J.A. Baisa-Cuevas Law Office

27/08/2026

The Supreme Court (SC) has ruled that a bank cannot require a depositor to return money they already withdrew on the ground of unjust enrichment when the loss was caused by the bank’s own gross negligence.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC’s Third Division denied the petition filed by BDO Unibank, Inc. (BDO), holding that the bank’s disregard of its own banking policy amounted to gross negligence.

The case stemmed from Cristina Barcellano’s (Barcellano) deposit of a regional check worth PHP 151,200 from an Albay branch of Landbank into her savings account at BDO’s Lucena City branch.

The BDO teller mistakenly validated the check as local instead of regional, allowing the amount to be credited after only three banking days instead of the required seven.

Believing the funds were available, Barcellano withdrew PHP 76,000. Shortly after, BDO received a stop payment order on the check and demanded that she return the money. Although Barcellano initially agreed, she never repaid the amount. BDO later refused to release the remaining balance and filed a criminal complaint for estafa.

Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals acquitted Barcellano, finding no fraud, deceit, or abuse of confidence on her part and blamed BDO’s own negligence.

Before the SC, BDO asked for a review of the civil aspect of the case, arguing that despite Barcellano's acquittal, she should still be required to return the money. BDO argued that her refusal amounted to unjust enrichment and that since the funds were released due to its error in processing the check, Barcellano was required to return them based on the principle of 𝘴𝘰𝘭𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰 𝘪𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘣𝘪𝘵𝘪, which requires the repayment of money received by mistake.

The SC disagreed, ruling that there was no unjust enrichment because BDO failed to prove that Barcellano knowingly received and retained a benefit to which she was not entitled.

SC declared that the bank did not explain why the stop payment order was issued or show that Barcellano knew the check would not be honored. Instead, the evidence showed that she withdrew the money in good faith after BDO itself made the funds available in her account.

The SC also ruled that BDO’s own gross negligence caused its loss. It found that the bank credited the check before it had properly cleared it, incorrectly treated a regional check as a local check, and failed to detect the error until after receiving the stop payment order. These lapses showed a failure to observe basic safeguards meant to protect the bank from the risks of invalid checks.

The SC also rejected BDO’s reliance on solutio indebiti. Although the doctrine generally requires the return of money received by mistake, it does not apply when the mistake resulted from the payor’s own gross negligence. Here, BDO’s error stemmed from its failure to exercise the extraordinary diligence and reasonable prudence required of banks.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171657

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/261264-bdo-unibank-inc-vs-cristina-barcellano-y-riego/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

27/08/2026

27/08/2026

The (SC) has clarified the rules on serving notices of dishonor in cases involving Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22) or the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘉𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘤𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘊𝘩𝘦𝘤𝘬 𝘓𝘢𝘸. The SC formally recognized electronic service as a valid mode of serving notice of dishonor, while requiring safeguards to ensure that service can be reliably proven in court.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 affirmed the conviction of spouses Arnel and Marivic Carlos for six counts of violating BP 22.

The spouses issued six checks to respondent Tire Star, Inc. as payment for car tires. All six checks were dishonored by the bank as the account they were drawn from had been closed.

The prosecution presented evidence that Tire Star’s messenger personally attempted to serve the notice of dishonor at the spouses’ office, and that the spouses refused to receive it, instructed an employee instead to sign for it.

The spouses then claimed before the SC that they should be acquitted because they were not properly served with a notice of dishonor.

The SC rejected the spouses’ argument, emphasizing that an accused cannot defeat a BP 22 prosecution simply by denying receipt of the notice or refusing to accept it. Otherwise, issuers could easily evade liability by avoiding service.

To promote uniformity and reduce disputes, the SC clarified the acceptable modes of serving notices of dishonor.

𝗣𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗼𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝘀𝗲𝗿𝘃𝗶𝗰𝗲 remains the preferred mode. The notice may be delivered directly to the issuer or, in the case of a business, to an authorized representative. If the issuer cannot be served at the office, the notice may be left at the issuer’s residence with an adult resident between 8:00 A.M. and 6:00 P.M.

