Lemoncito Law Office

02/07/2026

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The (SC) has ruled that a husband and wife’s mutual desire to end their marriage, by itself, is not enough to prove collusion in a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. A lack of objection is not the same as collusion.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division ruled that there was no collusion between the spouses in a petition to declare their marriage void. “Collusion” means that the spouses secretly agreed to fake or misrepresent facts in order to nullify their marriage.

The SC voided the marriage due to the husband’s psychological incapacity.

The wife filed the petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) alleging that her husband was unable to fulfill his marital duties because of continued physical, psychological, and economic abuse, which she said began even before their marriage.

When the husband did not file his answer to the petition, the RTC directed the Provincial Prosecutor to investigate possible collusion between the spouses. The Associate Provincial Prosecutor reported that there was no collusion.

During trial, the wife presented several witnesses while the husband presented none. He also did not oppose the petition.

Despite this, the RTC dismissed the case, ruling that the evidence did not sufficiently prove psychological incapacity.

The RTC pointed out that the husband’s father admitted discussing his testimony with his son, and that the husband was willing to have the marriage dissolved.

Explaining that collusion is a secret agreement to defraud or obtain something illegal, the SC noted that although the RTC observed suspicious circumstances, these did not clearly prove that the spouses conspired to fake grounds to nullify their marriage.

The SC emphasized that a mutual desire to end the marriage does not automatically mean collusion. A spouse’s agreement or lack of objection is not the same as a secret scheme to mislead the court.

Without proof that the spouses faked evidence or suppressed valid defenses, collusion cannot be established.

It added that the husband’s failure to file an answer or present evidence does not, by itself, prove collusion.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168319.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165664.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attributionon-policy.

19/05/2026

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SUPREME COURT ORDERS UNIVERSITY TO PAY P6 MILLION IN DAMAGES FOR NEGLIGENCE THAT CAUSED STUDENT DEATH

FIRST ON BATAS PH: The Supreme Court (SC) has ordered the University of Southeastern Philippines to pay PHP 6,450,000 in total damages to the parents of a student who died from severe burn injuries after her costume caught fire during a university-organized event, which have arisen from negligence in the conduct and safety arrangements of the activity.

In a 46-page decision penned by Senior Associate Justice Marvic Leonen, the SC En Banc has found the University of Southeastern Philippines, represented by its president, Dr. Romulo Dequito; Dr. Marie Rose Escalada; Dr. Gilbert Gordo; Professor Catherine Roble; and Ms. Emma Gobantes jointly and severally liable for damages for the death of Cheryl Sarate.

In 2006, the Guild of English Students, a recognized student organization in the university, organized a beauty pageant in the university's social hall. The organizers installed a T-shaped ramp lined with 12 small, lit candles in brown paper bags filled with damp soil. Each paper bag was tied with crepe paper, and the opening of the bags was structured like a crown to resemble a lantern. Some of the social hall's lights were switched off to highlight the candlelight.

Cheryl was the fourth candidate to walk for the pageant. She wore a snow fairy ensemble made of cotton balls glued to plastic cellophane, typically used to cover books. The lower skirt was on a tie wire to create a petticoat design. Its hem was covered with small feathers. Her tube top was covered with rolled cotton flattened to her chest.

The top of her blouse was attached to a tie wire. She held a rattan scepter and wore a butterfly headdress. Cheryl was standing on the leftmost side of the T-shaped ramp when her gown caught fire as she turned to pose. When she turned right to walk to the center ramp, she used her bare hands to ward off the small flames that
started to engulf her.

On the center ramp, the flames blazed, causing Cheryl to jump over the right side of the hall where the audience sat. She tripped as she screamed for help. Some students tried to help, and the fires were eventually put out. After the fire, Cheryl was seen topless, wearing only denim short pants. People tried to hug and console her. The ambulance arrived 30 minutes later and brought Cheryl to the hospital. Despite this, the pageant resumed. The organizers admitted that no faculty member was present to supervise the event, except for those who participated as judges.

Students said they had not seen fire extinguishers in the venue, although the university maintained that there were two inside the social hall. Eventually Cheryl died in the hospital due to "cardiac arrest due to septic shock; the antecedent cause is secondary to flame burn, 80% total body surface area (TBSA) involving face, neck, anterior chest, back, and both upper and lower extremities." Cheryl's parents, Antonio and Rosita Sarate, then filed a case for damages against the University of Southeastern Philippines and the Guild of English Students.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found the University and the Guild of English Students jointly and severally liable for the incident. It found that the university is negligent for its lack of preparedness for foreseeable emergencies. The RTC later on modified its first ruling by granting the university's motion for partial reconsideration and absolving it from liability and declared the guild adviser and university faculty member solely liable for the incident. Dismayed, the parents of the victim elevated the case before the Court of Appeals.

The appellate court granted the appeal and reinstated the first ruling of the RTC. The CA found the university liable through its administrators and officers-in-charge based on paragraph 4 of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, since there was collective negligence between them. This paved the way for the university to file an appeal before the Supreme Court.

In affirming the CA ruling with modification, the high court noted that under Articles 218 and 219 of the Family Code, schools, its administrators, and its teachers have special parental authority and responsibility over minors under their supervision, instruction, or custody, making them principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by them, and this liability applies to all their authorized activities.

