DAVID LAW OFFICE

06/05/2026

The has acquitted a man charged with violence against women and their children, or VAWC, for allegedly refusing to provide financial support to a child not proven to be his, emphasizing that a legal duty to provide financial support arises only after filiation or paternity has been established.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC’s Third Division reversed the rulings of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, which found the accused guilty of economic abuse under Republic Act No. 9262, or the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘪𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘈𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵 𝘞𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘛𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘳 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2004 (𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘈𝘞𝘊 𝘈𝘤𝘵).

The case arose from a complaint filed by a woman against her former boyfriend, accusing him of refusing to provide financial support for her child.

The accused consistently denied he was the father, claiming that the child was born only eight months after they last had sexual relations.

During trial, the woman presented the child’s birth certificate as evidence. However, the portion indicating the father’s name, was marked "𝘕/𝘈" and left unsigned.

The woman also admitted in court that the accused refused to give financial support because he doubted that he was the child’s father.

In reversing the accused’s conviction, the SC explained that to convict a person for economic abuse under Section 5(i) of the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘈𝘞𝘊 𝘈𝘤𝘵, the prosecution must show the following: (1) the victim is a woman and/or her child; (2) the woman is the offender’s wife or partner, or someone with whom the offender has a common child; (3) the offender refused to give financial support due; and (4) the refusal was intended to cause mental or emotional suffering.

In this case, the SC ruled that the prosecution failed to prove two essential elements: that the accused and the woman share a common child, and that the refusal to provide support was done to inflict psychological harm.

As the accused’s paternity was not proven in this case, no legal obligation to provide support could be imposed.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164663.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164655.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution.

29/04/2026

The (SC) 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤, during its session today, April 29, 2026, dismissed the petition for mandamus filed by Catalino Aldea Generillo, Jr., which sought to compel the Senate to immediately convene as an impeachment court to try the charges against Vice President Sara Duterte.

In a 14-0-1 Decision written by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda, the SC held that mandamus, which is meant to enforce a clear legal duty, was not the proper remedy. It ruled that the Senate’s actions within its sphere cannot be revised or controlled by the judicial department through mandamus. As a co-equal constitutional body, the Senate’s exercise of its duties is beyond the SC’s power of review, except in cases of grave abuse of discretion.

However, specifically for this case and in the interest of equity, the SC treated the petition as one for certiorari and proceeded to determine whether the Senate acted unlawfully or abused its discretion when it did not convene immediately as an impeachment court during its session break.

Contrary to the petitioner’s claim, the SC found that the Senate acted on the impeachment complaint in a timely manner.

While the Constitution requires the House of Representatives to act within a certain number of session days on an impeachment complaint, it does not specify a fixed timeframe for the Senate to start an impeachment trial. It simply provides that the trial “shall forthwith proceed,” leaving the timing to the Senate’s discretion.

The SC clarified that the term “forthwith” in Article XI, Section 3(4) of the Constitution means within a reasonable time, which may be longer or shorter, depending on the circumstances of each case. This allows the Senate to make the necessary preparations to convene as an impeachment court.

While the Constitution does not set an exact date for the trial, the Senate must avoid undue delay to uphold the principle that public officers must at all times be accountable to the people.

The SC considered the petition moot because the Senate had begun impeachment preparations, and the Articles of Impeachment against Vice President Duterte were nullified by the SC’s July 25, 2025 Decision and January 28, 2026 Resolution in Duterte v. House of Representatives. A case is moot when subsequent events remove any issues, making court rulings unnecessary. Since no Articles of Impeachment remained, the SC had no reason to order the Senate to convene as an impeachment court.

Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen concurred only in the result, that the petition was moot. However he was of the position that the impeachment court should have been convened immediately and that the impeachment court—not merely the Senate President—should have taken charge of organizing that court. (Updated as of April 29, 2026, 5:30 p.m.)

Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa took no part.

Read the full text of the Press Briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164510

The full text of the Decision will be uploaded to the SC website once available.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy.

11/03/2026

The (SC) 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 has upheld the validity of a Department of Justice (DOJ) circular that raised the standard of proof in preliminary investigations and inquest proceedings from probable cause to prima facie evidence with reasonable certainty of conviction.

In a Decision written by written by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 ruled that Department Circular No. 15, series of 2024 containing the 2024 𝘋𝘖𝘑-𝘕𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘴𝘦𝘤𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘚𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘪𝘤𝘦 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘯 𝘗𝘳𝘦𝘭𝘪𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘳𝘺 𝘐𝘯𝘷𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘨𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘐𝘯𝘲𝘶𝘦𝘴𝘵 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘤𝘦𝘦𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨𝘴 (𝘋𝘖𝘑 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴), is a valid exercise of the DOJ’s authority over prosecutorial processes.

