Atty Ruben Bance

19/02/2026

To all my Muslim brothers and sisters,

May this Ramadan bring you love, light and countless blessings.

02/02/2026

"Approved Amendments to the Guidelines on Conduct of Videoconferencing"

The has approved the Proposed Amendments to the Guidelines on the Conduct of Videoconferencing.

The Guidelines shall take effect on February 16, 2026, 15 days following its posting on the Supreme Court and OCA websites.

The Guidelines expand the definition of “overseas venues,” which now covers “Philippine consulates and embassies, other Philippine government offices abroad, other places allowed under applicable bilateral or multilateral agreements, and any other venue authorized by the Supreme Court for videoconferencing from abroad.” [Section 2(j), Part 1]

Section 4, Part 2 of the Guidelines details how videoconferencing is initiated:

“In civil and criminal cases, the parties, through their counsel, individually or jointly, may, by written or oral motion, move that they be allowed to participate via videoconferencing.

“In criminal cases, a motion to participate via videoconferencing shall be accompanied by a waiver of the right of the accused to meet witnesses face to face when the videoconferencing specifically involves the confrontation of a witness.

“Videoconferencing shall be the preferred mode in cases involving PDLs and CICL at all stages of the proceedings.

“It shall also be the preferred mode for arraignment, bail hearings, and hearings involving minor incidents of other accused, such as, but not limited to, clarificatory hearings, compliance hearings, and other similar ancillary matters where the presence of the accused is not necessary, unless the court deems it appropriate for the accused to appear in person.

“For a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of cases, the court may, on its own instance, order that the proceedings be conducted through videoconferencing at any or all stages”

Copies of the Guidelines are available at:

Supreme Court website:https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/A.M-No.-24-11-02-SC_FINAL.pdf

Office of the Court Administrator website:https://oca.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/A.M-No.-24-11-02-SC_FINAL.pdf

01/01/2026

Happy New Year!

01/01/2026

22/12/2025

R**e.

The has clarified that the proper term for the crime under Article 266-A(1)(a) of the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 (𝘙𝘗𝘊) is 𝘳𝘢𝘱𝘦 and not 𝘴𝘪𝘮𝘱𝘭𝘦 𝘳𝘢𝘱𝘦.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC’s Third Division affirmed a man’s conviction for ra**ng a 13-year-old girl, sentencing him to a maximum of 40 years in prison.

The accused was found guilty by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals of 𝘴𝘪𝘮𝘱𝘭𝘦 𝘳𝘢𝘱𝘦.

Under Article 266-A(1)(a) of the RPC, 𝘳𝘢𝘱𝘦 is committed when a man has sexual in*******se with a woman through force, threat, or intimidation.

The SC affirmed his conviction and also took the opportunity to clarify that the crime should be referred to as 𝘳𝘢𝘱𝘦 instead of 𝘴𝘪𝘮𝘱𝘭𝘦 𝘳𝘢𝘱𝘦:

“After all, there is nothing ‘simple’ about R**e and referring to it in such a manner downplays its severity and desensitizes the public to the harm it inflicts,” said the SC.

While 𝘳𝘢𝘱𝘦 was initially classified as a crime against chastity under Article 335 of the RPC, Republic Act No. 8353, or the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘙𝘢𝘱𝘦 𝘓𝘢𝘸 𝘰𝘧 1997, reclassified it as a crime against persons.

Crimes against chastity, such as adultery and seduction, are generally private crimes which focus on protecting the victim’s honor.

On the other hand, crimes against persons, such as homicide, murder, and physical injuries, aim to protect individuals’ bodily integrity and well-being.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=157708.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=157708.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

18/12/2025

Cybercrime Cases

The (SC) has held that while financial details of bank deposits remain confidential, the Cybercrime Prevention Act allows disclosure of bank account holder information for cybercrime investigations.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, the SC’s First Division denied the petition filed by EastWest Rural Bank (EastWest), which questioned the warrant to disclose computer data (WDCD) issued by the court and the subsequent Disclosure Order issued by the Philippine National Police Anti-Cybercrime Group (PNP-ACG) which required EastWest to disclose bank account holder information.

This EastWest bank account holder information sought to be disclosed is the account where Leonard Vendiola’s money was transferred after he was scammed by a caller posing as a bank employee.

Vendiola reported to the PNP-ACG that a caller who introduced herself as a bank employee deceived him by promising rewards contingent to disclosing his email and one-time password. When he checked his bank account, he discovered that an amount of PHP 10,000 was transferred to an EastWest account.

