Gandamra Legal Group

19/07/2026

19/07/2026

The (SC) has ruled that the infliction of psychological violence, if done through Facebook, is considered done through information and communications technology, which warrants the imposition of a higher penalty pursuant to Section 6 of RA 10175 or the 𝘊𝘺𝘣𝘦𝘳𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘦 𝘗𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2012.

In a Resolution penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, the SC’s First Division affirmed with modification its October 22, 2025 Decision (assailed Decision), which upheld the conviction of an individual (###) for committing psychological violence under Section 5(i) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9262, or the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘪𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘈𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵 𝘞𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘛𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘳 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2004 (Anti-VAWC Act) against his ex-girlfriend (AAA) by posting derogatory statements about her on Facebook.

The SC, however, resolved to raise the penalty by one degree, considering that the offense was committed through Facebook, as adequately alleged in the Information and established during trial.

AAA filed the VAWC case against her former partner ### after he posted a statement on Facebook calling her a dirty woman and an animal, and threatening to box her when he sees her. He repeated the insults in the comments to the post, which was public.

During trial, AAA presented screenshots of the Facebook post and testified that she had created for ### the Facebook account which made the post. Her two siblings testified that the account was ###’s and that they received messages from him through the same account.

Despite ###’s denial, the SC, in its assailed Decision, affirmed the decisions of the Family Court and the Court of Appeals (CA) convicting ###, stressing that in criminal cases, the prosecution must prove not only the elements of the crime but also the identity of the offender. The SC also upheld the penalty imposed by the CA, consisting of imprisonment for six months and one day to eight years and one day, a fine of PHP 100,000, and psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment.

Resolving ###’s Motion for Reconsideration, the SC held that ###’s authorship of the Facebook post was established beyond reasonable doubt, using the guideposts it established in its assailed Decision:

𝟏. 𝐀𝐝𝐦𝐢𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐨𝐟 𝐨𝐰𝐧𝐞𝐫𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩 𝐨𝐫 𝐚𝐮𝐭𝐡𝐨𝐫𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩;
𝟐. 𝐁𝐞𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐬𝐞𝐞𝐧 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭 𝐨𝐫 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐭;
𝟑. 𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐢𝐧𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐤𝐧𝐨𝐰𝐧 𝐨𝐧𝐥𝐲 𝐭𝐨 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐨𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐫 𝐚 𝐟𝐞𝐰 𝐩𝐞𝐨𝐩𝐥𝐞;
𝟒. 𝐋𝐚𝐧𝐠𝐮𝐚𝐠𝐞 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐰𝐢𝐭𝐡 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐨𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫’𝐬 𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐬;
𝟓. 𝐑𝐞𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐝𝐬 𝐟𝐫𝐨𝐦 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐢𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐞𝐭 𝐬𝐞𝐫𝐯𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐯𝐢𝐝𝐞𝐫, 𝐭𝐞𝐥𝐞𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐦𝐮𝐧𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐧𝐲, 𝐨𝐫 𝐬𝐨𝐜𝐢𝐚𝐥 𝐦𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐚 𝐬𝐢𝐭𝐞, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐮𝐥𝐭𝐬 𝐟𝐫𝐨𝐦 𝐝𝐞𝐯𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐜 𝐚𝐧𝐚𝐥𝐲𝐬𝐢𝐬 𝐬𝐡𝐨𝐰𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐠𝐞𝐨𝐥𝐨𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐟𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐞𝐬, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐚𝐭𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐛𝐮𝐭𝐞𝐬 𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐤𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭 𝐭𝐨 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐨𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫;
𝟔. 𝐀𝐜𝐭𝐬 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐰𝐢𝐭𝐡 𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐯𝐢𝐨𝐮𝐬 𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐬; 𝐨𝐫
𝟕. 𝐎𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐢𝐧𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞𝐬 𝐬𝐡𝐨𝐰𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐨𝐰𝐧𝐞𝐫𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩, 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐞𝐬𝐬, 𝐨𝐫 𝐚𝐮𝐭𝐡𝐨𝐫𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩.

The authorship of the Facebook post and all the elements of psychological violence having been established, the SC said Section 6 of the 𝘊𝘺𝘣𝘦𝘳𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘦 𝘗𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2012 applies, which mandates the imposition of a penalty higher by one degree for crimes and offenses committed using ICT. The use of ICT can enable offenders to evade liability, reach more victims, or cause greater harm.

Citing the definition of ICT, the Court ruled that social media platforms, such as Facebook, qualify as ICT systems because they allow users to generate, send, receive, store, and process electronic data messages through computers, mobile phones, or similar electronic devices.

