Victor and Cayaban Law Office

28/09/2026

The has adopted the term "𝘷𝘪𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘮-𝘴𝘶𝘳𝘷𝘪𝘷𝘰𝘳" when referring to persons who have experienced sexual violence.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC’s Third Division affirmed a man’s conviction for the r**e of a 12-year-old child.

The minor testified that while everyone was asleep, the accused, who was the common-law spouse of the minor’s mother, dragged the child outside the residence of her uncle, r**ed her, pointed a knife at her, and threatened to kill her if she told anyone about the incident.

She told her uncle and aunt that the accused had been sexually abusing her since she was nine years old. She did not report it earlier because she feared his threats.

The SC found all the elements of r**e present and the accused positively identified as the ra**st. In addition to the penalty of 𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘭𝘶𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘱𝘦𝘳𝘱𝘦𝘵𝘶𝘢 or up to 40 years in prison, the SC ordered the man to pay the victim-survivor PHP 450,000 in civil indemnity and damages.

The SC clarified its terminology in cases involving sexual violence. Rather than using the term "𝘷𝘪𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘮," it adopted "𝘷𝘪𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘮-𝘴𝘶𝘳𝘷𝘪𝘷𝘰𝘳" to acknowledge both the harm caused by the crime and the strength victims show in enduring and recovering from such violence.

As part of the government’s efforts to provide comprehensive support for victim-survivors, the SC also directed the Department of Social Welfare and Development to refer the minor to the proper r**e crisis center for assistance.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=174013.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168013.

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25/09/2026

The (SC) has ruled that the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) is not liable to pay interest or damages on funds it sequestered or took custody of. The PCGG’s duty is only to preserve the funds, not to make them grow.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, the SC’s First Division denied the petition of Palm Avenue Holding Co., Inc. and Palm Avenue Realty Development Corporation (“Palm Companies”) seeking interest on funds sequestered from them.

The PCGG sequestered shares of stock in Benguet Corporation registered under the Palm Companies in 1986 as part of the government’s effort to recover alleged ill-gotten wealth. It did so based on a letter identifying Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez as the shares’ beneficial owner.

The shares later earned income and were partly sold. The PCGG placed the proceeds in an escrow account and a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) account. The escrow funds earned over PHP 273 million in interest, while the CARP funds earned over PHP 4 million before being transferred to the CARP account. After their transfer to the CARP account, they stopped earning interest.

The Sandiganbayan later ordered the release of the funds, including the interest earned, to the Palm Companies pending its decision on whether the funds were ill-gotten.

Because the CARP account funds came without any interest, the Palm Companies moved to ask the Sandiganbayan to order the PCGG to pay interest at 12% per year, compounded until full payment. They argued that the PCGG should have kept the CARP funds in escrow instead of moving them.

The Sandiganbayan initially agreed and ordered the PCGG to pay 6% in interest but later reversed itself.

The SC affirmed the ruling of the Sandiganbayan as it denied for lack of merit the motion of the Palm Companies.

Under the law creating the PCGG, the Commission can sequester assets suspected to be ill-gotten while the courts are deciding whether they were unlawfully acquired. This prevents assets from being hidden, destroyed, or depleted while in government custody.

The SC explained that the PCGG’s role over sequestered property is limited to that of a caretaker, not an owner or manager. This duty is fulfilled when the sequestered assets are safeguarded, kept intact, and returned without loss, including any actual profits and interest earned while they were under sequestration.

The SC clarified that the PCGG has no duty to increase the value of the sequestered funds or generate profit for its owners. To impose this on the commission would unnecessarily burden the State’s resources and distract the PCGG from its main task of recovering ill-gotten wealth.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=173942.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=173926.

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24/09/2026

PRIOR DEMAND IS NOW A PREREQUISITE TO CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 28 (E) OF THE SSS LAW. Meaning, for employers who failed to register their employees under SSS, said employers would not be automatically be criminally liable if there was no prior demand for them to comply with SSS registration requirement. According to the Supreme Court in a case published yesterday, September 23, "[t]he Court now clarifies that the service of a prior demand to comply with the registration requirement is a necessary prerequisite before a criminal action may be instituted for violation of Section 28(e) of the SSS Law." Since the law penalizes failure "or refusal," and "one cannot be said to have refused an obligation that has not first been demanded," the Coverage Letter with Demand "must specify a reasonable period within which to comply. Criminal liability shall attach only if the employer fails or refuses to comply within the period stated in the demand, reckoned from receipt thereof." (Gabrillo v. People, GR No. 275194, Third Division, Caguioa, July 07, 2026, published on September 23, 2026)

19/09/2026

𝐋𝐀𝐖 𝐃𝐀𝐘 | 𝐒𝐄𝐏𝐓𝐄𝐌𝐁𝐄𝐑 𝟏𝟗

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines joins the nation in the observance of Law Day, celebrated every September 19 pursuant to Proclamation No. 1477, s. 1975. The proclamation recognizes the indispensable role of the administration of justice in a democracy and the important contribution of lawyers in strengthening the rule of law.

