Bradecina Law Office - Atty. Darwin B. Bradecina

Bradecina Law Office - Atty. Darwin B. Bradecina Lawyer & Notary Public

08/06/2026

WE ARE HIRING!!

Position: Legal Assistant

Qualifications:

•Good written and communication skills
•Computer Literate (Proficiency in MS Office)
•No experience required

Working Hours:

•8:00 AM to 5:00 PM (Non-law students)
•7:30 AM to 3:30 PM (For law students)

Office Address: 2nd Floor, HighPoint Building, Karangahan Blvd., Bombon, Tabaco City, Albay.

Please send your resume to:
[email protected]

18/03/2026

The (SC) 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 has upheld the validity of a Department of Justice (DOJ) circular that raised the standard of proof in preliminary investigations and inquest proceedings from probable cause to prima facie evidence with reasonable certainty of conviction.

In a Decision written by written by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 ruled that Department Circular No. 15, series of 2024 containing the 2024 𝘋𝘖𝘑-𝘕𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘴𝘦𝘤𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘚𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘪𝘤𝘦 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘯 𝘗𝘳𝘦𝘭𝘪𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘳𝘺 𝘐𝘯𝘷𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘨𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘐𝘯𝘲𝘶𝘦𝘴𝘵 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘤𝘦𝘦𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨𝘴 (𝘋𝘖𝘑 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴), is a valid exercise of the DOJ’s authority over prosecutorial processes.

Under the DOJ Rules’ new standard of proof in preliminary investigations and inquest, prosecutors must ensure that the evidence to charge a person with a crime must sufficiently establish all the elements and consequently warrant a conviction.

Atty. Hazel L. Meking questioned the DOJ Rules before the SC, claiming that the DOJ encroached on the SC’s constitutional authority to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts. She argued that the DOJ Rules effectively revised Rule 112, Section 3(a) of the 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘤𝘦𝘥𝘶𝘳𝘦, which provides that the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is probable cause.

The SC dismissed her petition and reiterated its ruling in 𝘈.𝘔. 𝘕𝘰. 24-02-09-𝘚𝘊, which recognized the DOJ’s authority to promulgate its own rules on preliminary investigations and inquest proceedings.

The SC held that the DOJ Rules govern only the conduct of preliminary investigations and inquests by prosecutors, which are executive functions. These Rules, however, do not extend to judicial proceedings as the power to promulgate rules of procedure over them remains under the authority of the Supreme Court.

The SC noted it had already recognized preliminary investigation as the exclusive domain of prosecutors when it revised the Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2005.

In 2024, through 𝘈.𝘔. 𝘕𝘰. 24-02-09-𝘚𝘊, the SC also ordered the repeal of provisions in Rule 112 which are inconsistent with the DOJ Rules to harmonize them.

The SC’s constitutional rule-making authority over judicial proceedings remains supreme, as well as its power to correct grave abuse of discretion in any prosecutorial rule or action that violates constitutional rights.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161871

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161853

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161858

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

23/10/2025

READ: Statement of the Office of the Spokesperson on the passing of Judge Carmela Rosario C. Pasquin.

26/07/2025

Sa sesyon nito ngayong araw, Hulyo 25, 2025, idineklara ng Korte Suprema ang Articles of Impeachment laban kay Bise Presidente Sara Z. Duterte na labag sa Saligang Batas dahil pinagbabawal ito ng one-year rule
sa ilalim ng Artikulo XI, Seksyon 3(5) ng Saligang Batas at nilalabag nito ang karapatan sa due process na nakasaad sa Bill of Rights. Kaya hindi makakakuha ng hurisdiksyon ang Senado sa impeachment proceeding.

Gayunpaman, sinabi ng Korte na hindi nito inaabswelto si Bise Presidente Duterte sa alinman sa mga paratang laban sa kanya. Ngunit ang anumang kasunod na impeachment complaint ay maaari lamang ihain simula Pebrero 6, 2026.

