Canoy Law

10/06/2026

Doctrine of Secondary Parental Authority and School Liability for Student Safety

Q: What is the doctrine of secondary parental authority?

A: The doctrine of secondary parental authority recognizes that schools, their administrators, and teachers exercise authority and responsibility over students while the latter are under their supervision, instruction, or custody. During such periods, the school assumes certain parental functions and duties to ensure the students' safety, discipline, and welfare.

Q: When does a school's secondary parental authority arise?

A: A school's secondary parental authority arises whenever students are under the school's supervision, instruction, or custody. This includes:

1. Classroom instruction;
2. School-sanctioned activities;
3. Educational tours and field trips;
4. Athletic events and competitions;
5. Student organization activities approved by the school; and
6. Other activities where students are under the control or supervision of school personnel.

The authority may extend beyond school premises if the activity is school-sponsored or supervised by the school.

Q: Does parental consent eliminate the school’s responsibility?

A: No.

Parental consent merely authorizes the student’s participation in the activity. It does not relieve the school of its continuing duty to exercise reasonable care, supervision, and diligence throughout the activity.

Q: What factors are considered in determining a school’s liability?

A: Courts commonly consider the following factors:

1. Whether the activity was officially sanctioned by the school;
2. The age, maturity, and circumstances of the students involved;
3. The adequacy of supervision provided;
4. Compliance with applicable school policies, regulations, and safety protocols;
5. Whether the risks were foreseeable;
6. The safety measures implemented before and during the activity;
7. The availability and adequacy of emergency response procedures; and
8. Whether the injury was caused by negligence or a failure to exercise reasonable care.

07/06/2026

Adultery and Concubinage

Q: What is adultery?

A: Adultery is committed by a married woman who has s*xual in*******se with a man who is not her husband. The man who knowingly has s*xual relations with a married woman may also be held liable as a co-accused.

Q: What are the elements of adultery?

A: The prosecution must prove:
1. The woman is legally married;
2. She had s*xual in*******se with a man other than her husband; and
3. The man knew that she was married.

Q: What is concubinage?

A: Concubinage is committed by a married man who:
1. Keeps a mistress in the conjugal dwelling;
2. Has s*xual in*******se with a woman not his wife under scandalous circumstances; or
3. Cohabits with a woman not his wife in another place.

Q: What are the elements of concubinage?

A: The prosecution must establish:
1. The man is legally married;
2. He committed any of the acts constituting concubinage; and
3. The offended party is his wife.

Q: Can the complaint be filed against only one of the offenders?

A: No. The offended spouse must include both guilty parties if both are alive, except when there is a legal reason preventing the inclusion of one of them.

Q: Can adultery or concubinage be prosecuted if the spouses are separated?

A: Yes. Mere separation does not dissolve the marriage. As long as the marriage remains legally valid, adultery or concubinage may still be committed.

05/06/2026

The (SC) has ruled that a spouse’s acts creating a hostile and intimidating environment for the other spouse, their children, and common children may constitute “grossly abusive conduct” under the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 which serves as a ground for legal separation.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr., the SC’s Second Division granted the petition for legal separation filed by a husband against his wife, after finding that her actions constituted grossly abusive conduct under Article 55(1) of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦.

The couple married in 2003 and later had two children. To support their family, the wife started selling coffee, but they still faced financial hardships. The husband studied nursing with hopes of eventually relocating their family abroad. However, his plan to move abroad never materialized.

During the marriage, the husband claimed he faced various abusive behaviors from his wife. He reported that she controlled their finances and refused to provide financial help, even when he needed treatment for his toothache and was advised to get a root canal.

The husband also claimed that at a party, his wife told their friends she wanted to cut off his p***s because they were no longer having s*x. He also alleged that she shared stories about him with family and friends, often twisting the facts to make him look bad.

The husband also said that his wife refused marriage counseling, prohibited him from seeing his friends, manipulated their children to force him to provide more financial support, and maintained a controlling attitude throughout their marriage.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the petition for legal separation after finding that the wife’s behavior amounted to grossly abusive conduct. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling, holding that their disagreements were ordinary marital disputes.

The SC affirmed the RTC defining acts constituting “grossly abusive conduct”, which is a ground for legal separation under Article 55(1) of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, to include those acts by a spouse that create a hostile and intimidating environment for the other spouse or the children.

The SC also stressed that courts must decide this issue on a case-by-case basis, based on the facts and evidence presented.

While the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 does not allow absolute divorce, spouses may legally separate by order of a court without ending their marriage. Unlike a declaration that a marriage is void, a legal separation does not break the marital bond.

Among the grounds for legal separation under Article 55(1) of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 is repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct against the spouse, their common child, or the spouse’s child.

The SC added that this interpretation is consistent with the State’s constitutional duty to protect marriage as a basic social institution.

In this case, the SC found that the wife’s actions, taken together, created a hostile and intimidating environment for the husband. He was made to constantly follow her lead, and his efforts to fix the marriage through counseling and other interventions were unsuccessful. Witnesses also confirmed her controlling behavior, which supported the finding of a hostile home environment. Because of this, the SC ruled that the husband was justified in seeking reassignment to another province to distance himself from the situation at home.