Today, we honor the members of the legal profession whose work advances justice, protects rights, and upholds the principles upon which our democratic institutions stand.

May this occasion remind us that the practice of law is not only a profession, but also a continuing responsibility to serve the public, defend the rule of law, and help make justice accessible to all.

Happy Law Day!

Serve the Country. Hail the IBP!

18/09/2026

The has reiterated that what Republic Act No. 9262, or the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘪𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘈𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵 𝘞𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘛𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘳 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2004, criminalizes is not marital infidelity by itself but the psychological violence that goes with it causing mental or emotional suffering to the wife.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, the SC’s Second Division affirmed the conviction of a husband for violation of Section 5(i) of the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘈𝘞𝘊 𝘈𝘤𝘵, which penalizes the act of causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to a woman or her child.

Married in 1999, the husband and wife’s marital problems began in 2009, when the husband started coming home late and grew distant from his family. In January 2010, the husband sent his wife text messages saying he would no longer return home, wanted to start a new life alone, and intended to seek the nullity of their marriage. The wife later discovered that her husband was living with another woman.

The husband was charged with psychological violence before the Regional Trial Court. During trial, the wife claimed that her husband’s actions caused her severe mental and emotional suffering, and loss of self-esteem and dignity. She said she experienced depression and attempted to take her own life several times.

The psychologist who evaluated the wife found signs of depression, including feelings of inferiority, sleep problems, difficulty concentrating, and problems relating with others. The psychologist linked these emotional difficulties to the wife’s conflict with her husband and his abandonment of the family for another woman.

The SC affirmed in full the finding that the husband is guilty of psychological violence under the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘈𝘞𝘊 𝘈𝘤𝘵, sentencing the husband to up to eight years in prison and ordering him to pay a PHP 100,000 fine and PHP 30,000 in moral damages to his wife. The SC also directed him to undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment.

The SC explained that, depending on the circumstances, an extramarital relationship may or may not cause mental or emotional anguish to the wife. Infidelity may be one of the acts through which psychological violence is committed, but the resulting mental or emotional suffering must still be proven.

In this case, the SC held that the wife’s testimony, psychological evaluation, and other witness testimonies sufficiently proved that her husband’s acts caused her mental and emotional suffering.

Read the full text of the Press Release at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=173362.

Read the full text of the Decision: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/268619-###-vs-people-of-the-philippines/.

Read the Dissenting Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168031.

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18/09/2026

The 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤, during its session on August 26, 2026, unanimously declared that Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution requires Congress to enact a law prohibiting political dynasties, holding that Congress’ failure to do so for 39 years constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

The Court directed Congress to comply with its mandatory constitutional duty to enact an anti-political dynasty law at the earliest opportunity, define political dynasties, and determine the scope of the prohibition.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, the Court 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 granted the consolidated petitions in G.R. Nos. 263934, 272370, and 279201 for certiorari and mandamus. The petitions challenged Congress’ prolonged failure to pass a law defining and prohibiting political dynasties.

The Court strongly urged Congress to heed its constitutional duty with utmost urgency, as it declared that the latter has “the MANDATORY CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY to enact the law on the constitutional prohibition against political dynasties as expressly provided for in Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution.”

It stated that the Congress “MUST HENCEFORTH AND WITH UTMOST URGENCY ENACT THE APPROPRIATE ANTI-POLITICAL DYNASTY LAW AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.”

Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution provides that “The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.”

The Court held that this provision is not merely an aspiration but a constitutional command. The use of the word “shall” makes clear that the State has a mandatory duty both to guarantee equal access to public service and to prohibit political dynasties.

The Court also held that the phrase “as may be defined by law” does not give Congress the choice whether to prohibit political dynasties. Rather, it gives Congress the authority to define what constitutes a political dynasty and determine the scope of the prohibition.

The Court further said that Congress’ prolonged failure to enact an anti-political dynasty law constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

The Court took judicial notice of the numerous anti-political dynasty bills filed but left unacted upon since the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. It also considered studies on the prevalence of political dynasties and their relationship with socioeconomic conditions in the country.

The Court noted that political dynasties have remained widespread and have extended even into the party-list system. Despite changes in the composition of Congress over the years, no comprehensive anti-political dynasty law has been enacted, implying either a lack of interest, avoidance for convenience, or service of self-interest.

Although the Constitution does not set a deadline for Congress to enact the law, the Court held that this does not allow Congress to postpone its constitutional duty indefinitely. The Court found that 39 years is beyond a reasonable period to carry out the constitutional command. Congress’ continued inaction therefore constitutes a continuing violation of its constitutional duty.

Read the full text of the Press Briefer at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=173242.

Read the full text of the Decision at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=173192.

Read Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen’s Concurring Opinion at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=173197.

Read Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting Concurring Opinion at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=173209.

Read Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda’s Separate Opinion at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=173202.

Read Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao’s Separate Concurring Opinion at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=173214.

