Atty. Jasmine Nicole Abella

08/10/2026

The 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤, during its session on October 7, 2026, approved amendments to the 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘵 (A.M. No. 25-03-14-SC) to make it easier for Filipino spouses to prove a foreign divorce when seeking its recognition in Philippine courts.

Under the amendments, which will take effect 15 days after they are posted on the Supreme Court Website, Filipino spouses seeking recognition of a foreign divorce under Article 26(2) of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 will no longer need to prove the applicable foreign law when filing their petition. They will only need to prove that the foreign divorce took place.

The amendments introduce Section 48-A of Rule 39, which presumes that a foreign divorce between a Filipino and a foreign spouse allows the foreign spouse to remarry under foreign law, unless the divorce decree itself states that it is only a limited divorce.

The party opposing the petition now bears the burden of proving that the divorce is not absolute.

The new rule also presumes that an English translation of a foreign divorce document is accurate if the translator certifies its accuracy under oath.

These presumptions are disputable; they may be challenged with contrary evidence, under Section 3 of Rule 131.

The amendments, however, leave the existing legal framework unchanged. A petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce is still required, and the substantive requirements of Article 26(2) of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 remain the same.

Recognition of a foreign divorce may still be opposed on grounds such as lack of jurisdiction, lack of notice, fraud, or a clear mistake of law or fact.

The amendments were approved upon the recommendation of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, and in consultation with Associate Justices Amy C. Lazaro-Javier and Jhosep Y. Lopez, and the Sub-Technical Working Group on the Concerns of Overseas Working Filipinos Regarding the Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees/Reports (Sub-TWG).

During consultations with the Sub-TWG, the Department of Foreign Affairs identified several challenges. Foreign family laws are often spread across different jurisdictions, making them difficult to obtain. Some countries have no designated official who can certify these laws, while foreign ministries generally do not provide official English translations.

Through these amendments, the Supreme Court aims to remove unnecessary barriers and make it easier for Filipinos to exercise their rights under the law.

Read the full text of the Press Briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=174621.

The full text of the Supreme Court 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 Resolution A.M. No. 25-03-14-SC shall be uploaded to the Supreme Court Website once available.

01/10/2026

Selling property? Keep track of these two tax deadlines.

Signing the Deed of Sale is only one step. Filing and paying the applicable taxes on time also matter.

📌 CAPITAL GAINS TAX (CGT)
For a sale of real property classified as a capital asset, the CGT return and payment are generally due within 30 days following the sale or disposition.

📌 DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAX (DST)
The DST return and payment are generally due within 5 days after the close of the month when the taxable document was made, signed, issued, accepted, or transferred.

🗓️ EXAMPLE
If the sale takes place and the taxable deed is executed on September 15, 2026, the general deadlines are:
✅ CGT: October 15, 2026
✅ DST: October 5, 2026

Notice that DST falls due earlier in this example. Mark both dates and prepare your documents ahead of time.

These dates assume an ordinary taxable sale with no applicable extension or special rule. The property’s classification and the nature of the transaction may affect its tax treatment.

For general information only. Specific transactions require individual assessment.

29/09/2026

ESTATE SETTLEMENT: DOCUMENTS HEIRS SHOULD PREPARE

After losing a parent, dealing with property documents can be difficult. Understanding the requirements is a helpful first step toward settling the estate and transferring the property properly.

For BIR estate tax processing and the issuance of an electronic Certificate Authorizing Registration (eCAR), the documents generally include:

• Certified true copy of the Death Certificate.

• Taxpayer Identification Numbers (TINs) of the deceased and the heirs.

• Certified true copies of property titles, including the front and back pages of the OCT, TCT, or Condominium Certificate of Title.

• Certified true copies of tax declarations for the land and improvements at the time of death. A Certificate of No Improvement may be required when applicable.

• Appropriate estate settlement documents, depending on the circumstances—an Extrajudicial Settlement, an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication for a qualified sole heir, or the relevant court documents.

• Accomplished Estate Tax Return and proof of payment, if tax is due.

