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06/05/2026

The has acquitted a man charged with violence against women and their children, or VAWC, for allegedly refusing to provide financial support to a child not proven to be his, emphasizing that a legal duty to provide financial support arises only after filiation or paternity has been established.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC’s Third Division reversed the rulings of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, which found the accused guilty of economic abuse under Republic Act No. 9262, or the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘪𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘈𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵 𝘞𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘛𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘳 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2004 (𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘈𝘞𝘊 𝘈𝘤𝘵).

The case arose from a complaint filed by a woman against her former boyfriend, accusing him of refusing to provide financial support for her child.

The accused consistently denied he was the father, claiming that the child was born only eight months after they last had sexual relations.

During trial, the woman presented the child’s birth certificate as evidence. However, the portion indicating the father’s name, was marked "𝘕/𝘈" and left unsigned.

The woman also admitted in court that the accused refused to give financial support because he doubted that he was the child’s father.

In reversing the accused’s conviction, the SC explained that to convict a person for economic abuse under Section 5(i) of the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘈𝘞𝘊 𝘈𝘤𝘵, the prosecution must show the following: (1) the victim is a woman and/or her child; (2) the woman is the offender’s wife or partner, or someone with whom the offender has a common child; (3) the offender refused to give financial support due; and (4) the refusal was intended to cause mental or emotional suffering.

In this case, the SC ruled that the prosecution failed to prove two essential elements: that the accused and the woman share a common child, and that the refusal to provide support was done to inflict psychological harm.

As the accused’s paternity was not proven in this case, no legal obligation to provide support could be imposed.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164663.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164655.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution.

27/04/2026

The (SC) has acquitted a mother of parricide over her daughter’s death, exempting her from criminal liability after finding that she has schizophrenia and her mental state deprived her of the capacity to recognize the wrongfulness of her act.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the SC’s Third Division granted a mother’s appeal and overturned her parricide conviction on the ground of legal insanity due to schizophrenia, an exempting circumstance under the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦.

The mother was charged with parricide for the killing of her five-year old daughter after she was seen embracing the child and simultaneously jumping off a bridge into a river with her, which led to her daughter’s death. While a man aboard a styrofoam banca was able to save the mother, he was unable to locate the child. The daughter’s lifeless body was found in the river the next day.

The mother claimed she was not in her right mind at the time. She could only remember walking with her daughter and had no memory of the incident itself. She said she only regained consciousness while floating in the water.

A licensed physician from the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) testified that the mother was diagnosed with schizophrenia.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) brushed aside the claim of insanity as she entered into a plea of “not guilty” and raised insanity as a defense only after the prosecution rested its case. The RTC convicted the mother and sentenced her to reclusion perpetua after finding that she was sane at the time of the incident.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision.

The SC disagreed. It ruled that the mother was not criminally liable because her mental condition during the incident prevented her from understanding the nature and wrongfulness of her actions.

Insanity is defined as a disease or defect of the brain manifested in language or conduct. Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, it is one of the circumstances that exempts a person from criminal liability.

In 𝙋𝙚𝙤𝙥𝙡𝙚 𝙫. 𝙋𝙖ñ𝙖, the SC laid down a three-way test to establish insanity as an exempting circumstance:

• 𝙛𝙞𝙧𝙨𝙩, the insanity must be present at the time of the commission of the crime;
• 𝙨𝙚𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙙, it must be medically proven; and
• 𝙩𝙝𝙞𝙧𝙙, it must render the accused incapable of appreciating the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of the act.

Insanity must be proven with clear and convincing evidence. Because it involves a person’s state of mind, courts look at overt acts or outward behavior. As a rule, insanity must be supported by medical evidence, unless there are extraordinary circumstances where such evidence is not available. While people who know the accused may testify about their observations, courts give greater weight to the findings and evaluations of qualified medical experts.

In this case, the SC determined that the mother was able to medically prove that she was suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the crime based on the testimony and mental status examination reports from psychiatrists.