In this case, the Information alleged that ### made the Facebook post using his "Facebook Messenger Account… which was set to public view." The SC ruled that this statement constitutes a sufficient allegation of the use of ICT as a qualifying circumstance. Even if the term "ICT" was not stated, the Information adequately informed ### that he is being charged of inflicting psychological violence upon AAA through Facebook, which falls under the contemplation of an ICT system.

The allegation was established by the prosecution during trial.

Thus, the Court increased the penalty by one degree from six months and one day to eight years and one day to imprisonment of six years and one day to 14 years, eight months, and one day, but retained the fined PHP 100,000. He was likewise ordered to undergo psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168987

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168968

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

02/06/2026

The has ruled that similarities in trademark or logo designs that may confuse purchasers prevent the registration of later marks, even if new words are added.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, the SC’s First Division granted Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, LLC’s (Starwood) consolidated petitions and reversed the Court of Appeals’ (CA) rulings allowing the registration of Oceanic Empire Limited’s (Oceanic) marks.

Oceanic filed to register the trademarks “𝐖 𝐆𝐋𝐎𝐁𝐀𝐋𝐂𝐄𝐍𝐓𝐄𝐑” and “𝐖 𝐅𝐈𝐅𝐓𝐇 𝐀𝐕𝐄𝐍𝐔𝐄” and had earlier secured registration for “𝐖 𝐓𝐎𝐖𝐄𝐑.”

Starwood, owner of several registered "𝐖” trademarks for hotels and entertainment services, opposed the applications and sought the cancellation of the “𝐖 𝐓𝐎𝐖𝐄𝐑,” arguing that Oceanic’s marks were confusingly similar to its trademarks.

Starwood argued that Oceanic would benefit from the popularity and reputation of its brand and that this would mislead the public into believing that Oceanic’s business was connected with Starwood.

Ruling in favor of Starwood, the SC explained that trademark protection prevents confusion of goods and businesses, and that only the likelihood, not actual proof, of confusion is required. Each case must be assessed based on the resemblance of the marks and the relatedness of the services.

Under the 𝗗𝗼𝗺𝗶𝗻𝗮𝗻𝗰𝘆 𝗧𝗲𝘀𝘁, emphasis is placed on the dominant or most striking features of the marks rather than on minor differences.

In this case, the SC ruled that "𝐖" is the dominant feature of both Starwood’s and Oceanic’s marks. While Starwood’s "𝐖" is registered as a word mark, the Court clarified that Starwood cannot claim the letter "𝐖," but only its distinct stylized version.

The Court stressed that purchasers would immediately notice the similarity between the parties’ "𝐖" marks. It held that minor textual differences do not change the fact that both use the same style, which looks visually similar.

The SC thus directed the Director of the Bureau of Trademarks to deny Oceanic’s application for registration of trademark, and to grant Starwood’s petition for cancellation of the “𝐖 𝐓𝐎𝐖𝐄𝐑” mark.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=166975.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164983.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

30/05/2026

Nagpasya ang na ang mga kilos ng isang asawa na lumilikha ng mapanganib at nakakatakot na paligid para sa kanyang kabiyak, kanilang mga anak, at mga anak sa labas ng kasal ay maaaring ituring na “grossly abusive conduct” o labis na mapang-abusong pag-uugali sa ilalim ng Family Code at maaaring magsilbing batayan para sa legal separation.

Sa isang Desisyong isinulat ni Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr., pinagbigyan ng Ikalawang Dibisyon ng Korte Suprema ang petisyon para sa legal separation na inihain ng isang asawa laban sa kanyang kabiyak matapos ituring na grossly abusive conduct sa ilalim ng Article 55(1) ng Family Code ang mga kilos nito.

Ikinasal ang mag-asawa noong 2003 at nagkaroon ng dalawang anak. Pero nakaranas ang asawang lalaki ng iba’t ibang mapang-abusong pag-uugali mula sa kanyang kabiyak. Ayon sa kanya, kontrolado nito ang kanilang pananalapi at tumangging magbigay ng tulong pinansiyal kahit kailangan niyang magpagamot ng matinding sakit ng ngipin at sumailalim sa root canal procedure.

Sa isang salu-salo, sinabi umano ng kanyang kabiyak sa kanilang mga kaibigan na nais nitong putulin ang kanyang ari dahil hindi na sila nagtatalik. Inakusahan din niya ang asawa ng pagkukuwento tungkol sa kanya sa pamilya at mga kaibigan habang binabaluktot ang mga pangyayari para mapalabas siyang masama.

Tumanggi rin umano ang kanyang kabiyak na sumailalim sa marriage counseling, pinagbawalan siyang makipagkita sa kanyang mga kaibigan, minanipula ang kanilang mga anak para pilitin siyang magbigay ng mas malaking suportang pinansiyal, at nananatili ang “controlling” na ugali sa buong panahon ng kanilang pagsasama.

