
July 13, 2026

Facts:

Spouses Marcos and Basilisa Seno were the registered owners of Lot No. 4726-A. In 1935, the spouses donated Lot No. 4726-A to Lapu-Lapu City, subject to the condition that the property shall be used exclusively and forever for school purposes only. Pursuant to the condition, Ibo Elementary School was constructed on the property. However, the school was later demolished and transferred to another location due to the increasing student population.

In 1958, some of the heirs of the spouses Seno executed an Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale covering the entire Lot No. 4726, including Lot No. 4726-A, in favor of petitioner Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA).

Years later, the heirs instituted an action for recovery of Lot No. 4726, including Lot No. 4 726-A. They claimed, among others, that the sale to MCIAA was void since the lot had already been donated to Lapu-Lapu City. Since Lapu-Lapu City did not comply with the condition to use the property for school purposes, ownership of the lot reverted back to them.

The RTC upheld the validity of the donation in favor of Lapu-Lapu
City, ruling that the condition attached to it was deemed non-existent. Accordingly, the RTC declared Lapu-Lapu City as the rightful owner of Lot No. 4726-A.

The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in so far as the Lot No. 4726-A is concerned.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in upholding Lapu-Lapu City's ownership of Lot No. 4726-A?

Ruling:

No, the CA did not err in upholding Lapu-Lapu City's ownership of Lot No. 4726-A. To justify the revocation of a donation for breach of a condition, the noncompliance must be substantial and fundamental, not merely slight or casual, taking into account the purpose of the donation and the parties' intent. Respondent consistently maintained throughout the proceedings that Lot No. 4726-A remained intended for school use and that the demolition of the school building was prompted not by abandonment, but by
the practical necessity of transferring the school to accommodate a growing student population.

Send a message to learn more

08/07/2026

NOTICE TO THE PUBLIC!

We would like to announce that Ballo Law Office is temporarily closed starting July 09, 2026, at 1:00 in the afternoon until July 15, 2026, for an out-of-town professional legal engagement. Consultation and follow-up on the status of cases would still be available online.

Resumption of office will be on July 16, 2026.

Thank you for your understanding.

ATTY. RENE A. BALLO, CPA
Attorney-At-law | Notary Public

07/07/2026

Isican vs. People
G.R. No. 266431
January 29, 2026

Facts.

Pedro Isican is charged with violation of Section 78 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, which penalizes the unlawful occupation or destruction of forest and grazing lands.

Isican, in his defense, avouched that he acted on behalf of the heirs of Evaristo Tiotioen (heirs of Tiotioen) and did not personally occupy the area. He intended to protect the growing plants and improvements introduced by the heirs. In the judicial affidavit of Gretchen Tiotioen Fagyan (Fagyan), she attested that Isican was the attorney-in-fact of the heirs of Tiotioen, and the improvements were meant to assert their claims over the property.

The MTC found Isican guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged for the reason that the law is a malum prohibitum and good faith or motive is not a defense. RTC and CA affirmed the decision.

Issue.

Whether or not Isican is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged?

Ruling.

Isican is not guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. While it is true that in a mala prohibitum crime, good faith or motive is not a defense because the law punishes the prohibited act itself, the intent to perpetrate the prohibited act under the special law must nevertheless be shown. The SC explained that in a mala in se crime, intent to commit the crime must be proven to convict the accused, and in a mala prohibitum crime, it is the intent to perpetrate the prohibited act that is required to sustain conviction. In this case, evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to establish Isican's guilt beyond reasonable doubt as the accused was merely an attorney-in-fact of the heirs of Tiotioen.

Send a message to learn more

11/06/2026

Question:
Is an injury sustained during a basketball game on board a vessel work-related?

Answer:
Yes, injury sustained during a basketball game on board a vessel is work-related. In the case of Arriesgado (G.R. No. 275424, April 29, 2026) citing the case of Arguilles v. Wilhelmsen Smith Bell Manning, Inc., the SC ruled that injury sustained during a basketball game on board a vessel is work-related based on the Bunkhouse Rule and the Personal Comfort Doctrine.

20/05/2026

Question: Is a breach of promise to marry alone an actionable wrong?

Answer: No, a breach of promise to marry alone is not an actionable wrong. There is no law that punishes one from sincerely retracting his decision from the promise to marry. There is no law that compels one to marry another because he or she made a promise or breached the said promise.

However, if there is an act independent of the promise to marry and that act causes loss or injury to another, then the breach of promise to marry could be used to establish liability. Example, when the promise to marry is made in order to obtain sexual advances and later that promise is breached, or when the breach was committed after wedding preparations were already set and expenses have already been incurred, the one who committed the breach of the promise to marry may be held liable under Article 21 of the New Civil Code which states that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

In addition, when the acts constitute or fall as among the punishable acts under the VAWC law, one who committed the breach may also be civilly and criminally liable accordingly.

Send a message to learn more

24/04/2026

What is novation?

Answer:

It is the change of an obligation by another, resulting in its extinguishment or modification, either by changing the object or principal conditions, or by substituting another in the place of the debtor or by subrogating a third person to the rights of the creditor. (Pineda, Obligations and Contracts, 2000 ed, p. 298)

Is there a valid novation when the original obligation is void?