The SC further explained that schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by the inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality. Often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions, the medical condition deprives a person of discernment, satisfying the third requisite in the 𝘗𝘢ñ𝘢 𝘥𝘰𝘤𝘵𝘳𝘪𝘯𝘦.

Here, the psychiatrist testified that the mother was mentally disturbed at the time of the incident, showing signs of paranoia and perceiving threats, gossip, and envy directed at her.

While the SC exempted the mother from criminal liability, it still held her civilly liable and ordered her to pay the victim’s heirs PHP 75,000 in civil indemnity and PHP 200,000 in moral, exemplary, and temperate damages.

The SC also ordered the mother’s immediate transfer from the Correctional Institution for Women to the NCMH for her treatment. She will be released only upon the order of the RTC based on a recommendation from her attending physician at the hospital.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164320

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164308

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy.

20/04/2026

The (SC) has affirmed its previous ruling that cyber libel prescribes one year from the time it is discovered, holding that “cyber libel” is not a new crime but a form of “libel” under Art. 355 of the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 that is committed through a computer system or other similar means.

In a Resolution written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 denied the separate motions for reconsideration filed by Berteni Cataluña Causing and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

In December 2020, Cotabato Second District Representative Ferdinand L. Hernandez filed a cyber libel complaint with the prosecutor against Causing related to Facebook posts accusing Hernandez of pocketing over PHP 200 million in relief goods for Marawi victims. Hernandez stated he discovered the posts on February 4 and April 29, 2019.

Informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Causing in May 2021. He filed a motion to quash the Informations, arguing that they were already time-barred under the RPC because more than one year had passed since the posts were uploaded.

The RTC denied the motion, ruling that cyber libel prescribes in 12 years under 𝘙𝘦𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘕𝘰. (𝘙𝘈) 10175 or the 𝘊𝘺𝘣𝘦𝘳𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘦 𝘗𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵.

Causing appealed to the SC, which clarified that the prescriptive period for cyber libel is one year from the date of discovery, consistent with traditional libel under the RPC. The Court rejected Causing’s motion to quash the Informations due to insufficient proof that the offense had already prescribed, highlighting that he can present evidence during the trial at the RTC.

Both the OSG and Causing filed separate partial motions for reconsideration.

The OSG argued that the one-year prescriptive period for traditional libel under the RPC should not apply to cyber libel. Instead, it should be 15 years under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, as previously decided by the Supreme Court through an unsigned resolution in Tolentino v. People.

Causing, on the other hand, argued that the prescription for cyber libel should start from the publication date rather than from discovery. He contended that online posts are more widespread than traditional forms of publication. If the discovery rule is applied, cyber libel charges could be filed several years after the post was made, as long as the offended party discovered it later.

The SC rejected both arguments.

Under the RPC, written libel prescribes in one year. There is no law that excludes cyber libel from this one-year period, and Congress has consistently treated libel as having a shorter prescriptive period than other crimes, even when penalties are increased.

The SC reiterated that cyber libel is not a separate crime, but rather libel committed through a computer system. The fact that the Cybercrime Prevention Act imposes a higher penalty for cyber libel does not imply that its prescriptive period should be extended beyond that of traditional libel.

The SC added that when laws on the prescription of crimes are unclear, they must be interpreted in favor of the accused. Since the RPC sets a one-year prescriptive period for cyber libel, it prevails over the 15-year period set in the case of Tolentino v. People, which is an unsigned resolution.

The SC also affirmed that prescription begins upon discovery of the offense, not upon publication. The law clearly states that prescription runs from the time the crime is discovered by the offended party or the authorities.

Seven other Justices joined Justice Inting in the majority. They are:
• Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo
• Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
• Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa
• Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda
• Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan
• Associate Justice Jose Midas P. Marquez
• Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh

In his Concurring Opinion, Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen argued that the one-year prescription period should apply only to libel cases against private individuals. He added that libel against public figures should be decriminalized, as punishing comments and criticisms directed at public officials discourages free and uninhibited discussion about how those in public office conduct themselves.