Nag-ugat ang kaso sa apat na reklamong impeachment laban kay Bise Presidente Duterte. Ang unang tatlo ay inihain sa Mababang Kapulungan ng mga pribadong indibidwal at iba't ibang grupo noong Disyembre 2, 4, at 19, 2024.

May ikaapat na reklamo na inihain sa pamamagitan ng isang resolusyon na inaprubahan ng higit sa one-third ng mga miyembro ng Mababang Kapulungan ng 19th Congress noong Pebrero 5, 2025, na ipinadala bilang Articles of Impeachment sa Senado sa parehong araw. Sinundan ito ng dalawang petisyon na inihain sa Korte Suprema na kinwestiyon ang konstitusyonalidad nito.

Bumoto ang Korte Suprema ng 13-0-2, kung saan ang mga Justices na naroon ay sumang-ayon sa pagboto para pagbigyan ang mga petisyon na ipawalang-bisa ang Articles of Impeachment. Si Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa ay nag-inhibit, samantalang si Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh ay naka-leave.

Sa Desisyon na isinulat ni Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, nagpasya ang Korte Suprema na ang lahat ng mga legal na isyu na kinasasangkutan ng mga paglilitis sa impeachment ay napapailalim sa pagsusuri ng hudisyal o judicial review, dahil sa likas na katangian ng mga tanggapan at mga institusyon na napapailalim sa impeachment, ang epekto nito sa kalayaan ng mga kagawaran at organo ng Konstitusyon, at ang kalikasan nito bilang isang proseso ng Konstitusyon.

Sa pagdedeklara na ang Articles of Impeachment ay pinagbawalan ng one-year rule, itinuring ng Desisyon na iba ang unang tatlong reklamo mula sa ikaapat na reklamo. Ang unang tatlo, aniya, ay isinampa sa ilalim ng Artikulo XI, Seksyon 3(2) ng Saligang Batas na nagpapahintulot sa sinumang mamamayan na magsampa ng beripikadong reklamo na inendorso ng sinumang miyembro ng Mababang Kapulungan. Ang pang-apat ay sa pamamagitan ng Artikulo XI, Seksyon 3(4) ng Konstitusyon sa pamamagitan ng beripikadong reklamo o resolusyon na inihain ng hindi bababa sa one-third ng mga miyembro ng Mababang Kapulungan.

Binigyang-pansin ng Korte Suprema na hindi kumilos ang Mababang Kapulungan sa 19th Congress sa unang tatlong inendorsong reklamo na itinuring na tinapos na o tinanggal na sa pagpapaliban nito.

Natukoy din ng Korte Suprema na mayroong mga naging paglabag ang Mababang Kapulungan sa due process sa paglilitis. Inilatag nito ang mga sumusunod na angkop na proseso sa mga paglilitis ng impeachment:

1. Ang Articles of Impeachment o resolusyon ay dapat maglalaman ng ebidensiya kapag ibinabahagi sa mga miyembro ng Kapulungan, lalo na sa mga nagbabalak na iendorso ito.

2. Sapat dapat ang ebidensiya para patunayan ang mga paratang sa Articles of Impeachment.

3. Ang Articles of Impeachment at ang mga nilalamang ebidensiya ay dapat pwedeng ibigay sa lahat ng miyembro ng Mababang Kapulungan, hindi lamang sa mga nagbabalak na mag-endorso nito.

4. Dapat sana ay nabigyan ng pagkakataon ang taong sinampahan na marinig ang kanyang panig hinggil sa Articles of Impeachment at ang mga nilalamang ebidensiya para patunayan ang mga paratang laban sa kanya bago ito ipadala sa Senado, gaano man karami ang mga nag-eendorsong miyembro ng Mababang Kapulungan.

5. Dapat bigyan ng makatwirang panahon ang Mababang Kapulungan na malayang makapagpasya kung ieendorso ba nila ang reklamong impeachment. Gayunpaman, may kapangyarihan ang Korte na suriin kung sapat ang panahong ito, ngunit ang nagpetisyon – na humihiling sa kapangyarihan ng Korte na magsuri – ay dapat patunayang nabigo ang mga opisyal na gampanan nang maayos ang kanilang mga tungkulin.