The SC granted the legal separation and sent the case back to the RTC for the dissolution and division of the couple’s property. It also directed the RTC to decide on the custody and support of their children.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=166927

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164913

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164917

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy.

05/06/2026

The has ruled that similarities in trademark or logo designs that may confuse purchasers prevent the registration of later marks, even if new words are added.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, the SC’s First Division granted Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, LLC’s (Starwood) consolidated petitions and reversed the Court of Appeals’ (CA) rulings allowing the registration of Oceanic Empire Limited’s (Oceanic) marks.

Oceanic filed to register the trademarks “𝐖 𝐆𝐋𝐎𝐁𝐀𝐋𝐂𝐄𝐍𝐓𝐄𝐑” and “𝐖 𝐅𝐈𝐅𝐓𝐇 𝐀𝐕𝐄𝐍𝐔𝐄” and had earlier secured registration for “𝐖 𝐓𝐎𝐖𝐄𝐑.”

Starwood, owner of several registered "𝐖” trademarks for hotels and entertainment services, opposed the applications and sought the cancellation of the “𝐖 𝐓𝐎𝐖𝐄𝐑,” arguing that Oceanic’s marks were confusingly similar to its trademarks.

Starwood argued that Oceanic would benefit from the popularity and reputation of its brand and that this would mislead the public into believing that Oceanic’s business was connected with Starwood.

Ruling in favor of Starwood, the SC explained that trademark protection prevents confusion of goods and businesses, and that only the likelihood, not actual proof, of confusion is required. Each case must be assessed based on the resemblance of the marks and the relatedness of the services.

Under the 𝗗𝗼𝗺𝗶𝗻𝗮𝗻𝗰𝘆 𝗧𝗲𝘀𝘁, emphasis is placed on the dominant or most striking features of the marks rather than on minor differences.

In this case, the SC ruled that "𝐖" is the dominant feature of both Starwood’s and Oceanic’s marks. While Starwood’s "𝐖" is registered as a word mark, the Court clarified that Starwood cannot claim the letter "𝐖," but only its distinct stylized version.

The Court stressed that purchasers would immediately notice the similarity between the parties’ "𝐖" marks. It held that minor textual differences do not change the fact that both use the same style, which looks visually similar.

The SC thus directed the Director of the Bureau of Trademarks to deny Oceanic’s application for registration of trademark, and to grant Starwood’s petition for cancellation of the “𝐖 𝐓𝐎𝐖𝐄𝐑” mark.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=166975.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164983.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

01/06/2026

27/05/2026

The has clarified that the rules on modifying circumstances—factors that can lessen or increase penalties—apply in cases of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide involving a motor vehicle.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr., the SC En Banc upheld Noli Z. Ilon’s (Ilon) conviction for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, but reduced his sentence because he voluntarily surrendered to the police.

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), reckless imprudence is acting without intent to harm but still causing injury or death to another due to a clear lack of precaution. The SC emphasized that motorists are expected to drive at a reasonable speed suited to road and weather conditions, especially near intersections. In this case, Ilon admitted that he failed to slow down despite knowing he was approaching an intersection. He even increased his speed, leading him to hit the trisikad that caused Lee de la Cruz’s death.

The SC clarified that Ilon’s voluntary surrender should be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance that reduces his penalty. It explained that while Article 365 of the RPC generally allows trial courts to impose penalties without applying the rules on mitigating and aggravating circumstances under Article 64 of the RPC, this does not apply when reckless imprudence results in death involving a motor vehicle. In such cases, Article 64 must be followed.

The SC reviewed the amendments to Article 365—from Act No. 3992, or the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, passed in 1932, through Batas Pambansa Blg. 398 passed in 1983—and found that Congress consistently retained the clause excluding cases where death results from reckless imprudence involving motor vehicles from the usual discretion given to trial courts. This means that courts must apply Article 64 to determine the proper penalty.

The SC observed, however, an inconsistency: reckless imprudence resulting in homicide with the use of a motor vehicle may be mitigated, while those resulting in serious bodily injury or damage to property are left to the discretion of the trial courts. Finding this distinction unjust, the SC directed that copies of its Decision be furnished to the President, the Senate, and the House of Representatives, to alert its co-equal branches of this inconsistency and for possible legislative action.

Ilon was sentenced to up to two years and four months in prison and ordered to pay the heirs of de la Cruz PHP 629,883.45 in damages.

In his Concurring Opinion, Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen noted that piecemeal amendments to the RPC have led to inconsistencies in criminal law. He called for the consolidation of all criminal provisions into a single, unified code to ensure fairness, clarity, and the orderly administration of justice.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=166162

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260538-noli-z-ilon-vs-people-of-the-philippines/

Read the full text of the Concurring Opinion at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260538-concurring-opinion-senior-associate-justice-marvic-m-v-f-leonen/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/

27/05/2026

The has ruled that the unilateral imposition of reduced workdays and worker rotation scheme amounts to constructive dismissal.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, the SC En Banc found Fiber Textile Manufacturing Corp. (FMC) liable for constructively dismissing seven production workers after reducing their six-day workweek to only two to three days and implementing a work rotation plan without their consent, despite FMC’s claim that the workers agreed to the temporary scheme during a meeting on the shortage of raw materials.