In his Concurring Opinion, Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa stressed that the prescriptive period for libel has always been fixed at one or two years, never at 10 or more years.

Meanwhile, six other Justices joined Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr. in his dissent:
• Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando
• Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier
• Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario
• Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez
• Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao
• Associate Justice Raul B. Villanueva

In his Concurring and Dissenting opinion, Justice Kho, Jr. agreed with the majority that unsigned resolutions do not lay down doctrines of law but disagreed on the prescriptive period for cyber libel. Since cyber libel is committed through computer systems and is punishable under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, it is a separate crime from libel and the one-year prescriptive period for libel does not apply.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163671

Read the full text of the Resolution at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163636

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163642

Read the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-admin/post.php?p=163650

Read the Concurring and Dissenting OpinionOpinion of Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr. at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163661

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

08/04/2026

The (SC) clarified the application of lascivious conduct under 𝘙𝘦𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤 𝘈𝘤𝘵 (𝘙𝘈) 𝘕𝘰. 7610, or 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘚𝘱𝘦𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘵𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 𝘈𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵 𝘈𝘣𝘶𝘴𝘦, 𝘌𝘹𝘱𝘭𝘰𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘋𝘪𝘴𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵, in relation to acts of lasciviousness under the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 (𝘙𝘗𝘊).

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 upheld Jeffrey L. Gramatica’s conviction for lascivious conduct under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610, but modified another accused’s (###2660399) conviction for acts of lasciviousness under 𝘈𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘭𝘦 366 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘙𝘗𝘊.

In these consolidated cases involving minors, AAA, BBB, and CCC, the Supreme Court laid down guidelines to ensure the proper prosecution of cases under these two distinct laws.

AAA and BBB, both addicted to shabu, engaged in sexual acts with Gramatica and another man in exchange for the drug. Gramatica was later arrested and prosecuted for violation of 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610, which penalizes lascivious conduct committed against a child exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse.

In the other case, CCC was victimized by her grandfather, ###266039, who touched her private parts while she was sleeping. ###266039 was also charged under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610.

In his defense, Gramatica claimed that he courted BBB and had a sexual relationship with her but did not know she was a minor because she looked mature. For his part, ###266039 denied the charges and claimed he merely woke CCC up to ask her for help applying his eye medicine.

The Regional Trial Court found both Gramatica and ###266039 guilty of lascivious conduct under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 towards BBB and CCC, respectively. The Court of Appeals affirmed their convictions.

A minor is considered to have been subjected to other sexual abuse when they are a victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of an adult. In this case, BBB was 14 and CCC was 17 at the time of the incident. Gramatica was 23, and ###266039 was 62.

Both courts found that Gramatica took advantage of BBB’s youth and vulnerable situation, using his influence over her to make her submit to his sexual demands. Meanwhile, ###266039, due to his age and relationship as CCC’s grandfather, was able to exert control over her and exploit her trust.

The SC affirmed Gramatica’s conviction under RA 7610, but modified ###266039’s conviction from acts of lasciviousness under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 to acts of lasciviousness under the RPC explaining that RA 7610 does not apply where the minor is entirely unaware, coerced or unconscious as the victim in that instance is not considered to have “indulged” in the sexual in*******se.

A plain and straightforward interpretation of 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 provides a clear definition of children subjected to other sexual abuse as those who indulge in sexual in*******se or lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence of an adult.

The SC clarified the scope of lascivious conduct under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 and distinguished it from related crimes under the RPC. To ensure uniform and consistent prosecution of cases, the Supreme Court laid down guidelines, considering also RA 11648, which raised the age of sexual consent to 16 years old.

𝙁𝙞𝙧𝙨𝙩, 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 applies to children who are 12 years of age (now 16 years old following the amendment under RA 11648) to below 18 who are subjected to sexual abuse.

𝙎𝙚𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙙, it covers situations where consent is present but defective. The minor may seem to “indulge” or agree, but does so not out of free will, but because of coercion or influence by an adult. Thus, engaging in sexual acts with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse is a criminal act, regardless of apparent consent.