Pinagbigyan ng Regional Trial Court (RTC) ang petisyon para sa legal separation pero binaliktad ito ng Court of Appeals matapos nitong ituring na karaniwang alitan lamang ng mag-asawa ang kanilang mga hindi pagkakaunawaan.

Pinagtibay ng Korte Suprema ang pasya ng RTC at nilinaw na ang mga gawaing itinuturing “grossly abusive conduct,” na isang batayan para sa legal separation sa ilalim ng Article 55(1) ng Family Code, ay kinabibilangan ng mga kilos ng isang asawa na lumilikha ng mapanganib at nakakatakot na paligid para sa kanyang kabiyak o mga anak.

Binigyang-diin din ng Korte Suprema na kinakailangang suriin ng mga hukuman ang bawat kaso batay sa kani-kanilang mga pangyayari at ebidensiyang iniharap.

Bagaman hindi pinahihintulutan ng Family Code ang absolute divorce, maaaring legal na maghiwalay ang mag-asawa sa pamamagitan ng utos ng hukuman nang hindi napapawalang-bisa ang kanilang kasal. Hindi tulad ng deklarasyon na walang bisa ang kasal, ang legal separation ay hindi pumuputol sa bigkis ng pag-aasawa.

Kabilang sa mga batayan para sa legal separation sa ilalim ng Article 55(1) ng Family Code ang paulit-ulit na pisikal na pananakit o grossly abusive conduct laban sa asawa, kanilang anak, o anak ng asawa.

Dagdag pa ng Korte Suprema, ang interpretasyong ito ay naaayon sa tungkulin ng Estado sa ilalim ng Konstitusyon na pangalagaan ang kasal bilang pangunahing institusyong panlipunan.

Sa kasong ito, napag-alaman ng Korte Suprema na ang pinagsama-samang kilos ng asawa ay lumikha ng mapanganib at nakakatakot na paligid para sa kanyang kabiyak. Napilitan umano ang asawa na palaging sumunod sa kagustuhan ng kanyang kabiyak, at nabigo rin ang kanyang mga pagsisikap na ayusin ang kanilang pagsasama sa pamamagitan ng counseling at iba pang mga hakbang. Pinagtibay rin ng mga testigo ang “controlling” na ugali ng asawa, na sumuporta sa konklusyon na may umiiral na mapanganib na kalagayan sa kanilang tahanan. Dahil dito, nagpasya ang Korte Suprema na may sapat na dahilan ang asawa para humiling ng reassignment sa ibang lalawigan para makalayo sa sitwasyon sa kanilang bahay.

Pinagbigyan ng Korte Suprema ang legal separation at ibinalik ang kaso sa RTC para sa pagbuwag at paghahati ng ari-arian ng mag-asawa. Inatasan din nito ang RTC na magpasya ukol sa kustodiya at suporta para sa kanilang mga anak.

Basahin ang press release sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=166927

Basahin ang Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164913

Basahin ang Hiwalay na Sumasang-ayon na Opinyon ni Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164917

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

16/03/2026

Isinantabi ng ang petisyong kumukuwestiyon sa konstitusyonalidad ng isang ordinansa ng Maynila na nagtaas ng halaga ng bayad sa koleksyon ng basura ng lungsod.

Sa isang resolusyon, nagpasya ang En Banc ng Korte Suprema na ang petisyong inihain ni John Barry T. Tayam laban kay Francisco M. Domagoso, alkalde ng Manila, at sa City Council ay hindi nakatugon sa mga pangunahing rekisito ng judicial review dahil wala siyang legal standing o personalidad para magsampa ng petisyon. Lumabag din ito sa doktrina ng hierarchy of courts dahil dumiretso ito sa Korte Suprema sa halip na sa mas mababang korte nang hindi nito naipakita na ang kaso ay isang pambihirang sitwasyon na may kinalaman lamang sa mga tanong ng batas.

Hiniling ni John Barry T. Tayam, isang residente ng Lungsod ng Las Piñas, na ipawalang-bisa ang Ordinance No. 9151 na ipinasa ng Manila City Council noong Nobyembre 2025 na nagpatupad ng binagong iskedyul ng mga bayarin sa koleksyon ng basura sa Manila.

Iginiit ni Tayam na walang bisa ang ordinansa dahil inaprubahan umano ito nang walang publikasyon, na lumalabag sa Article 2 ng Civil Code of the Philippines at Section 187 ng Local Government Code of the Philippines (LGC).