Read Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh’s Separate Opinion at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=173225

Read Associate Justice Raul B. Villanueva’s Separate Concurring Opinion at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=173231.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

15/09/2026

The (SC) has ruled that appearing intoxicated, smelling of alcohol, or being found near empty liquor bottles is not, by itself, enough to establish a violation of the election liquor ban.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, the SC’s Third Division acquitted Mcgill Esquillo Omandam (Omandam), ruling that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he consumed alcohol during the prohibited period as stated under Section 261(dd)(1) of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), or the “COMELEC liquor ban.”

Omandam was arrested on the eve of the elections after police responded to reports of rowdiness. Arresting officers said he appeared intoxicated, smelled of alcohol, spoke with a slurred voice, and moved groggily. The police also recovered two empty bottles of Tanduay Rhum near the scene.

The SC explained that the OEC prohibits the taking of intoxicating liquor during the election liquor ban, which covers the day before the election and election day. The prosecution has to prove that the accused actually consumed alcohol during that period.

In this case, however, none of the arresting officers saw Omandam drinking. The prosecution relied solely on circumstantial evidence.

While circumstantial evidence may support a conviction, the SC stressed that the circumstances taken together must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt and rule out any reasonable explanation of innocence.

The SC found that the prosecution failed to meet this standard. It based its case solely on observations of Omandam’s appearance and other unsupported circumstances.

The SC noted that the offense is not typically committed in secret and could have been easily verified through readily available means, such as field sobriety, breath analyzer, or chemical tests. However, the police did not conduct any of these, nor did they take photographs or videos to document Omandam’s alleged intoxication.

Although two empty liquor bottles were recovered, the police did not examine them for fingerprints or conduct forensic tests to determine whether Omandam handled them.

The SC ruled that these omissions undermined the accuracy and fairness of the investigation. Taken together, they cast doubt on the reliability and sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence.

Read more at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=173139

Read the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=173133

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09/09/2026

09/09/2026

The (SC) clarified that the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) has no jurisdiction over a dispute unless both parties involved are indigenous peoples (IP) from the same group.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC’s Third Division dismissed a petition to compel a judge to set aside its decision in an ejectment case against the spouses claiming to be members of the IP community. The spouses had claimed that under Republic Act No. 8371 or the 𝘐𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘨𝘦𝘯𝘰𝘶𝘴 𝘗𝘦𝘰𝘱𝘭𝘦 𝘙𝘪𝘨𝘩𝘵𝘴 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 1997 (IPRA), customary laws and practices should govern in resolving disputes involving them.

The case stemmed from an unlawful detainer case filed by Kristoffer R. Co Uy (Co Uy) against Elvin and Jocelyn Sending (the Sendings), seeking to have them vacate a property registered in his name.

The Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Regional Trial Court, and the Court of Appeals (CA) all ruled in favor of Co Uy and ordered the Sendings to vacate the property.

After attaining finality, and during the enforcement of the decision, the Sendings questioned the jurisdiction of the MCTC. They claimed that they were members of the IP group 𝘓𝘶𝘮𝘢𝘥 𝘒𝘒𝘒-𝘈𝘭𝘪𝘮𝘢𝘰𝘯𝘨 𝘏𝘪𝘨𝘢𝘰𝘯𝘰𝘯 𝘛𝘳𝘪𝘣𝘦. They asserted, for the first time, that customary laws, traditions, and practices should be used to resolve the property dispute, in accordance with IPRA. Under the IPRA, the NCIP has jurisdiction over disputes involving the rights of IPs.

The spouses brought the case to the SC after their motion to suspend the ex*****on of decision was denied by the MCTC. They argued that the Higaonon Tribe and the Dadantulan Tribal Court, not the MCTC, should have jurisdiction over their case.

The SC disagreed and clarified that under Section 66 of IPRA, the NCIP has jurisdiction over disputes involving IP rights only when all parties belong to the same indigenous group. If any party is not a member of the same IP community, jurisdiction belongs to the regular courts.

Here, Co Uy was not a member of any indigenous group. The SC explained that subjecting him to the customary laws of an IP community violates the fundamental principles of fair play and due process.

The SC also noted that the Sendings simply claimed they were IPs but failed to provide supporting evidence. They did not explain their customs, political structures, institutions, decision-making processes, or any other proof showing they were truly members of an IP community.

The SC stressed that a final judgment cannot be easily set aside, especially when the parties were given opportunity to present their side, and the decision was reached after careful review of the case.

The SC found that the petitioners invoked the NCIP’s authority simply to avoid the ex*****on of the final judgment against them. They raised their claim of being IP members only during the ex*****on stage, despite having participated in the barangay proceedings and the courts, casting doubt on the credibility of their claim.

The SC ordered the spouses to vacate the subject property within 30 days from receipt of the Decision.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=172796

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/271354-spouses-elvin-sending-datu-gibo-and-jocelyn-sending-bae-orange-vs-kristopper-rahda-co-uy-atty-jocelyn-pesquera-henry-p-canete-jr-and-hon-ameli-amor-r-estrada-presiding-judge-of-t/

Read the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/271354-concurring-opinion-justice-alfredo-benjamin-s-caguioa/

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04/09/2026