The SC emphasized that the university failed to exercise the diligence required of it as an educational institution. During the incident, it was only the students who put out the fire, without help from employees of the university. The university failed to train personnel to conduct first aid, shown by the fact that only students attempted to help Cheryl.

It also flagged the university's lack of preparedness to address the emergency due to its failure to sound the fire alarm and no one used the fire extinguishers the university claims were available.

The highest bench did not give credence to the defense of the university attempting to escape liability by arguing that the beauty pageant organized by the Guild was an unauthorized activity. It insisted that the Guild did not have the required permit to hold the event, making it a private affair, and the pageant, which was held on a weekday, violated the school policy to hold extracurricular activities only during weekends.

The court highlighted that it is not right for the university to easily deny any connection with the Guild, insisting that the pageant was a private affair, especially since the latter is a campus organization, of which the members are the enrolled students of the university and the adviser of which is a permanent employee of the university.

"The holding of the activity on a date different from the schedule and the fact that it violated the university's policy of holding activities only on weekends does not make the activity illegal or unauthorized but may only open [petitioner] Roble, as its adviser, to administrative sanctions from the school," the Supreme Court said.

It cited the findings of the RTC, holding petitioner Roble's negligence as Guild adviser in the supervision and instruction of the Guild members can be considered the natural, continuous sequence preceding the cause of Cheryl's death."

The high court held that Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code are also applicable in this case, which makes the university, as an employer, liable for the damages caused by its employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks.

"There is also collective negligence on the part of the petitioner university, through its administrators and officers-in-charge, when it failed to exercise due diligence in taking safety measures to ensure that no unfortunate incident would happen for those who would use its facilities," it added.

The high court ordered the university and its co-respondents to pay the parents of Cheryl PHP 300,000 as civil indemnity, PHP 5,000,000 as moral damages, PHP 1,000,000 as exemplary damages, and PHP 150,000 as attorney's fees.

27/04/2026

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04/01/2026

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SUPREME COURT DECLARES MARRIAGE VOID DUE TO WIFE'S CONTROLLING CONDUCT

The Supreme Court (SC) has affirmed the Court of Appeals (CA) ruling that nullified the marriage of a couple on the ground of the wife's psychological incapacity demonstrated through her domineering and controlling attitude to the extent that she always demands her husband to always update her of his whereabouts.

In a 14-page decision authored by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul Inting, the SC's Third Division has declared void from the beginning the marriage between a couple on the ground of the wife's psychological incapacity as provided under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The couple were married on January 22, 1995. They had no antenuptial agreement, and their property relations are governed by the regime of absolute community of property.

The husband narrated that even prior to the wedding, the psychological incapacity of his wife, whose childhood was marked with overindulgence at a time when her pathogenic family was still wealthy, was demonstrated by her domineering attitude coupled with her lazy and poor study habits.

He added that after the wedding, the wife's incapacity to perform her marital obligations supposedly became more apparent given that she continued to be domineering and controlling as she required the husband to always update her of his whereabouts. She also displayed an arrogant and haughty attitude, especially towards his mother.

More than these, the husband also claimed that the wife's psychologically abused their children when she physically attacked him in the presence of their kids while he was holding their daughter, and reached the point when she sneaked in the house of the husband's mother to take the kids home without telling anyone. This paved the way for him to file a petition for nullification of marriage.

A clinical psychologist testified that the wife suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder with paranoid features, which is categorized as grave, incurable, and with antecedents. The expert recommended the nullification of their marriage.

In her defense, the wife countered that it was the husband who abused their children, not only psychologically but also sexually. She averred that in times of disagreement, her husband also physically and verbally abused her.

The Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals (CA) granted the petition and declared void ab initio their marriage. The CA gave much weight to the psychological reports, which showed that the wife's psychological incapacity is grave and incurable. Aggrieved the wife elevated the case before the Supreme Court.

In denying her appeal, the high court found no valid reason to overturn the consistent findings and conclusions of the RTC and the CA, which are supported by the evidence on record.

It cited the landmark case of Tan-Andal vs. Andal, which requires that in order to grant the nullification of marriage due to psychological incapacity, the same must be grave enough to cause the couple's inability, not mere refusal, neglect, or difficulty, to perform the essential marital obligations.

It must also be shown that the psychological incapacity existed prior to or at the time of the celebration of the marriage, and it must be proven that the spouse, by reason of his or her psychological incapacity, persistently fails to comply with the essential marital obligations.

The SC agreed to the CA finding that the evidence presented by the husband is sufficient to establish that the wife suffered from a narcissistic personality disorder with paranoid features through the accounts of his witnesses, corroborated by the psychological report and testimony of the clinical psychologist.

It also emphasized that the nature of the wife's psychological incapacity is severe and pervasive, citing the psychological reports that revealed it affects all areas of her life, to the point that she is unable to perform her essential marital obligations to her husband.

The high court also took into consideration that it is quite apparent that the wife's psychological incapacity, as shown by the behavioral manifestations of her personality disorder, existed even before their marriage, as the same is rooted in her childhood and carried over into her adulthood.

It ruled that since their marriage was declared void, the rules on co-ownership, in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code, govern the liquidation, partition, and distribution of their common properties.

Hence, the highest bench deemed it proper to remand the case back to the trial court, as it appears that both parties have raised issues regarding their property relations in their respective pleadings.