PNP-ACG applied for a WDCD to identify the EastWest account holder involved in the alleged scam. This was granted by the Regional Trial Court which authorized the PNP-ACG to compel EastWest to disclose and preserve data relating to the account holder. Pursuant to this, the PNP-ACG issued a Disclosure Order to EastWest.

EastWest filed a petition with the Court of Appeals challenging the WDCD and arguing that the Bank Secrecy Law prohibits banks from revealing any information about bank deposits, including the identity of the account holder. It maintained that this rule remains in force because it was not repealed by the Cybercrime Prevention Act.

EastWest also asserted that it should not be subject to the Cybercrime law’s disclosure rules because it is a financial institution rather than a communications service provider.

The SC rejected these arguments and upheld the validity of the WDCD and Disclosure Order.

The SC clarified that while the Bank Secrecy Law protects the confidentiality of bank deposits and their financial details, it does not prevent the disclosure of basic identifying information when allowed by law. Under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, law enforcement agencies may, with a court-issued warrant, require the disclosure of computer data necessary to investigate cybercrime offenses.

The SC ruled that EastWest is considered a service provider under the Cybercrime Prevention Act because their digital banking services, such as online banking platforms, mobile applications, and automated email notifications, allow customers to communicate and transact through computer systems. As a banking institution, EastWest also processes and stores substantial amounts of computer data both in the course of its operations and on behalf of its customers, placing it within the law’s coverage for the disclosure of computer data when authorized by a court-issued warrant.

Read the full text of the press release at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=157653

Read the full text of the Decision at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=157646

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

29/11/2025

The (SC) has ruled that voluntary arbitrators have jurisdiction over a labor dispute only when both parties clearly and mutually agree to it. One party’s agreement is not enough if the other consistently objects.

In a Decision written by Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, the SC’s Second Division ruled that the panel of voluntary arbitrators lacked authority to resolve the monetary claims of Benjie Tandayag against Magsaysay Maritime Corporation. Instead, the jurisdiction over the dispute lies with the Labor Arbiter (LA).

Tandayag, a seafarer hired by the corporation for one of its vessels, suffered a work-related injury while on board the vessel, leaving him permanently disabled. There was no collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between him and the corporation.

When the corporation refused to pay his disability and other related benefits, he filed a case with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board, which referred it to a panel of voluntary arbitrators (panel).

The parties entered into a submission agreement to arbitrate before the panel. However, the corporation argued that the panel lacked jurisdiction over the monetary claims. The panel disagreed, stating that the corporation waived its right to contest the panel’s jurisdiction when it signed the submission agreement. Ultimately, it ruled in favor of Tandayag.

The corporation challenged this decision before the Court of Appeals (CA), which ruled that the LA, not the voluntary arbitrators, has jurisdiction.

Upholding the CA, the SC cited the 𝘓𝘢𝘣𝘰𝘳 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, which provides that money claims arising from employer-employee relations must be filed before the LA, a rule similarly stated in RA 8042 or the 𝘔𝘪𝘨𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘵 𝘞𝘰𝘳𝘬𝘦𝘳𝘴 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘖𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘴𝘦𝘢𝘴 𝘍𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘰𝘴 𝘈𝘤𝘵 for claims of overseas Filipino workers. Voluntary arbitrators, on the other hand, handle disputes involving CBAs, company policies, and 𝗼𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗿 𝗺𝗮𝘁𝘁𝗲𝗿𝘀 that 𝗯𝗼𝘁𝗵 𝗽𝗮𝗿𝘁𝗶𝗲𝘀 𝗮𝗴𝗿𝗲𝗲 𝘁𝗼 𝘀𝘂𝗯𝗺𝗶𝘁 to them.

In this case, there was no CBA, but Tandayag and the panel relied on the parties’ submission agreement.

However, records show that the corporation promptly and repeatedly objected to the voluntary arbitrators’ authority. In fact, it even asked that the jurisdiction issue be resolved and insisted that the case belonged to the LA.

The SC explained that the submission agreement did not mean the corporation accepted the voluntary arbitrators’ jurisdiction, since it clearly raised the issue from the start.

The SC added that while voluntary arbitration is encouraged, “𝘪𝘵 𝘮𝘶𝘴𝘵 𝘣𝘦 𝘤𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘨𝘰𝘳𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘭 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘶𝘯𝘦𝘲𝘶𝘪𝘷𝘰𝘤𝘢𝘭 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘣𝘰𝘵𝘩 𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘦𝘴 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘥𝘪𝘴𝘱𝘶𝘵𝘦 𝘢𝘨𝘳𝘦𝘦𝘥 𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘣𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘥 𝘣𝘺 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘷𝘰𝘭𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘳𝘺 𝘢𝘳𝘣𝘪𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘰𝘳.” Submission to arbitration by one side is not enough if the other side consistently objects.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156011.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156005.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

11/11/2025

The (SC) has ruled that a candidate’s low vote count in past elections does not automatically make them a nuisance candidate in future elections.

In a Decision written by Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 annulled the November 29, 2024 Resolutions of the Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC) which cancelled the certificate of candidacy (COC) of Subair Guinthum Mustapha (Mustapha) in the 2025 senatorial elections.

Mustapha filed his COC under the Workers and Peasants Party (WPP). The COMELEC Law Department moved to declare him a nuisance candidate, arguing that his candidacy was primarily a distraction, especially since he received only 5,387 votes—just 2.01% of the total votes for the Lanao del Sur Representative seat in the 2022 elections.

Mustapha claimed that he is a qualified and serious candidate for senator, highlighting his academic credentials, leadership roles, dedication to labor advocacy, and governance platform.

The SC ruled that there is no direct link between candidates’ seriousness to run for office and their vote count in previous elections.

The SC warned that if the COMELEC could declare someone a nuisance candidate simply because of low votes in past elections or perceived inability to win, it would be exercising a power reserved for voters on election day.

In Mustapha’s case, the SC found that his low votes in the 2022 elections do not prove he lacked seriousness to run for senator in 2025.

The SC noted he submitted evidence to show his genuine intent, such as his membership in WPP, a recognized and accredited national political party with various policies on labor and other social justice causes.

While the SC recognized the efforts of the COMELEC to w**d out nuisance candidates, it reminded the poll body to exercise caution and avoid using grounds already ruled as invalid by the Court, such as lack of financial capacity, to mount a national campaign or perceived unpopularity.

Although the May 2025 election results had rendered Mustapha’s petition moot, the SC still decided the case as the issue could again arise in future elections.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=154935.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=154903.

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=154907.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

21/10/2025

The has reiterated that just compensation in land expropriation cases must be based on all relevant factors, not just market value.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the SC’s Third Division remanded to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) the case between the City Government of Pasay (Pasay LGU) and Arellano University (University) to reassess the amount of just compensation owed to the latter.

The University filed a complaint before the RTC in 2015, claiming that the Pasay LGU took its 805-sq. m. parcel of land in Barangay San Isidro and turned it into a public road, now known as Menlo Street, without going through proper expropriation proceedings or paying just compensation. The parties subsequently referred the matter to a board of commissioners composed of Pasay LGU officials.

The board used a base value of PHP200/sq. m. based on the 1978 General Revision of the City Assessor’s Office, then added 6% annual interest from 1978, the year the street was discovered, up to 2017, resulting in a value of PHP2,060/sq. m.

The University disagreed and proposed a total compensation of PHP 5,793,664.63, arguing that the interest should be based on the rates published by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.

The RTC adopted the board’s base value but applied a different interest rate, ordering Pasay LGU to pay PHP 161,000 plus 12% annual interest from 1978 to 2018.

The CA remanded the case to the RTC, ruling that the RTC relied solely on the 1978 assessment and ignored other relevant factors.

The SC upheld the CA, finding that the RTC’s decision was based on incomplete data.

Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution provides that private property cannot be taken for public use without just compensation. The SC emphasized that just compensation must be real, substantial, full, and ample, and that determining this amount is a matter for the courts to decide.

The SC clarified that although local government assessors provide appraisals, these are not controlling in expropriation cases. Such appraisals often cover broad areas and do not account for specific property differences. They rely on general descriptions and may be inaccurate. And while tax values can serve as a guideline, they cannot substitute for a comprehensive assessment of just compensation.

Thus, courts must use a “totality of circumstances” approach, considering all facts about the property’s condition, surroundings, existing improvements, and capabilities. These include the zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, acquisition cost, tax declarations, size, shape, location, and the current value of similar properties.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=153762

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=153692

Read the Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=153737

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

13/10/2025

06/10/2025

Pinawalang-bisa ng ang pagremata ng ilang mga ari-arian dahil hindi patas ang interes na siningil sa isang pautang sa bangko at ipinataw ito nang walang pahintulot mula sa nangungutang.