Sinabi rin niya na nilalabag ng ordinansa ang Section 13(b)(3) ng LGC dahil ang itinaas na bayarin ay lampas umano sa aktwal na gastos ng regulasyon ng basura sa Maynila. Dagdag pa niya, lumalabag din ito sa Republic Act No. 9003 o ang Ecological Solid Waste Management Act, dahil hindi umano nito kinikilala ang papel ng mga barangay sa pamamahala ng basura at ang patakaran na nagtataguyod ng muling paggamit at pagre-recycle ng basura.

Tinanggihan ng Korte Suprema ang mga argumentong ito at nagpasya ito na ang petisyon ni John Barry T. Tayam ay hindi ayon sa mga rekisito ng judicial review.

Iginiit Korte Suprema na bago maisagawa ang judicial review, kailangang maipakita ng isang petisyon na: (1) may umiiral na aktwal na kaso o kontrobersiya, (2) may legal standing ang naghain ng petisyon para isampa ang kaso, (3) ang isyu ng konstitusyonalidad ng aksyon ng pamahalaan ay iniharap sa pinakamaagang pagkakataon, at (4) ang konstitusyonalidad ng nasabing aksyon ang mismong lis mota o pangunahing isyu ng petisyon.

Sinabi rin ng Korte Suprema na wala legal standing si Tayam para maghain ng petisyon. Para magkaroon ng legal standing, ang petitioner ay dapat ipakita ang personal at makabuluhang interes sa kaso, kung saan maaapektuhan sila dahil sa ginagawang aksyon ng pamahalaan na kinukwestiyon.

Sa kasong ito, para lamang sa mga negosyo, service agencies, at mga tirahan sa Maynila ang ordinansa. Hindi nakatira si Tayam sa Maynila at wala rin siyang negosyo o service agency roon. Dahil dito, hindi siya kabilang sa mga taong maaaring direktang maapektuhan ng pagpapatupad ng ordinansa.

Sinabi rin ng Korte Suprema na hindi maaaring ituring ang petisyon bilang taxpayer’s suit, na isang eksepsyon sa requirement ng legal standing. Pinapayagan lamang ang taxpayer’s suit kung may alegasyon ng ilegal na paggastos ng pampublikong pondo o ng isang hindi konstitusyunal na buwis. Binigyang-diin nito na ang ordinansa ay isang regulatory measure at hindi isang buwis ng pamahalaan, kaya hindi naaangkop ang eksepsyon.

Basahin ang press release sa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161984.

Basahin ang buong Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161972.

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

12/03/2026

The (SC) 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 has upheld the validity of a Department of Justice (DOJ) circular that raised the standard of proof in preliminary investigations and inquest proceedings from probable cause to prima facie evidence with reasonable certainty of conviction.

In a Decision written by written by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 ruled that Department Circular No. 15, series of 2024 containing the 2024 𝘋𝘖𝘑-𝘕𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘴𝘦𝘤𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘚𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘪𝘤𝘦 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘯 𝘗𝘳𝘦𝘭𝘪𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘳𝘺 𝘐𝘯𝘷𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘨𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘐𝘯𝘲𝘶𝘦𝘴𝘵 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘤𝘦𝘦𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨𝘴 (𝘋𝘖𝘑 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴), is a valid exercise of the DOJ’s authority over prosecutorial processes.

Under the DOJ Rules’ new standard of proof in preliminary investigations and inquest, prosecutors must ensure that the evidence to charge a person with a crime must sufficiently establish all the elements and consequently warrant a conviction.

Atty. Hazel L. Meking questioned the DOJ Rules before the SC, claiming that the DOJ encroached on the SC’s constitutional authority to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts. She argued that the DOJ Rules effectively revised Rule 112, Section 3(a) of the 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘤𝘦𝘥𝘶𝘳𝘦, which provides that the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is probable cause.

The SC dismissed her petition and reiterated its ruling in 𝘈.𝘔. 𝘕𝘰. 24-02-09-𝘚𝘊, which recognized the DOJ’s authority to promulgate its own rules on preliminary investigations and inquest proceedings.

The SC held that the DOJ Rules govern only the conduct of preliminary investigations and inquests by prosecutors, which are executive functions. These Rules, however, do not extend to judicial proceedings as the power to promulgate rules of procedure over them remains under the authority of the Supreme Court.

The SC noted it had already recognized preliminary investigation as the exclusive domain of prosecutors when it revised the Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2005.

In 2024, through 𝘈.𝘔. 𝘕𝘰. 24-02-09-𝘚𝘊, the SC also ordered the repeal of provisions in Rule 112 which are inconsistent with the DOJ Rules to harmonize them.

The SC’s constitutional rule-making authority over judicial proceedings remains supreme, as well as its power to correct grave abuse of discretion in any prosecutorial rule or action that violates constitutional rights.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161871

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161853

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161858

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution