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###The Court strongly urged Congress to heed its constitutional duty with utmost urgency, as it declared that the latter...
17/09/2026

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The Court strongly urged Congress to heed its constitutional duty with utmost urgency, as it declared that the latter has “the MANDATORY CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY to enact the law on the constitutional prohibition against political dynasties as expressly provided for in Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution.”

It stated that the Congress “MUST HENCEFORTH AND WITH UTMOST URGENCY ENACT THE APPROPRIATE ANTI-POLITICAL DYNASTY LAW AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.”

Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution provides that “The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.”

The Court held that this provision is not merely an aspiration but a constitutional command. The use of the word “shall” makes clear that the State has a mandatory duty both to guarantee equal access to public service and to prohibit political dynasties.

The Court also held that the phrase “as may be defined by law” does not give Congress the choice whether to prohibit political dynasties. Rather, it gives Congress the authority to define what constitutes a political dynasty and determine the scope of the prohibition.

The Court further said that Congress’ prolonged failure to enact an anti-political dynasty law constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

###

The 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤, during its session on August 26, 2026, unanimously declared that Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution requires Congress to enact a law prohibiting political dynasties, holding that Congress’ failure to do so for 39 years constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

The Court directed Congress to comply with its mandatory constitutional duty to enact an anti-political dynasty law at the earliest opportunity, define political dynasties, and determine the scope of the prohibition.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, the Court 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 granted the consolidated petitions in G.R. Nos. 263934, 272370, and 279201 for certiorari and mandamus. The petitions challenged Congress’ prolonged failure to pass a law defining and prohibiting political dynasties.

The Court strongly urged Congress to heed its constitutional duty with utmost urgency, as it declared that the latter has “the MANDATORY CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY to enact the law on the constitutional prohibition against political dynasties as expressly provided for in Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution.”

It stated that the Congress “MUST HENCEFORTH AND WITH UTMOST URGENCY ENACT THE APPROPRIATE ANTI-POLITICAL DYNASTY LAW AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.”

Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution provides that “The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.”

The Court held that this provision is not merely an aspiration but a constitutional command. The use of the word “shall” makes clear that the State has a mandatory duty both to guarantee equal access to public service and to prohibit political dynasties.

The Court also held that the phrase “as may be defined by law” does not give Congress the choice whether to prohibit political dynasties. Rather, it gives Congress the authority to define what constitutes a political dynasty and determine the scope of the prohibition.

The Court further said that Congress’ prolonged failure to enact an anti-political dynasty law constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

The Court took judicial notice of the numerous anti-political dynasty bills filed but left unacted upon since the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. It also considered studies on the prevalence of political dynasties and their relationship with socioeconomic conditions in the country.

The Court noted that political dynasties have remained widespread and have extended even into the party-list system. Despite changes in the composition of Congress over the years, no comprehensive anti-political dynasty law has been enacted, implying either a lack of interest, avoidance for convenience, or service of self-interest.

Although the Constitution does not set a deadline for Congress to enact the law, the Court held that this does not allow Congress to postpone its constitutional duty indefinitely. The Court found that 39 years is beyond a reasonable period to carry out the constitutional command. Congress’ continued inaction therefore constitutes a continuing violation of its constitutional duty.

Read the full text of the Press Briefer at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=173242.

Read the full text of the Decision at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=173192.

Read Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen’s Concurring Opinion at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=173197.

Read Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting Concurring Opinion at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=173209.

Read Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda’s Separate Opinion at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=173202.

Read Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao’s Separate Concurring Opinion at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=173214.

Read Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh’s Separate Opinion at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=173225

Read Associate Justice Raul B. Villanueva’s Separate Concurring Opinion at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=173231.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

###In this case, however, none of the arresting officers saw Omandam drinking. The prosecution relied solely on circumst...
16/09/2026

###

In this case, however, none of the arresting officers saw Omandam drinking. The prosecution relied solely on circumstantial evidence.
While circumstantial evidence may support a conviction, the SC stressed that the circumstances taken together must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt and rule out any reasonable explanation of innocence.

The SC found that the prosecution failed to meet this standard. It based its case solely on observations of Omandam’s appearance and other unsupported circumstances.