Sa isang resolusyon na isinulat ni Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, pinagbigyan ng Special Third Division ng Korte ang Motion for Reconsideration na inihain nina Editha Ang at Violeta Fernandez (mga nangutang). Ang kanilang mga ari-arian ay naremata ng United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) matapos silang mabigong magbayad ng 16 milyong pisong utang.

Nangutang sina Ang at Fernandez mula sa UCPB. Pinahihintulutan ng kasunduan sa pautang ang UCPB na i-adjust ang interest rate kada quarter batay sa kondisyon ng merkado.

Nang mabigo ang mga nanghihiram na bayaran ang kabuuang utang sa takdang panahon ay sinimulan ng UCPB ang proseso ng pagreremata sa kanilang mga ari-arian.

Nagsumite ng petisyon ang mga nangutang sa Regional Trial Court (RTC) para ipawalang-bisa ang pagbebenta ng ari-arian. Ayon sa kanila, hindi makatarungan at walang bisa ang kasunduan na ang bangko ang may tanging kapangyarihan na magtakda at magtaas ng interest rate.

Sumang-ayon ang RTC na ang mga probisyon sa interest rate ay hindi wasto dahil ipinaubaya ang mga ito sa pagpapasya ng bangko. Gayunpaman, idineklara nitong legal ang ginawang pagbebenta ng ari-arian. Binaliktad ito ng Court of Appeals, na nagpasiyang walang bisa ang parehong interest rate at ang pagbebenta ng ari-arian.

Sa una ay sumang-ayon ang Korte Suprema na hindi wasto ang interest rate ngunit pinagtibay ang pagbebenta ng ari-arian dahil sa kabiguang makapagbayad ng mga nangutang.

Gayunman, sa muling pagsasaalang-alang ng Korte ay nagpasya itong kung ang interest rate ay hindi katanggap-tanggap at ipinataw lamang ng nagpapautang, ang anumang kasunod na pagremata ay wala ring bisa.

Binigyang-diin ng Korte Suprema na sa ilalim ng Civil Code, ang mga kontrata ay dapat patas at napagkasunduan ng magkabilang panig. Walang bisa ang kontrata na nakasalalay lamang sa kagustuhan ng isang partido.

Sa kasong ito, tanging ang UCPB lang ang nagtakda ng interest rate. Dahil hindi wasto ang interest rate, walang bisa ang pagremata ng mga ari-arian.

Naniniwala ang Korte na dapat bigyan ng pagkakataon ang mga nangungutang na bayaran ang utang sa isang interest rate na napagkasunduan ng magkabilang panig. Kung hindi, ang kanilang kapalaran ay nasa kamay lang ng nagpapautang, na maglalagay sa panganib para mawalan sila ng ari-arian bunsod ng hindi patas na pagkakataon para mabayaran ang kanilang utang.

Basahin ang kabuuan ng Press Release sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=152735

Basahin ang kabuuan ng Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=152719

Basahin ang Dissenting Opinion ni Acting Chief Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=152726

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO:
https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

05/10/2025

The (SC) has revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court to introduce fairer penalties for habitual tardiness among Judiciary personnel, ensuring that sanctions are proportionate to the actual impact of the offense.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, the SC En Banc approved amendments to Rule 140, including adding a new offense under light charges for ordinary habitual tardiness not causing prejudice to the operations of the office.

The amendment also redefines the previous less serious charge of habitual absenteeism and/or tardiness to now read as habitual tardiness causing prejudice to the operations of the office and/or habitual absenteeism.

Under the latest amendment, Judiciary personnel may now be held liable for either a light charge for ordinary habitual tardiness that does not disrupt office functions or a less serious charge of habitual tardiness if it does, depending on the circumstances.

Penalties for light charges may include: (a) a fine ranging from PHP 1,000.00 to PHP 35,000.00; (b) censure; or (c) reprimand.

“Censure” refers to a stern expression of blame, while “reprimand” is a strong or formal warning.

If the penalty is limited to censure or reprimand, the employee may still be entitled to receive benefits. This is in line with the SC’s ruling in the 2024 case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Villavicencio-Olan, which significantly increased the consequences for employees, including suspension of benefits, disproportionately affecting employees with lower salary grades.

By distinguishing between ordinary and prejudicial tardiness, the SC aims to ensure that disciplinary actions are based on the actual circumstances and impact of each case.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=152628.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=152502.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.