Additional documents may be required for other assets, claimed deductions, or transactions processed through an authorized representative.

A note on the CPA-certified statement: For deaths on or after 1 January 2018, this is required when the gross estate exceeds ₱5 million. For deaths from 1 January 1998 to 31 December 2017, the threshold is more than ₱2 million. These thresholds refer to the gross estate before deductions.

Check the dates on your records. The current tax declaration may not be sufficient because estate tax computation requires information applicable at the time of death.

Requirements vary according to the date of death, the assets involved, and the stage of processing. Confirm the applicable checklist with the BIR Revenue District Office handling the estate.

This post provides general legal information. The proper course of action depends on the facts and documents of each estate.

Source: BIR Form No. 1801 instructions and BIR documentary checklists for estate tax processing and eCAR issuance.

29/09/2026

N RE: SOCIAL MEDIA POSTS OF EDGAR S. DIZON
B.M. No. 4734 | 15 July 2026 | En Banc | Per Curiam
Subject: Indirect Contempt; Unauthorized Practice of Law; Admission to the Bar.

FACTS:
Edgar S. Dizon administered the Facebook accounts Bar Law for Dummies Training Program and Tsidkenu Dizon. During the 2023 Bar Examinations, he published posts claiming that artificial intelligence (AI) would check and sort examinees’ answers. The posts circulated widely, caused anxiety among examinees, and disrupted Bar operations.

The Office of the Bar Chair issued an advisory refuting the claim and clarifying that human examiners would check the examinations. Despite the advisory, Dizon did not remove his posts. He instead demanded a public apology and threatened to sue the Court.
Dizon passed the 2016 Bar Examinations but had not taken the lawyer’s oath because of pending murder cases. Nevertheless, he conducted Bar coaching sessions, discussed answers to previous Bar questions, and prepared review materials on various legal subjects.

Ordered to explain why he should not be cited for indirect contempt, Dizon denied spreading misinformation and engaging in unauthorized practice of law. He maintained that his activities merely involved teaching techniques for answering Bar questions and that he instructed his students to call him “Teacher,” not “Attorney.”

ISSUES:
1. Whether Dizon’s social media posts constituted indirect contempt.
2. Whether his Bar coaching and preparation of legal review materials constituted unauthorized practice of law.
3. Whether his conduct warranted removal from the list of Bar passers.

RULING:
Yes, on all three issues.
1. The posts unlawfully interfered with Bar operations and impeded the administration of justice.

Under Rule 71, Section 3(c) and (d) of the Rules of Court, unlawful interference with court processes and improper conduct tending to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice constitute indirect contempt.

The Court found that Dizon’s false statements undermined the integrity of the Bar Examinations and the Supreme Court. His posts diverted the Bar Chair’s limited time and personnel toward investigating their origin, coordinating with concerned agencies, issuing an advisory, and responding to inquiries.

The Court rejected Dizon’s explanation that AI would merely “help,” as his post expressly attributed the checking and sorting of answers to AI.

2. Dizon engaged in unauthorized practice of law.

The practice of law includes activities, whether inside or outside court, requiring the application of legal knowledge, training, experience, or procedure.

The Court held that Dizon’s discussion of previous Bar examination answers and preparation of substantive legal review materials required legal knowledge. Calling himself a teacher and describing his services as coaching did not change the nature of these activities.
Since he had not been admitted to the Bar, his conduct constituted unauthorized practice of law and indirect contempt under Rule 71, Section 3(e).

3. Delisting was warranted.

The Court emphasized that the practice of law is a privilege, and passing the Bar Examinations does not automatically entitle a person to admission. The Court retains authority to assess an applicant’s fitness and impose appropriate preventive measures.
Dizon’s dissemination of false information, which directly compromised the integrity of the Bar Examinations, warranted his removal from the list of Bar passers.

Dizon was:
- Found guilty of indirect contempt and fined ₱30,000.00;
- Ordered delisted from the list of Bar passers; and
- Warned against further engaging in unauthorized practice of law.

