29/09/2026
CHARCOAL IS NOT A FOREST PRODUCT AND DENR CANNOT EXPAND A PENAL LAW BY MERE ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
Bar Guide: Administrative Law; Criminal Law; Delegated Rule-Making Power of Administrative Agencies; nullum crimen sine lege; The Law of the Case Doctrine
By Atty. Vincent Cesista; Decision published by the Supreme Court via its website on September 28, 2026
On September 28, 2026, the Supreme Court published the case of People v. Villagen, where the Court held that manufactured wood charcoal is not a “forest product” under the Revised Forestry Code, and that the DENR could not make it one through an administrative order.
On October 8, 2020, Rudy Villagen was charged before the RTC of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro with violating Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (Revised Forestry Code) for transporting 475 sacks of manufactured wood charcoal, valued at PHP 71,250.00, without a permit. He moved to quash, arguing that charcoal is not among the “forest products” enumerated in Section 3(q) of the Code. The RTC agreed and dismissed the case, holding that the inclusion of charcoal in DENR Administrative Order No. 97-32 could not expand the penal statute.
The prosecution argued that the DENR merely exercised delegated rule-making power, that “wood” covers both raw and processed wood, and that a literal reading would defeat the law’s purpose of forest conservation. The Court of Appeals set aside the quashal on procedural grounds and ordered the RTC to let the prosecution amend the Information, but it also ruled that charcoal does not clearly fall within the statutory phrase “timber or other forest products”. The prosecution amended the Information but the RTC quashed it again on July 31, 2025. The People went directly to the Supreme Court under Rule 45.
The Supreme Court DENIED the petition, AFFIRMED the RTC, and DISMISSED the criminal case. Accordingly:
1. The petition was filed out of time. The OSG e-mailed the petition on the last day but personally filed the paper copy a day later. Under the Court’s Resolution dated August 20, 2024 in relation to Rule 13, Section 14, initiatory pleadings “must be served or filed personally or by registered mail; they cannot be served or filed electronically.” “The petition was thus deemed filed only when a paper copy thereof was personally submitted to the Court on September 24, 2025, one day after the expiration of the period of extension prayed for.” The Court noted that mandatory e-filing in the Supreme Court took effect only on October 30, 2025 under A.M. No. 25-09-16-SC.
2. The “Law of the Case Doctrine”. Further, the CA’s earlier ruling that charcoal is not a forest product, which the OSG did not appeal, bound the RTC: “whether correct on general principles or not, the ruling of the CA is binding on the RTC.” The “law of the case” doctrine applies to the case at bar. For one, the certiorari proceeding in CA-G.R. SP No. 176218 involves the very same parties in the present case. For another, the legal issue at hand-whether “manufactured wood charcoal” is a timber or forest product under Section 77 of P.D. No. 705-had already been resolved by the CA in the earlier certiorari case.
3. In any case, charcoal is a manufactured product, not a forest product. Citing Bermejo v. Collector of Internal Revenue (1950), the Court held that “by the time wood becomes charcoal, it is no longer ‘wood’ in its natural, ordinary, scientific, or commercial sense.” The statutory term “must be understood to contemplate forest or plant growths in their raw or natural form, which could be cut, gathered, collected, or removed from land. Once the material has been processed or manufactured, such that it acquires a form, quality or substance, and adaptability in uses that are unique to it and distinct from the natural resource, then it should be excluded from ‘timber or other forest products’ in Section 77 of P.D. No. 705, as amended.”
4. The DENR cannot amend the law by regulation. While Sections 7 and 9 of P.D. 705 authorize the DENR to issue implementing rules, “it cannot abridge, enlarge, supplant, or modify the enabling statute, for such power is granted only to the Legislature.” “Criminal liability must rest on a clear and unequivocal provision of law, thus, it cannot be created or extended by implication, administrative interpretation or regulation.” DAO 97-32 remains valid as a mechanism for apprehension, seizure, and confiscation, but “the inclusion of charcoal within the definition of ‘forest products’ cannot be sustained, as it finds no basis under P.D. No. 705, as amended.”
Reference: People v. Rudy Villagen, G.R. No. E-02082, Third Division, Inting, June 11, 2026, published on September 28, 2026
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