6. Ang batayan ng anumang reklamo ay para dapat sa mga impeachable na pagkakasala o pagkukulang na ginawa kaugnay sa kanilang tungkulin at sa kasalukuyang termino ng impeachable na opisyal. Para sa Presidente at Bise Presidente, ang mga ginawa ay dapat kasimbigat ng mga katumbas na krimeng nakasaad sa Artikulo XI, Seksyon 3 (1) o isang pagtataksil sa tiwala ng publiko (betrayal of public trust) na ibinigay ng karamihan ng mga botante.

Para sa iba pang mga impeachable na opisyal, kailangang mabigat ang kanilang ginawa na talagang nakasisira sa respetong dapat ay taglay nila bilang mga tagapagtaguyod ng Konstitusyon;

7. Para matiyak na narinig ang panig ng taong sinampahan ng impeachment, ang Mababang Kapulungan ay kinakailangan na:

(a) Magbigay ng kopya ng Articles of Impeachment at mga nilalamang ebidensiya sa taong sinampahan para magkaroon siya ng pagkakataong tumugon sa loob ng makatwirang panahon na itatakda ng mga alituntunin ng Mababang Kapulungan. Ang hinihingi lamang ng Saligang Batas ay ang pagkakataong mapakinggan. Nasa taong sinampahan kung kusa niyang tatalikuran ang pangunahing karapatang ito at piliing iharap ang kanyang ebidensiya sa paglilitis ng Senado; at

(b) Gawing available sa lahat ng miyembro ng Mababang Kapulungan ang Articles of Impeachment, kasama ang nilalamang ebidensiya at komento ng taong sinampahan. Ang Mababang Kapulungan—hindi ang one-third ng Mababang Kapulungan—ang may tanging karapatan na magpasimula ng mga reklamong impeachment. Kaya naman, dapat magkaroon ng kaunting deliberasyon upang mapakinggan ang bawat miyembro na kumakatawan sa kanilang mga nasasakupan at sa gayon ay makumbinsi ang iba sa kanilang posisyon. Ang transmittal gayunman ay magaganap lamang kung may kalipikadong boto ng one-third ng Kapulungan.

Basahin ang press release sa https://tinyurl.com/596r7cde.

Basahin ang buong Desisyon sa https://tinyurl.com/xukhchaf.

Basahin ang Hiwalay na Sumasang-ayon na Opinyon ni Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando sa https://tinyurl.com/3cjtcpjv.

Basahin ang Hiwalay na Sumasang-ayon na Opinyon ni Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting sa https://tinyurl.com/3wdhk52w.

Basahin ang Hiwalay na Sumasang-ayon na Opinyon ni Justice Rodil V. Zalameda sa https://tinyurl.com/mr47p9ux.

Basahin ang Hiwalay na Sumasang-ayon na Opinyon ni Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez sa https://tinyurl.com/mr22rane.

Basahin ang Hiwalay na Sumasang-ayon na Opinyon ni Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan sa https://tinyurl.com/u9um2h54.

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.


26/07/2025

The (SC) En Banc, during its session today, July 25, 2025, has declared the Articles of Impeachment against Vice President Sara Z. Duterte unconstitutional, noting that it is barred by the one-year rule under Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution and that it violates the right to due process enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Therefore, the Senate could not acquire jurisdiction over the impeachment proceedings.

However, the SC said it is not absolving Vice President Duterte from any of the charges against her. But any subsequent impeachment complaint may only be filed starting February 6, 2026.

The ruling of the SC is immediately executory. It shall be deemed served on the petitioners and promulgated upon publication in the SC website and receipt of the parties of their digital copy in accordance with A.M. No. 25-05-16-SC or the Guidelines on the Transition to Electronic Filing in the Supreme Court.

The case stemmed from four impeachment complaints against Vice President Duterte. The first three were filed before the House of Representatives (HOR) by private individuals and different groups on December 2, 4, and 19, 2024.