The workers filed a complaint for constructive dismissal, claiming that they were effectively dismissed when they were told not to return to work.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the workers, but the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals upheld FMC’s actions as a valid exercise of management prerogative.

The SC disagreed. It emphasized that while employers may adopt flexible work arrangements during economic difficulties or national emergencies, these arrangements must comply with the requirements set out in Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Department Advisory No. 2, Series of 2009.

The SC explained that employers must first consult affected employees and obtain the voluntary support of the majority of workers. Employers must also notify the DOLE before implementing the arrangement and prove that the company is suffering from actual or reasonably imminent economic difficulties.

In this case, the SC held that FMC failed to prove that the workers voluntarily agreed to the reduced workdays and worker rotation scheme. The Court ruled that informing employees of the arrangement does not equate to securing their consent.

FMC also failed to notify the DOLE before implementation and failed to prove that it was suffering from actual or imminent economic difficulties that would justify the reduction of workdays.

The SC emphasized that while employers may adopt flexible work arrangements to prevent business losses, such measures must be exercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of workers.

FMC’s unlawful reduction of workdays amounted to constructive dismissal because it resulted in diminished salaries, making continued employment unreasonable for the workers.

In his Concurring Opinion, Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen stressed that the requirement of mutual consent in flexible work arrangements originates from the consensual nature of employment contracts, such that employers cannot unilaterally alter work schedules in a manner that diminishes employees’ pay.

In his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa agreed that FMC remained liable for constructive dismissal for failing to prove that the workers voluntarily agreed to the reduced workdays and work rotation plan. However, he emphasized that FMC had no raw materials to work with for several months, significantly affecting production operations. Thus, he stated that FMC faced a reasonably imminent economic difficulty that could justify the temporary adoption of flexible work arrangements.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=166287

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=166264

Read the full text of the Concurring Opinion at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=166269

Read the full text of the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=166274

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/

27/05/2026

The has found a clerk of court guilty of multiple offenses under the 2025 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘶𝘤𝘵 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘈𝘤𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘣𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘊𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘵 𝘖𝘧𝘧𝘪𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭𝘴 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘳𝘴𝘰𝘯𝘯𝘦𝘭 for committing serious dishonesty, falsification of official documents, and gross misconduct.

In a 𝘗𝘦𝘳 𝘊𝘶𝘳𝘪𝘢𝘮 Decision, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 imposed the penalty of dismissal on Luzviminda G. Hernandez (Hernandez), Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Buenavista, Agusan Del Norte.

Hernandez was found to have falsified her Daily Time Record to show that she reported to work from April 26 to 28, 2023, when she was actually in Dipolog City on the said dates, attending a convention she was not authorized to attend using the MTC court stenographer’s identity.

In dismissing Hernandez, the SC ruled that she committed serious dishonesty for using her co-worker’s identity to attend the convention; falsifying her Daily Time Record; causing the issuance of a certificate of attendance, acknowledgement receipt, and LGU checks; and signing papers related to the convention despite her lack of authority to do so.

The SC said that by creating the false appearance of authorized attendance and entitlement to public funds, her acts caused harm to the government.

The SC also ruled that Hernandez committed falsification for knowingly making false entries in her Daily Time Record, as well as in the attendance and reimbursement papers she prepared and used on behalf of her co-worker without authority.

Additionally, the SC found that Hernandez intended to secure reimbursement for herself by using falsified documents.

Hernandez was also found guilty of gross misconduct for her repeated acts of falsification and misrepresentation, which showed clear intent to violate established rules. These were deliberate acts, not mere errors in judgment, reflecting a persistent disregard for proper procedures, said the SC.

Since dismissal from service could no longer be imposed due to Hernandez’s compulsory retirement in 2024, the Court instead ordered the forfeiture of all her retirement benefits and disqualified her from reinstatement or appointment to any public office.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=166752.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164988.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attributionon-policy.

27/05/2026

Non-Compete and Non-Solicitation Clauses

Q: What is a non-compete clause?

A: A non-compete clause is a contract provision that limits an employee from working for a competitor or starting a competing business after leaving a company.

Q: What is a non-solicitation clause?

A: A non-solicitation clause prevents a former employee from:

* Pirating clients or customers;
* Recruiting co-employees;
* Encouraging an employee to resign and transfer to another company; or
* Using confidential relationships for competitive advantage.

Q: Are non-compete clauses legal in the Philippines?

Yes, but only if they are reasonable.

Philippine courts generally uphold non-compete clauses when they:

* Protect legitimate business interests;
* Have reasonable time limits;
* Cover reasonable geographic areas; and
* Do not completely deprive a person of the right to earn a living.

A clause that is too broad, oppressive, or unfair may be declared invalid.