The SC noted that the offense is not typically committed in secret and could have been easily verified through readily available means, such as field sobriety, breath analyzer, or chemical tests. However, the police did not conduct any of these, nor did they take photographs or videos to document Omandam’s alleged intoxication.

###

The (SC) has ruled that appearing intoxicated, smelling of alcohol, or being found near empty liquor bottles is not, by itself, enough to establish a violation of the election liquor ban.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, the SC’s Third Division acquitted Mcgill Esquillo Omandam (Omandam), ruling that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he consumed alcohol during the prohibited period as stated under Section 261(dd)(1) of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), or the “COMELEC liquor ban.”

Omandam was arrested on the eve of the elections after police responded to reports of rowdiness. Arresting officers said he appeared intoxicated, smelled of alcohol, spoke with a slurred voice, and moved groggily. The police also recovered two empty bottles of Tanduay Rhum near the scene.

The SC explained that the OEC prohibits the taking of intoxicating liquor during the election liquor ban, which covers the day before the election and election day. The prosecution has to prove that the accused actually consumed alcohol during that period.

In this case, however, none of the arresting officers saw Omandam drinking. The prosecution relied solely on circumstantial evidence.

While circumstantial evidence may support a conviction, the SC stressed that the circumstances taken together must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt and rule out any reasonable explanation of innocence.

The SC found that the prosecution failed to meet this standard. It based its case solely on observations of Omandam’s appearance and other unsupported circumstances.

The SC noted that the offense is not typically committed in secret and could have been easily verified through readily available means, such as field sobriety, breath analyzer, or chemical tests. However, the police did not conduct any of these, nor did they take photographs or videos to document Omandam’s alleged intoxication.

Although two empty liquor bottles were recovered, the police did not examine them for fingerprints or conduct forensic tests to determine whether Omandam handled them.

The SC ruled that these omissions undermined the accuracy and fairness of the investigation. Taken together, they cast doubt on the reliability and sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence.

Read more at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=173139

Read the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=173133

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

16/09/2026
###The SC disagreed and clarified that under Section 66 of IPRA, the NCIP has jurisdiction over disputes involving IP ri...
09/09/2026

###

The SC disagreed and clarified that under Section 66 of IPRA, the NCIP has jurisdiction over disputes involving IP rights only when all parties belong to the same indigenous group. If any party is not a member of the same IP community, jurisdiction belongs to the regular courts.

Here, Co Uy was not a member of any indigenous group. The SC explained that subjecting him to the customary laws of an IP community violates the fundamental principles of fair play and due process.

The SC also noted that the Sendings simply claimed they were IPs but failed to provide supporting evidence. They did not explain their customs, political structures, institutions, decision-making processes, or any other proof showing they were truly members of an IP community.

The SC stressed that a final judgment cannot be easily set aside, especially when the parties were given opportunity to present their side, and the decision was reached after careful review of the case.

###

The (SC) clarified that the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) has no jurisdiction over a dispute unless both parties involved are indigenous peoples (IP) from the same group.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC’s Third Division dismissed a petition to compel a judge to set aside its decision in an ejectment case against the spouses claiming to be members of the IP community. The spouses had claimed that under Republic Act No. 8371 or the 𝘐𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘨𝘦𝘯𝘰𝘶𝘴 𝘗𝘦𝘰𝘱𝘭𝘦 𝘙𝘪𝘨𝘩𝘵𝘴 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 1997 (IPRA), customary laws and practices should govern in resolving disputes involving them.

The case stemmed from an unlawful detainer case filed by Kristoffer R. Co Uy (Co Uy) against Elvin and Jocelyn Sending (the Sendings), seeking to have them vacate a property registered in his name.

The Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Regional Trial Court, and the Court of Appeals (CA) all ruled in favor of Co Uy and ordered the Sendings to vacate the property.

After attaining finality, and during the enforcement of the decision, the Sendings questioned the jurisdiction of the MCTC. They claimed that they were members of the IP group 𝘓𝘶𝘮𝘢𝘥 𝘒𝘒𝘒-𝘈𝘭𝘪𝘮𝘢𝘰𝘯𝘨 𝘏𝘪𝘨𝘢𝘰𝘯𝘰𝘯 𝘛𝘳𝘪𝘣𝘦. They asserted, for the first time, that customary laws, traditions, and practices should be used to resolve the property dispute, in accordance with IPRA. Under the IPRA, the NCIP has jurisdiction over disputes involving the rights of IPs.