A fourth complaint was lodged by a resolution approved by more than one-third of the HOR members of the 19th Congress on February 5, 2025, which was transmitted as the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate on the same day. This was followed by two petitions filed before the SC challenging its constitutionality.

The SC voted 13-0-2, with the Justices present voting unanimously to grant the petitions to annul the Articles of Impeachment, and Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa inhibiting and Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh on leave.

The Decision, written by Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, ruled that all legal issues involving impeachment proceedings are subject to judicial review, “considering the nature of the offices and the institutions that are subject to impeachment, its effect on the independence of constitutional departments and organs, and its nature as a constitutional process.”

In declaring that the Articles of Impeachment were barred by the one-year rule, the Decision differentiated the first three complaints from the fourth complaint. The first three, it said, were filed under Article XI, Section 3(2) of the Constitution which allows any citizen to file a verified complaint with an endorsement by any HOR member. The fourth one was through Article XI, Section 3(4) of the Constitution through a verified complaint or resolution filed by at least one-third of the HOR members.

The SC took note that the HOR in the 19th Congress did not act on the first three endorsed complaints, which were considered “terminated or dismissed” upon the adjournment of the HOR.

The SC also determined that due process applies to the impeachment process. It laid down the following due process requirements in impeachment proceedings:

1. The Articles of Impeachment or resolution must include evidence when shared with HOR members, especially those who are considering its endorsement.

2. The evidence should be sufficient to prove the charges in the Articles of Impeachment.

3. The Articles of Impeachment and the supporting evidence should be available to all members of the HOR, not only those who are being considered to endorse.

4. The respondent in the impeachment complaint should have been given a chance to be heard on the Articles of Impeachment and the supporting evidence to prove the charges prior to its transmittal to the Senate, despite the number of endorsements from HOR members.

5. The HOR must be given a reasonable time to reach their independent decision of whether they will endorse an impeachment complaint. The SC, however, has the power to review whether this period is sufficient, but petitioner—who invokes the SC’s power to review—should prove that officials failed to perform their duties properly.

6. The basis of any charge must be for impeachable acts or omissions committed in relation to their office and during the current term of the impeachable officer. For the President and Vice President, these acts must be sufficiently grave amounting to the crimes described in Article XI, Section 2 or a betrayal of public trust given by the majority of the electorate. For the other impeachable officers, the acts must be sufficiently grave that they undermine and outweigh the respect for their constitutional independence and autonomy.

7. To ensure that respondent in the impeachment complaint is heard, the HOR is required to:

(a) Provide a copy of the Articles of Impeachment and its accompanying evidence to the respondent to give him/her an opportunity to respond within a reasonable period to be determined by the HOR rules. The Constitution only requires an opportunity to be heard. It is up the respondent to waive this fundamental right and opt to present his/her evidence at the Senate trial; and

(b) Make the Articles of Impeachment, with its accompanying evidence and the comment of the respondent, available to all the members of the HOR. It is the HOR—not one-third of the HOR—that has the sole prerogative to initiate impeachment complaints. Thus, there must be some modicum of deliberation so that each member representing their constituents can be heard and thus convince others of their position. The transmittal however will only take place upon the qualified vote of one-third of the HOR.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://tinyurl.com/596r7cde.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://tinyurl.com/xukhchaf

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando at https://tinyurl.com/3cjtcpjv.

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting at https://tinyurl.com/3wdhk52w.

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Rodil V. Zalameda at https://tinyurl.com/mr47p9ux.

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez at https://tinyurl.com/mr22rane.

Read the Concurring Opinion of Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan at https://tinyurl.com/u9um2h54.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

05/07/2025

The (SC) has ruled that an acknowledgment receipt cannot be considered a contract of sale unless it clearly shows that the seller intends to transfer ownership of the property to the buyer.

In a decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division ruled that the agreement between Virgilio B. Chavez and his fellow petitioners (Chavez family) on one hand, and Spouses Joselito and Adriana Gopez (spouses) on the other was a contract to sell, not a contract of sale.