𝙏𝙝𝙞𝙧𝙙, it does not apply when the act involves force, intimidation, fraud, deprivation of reason, unconsciousness, or grave abuse of authority. In such cases, the crime falls under acts of lasciviousness under the RPC.

𝙁𝙤𝙪𝙧𝙩𝙝, if the victim is under 12 or under 16, and the case does not fit Section 5(b), the crime is r**e or acts of lasciviousness under the RPC.

These principles, which distinguish force and intimidation on one hand, and coercion and influence on the other, and limit RA 7610 to minors who are exploited in prostitution or sexual abuse, also apply to other sexual crimes, including r**e.

In this case, BBB was a child exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse because she had sexual in*******se with Gramatica in exchange for some consideration, namely shabu, which makes him criminally liable under Section 5(b).

Meanwhile, 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 does not apply to ###266039.

The Supreme Court clarified that not all acts of lasciviousness against minors aged 12 to under 18 are covered by RA 7610. The law applies only when minors are subjected to sexual abuse, such as when they “indulge” or give defective consent to the conduct.

Here, CCC did not indulge in lascivious conduct, as she was asleep and unconscious during the incident. ###266039 did not use coercion or influence, but relied on his moral ascendancy as her grandfather, which counts as intimidation. These circumstances make ###266039 liable for acts of lasciviousness under 𝘈𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘭𝘦 336 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘙𝘗𝘊, rather than RA 7610.

For lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) involving BBB, Gramatica was sentenced to a maximum of 17 years, four months, and one day in prison and ordered to pay BBB PHP 150,000 in civil indemnity and damages, as well as a PHP 15,000 fine.

For acts of lasciviousness under 𝘈𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘭𝘦 336 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘙𝘗𝘊, ###266039 was sentenced to a maximum of six years in prison and ordered to pay CCC PHP450,000 in civil indemnity and damages with interest.

The SC acknowledged that under current laws, ###266039, “who committed abhorrent and be***al acts against his minor granddaughter,” faces a penalty lower than that under RA 7610, and called on the legislature to amend existing laws to better protect children.

The SC calls the legislature to review and amend current laws protecting children, thus:

“𝘐𝘯 𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘦 𝘸𝘪𝘵𝘩 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘢𝘣𝘰𝘷𝘦, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘪𝘯 𝘧𝘶𝘭𝘧𝘪𝘭𝘭𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘵’𝘴 𝘥𝘶𝘵𝘺 𝘵𝘰 𝘶𝘱𝘩𝘰𝘭𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯, 𝘸𝘩𝘪𝘤𝘩 𝘮𝘢𝘯𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘴𝘱𝘦𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘵𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘤𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 𝘧𝘳𝘰𝘮 𝘢𝘭𝘭 𝘧𝘰𝘳𝘮𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘯𝘦𝘨𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵, 𝘢𝘣𝘶𝘴𝘦, 𝘤𝘳𝘶𝘦𝘭𝘵𝘺, 𝘦𝘹𝘱𝘭𝘰𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘰𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘳 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴 𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘫𝘶𝘥𝘪𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘳 𝘥𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘭𝘰𝘱𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵, 𝘭𝘦𝘵 𝘵𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘦 𝘢𝘴 𝘢 𝘤𝘢𝘭𝘭 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘭𝘦𝘨𝘪𝘴𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘶𝘳𝘦 𝘵𝘰 𝘧𝘶𝘭𝘧𝘪𝘭𝘭 𝘪𝘵𝘴 𝘣𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘯 𝘥𝘶𝘵𝘺 𝘰𝘧 𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘦𝘸𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘢𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘰𝘶𝘳 𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘭𝘢𝘸𝘴 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘶𝘳𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘴𝘢𝘧𝘦𝘵𝘺, 𝘸𝘦𝘭𝘭-𝘣𝘦𝘪𝘯𝘨, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘥𝘪𝘨𝘯𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘰𝘧 𝘰𝘶𝘳 𝘍𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘰 𝘤𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯.”