06/09/2026

Day 1 has ended. Read the questions in Political and Public International Law and in Commercial and Taxation Laws on the Supreme Court website.

Political and Public International Law (Morning Exams):https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/2026-BAR-Political-and-Public-International-Law-Law.pdf

Commercial and Taxation Laws (Afternoon Exams):https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/2026-BAR-Commercial-and-Taxation-Laws.pdf

04/09/2026

The (SC) has ruled that evidence of credit card hacking cannot be seized under a search warrant that authorizes only the search for illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia unless they are discovered in plain view.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC’s Third Division acquitted an accused of violating Republic Act No. (RA) 8484, or 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘈𝘤𝘤𝘦𝘴𝘴 𝘋𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘤𝘦𝘴 𝘙𝘦𝘨𝘶𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 1998. Section 9(e) of the law prohibits the possession of counterfeit access devices, including fake credit cards.

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) received information that the accused was involved in illegal drug activities and computer hacking, particularly credit card fraud.

To verify the report, the NBI instructed the informant to buy methamphetamine hydrochloride (𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶) from the accused. Laboratory test later confirmed that it was indeed 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶.

The NBI obtained a search warrant for violation of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, authorizing the search for 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶 and other drug-related items.

During the search of the accused’s residence, NBI agents seized several items including computers, ATM cards, laptops, a money counter, a dry seal, and a card-scheming device.

They also recovered two American Express credit cards bearing the name “V S Tan.” An American Express manager later confirmed that the cards were fake because their numbers did not match the records of the original account holder.

Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals convicted the accused based on the evidence seized in the implementation of the search warrant.

The SC reversed the conviction and explained that, as a general rule, authorities may seize only items specifically described in a search warrant. One exception is the plain view doctrine, which allows officers to seize evidence they discover while lawfully present in a place.

For the 𝘱𝘭𝘢𝘪𝘯 𝘷𝘪𝘦𝘸 𝘥𝘰𝘤𝘵𝘳𝘪𝘯𝘦 to apply, the officers must have a lawful reason to be in the place where the evidence is found; the discovery must be inadvertent or unintentional; and it must be immediately clear that the item may be connected to a crime.

The SC found that only the first requirement was met.

The search warrant covered only illegal drugs and related paraphernalia. It did not authorize the seizure of credit cards or other access devices.

Their discovery of the credit cards was also not made in plain view. The credit cards were inside a non-transparent bag. Their contents could not be seen until the bag was opened. Even then, the cards did not appear fake on their face. Their alleged connection to a crime became apparent only because of the NBI’s prior information and their subsequent verification by American Express.

Although the NBI agents were lawfully inside the accused’s residence, their discovery of the credit cards was not accidental. The agents already had information linking the accused to alleged credit card fraud and hacking but did not obtain a search warrant covering those offenses.

The SC thus ruled that the credit cards were unlawfully seized and could not be used as evidence against the accused. Without them, the prosecution failed to prove his guilt under RA 8484.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=172645

Read the full text of the Decision athttps://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/273931.pdf

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

27/08/2026

CASE DIGEST | SUPREME COURT

BANK CANNOT PASS THE CONSEQUENCES OF ITS OWN GROSS NEGLIGENCE TO A DEPOSITOR

BDO Unibank, Inc. v. Cristina Barcellano y Riego
G.R. No. 261264 | February 16, 2026 | Third Division
Ponente: Justice Japar B. Dimaampao

DOCTRINE:
A bank cannot require a depositor to return money already withdrawn on the ground of unjust enrichment when the loss was caused by the bank’s own gross negligence.
Banks are engaged in a business imbued with public interest and are therefore required to exercise extraordinary diligence in handling banking transactions.

FACTS:
Cristina Barcellano deposited a ₱151,200.00 regional Landbank check into her BDO savings account.
However, a BDO teller mistakenly processed the check as a local check instead of a regional check, causing it to clear within three (3) banking days instead of seven (7) days.
Because the funds were prematurely made available, Barcellano was able to withdraw ₱76,000.00.