The person serving the notice must execute an affidavit stating when, where, and how service was made. When practicable, service should be documented through photographs or video recordings, subject to proper authentication in court.

If personal service is not practicable, the notice of dishonor may be sent by 𝗿𝗲𝗴𝗶𝘀𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗱 𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹, or where registry service is unavailable, by 𝗼𝗿𝗱𝗶𝗻𝗮𝗿𝘆 𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹. The person serving the notice must likewise execute an affidavit explaining why personal service could not be made and attach the supporting postal documents.

The SC also recognized 𝗲𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗿𝗼𝗻𝗶𝗰 𝘀𝗲𝗿𝘃𝗶𝗰𝗲, ruling that a notice of dishonor may now be served through email as a primary mode of service when the issuer previously provided their email address. Electronic service may likewise be used through platforms such as 𝘝𝘪𝘣𝘦𝘳, 𝘍𝘢𝘤𝘦𝘣𝘰𝘰𝘬 𝘔𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘨𝘦𝘳, or similar applications, provided it can be verified that the electronic account belongs to the issuer.

Electronic service may also be used when the issuer refuses to receive the notice, avoids service, or when personal service is otherwise impracticable. In such cases, the electronic notice must be sent within 24 hours after the final unsuccessful attempt at personal service and must state the dates and details of those failed attempts.

The sender must also execute an affidavit and preserve supporting evidence, such as screenshots, messages, delivery or read receipts, or chat histories., stressing that a simple denial of receipt is not enough to invalidate electronic service.

In all instances, to successfully dispute service, the issuer must show that it was physically impossible to have received the notice at the time and place it was served.

The spouses were fined a total of PHP 609,972.58 for the six BP 22 violations, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of nonpayment. They were also ordered to pay Tire Star the same amount, plus interest.

In his Concurring Opinion, Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen agreed that electronic service should not merely be a substitute but a primary mode of service consistent with contemporary means of communication and the Judiciary’s ongoing digital reforms.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=172159.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171528.

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171527.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

27/08/2026

The 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤, during its session on August 26, 2026, acted on G.R. Nos. 260219 and 260231, 𝘋𝘢𝘵𝘶 𝘗𝘢𝘹 𝘈𝘭𝘪 𝘚. 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘶𝘥𝘢𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘶 𝘷. 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘮𝘮𝘪𝘴𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘯 𝘌𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴, 𝘚𝘩𝘢𝘳𝘪𝘧𝘢 𝘈𝘬𝘦𝘦𝘭 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘶𝘥𝘢𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘶, 𝘈𝘻𝘦𝘭 𝘝. 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘶𝘥𝘢𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘶, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘉𝘢𝘪 𝘈𝘭𝘪 𝘈. 𝘜𝘯𝘵𝘰𝘯𝘨, by denying with finality the motion for reconsideration filed by Datu Pax Ali S. Mangudadatu, affirming its earlier ruling that upheld the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for Governor of Sultan Kudarat and abandoned the “second placer rule.”

The SC held that the resulting vacancy should be filled by the Vice-Governor.

The “second placer rule” refers to the practice of declaring the candidate who received the second highest number of votes as the winner after the candidate with the highest number of votes is later found disqualified or ineligible.

Mangudadatu, in his motion, insisted that the second placer rule has clear basis in law and should not be abandoned.

The SC reiterated that no law authorizes the second placer rule. It emphasized that the 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 recognizes as elected only the candidate who received the highest number of votes.

The SC explained that when the winning candidate is later found ineligible to hold office, a permanent vacancy arises. For local elective positions covered by the 𝘓𝘰𝘤𝘢𝘭 𝘎𝘰𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘯𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 (LGC), that vacancy is filled through the rule on succession, not by proclaiming the second placer as the winner. Accordingly, the Vice-Governor succeeds to the position of Governor for the remainder of the term.

The SC clarified that its ruling is limited to local elective positions covered by the LGC. The case did not address the application or non-application of the second placer rule or succession rules for national elective positions, as these issues were not raised before the Court.