The case involved two properties inherited by the Chavez family, which they agreed to sell to the Spouses Gopez for PHP 31.5 million. The spouses were required to pay PHP 5 million as downpayment and to prepare the necessary documents, including the contract to sell.

The spouses initially paid PHP 200,000, noted in an acknowledgment receipt as “earnest money.” This receipt was the only proof of their agreement.

Later, the Chavez family canceled the agreement, claiming that the spouses had not paid the full down payment and had delayed the paperwork. This led the Spouses Gopez to file a case to force the Chavez family to proceed with the sale.

Ruling that the transaction was a contract to sell, the SC explained that in such a contract, the seller does not agree to transfer ownership of the property just yet. The seller only commits to fulfilling their promise to sell the properties and transfer title to the buyer after an event, typically the full payment of the purchase price. If this does not happen, their obligation to sell does not arise, and the seller retains ownership of the property.

In contrast, a contract of sale clearly shows the seller's intent to transfer ownership to the buyer.

In this case, the acknowledgment receipt did not include any promise to transfer ownership. It only showed that the spouses needed to meet conditions: the payment of the purchase price and preparation of the contract to sell, deed of sale, and estate settlement.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://tinyurl.com/3zfynpbc.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://tinyurl.com/4hvfm3ze.

Read the the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://tinyurl.com/msysydyb.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

05/07/2025

Nilinaw ng na maaaring kolektahin ng korte ang suweldo ng mga pampublikong opisyal para mabayaran ang kanilang mga utang. Ang mga suweldong ito ay hindi exempted sa garnishment sa ilalim ng kasalukuyang mga batas at tuntunin.

Sa isang desisyon na isinulat ni Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, nagpasya ang Third Division ng Korte na maaaring ma-garnish o makumpiska para legal na kolektahin ang suweldo ni Atty. Fred L. Bagbagen (Bagbagen) para bayaran ang kanyang utang kay Anna May F. Perez (Perez).

Napawalang-sala ng Regional Trial Court (RTC) sa kasong estafa si Bagbagen pero napatunayan siyang may sibil na pananagutan para bayaran si Perez ng PHP 308,000. Pinayagan ng RTC ang garnishment ng kanyang sweldo na nakadeposito sa Philippine Veterans Bank.

Sinubukan ni Bagbagen na pigilan ang garnishment sa katwiran na ang kanyang mga suweldo ay pondo ng gobyerno hangga’t hindi nagagastos.

Tinanggihan ito RTC na nagsabing hindi na itinuturing na pondo ng gobyerno ang pera kapag ito ay naideposito na sa personal bank account. Sumang-ayon sa RTC ang Court of Appeals (CA).

Pinagtibay ng Korte Suprema ang Desisyon ng CA at RTC. Binigyang diin nito na walang batas na nag-i-exempt sa mga sweldo ng mga opisyal ng gobyerno sa garnishment. Sa ilalim ng Rule 39 ng Rules of Court, ang mga suweldo, parehong pampubliko at pribado, ay maaaring ma-garnish para pambayad sa utang.

May exception para sa mga manual laborer o manggagawa na ang mga sahod ay protektado para matiyak na maaari pa rin nilang suportahan ang kanilang mga pamilya. Paliwanag ng Korte, ang mga manggagawa ay karaniwang umaasa sa kikitain sa isang araw ng trabaho para suportahan ang kanilang pamilya kaya higit silang nangangailangan ng exemption. Pero hanggang apat na buwan lang na halaga ng sahod ang kasama sa exemption. Anumang halaga na higit pa rito ay maaari pa ring kolektahin para bayaran ang mga utang.

Pinapanatili ring mas mahigpit ang pamantayan pagdating sa kita at obligasyon sa pananalapi sa mga pampublikong opisyal dahil sa kanilang tungkulin sa Konstitusyon bilang tagapag-ingat ng tiwala ng publiko.

Basahin ang press release sa https://tinyurl.com/44u5fp2s.

Basahin ang Desisyon sa https://tinyurl.com/4pzbvsv9.

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.