The spouses brought the case to the SC after their motion to suspend the ex*****on of decision was denied by the MCTC. They argued that the Higaonon Tribe and the Dadantulan Tribal Court, not the MCTC, should have jurisdiction over their case.

The SC disagreed and clarified that under Section 66 of IPRA, the NCIP has jurisdiction over disputes involving IP rights only when all parties belong to the same indigenous group. If any party is not a member of the same IP community, jurisdiction belongs to the regular courts.

Here, Co Uy was not a member of any indigenous group. The SC explained that subjecting him to the customary laws of an IP community violates the fundamental principles of fair play and due process.

The SC also noted that the Sendings simply claimed they were IPs but failed to provide supporting evidence. They did not explain their customs, political structures, institutions, decision-making processes, or any other proof showing they were truly members of an IP community.

The SC stressed that a final judgment cannot be easily set aside, especially when the parties were given opportunity to present their side, and the decision was reached after careful review of the case.

The SC found that the petitioners invoked the NCIP’s authority simply to avoid the ex*****on of the final judgment against them. They raised their claim of being IP members only during the ex*****on stage, despite having participated in the barangay proceedings and the courts, casting doubt on the credibility of their claim.

The SC ordered the spouses to vacate the subject property within 30 days from receipt of the Decision.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=172796

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/271354-spouses-elvin-sending-datu-gibo-and-jocelyn-sending-bae-orange-vs-kristopper-rahda-co-uy-atty-jocelyn-pesquera-henry-p-canete-jr-and-hon-ameli-amor-r-estrada-presiding-judge-of-t/

Read the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/271354-concurring-opinion-justice-alfredo-benjamin-s-caguioa/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

𝗟𝗘𝗚𝗔𝗟 𝗦𝗜(𝗭𝗢𝗡𝗘):𝑸: 𝑰𝒇 𝒂𝒏 𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒐𝒚𝒆𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒖𝒔𝒆 𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒌 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒖𝒏𝒃𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒅𝒖𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕'𝒔 𝒉𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚, 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒊𝒕 𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒍 ...
05/09/2026

𝗟𝗘𝗚𝗔𝗟 𝗦𝗜(𝗭𝗢𝗡𝗘):

𝑸: 𝑰𝒇 𝒂𝒏 𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒐𝒚𝒆𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒖𝒔𝒆 𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒌 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒖𝒏𝒃𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒅𝒖𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕'𝒔 𝒉𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚, 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒊𝒕 𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒃𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏 𝒊𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒂𝒍?

In 𝑩𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒐𝒍𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒗. 𝑻𝒐𝒚𝒐𝒕𝒂 𝑸𝒖𝒆𝒛𝒐𝒏 𝑨𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆, 𝑰𝒏𝒄. (𝑮.𝑹. 𝑵𝒐. 254465, 𝑨𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒍 03, 2024), the Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative, clarifying that a resignation forced by unbearable hostility is a 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒂𝒍 𝒊𝒏 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒈𝒖𝒊𝒔𝒆, legally recognized as 𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙨𝙩𝙧𝙪𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚 𝙙𝙞𝙨𝙢𝙞𝙨𝙨𝙖𝙡.

𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐮𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞 𝐝𝐢𝐬𝐦𝐢𝐬𝐬𝐚𝐥 arises when continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely, or when an employer's clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain becomes unbearable to the employee. The test is whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would feel compelled to give up their employment under the circumstances.

In this case, top management's public humiliation of the employee for bringing legal counsel, unceremonious pullout of major accounts, sabotage of sales approvals, retaliatory alteration of performance grades, and explicit pressure to resign transcended ordinary workplace friction.

An employee who tenders a resignation under such hostile conditions does not leave voluntarily. Executing a quitclaim marked ❝𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒆❞ and promptly filing an illegal dismissal complaint unequivocally demonstrates an intent to contest the oppressive treatment rather than waive labor rights.