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162863

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162842

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260233-266039-separate-concurring-opinion-senior-associate-justice-marvic-m-v-f-leonen/

Read the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260233-266039-concurring-opinion-associate-justice-alfredo-benjamin-s-caguioa/

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260233-266039-separate-concurring-opinion-associate-justice-rodil-v-zalameda/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

26/03/2026

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25/03/2026

📍Almirante Law Office is now located at Unit 202, 2F, Doña Maria Building, Corner Avanceña-San Juan Streets, Molo, Iloilo City

06/10/2025

The (SC) has nullified the foreclosure of several properties after ruling that the interest charged on the unpaid bank loan was unfair and imposed without the borrower’s consent.

In a Resolution written by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, the SC’s Special Third Division granted the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Editha Ang and Violeta Fernandez, whose properties were foreclosed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) after they failed to pay a PHP 16-million loan.

Ang and Fernandez obtained a loan from UCPB. Based on the loan documents, however, UCPB was allowed to unilaterally adjust the interest rate every quarter based on market conditions.

When Ang and Fernandez failed to pay the total loan when it fell due, UCPB began to extrajudicially foreclose their properties.

Ang and Fernandez then filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to nullify the foreclosure sale, claiming that because the bank had the sole power to set and increase the interest rate, the rate was unfair and invalid.

The SC initially agreed that the interest rate was invalid but still upheld the foreclosure sale, ruling that the borrowers remained in default.

Upon reconsideration, however, the SC ruled that if the interest rate was unconscionable or imposed unilaterally by the lender, then any foreclosure that follows is also invalid.

The Court emphasized that under the Civil Code, contracts must be fair and mutually agreed upon. A contract that depends only on one party’s will is void.

In this case, the interest rate was solely determined by UCPB. Since the interest rate was invalid, the foreclosure of the properties was void.

The SC held that the borrowers should be given a chance to pay the loan at an interest rate agreed upon by both parties. Otherwise, they would be at the mercy of the lender and risk losing their property without a fair opportunity to settle their debt.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=152735.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=152719.

Read the Dissenting Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=152726.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

25/09/2025

The (SC) has reiterated that banks may be held liable for moral damages suffered by depositors due to negligence, even if there is no proof of bad faith or malice.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the SC’s Third Division ordered Banco de Oro (BDO) to pay Remedios and Angelita Antonino (Antoninos) the proceeds of their time deposit, including PHP 100,000 in moral damages.

The Antoninos, who are U.S. green card holders living abroad, made three time deposit placements totaling over USD 150,000 at BDO’s San Lorenzo Branch in Makati City (BDO San Lorenzo). They had an arrangement with the branch manager that if the deposits were not withdrawn at maturity, they would automatically roll over into interest-bearing savings accounts. The time deposit certificates (TDCs) were not redeemed and were stored in a Banco Filipino deposit box for safekeeping.

Later, Banco Filipino declared bankruptcy and was taken over by the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). It took the Antoninos some time to retrieve their TDCs from the PDIC.
BDO San Lorenzo then ceased operations and closed down without notifying the Antoninos, who only discovered the closure when they tried to withdraw their investments.

They sent several demand letters to BDO, but the bank claimed the deposits had already been withdrawn, citing a demand draft allegedly signed by Angelita. Angelita denied signing the document.

The Antoninos filed a complaint against BDO seeking payment of their time deposit placements.

Ruling in favor of the Antoninos, the SC cited Section 9 of BDO’s terms and conditions for time deposit placements, which requires the surrender of TDCs when withdrawing deposits. Since the Antoninos still had the certificates, the SC concluded that the funds were not withdrawn.

The SC noted that the PNP expert said the signature on the demand draft was likely forged. Immigration and passport records also showed Angelita could not have been in the country to sign the draft. Further, BDO failed to verify the identity of the person who withdrew the funds.

The SC held that these lapses showed BDO’s failure to exercise the required diligence, especially given the large amount involved.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=152203.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=152187.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

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