27/06/2025

Nagpasya ang na ang isang kasunduan sa pagbebenta ng lupa ay may bisa kahit hindi nakasulat kung ito ay bahagya o ganap nang naipatupad.

Sa Desisyon na isinulat ni Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, kinatigan ng Third Division ng Korte ang berbal na pagbebenta ng lupa sa pagitan nina Marcos Batara (Batara) at ng kanyang pamangkin na si Benedicto Ocampo (Ocampo). Bagamat walang nakasulat na kontrata, sinabi ng Korte na may bisa ang pagbebenta dahil natanggap na ni Ocampo ang titulo ng lupa, nakalipat na siya sa ari-arian, at nagtanim ng mga pananim dito.

Nakarehistro ang lupa sa pangalan ni Batara na namatay noong 1974. Nalaman lang ng kanyang mga anak na sina Noblesa at Ernesto ang tungkol sa ari-arian noong 2007. Nakatanggap sila ng notice na magbayad ng hindi pa nababayarang buwis sa real estate at nalaman din na doon nakatira ang kanilang pinsan na si Ocampo.

Sina Noblesa at Ernesto ay nagsampa ng kaso para bawiin ang lupain mula kay Ocampo at sinabing sila ang mga nararapat na tagapagmana.

Sinabi ni Ocampo na binili niya ang lupa kay Batara noong buhay pa siya. Nang namatay si Batara, patuloy na nagbabayad si Ocampo ng hulugan kay Marcelo, kapatid ni Batara at tagapag-alaga ni Noblesa.

Inamin ni Ocampo na ang pagbebenta ay hindi napatunayan ng anumang nakasulat na dokumento dahil namatay si Batara bago pa nila maisagawa ang mga kinakailangan. Pero iprinisenta ni Ocampo ang kopya ng titulo ng lupa ng may-ari bilang patunay na sinasabing ibinigay ito ni Batara sa kanya pagkatapos ng unang pagbabayad noong 1972.

Nagdesisyon pabor kina Noblesa at Ernesto ang Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Court of Appeals (CA) na nagsabing mas may karapatan sila sa ari-arian dahil nakarehistro ito sa pangalan ng kanilang ama. Dagdag pa rito, walang sapat na patunay ng pagbebenta maliban sa mga pahayag ni Ocampo.

Binaliktad ng Korte Suprema ang desisyon ng RTC at CA.

Sa ilalim ng Civil Code, ang pagbebenta ng lupa ay dapat na nakasulat para maipatupad ito sa korte. Ang nakasulat na dokumentong ito ay nagsisilbing patunay na ang magkabilang partido ay sumang-ayon sa pagbebenta. Pero ang pagbebenta ay itinuturing na may bisa pa rin kahit na walang nakasulat na kontrata kung ito ay ganap na o bahagyang naisakatuparan na. Sa ganitong mga kaso, ang isang berbal na kasunduan ay maaari pa ring magkaroon ng legal na bisa, at ang mga saksi ay maaaring payagang tumestigo upang patunayan na nangyari ang bentahan.

Dagdag pa ng Korte, ang pag-aari ng lupa at pagpapagawa ng mga pagbabago ay matibay na senyales na nagkaroon na ng verbal sale. Kaya ang mga mamimili na nakatira na sa ari-arian ay maaaring gamitin ang kasunduang berbal bilang legal na batayan sa kanilang pagmamay-ari kahit na walang nakasulat na kontrata.

Sa kasong ito, ang pagbebenta ay bahagyang naipatupad dahil bahagyang binayaran ni Ocampo ang lupa, lumipat siya rito, natanggap niya rin ang titulo ng lupa, at nagbayad din ng amilyar. May patunay na may bentahan base sa mga testimonya ni Ocampo at ng kanyang mga testigo.

Pero sinabi ng Korte na hindi si Marcelo ang awtorisadong tumanggap ng bayad sa ngalan ng mga tagapagmana ng kanyang kapatid. Kaya kahit nananatiling wasto at may bisa ang pagbebenta, kailangang bayaran ni Ocampo ang natitirang balanse ng presyo ng pagbili na may kasamang interes kina Noblesa at Ernesto.