𝘼 𝙧𝙚𝙨𝙞𝙜𝙣𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙡𝙚𝙩𝙩𝙚𝙧 𝙙𝙤𝙚𝙨 𝙣𝙤𝙩 𝙖𝙪𝙩𝙤𝙢𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙘𝙖𝙡𝙡𝙮 𝙖𝙗𝙨𝙤𝙡𝙫𝙚 𝙖𝙣 𝙚𝙢𝙥𝙡𝙤𝙮𝙚𝙧. 𝙒𝙝𝙚𝙣 𝙢𝙖𝙣𝙖𝙜𝙚𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙥𝙧𝙚𝙧𝙤𝙜𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚 𝙞𝙨 𝙚𝙭𝙚𝙧𝙘𝙞𝙨𝙚𝙙 𝙬𝙞𝙩𝙝 𝙢𝙖𝙡𝙞𝙘𝙚, 𝙙𝙞𝙨𝙙𝙖𝙞𝙣, 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙤𝙥𝙥𝙧𝙚𝙨𝙨𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙩𝙤 𝙛𝙤𝙧𝙘𝙚 𝙖 𝙬𝙤𝙧𝙠𝙚𝙧 𝙤𝙪𝙩, 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙡𝙖𝙬 𝙨𝙩𝙚𝙥𝙨 𝙞𝙣 𝙩𝙤 𝙥𝙧𝙤𝙩𝙚𝙘𝙩 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙚𝙢𝙥𝙡𝙤𝙮𝙚𝙚’𝙨 𝙨𝙚𝙘𝙪𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙤𝙛 𝙩𝙚𝙣𝙪𝙧𝙚.

Read the full Supreme Court decision through this link:
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/69528

###The SC explained that affidavits of desistance by victims of exploitation should be treated with caution, as they may...
01/09/2026

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The SC explained that affidavits of desistance by victims of exploitation should be treated with caution, as they may have been made under coercion, pressure, or undue influence.

This is especially true when the victims are children, who may not fully understand the consequences of withdrawing their testimony.
The SC further stressed that once a criminal case has been filed in court, the complainant can no longer decide whether the case should proceed.

The State has an interest in prosecuting the crime and is the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action. Thus, an affidavit of desistance, especially one executed while trial is ongoing, does not, by itself, justify dismissal of the case.

###

Read the full text of the Decision: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=167240

The (SC) has ruled that an affidavit of desistance, or a sworn statement withdrawing a complaint, is considered “highly suspect” when made by a victim of exploitation and cannot be used as a basis to dismiss a trafficking case.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the SC’s Third Division affirmed the conviction of a woman for qualified trafficking in persons involving a minor. The SC sentenced her to life imprisonment, imposed a fine of PHP 2,000,000, and ordered her to pay PHP 600,000 in damages.

The woman, who was the minor’s neighbor, recruited the minor to provide sexual services to a man in exchange for money. The minor received PHP 15,000 from the man for the sexual act, but the woman later took the money. The woman also bought the minor a cellphone and gave her PHP 3,000.

The minor’s mother discovered the incident and filed a complaint against the woman. The minor testified in court but later signed an affidavit of desistance to withdraw the charges.

During cross-examination, the minor admitted that she accepted PHP 30,000 to sign the affidavit prepared by the woman’s counsel. When the trial court questioned her further, the minor maintained that her earlier testimony was true.

Sustaining the woman’s conviction of qualified trafficking in persons under Republic Act No. (RA) 9208, or the 𝗔𝗻𝘁𝗶-𝗧𝗿𝗮𝗳𝗳𝗶𝗰𝗸𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗶𝗻 𝗣𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗼𝗻𝘀 𝗔𝗰𝘁 𝗼𝗳 𝟮𝟬𝟬𝟯, as amended, SC held that human trafficking cases should not be dismissed based on the affidavits of desistance executed by the victims or their parents or legal guardians.

The SC explained that affidavits of desistance by victims of exploitation should be treated with caution, as they may have been made under coercion, pressure, or undue influence. This is especially true when the victims are children, who may not fully understand the consequences of withdrawing their testimony.

The SC further stressed that once a criminal case has been filed in court, the complainant can no longer decide whether the case should proceed.