However, the SC stressed that succession for national elective positions like the President and Vice-President is governed exclusively by Article VII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯, which prescribe the order of succession when the President or Vice-President fails to qualify, dies, or is permanently disabled, removed from office, or resigns.

The SC also clarified that its ruling applies to pending cases, emphasizing that second placers have no vested right or entitlement to be declared the winner.

The full text of the August 26, 2026 Resolution in G.R. Nos. 260219 and 260231 will be uploaded to the Supreme Court website once available.

Read the full text of the Press Briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171947.

Read the full text of the SC’s April 25, 2025 Decision in G.R. Nos. 260219 and 260231 at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=146486.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attributionon-policy.

14/08/2026

11/08/2026

Seeing a case through from start to finish and securing the justice our clients deserve is the most rewarding part of what we do. Grateful for the trust placed in us. ⚖️✨

25/07/2026

The (SC) has ruled that a sale of land remains valid even if the deed of sale designates a different lot number from what was actually sold, as long as the parties’ true agreement can be clearly shown. The deed may then be corrected to match what the parties actually agreed to.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC’s Third Division upheld the sale of a 491-square-meter parcel of land in Cebu City between buyers Genara and Felipe Abay, Sr. (the Abays) and sellers Crispin Caballes and the heirs of Trinidad Caballes-Gallardo (the Gallardos), despite the mistake in the designation of the lot number in the deed of sale.

The property formed part of the estate of Margarita Lopez, who had nine children, including Crispin and Trinidad.

The Abays visited the site with Crispin and Tomas Gallardo, one of Trinidad’s heirs before buying the property. During the visit, they were showed them the land’s boundaries. Tomas even helped the Abays build a concrete fence around it.

The Abays openly occupied the property for about 20 years until their possession was disrupted when workers of spouses Jacinto and Chiok Ngo Lim Young (the Youngs), who are claiming ownership over the property, entered it, destroyed the fence, and built their own posts.

The Abays discovered that a title over the property had been issued in the Youngs’ name. This prompted them to file a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to cancel the title.

The Gallardos challenged this, arguing that the documents the Abays presented referred to a different lot, Lot No. 6036-B, and not the lot they were occupying, which was Lot No. 7. While both lots were located in the same area, they were separate properties and were not beside each other. The Youngs supported the Gallardos’ position and maintained that they were buyers in good faith.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Abays which ruling was reversed by the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA held that the documents presented by the Abays showed that they purchased Lot No. 6036-B and not Lot No. 7, which they claimed to own and possess.

The SC disagreed and reiterated its pronouncements in previous cases upholding the validity of the sale and allowing the correction of a contract to reflect the parties’ true agreement in instances where the deed of sale failed to accurately describe the land intended by the parties.

The SC stressed that a person buys property based on what they see on the ground, such as its boundaries, landmarks, and improvements, and not by its technical lot number. Ordinary buyers cannot be expected to identify property based only on survey descriptions or legal documents.

Under the 𝘊𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, a written document may be corrected when, because of a mistake, it does not express the parties’ actual agreement.

The SC explained that a contract may be reformed or corrected if: (1) the parties agreed on the transaction; (2) the written document does not express their true agreement; and (3) the error was caused by a mistake, fraud, accident, or unfair conduct.

In this case, all these requirements were present.

Thus, the Court declared deemed reformed the Deeds of Sale and Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale by changing the designation of the property sold from “Lot No. 6036-B” to “Lot 7” and the Abays as absolute owners of such property.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169523

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/266298-spouses-genera-and-felipe-abay-sr-et-al-vs-spouses-jacinto-s-young-et-al/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

25/07/2026

Nagpasya ang na nananatiling may bisa ang bentahan ng lupa na magkaibang numero ng lote ang nakasaad sa kasulatan ng bentahan o deed of sale kumpara sa tunay na nabenta, basta’t malinaw na maipapakita ang totoong pinagkasunduan ng mga partido. Dahil dito, maaaring itama ang kasulatan para tumugma sa aktuwal na napagkasunduan ng magkabilang panig.