Basahin ang press release sa https://tinyurl.com/yeapyzcd.

Basahin ang Desisyon sa https://tinyurl.com/msxr7hsd.

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.


27/06/2025

The (SC) has ruled that a land sale made through a verbal, unwritten agreement can be considered valid and binding—as long as it has been partly or fully carried out.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the SC’s Third Division upheld the verbal sale of land between Marcos Batara (Batara) and his nephew Benedicto Ocampo (Ocampo). Even without a written contract, the SC found the sale valid because Ocampo had already received the land title, moved into the property, and made improvements on it.

The land was registered in the name of Batara, who passed away in 1974. His children, Noblesa and Ernesto, only learned of their father’s ownership of the property in 2007, when they received a notice to pay unpaid real estate taxes on the land and found out that the same was being occupied by their cousin, Ocampo.

Noblesa and Ernesto filed a case to reclaim the land from Ocampo, saying they were the rightful heirs. Ocampo, on the other hand, claimed he bought the land from Batara while the latter was still alive. After Batara died, Ocampo kept paying installments to Marcelo, Batara’s brother.

Ocampo admitted that the sale was not evidenced by any written document because Batara died before they could execute the necessary instruments. But Ocampo provided the owner’s copy of land title as proof, claiming Batara gave it to him after the initial payment in 1972.

Ruling in Ocampo’s favor, the SC said that under the Civil Code, a sale of land must be in writing to be enforced in court. This written document serves as proof that both parties agreed to the sale.

However, the sale is still considered valid even without a written contract if it has already been fully or partly carried out. In such cases, a verbal agreement can still be legally binding, and witnesses may be allowed to testify to prove that the sale happened.

In this case, the sale was partially executed as Ocampo had partially paid for the land, taken possession of it, received the land title, and paid real property taxes. The SC thus admitted the testimonies of Ocampo and his witnesses, which proved the sale.

The SC, however, found that Ocampo’s payments to Batara’s brother Marcelo were ineffective because he was not authorized to accept them on behalf of his brother’s heirs.

Therefore, while the sale remains valid, Ocampo must pay the remaining balance of the purchase price, with interest, to Noblesa and Ernesto.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://tinyurl.com/yeapyzcd.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://tinyurl.com/msxr7hsd.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

26/06/2025

The (SC) has ruled that a spouse’s inability to love or emotionally connect with their partner, if rooted in a genuine personality disorder, may be considered evidence of psychological incapacity and a ground to declare a marriage void.

In a Decision written by Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, the SC’s Second Division reinstated an earlier ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which declared a couple’s marriage void from the beginning due to the husband’s psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital duties.

The couple met in 1999 and married in 2002. They did not live together immediately, as the husband worked in Saudi Arabia. They were only physically together for about five years, and their relationship was marked by frequent arguments and periods of separation.

In 2016, the husband filed a petition to nullify the marriage, supported by a psychologist’s diagnosis of his Passive-Aggressive Personality Disorder, which made it difficult for him to maintain close relationships. The RTC initially granted his petition, but reversed the same on reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied the husband’s appeal.

The SC, however, ruled in favor of the husband, finding that he had sufficiently proven psychological incapacity.

Under Article 36 of the Family Code, a marriage is void if one or both spouses are psychologically unable to fulfill their marital duties—even if the condition becomes evident only after the wedding. The incapacity must be deeply rooted in the person’s character and must have existed before the marriage.

The SC clarified that psychological incapacity can manifest long after the wedding, so a spouse who initially appears capable may later show signs of inability. If this comes from a genuine psychological condition, the marriage can still be declared void.

In this case, the SC found that the husband’s emotional detachment stemmed from a strict and emotionally distant upbringing. While he could provide for his family financially, he struggled to meet his wife’s emotional needs, including basic companionship.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://tinyurl.com/2zjba472.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://tinyurl.com/8e67mcme.

Read the Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez at https://tinyurl.com/56e9rs43.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

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