The following day, the check was returned to BDO because of a stop-payment order. BDO demanded that Barcellano return the ₱76,000.00 and eventually filed an estafa case against her.
The RTC acquitted Barcellano. The CA affirmed.
BDO then went to the Supreme Court, arguing that Barcellano should return the money because allowing her to retain it would constitute unjust enrichment and that the amount should be returned under the principle of solutio indebiti.

ISSUE:
Can BDO compel Barcellano to return the ₱76,000.00 on the ground of unjust enrichment or solutio indebiti?

RULING:

NO.

The Supreme Court found that BDO committed multiple errors:
First, BDO credited the amount of the check without properly clearing it with the drawee bank.

Second, its teller improperly processed a regional check as a local check.

Third, BDO failed to detect the erroneous clearing and discovered the problem only after receiving the stop-payment order.

Taken together, these errors constituted GROSS NEGLIGENCE on the part of the bank.

The Court emphasized:
“It is axiomatic that no recovery is due if the mistake done is one of gross negligence.”

The Supreme Court also found that BDO failed to establish that Barcellano knowingly received a benefit to which she was not entitled.

The reason for the stop-payment order was not established, and there was no showing that Barcellano knew that the check would not be honored. Her actions instead supported the inference that she believed in good faith that the funds credited to her account belonged to her.

Thus, solutio indebiti did not apply.

WHY IS THIS CASE IMPORTANT?
The case emphasizes that a bank cannot simply invoke unjust enrichment to recover money when the loss resulted from the bank's own gross negligence.

Banks are required to exercise extraordinary diligence because their business is imbued with public interest.

Before a check is cleared, the collecting bank assumes at its own risk that the check will eventually be cleared and paid.

Thus, when a bank prematurely makes funds available because it failed to follow proper banking safeguards, it cannot simply shift the consequences of its own gross negligence to an innocent depositor who withdrew the funds in good faith.

Full Text of the Casehttps://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/261264.pdf

26/08/2026

PAGKALIWANGAN, BALDE, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 272465 | January 21, 2026 | En Banc | Inting, J.

MADERA DOCTRINE ON RETURN OF DISALLOWED AMOUNTS

FACTS:
The Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) granted Flying Risk Pay (FRP) to certain officials and employees under Section 30 of Republic Act No. 776. COA later issued Notice of Disallowance No. 13-002 (2011), disallowing a total of P323,579.50 because the recipients’ functions were not inherently connected with aerial or flight operations and their positions were not included in the DBM-approved roster of FRP-eligible positions.

COA affirmed the disallowance and held the approving and certifying officers solidarily liable, while the recipient-payees were required to return the amounts they actually received. The petitioners invoked Madera v. Commission on Audit and claimed good faith.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the payment of Flying Risk Pay was valid under Section 30 of R.A. No. 776.
2. Whether the approving and certifying officers were liable to return the disallowed amounts.
3. Whether the recipient-payees were likewise required to return the amounts they received.

RULING:
The Supreme Court PARTLY GRANTED the petition. It upheld the disallowance of the FRP but modified the COA ruling on liability: the approving and certifying officers were ABSOLVED from solidary liability, while the recipient-payees remained individually liable to return the disallowed amounts they respectively received.

WHY THE FRP WAS DISALLOWED?
The Court held that Section 30 of R.A. No. 776 imposes a functional limitation. Flying Risk Pay is intended for personnel whose regular duties require regular and frequent aerial flights and whose functions are inherently connected with aircraft operations, navigation, flight safety, or similar technical and operational responsibilities.

Mere air travel in the performance of official duties does not qualify. Administrative, managerial, legal, or financial personnel who travel by aircraft merely as passengers to attend meetings, inspections, conferences, hearings, or other official engagements are not thereby entitled to FRP.

MADERA DOCTRINE: THE IMPORTANT PART

The Court emphasized that the validity of a Notice of Disallowance and the personal liability to return the disallowed amount are two separate questions. The fact that an expenditure is properly disallowed does NOT automatically mean that every approving or certifying officer must personally refund it.