Answer:

No, under Article 1298 of the NCC, the novation is void if the original obligation was void.

Therefore, in order that there is a valid novation, the original obligation must be valid or at least, voidable.

Send a message to learn more

09/04/2026

Question:

In the case of a disallowed payroll, is service to the accountant constitutes constructive notice to all payees in the payroll?

Answer:

In the case of a disallowed payroll, service to the accountant constitutes constructive notice to all payees in the payroll only when there is proof that the accountant informed all payees concerned in the payroll.

In the case of Ablong, et.al. G.R. No. 233308, dated August 18, 2020, the SC held that absent any proof that the accountant informed all payees concerned in the payroll, there is no constructive notice to the payees that arises. While COA issued ND on January 27, 2011 and the same was served to the acting NORSU Acting Chief Accountant and was received on February 16, 2011 pursuant to Section 12.1 of COA Circular No. 2009-006, there is no proof that the latter informed the payees in the payroll that would trigger constructive notice upon them.

09/04/2026

Question:

Can a person liable in a Notice of Disallowance (ND) properly file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in the RTC to assail the ND on the ground of pure question of law?

Answer:

No, a person liable in a Notice of Disallowance (ND) cannot properly file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in the RTC to assail the ND on the ground of pure question of law.

In the case of COA versus Villafuerte, G.R. No. 247391 dated July 13, 2021, the SC held that petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in the RTC despite it being on the ground of pure question of law, is an improper remedy resorted to by the respondent. The power granted in B.P. 129 to the RTC in a general legislation must yield to the specific rule laid down by Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution and Sec. 50 of P.D. No. 1445 that specified the only court vested with jurisdiction to entertain a petition for certiorari against any decision, ruling, or order of the COA, which is the Supreme Court.

Thus, the respondent should have filed an appeal to the Regional Director and to Commission Proper of COA, as the case may be as provided in the RRPC issued by COA, and finally to the SC, and not assail directly the ND to the RTC.

Send a message to learn more

19/02/2026

Josef vs. Ursua
G.R. No. 267469
February 05, 2025

Facts.

Jennifer C. Josef and Evalyn G. Ursua lived together as homosexual couple. During their relationship, they able to acquire a real property. Ursua acknowedged in a document recognizing 50% share of Josef. However, Ursua emphasized that the Acknowledgment stated that Josef's interest over the property was subject to the determination of the actual percentage of interest based on records and documents. However, records were bereft of proof that Josef contributed to the acquisition of the subject property.

Issue.

Whether Josef is entitled to a share of the real property.

Ruling.

Yes, Josef is entitled to a share of the real property. Ursua is estopped to question the contribution of Josef having already acknowledged the contribution of Josef. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, Josef is entitled to a 50% share of the real property.

----------------------------------
My personal view and opinion.

First, I agree with the interpretation of the SC that homosexual couples can take shelter under Article 148 of the Family Code. It is not incorporated in the FC for the exclusive use of heterosexual couples.

Second, It appears from the close reading of the case, the basis of the SC in coming up with a conclusion that the petitioner is entitled to a 50% share is the admission by the respondent in the Acknowledgment that the petitioner actually contributed to the acquisition of the subject real property. It just so happened that the agreement of the parties in this case provides for an equal share or 50%. But for proper understanding and application of Article 148 of the FC, it is crucial to cross upon the following questions:

1.) How about if there was no admission by a party and a party was able to prove less or more than 50% contribution, how much is a party entitled to the property?
2.) How about if only the fact of actual contribution is proven with amount actually contributed is undetermined, how much is a party entitled to the property?

To answer the above questions, it is necessary to examine closely Article 148 of the FC.

"Article 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

###xx."

As can be clearly understood from the above provision, it is clear that the parties are entitled only to a proportionate share of their actual contribution. This is clearly stated in a phrase "shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions". Therefore, using this provision, we can already answer question number 1. If there is proof of actual amount of contribution, then a party is entitled to the extent of an actual contribution. So a sharing could be 10% for one party and 90% to the other or on any percentage of share between parties provided there is proof actual contribution and the contribution is capable of quantification for the determination of proportionate share over the property.

Now, the second sentence of the same paragraph is somewhat controversial as it may be interpreted differently. My humble interpretation of the sentence "In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal." is that when there is proof of common ownership of the property but the parties could not agree or determine their respective percentage of share, the provision will govern as a matter of presumption by provision of law.

Thus, the answer to question number 2 is that when the parties agree of a common ownership or an existence of it is proven but the parties could not agree and/or determine what percentage they actually contributed to the property as basis of the determination of their proportionate share, the law presumes the contribution to be on equal share.

So, my humble conclusion is this: Article 148 of the FC provides for an actual proportionate share based on actual contribution and in case of incapability of determining the actual contribution as basis of proportionate share, only then the presumption of equal share arises.

Proof of actual contribution however may be sourced from a documentary evidence showing expenses, and of an agreement between the parties which may contain admissions that will trigger operation of the doctrine of estoppel as in the case above.

Send a message to learn more