The State has an interest in prosecuting the crime and is the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action. Thus, an affidavit of desistance, especially one executed while trial is ongoing, does not, by itself, justify dismissal of the case.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=172431

Read the full text of the Decision at
https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=167240

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

26/08/2026

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###The BDO teller mistakenly validated the check as local instead of regional, allowing the amount to be credited after ...
25/08/2026

###

The BDO teller mistakenly validated the check as local instead of regional, allowing the amount to be credited after only three banking days instead of the required seven.

###

Before the SC, BDO asked for a review of the civil aspect of the case, arguing that despite Barcellano's acquittal, she should still be required to return the money. BDO argued that her refusal amounted to unjust enrichment and that since the funds were released due to its error in processing the check, Barcellano was required to return them based on the principle of 𝘴𝘰𝘭𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰 𝘪𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘣𝘪𝘵𝘪, which requires the repayment of money received by mistake.

The SC disagreed, ruling that there was no unjust enrichment because BDO failed to prove that Barcellano knowingly received and retained a benefit to which she was not entitled.

SC declared that the bank did not explain why the stop payment order was issued or show that Barcellano knew the check would not be honored. Instead, the evidence showed that she withdrew the money in good faith after BDO itself made the funds available in her account.

The SC also ruled that BDO’s own gross negligence caused its loss. It found that the bank credited the check before it had properly cleared it, incorrectly treated a regional check as a local check, and failed to detect the error until after receiving the stop payment order. These lapses showed a failure to observe basic safeguards meant to protect the bank from the risks of invalid checks.

The SC also rejected BDO’s reliance on solutio indebiti. Although the doctrine generally requires the return of money received by mistake, it does not apply when the mistake resulted from the payor’s own gross negligence. Here, BDO’s error stemmed from its failure to exercise the extraordinary diligence and reasonable prudence required of banks.

###

The Supreme Court (SC) has ruled that a bank cannot require a depositor to return money they already withdrew on the ground of unjust enrichment when the loss was caused by the bank’s own gross negligence.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC’s Third Division denied the petition filed by BDO Unibank, Inc. (BDO), holding that the bank’s disregard of its own banking policy amounted to gross negligence.

The case stemmed from Cristina Barcellano’s (Barcellano) deposit of a regional check worth PHP 151,200 from an Albay branch of Landbank into her savings account at BDO’s Lucena City branch.

The BDO teller mistakenly validated the check as local instead of regional, allowing the amount to be credited after only three banking days instead of the required seven.

Believing the funds were available, Barcellano withdrew PHP 76,000. Shortly after, BDO received a stop payment order on the check and demanded that she return the money. Although Barcellano initially agreed, she never repaid the amount. BDO later refused to release the remaining balance and filed a criminal complaint for estafa.

Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals acquitted Barcellano, finding no fraud, deceit, or abuse of confidence on her part and blamed BDO’s own negligence.

Before the SC, BDO asked for a review of the civil aspect of the case, arguing that despite Barcellano's acquittal, she should still be required to return the money. BDO argued that her refusal amounted to unjust enrichment and that since the funds were released due to its error in processing the check, Barcellano was required to return them based on the principle of 𝘴𝘰𝘭𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰 𝘪𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘣𝘪𝘵𝘪, which requires the repayment of money received by mistake.

The SC disagreed, ruling that there was no unjust enrichment because BDO failed to prove that Barcellano knowingly received and retained a benefit to which she was not entitled.

SC declared that the bank did not explain why the stop payment order was issued or show that Barcellano knew the check would not be honored. Instead, the evidence showed that she withdrew the money in good faith after BDO itself made the funds available in her account.

The SC also ruled that BDO’s own gross negligence caused its loss. It found that the bank credited the check before it had properly cleared it, incorrectly treated a regional check as a local check, and failed to detect the error until after receiving the stop payment order. These lapses showed a failure to observe basic safeguards meant to protect the bank from the risks of invalid checks.

The SC also rejected BDO’s reliance on solutio indebiti. Although the doctrine generally requires the return of money received by mistake, it does not apply when the mistake resulted from the payor’s own gross negligence. Here, BDO’s error stemmed from its failure to exercise the extraordinary diligence and reasonable prudence required of banks.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171657

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/261264-bdo-unibank-inc-vs-cristina-barcellano-y-riego/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

24/08/2026

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