VALID DISALLOWANCE ≠ AUTOMATIC PERSONAL LIABILITY
THE MADERA RULES ON RETURN
1. If the Notice of Disallowance is set aside: No return is required from the persons held liable.
2. Approving and certifying officers: They are not civilly liable if they acted in good faith, in the regular performance of official functions, and with the diligence of a good father of a family.
3. Bad faith, malice, or gross negligence: Approving and certifying officers who are clearly shown to have acted with any of these may be held solidarily liable for the net disallowed amount.
4. Recipient-payees: As a rule, they must return the amounts they actually received, even if they received them in good faith or merely as passive recipients, subject to the recognized Madera exceptions.
5. Exceptions for recipients: Return may be excused when the amount was genuinely given in consideration of services rendered under Rule 2(c), or when undue prejudice, social justice, or other bona fide considerations justify an exception under Rule 2(d).

APPLICATION OF MADERA TO THE APPROVING AND CERTIFYING OFFICERS
The Court found that the approving and certifying officers acted in good faith. At the time the FRP was granted in 2011, there was no Supreme Court precedent squarely interpreting Section 30 of R.A. No. 776. More importantly, COA Decision No. 2009-125 had previously lifted a disallowance involving similar FRP payments.
Thus, the officers relied on a then-prevailing interpretation issued by COA itself. The Court regarded that earlier COA ruling as a colorable legal basis. Although the Supreme Court later rejected that interpretation, it was a plausible reading of the law when the officers acted.

Under Madera, good faith is assessed based on the circumstances existing at the time the public officer acted. Because there was no showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, the approving and certifying officers were absolved from solidary liability.

BADGES OF GOOD FAITH / DILIGENCE UNDER MADERA:

In determining whether an approving or certifying officer exercised proper diligence, the Court may consider: (1) a Certificate of Availability of Funds; (2) an in-house or Department of Justice legal opinion; (3) the absence of precedent disallowing a similar transaction; (4) a traditional agency practice with no prior disallowance; and (5) a reasonable textual interpretation supporting the legality of the transaction.
In Pagkaliwangan, the Court found particularly relevant the absence of contrary judicial precedent and the existence of a reasonable textual interpretation supported by the earlier COA decision.

WHY THE RECIPIENT-PAYEES STILL HAD TO RETURN THE MONEY?

Good faith does not have the same effect on recipient-payees. Under Madera, recipients are generally required to return amounts they were not legally entitled to receive, pursuant to unjust enrichment and solutio indebiti.

The “services rendered” exception under Madera Rule 2(c) did not apply. As clarified in Abellanosa v. COA, the benefit must have a proper legal basis and be disallowed merely because of procedural irregularities, and it must have a clear, direct, and reasonable connection to the recipient’s official work for which the benefit was intended as additional compensation.
Here, the defect was substantive, not merely procedural. The recipients were not legally entitled to FRP because their duties did not involve the aerial-flight functions contemplated by law. Hence, they had to return the amounts they respectively received.

KEY DOCTRINE
Madera is not simply a “good faith” doctrine. It is a framework for determining civil liability after a COA disallowance has been sustained. The legality of the expenditure and the liability of the persons involved must be analyzed separately.

UPHELD DISALLOWANCE + GOOD-FAITH APPROVING OFFICER = MAY BE ABSOLVED
UPHELD DISALLOWANCE + BAD FAITH / MALICE / GROSS NEGLIGENCE = MAY BE SOLIDARILY LIABLE
RECIPIENT WITHOUT LEGAL ENTITLEMENT = GENERALLY MUST RETURN
DISPOSITION

The COA Decision and Resolution were AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The approving and certifying officers were ABSOLVED from solidary liability to return the net disallowed amount. The recipients of the Flying Risk Pay remained individually liable to return the disallowed amounts they respectively received.

Full text of the case: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/272465-concordia-s-pagkaliwangan-alex-b-balde-and-other-officers-and-employees-of-the-civil-aviation-authority-of-the-philippines-caap-represented-herein-by-captain-manuel-antonio-l-tamayo-vs/

For educational and legal discussion purposes.

25/08/2026