Sa Desisyong isinulat ni Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, pinagtibay ng Ikatlong Dibisyon ng Korte Suprema ang bentahan ng isang 491 metro kuwadradong lupain sa Lungsod ng Cebu sa pagitan ng mga mamimiling sina Genara at Felipe Abay, Sr. (mga Abay) at ng mga nagbentang sina Crispin Caballes at mga tagapagmana ni Trinidad Caballes-Gallardo (mga Gallardo), sa kabila ng pagkakamali sa nakalagay na numero ng lote sa deed of sale.

Bahagi ang lupang ito ng ari-ariang naiwan ni Margarita Lopez na may siyam na anak, kabilang sina Crispin at Trinidad.

Binisita ng mga Abay ang lugar kasama si Crispin at si Tomas Gallardo, isa sa mga tagapagmana ni Trinidad, bago nila binili ang ari-arian. Sa kanilang pagbisita, ipinakita sa kanila ang mga hangganan ng lupa. Tumulong pa si Tomas sa mga Abay sa pagtatayo ng bakod sa paligid nito.

Tinirahan ng mga Abay ang ari-arian nang humigit-kumulang 20 taon. Naputol lang ang kanilang paninirahan nang pumasok dito ang mga manggagawa ng mag-asawang Jacinto at Chiok Ngo Lim Young (mga Young), sinara ang bakod, at nagtayo ng sarili nilang mga poste.

Nalaman ng mga Abay na isang titulo para sa ari-arian ang naisyu sa pangalan ng mga Young. Dahil dito, naghain sila ng reklamo sa Regional Trial Court (RTC) para maipakansela ang nasabing titulo.

Kinuwestiyon ito ng mga Gallardo at ikinatuwirang ang mga dokumentong iprinisenta ng mga Abay ay tumutukoy sa ibang lote, ang Lot No. 6036-B, at hindi sa loteng kanilang tinitirhan na Lot No. 7. Bagama’t parehong matatagpuan sa iisang lugar ang dalawang lote, hiwalay na ari-arian ang mga ito at hindi magkatabi. Sinuportahan ng mga Young ang panig ng mga Gallardo at pinanindigang sila ay mga mamimili na may mabuting intensyon.

Nagdesisyon ang RTC pabor sa mga Abay, pero binaliktad ang desisyong ng Court of Appeals (CA). Ayon sa CA, ang mga dokumentong iprinisenta ng mga Abay ay nagpapakitang Lot No. 6036-B ang kanilang nabili at hindi ang Lot No. 7 na inangkin at pinaghahawakan nila.

Hindi sumang-ayon ang Korte Suprema at iginiit nito ang ang mga naging desisyon nito sa mga naunang kaso na nagpapatibay ng bilihan. Pinahihintulutan nito ang pagtatama ng kasulatan para maipakita ang tunay na kasunduan ng mga panig sa mga pagkakataong nabigo ang deed of sale na tumpak na mailarawan ang lupang nilayon ng magkabilang panig.

Sa ilalim ng Civil Code, maaaring itama ang isang kasulatan nang kapag dahil sa isang pagkakamali hindi nito naipapakita ang tunay na pinagkasunduan ng mga panig.

Paliwanag ng Korte Suprema, ang isang kontrata ay maaaring baguhin o itama kung: (1) nagkasundo ang mga panig sa transaksyon; (2) hindi naipapahayag ng kasulatan ang kanilang tunay na kasunduan; at (3) ang kamalian ay sanhi ng pagkakamali o mistake, panlilinlang o fraud, aksidente, o unfair conduct.

Sa kasong ito, napatunayang umiiral ang lahat ng mga kondisyong ito.

Basahin ang press release sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169523

Basahin ang Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164169

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

08/07/2026

In this opinion piece, attention turns to why the prosecution chose to focus on the controversial video tied to Article 4 during the second day of Vice President Sara Duterte's impeachment trial, and what that could mean for both the proceedings and public perception.

Read more at the link in the comments.