Under the DOJ Rules’ new standard of proof in preliminary investigations and inquest, prosecutors must ensure that the evidence to charge a person with a crime must sufficiently establish all the elements and consequently warrant a conviction.

Atty. Hazel L. Meking questioned the DOJ Rules before the SC, claiming that the DOJ encroached on the SC’s constitutional authority to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts. She argued that the DOJ Rules effectively revised Rule 112, Section 3(a) of the 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘤𝘦𝘥𝘶𝘳𝘦, which provides that the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is probable cause.

The SC dismissed her petition and reiterated its ruling in 𝘈.𝘔. 𝘕𝘰. 24-02-09-𝘚𝘊, which recognized the DOJ’s authority to promulgate its own rules on preliminary investigations and inquest proceedings.

The SC held that the DOJ Rules govern only the conduct of preliminary investigations and inquests by prosecutors, which are executive functions. These Rules, however, do not extend to judicial proceedings as the power to promulgate rules of procedure over them remains under the authority of the Supreme Court.

The SC noted it had already recognized preliminary investigation as the exclusive domain of prosecutors when it revised the Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2005.

In 2024, through 𝘈.𝘔. 𝘕𝘰. 24-02-09-𝘚𝘊, the SC also ordered the repeal of provisions in Rule 112 which are inconsistent with the DOJ Rules to harmonize them.

The SC’s constitutional rule-making authority over judicial proceedings remains supreme, as well as its power to correct grave abuse of discretion in any prosecutorial rule or action that violates constitutional rights.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161871

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161853

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161858

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

03/03/2026

WATCH: How to create an account through the Philippine Judiciary Platform (PJP).eCourt PH can be accessed through the PJP at https://portal.judiciary.gov.ph/...

03/03/2026

22/02/2026

GRAMATICA RULING

22/02/2026

A judgement of acquittal is not subject to appeal. The rule is that a judgment acquitting the accused is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation.

22/02/2026

The (SC) has ruled that same-sex couples who live together may be recognized as co-owners of property under Article 148 of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, provided there is proof of actual contribution.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, the SC’s Second Division granted a woman’s complaint for partition of property and recognized her as a co-owner of the house and lot she shared with her same-sex partner.

Article 148 of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 governs the property relations of couples who are living together but cannot legally marry, acknowledging co-ownership based on their actual contributions.

The two women lived together as a couple. A year into their relationship, they purchased a house and lot, and agreed to register the property in one partner’s name to facilitate banking transactions.

Upon separation, they agreed to sell the property and divide the proceeds equally. One partner signed an 𝘈𝘤𝘬𝘯𝘰𝘸𝘭𝘦𝘥𝘨𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 stating that the other had paid about 50% of the purchase and renovation costs.

However, she later refused to sell the property and denied that her former partner was a co-owner.

To protect her interest, the former partner annotated an adverse claim on the title and demanded partition of the property. When this failed, she filed a case for partition of real estate and damages, relying on the 𝘈𝘤𝘬𝘯𝘰𝘸𝘭𝘦𝘥𝘨𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 as proof of co-ownership.

The SC granted the complaint for partition of real estate, as it clarified the provisions in the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 governing the property relations of unmarried couples living together.

Article 147 applies to unmarried couples who may legally marry. Property acquired during their cohabitation is presumed jointly owned.

Article 148, on the other hand, applies to couples who are not permitted to marry. Only properties obtained through actual contribution are considered common property.

Since the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 only allows marriage between a man and a woman, the SC held that same-sex couples necessarily fall under Article 148.

Here, the SC found that the signed 𝘈𝘤𝘬𝘯𝘰𝘸𝘭𝘦𝘥𝘨𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵, where one partner admitted that the other paid about half of the property costs, was a binding admission and sufficient proof of actual contribution. This established co-ownership.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160462.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160431.

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160444.

Read the Concurrence of Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160439.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

22/02/2026

Nagpasya ang na puwedeng kilalanin bilang magkatuwang na may-ari ng ari-arian (co-owners of property) ang mga nagsasama na magkapareho ang kasarian, alinsunod sa Artikulo 148 ng Family Code, kung may sapat na patunay na kapwa silang may aktuwal na ambag sa naturang mga pag-aari.

Sa isang desisyong isinulat ni Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, pinagbigyan ng Second Division ng Korte Suprema ang reklamo ng isang babae para sa paghahati ng ari-arian at kinilala siya bilang isa sa mga may-ari ng bahay at lupang kanyang pinagsamahan kasama ang kanyang kaparehong kasarian na partner.

Ang Artikulo 148 ng Family Code ang nagtatakda ng mga patakaran sa pagmamay-ari ng ari-arian ng mga magkaparehang nagsasama ngunit hindi maaaring magpakasal ayon sa batas, at kinikilala nito ang pagiging magkatuwang na may-ari batay sa aktuwal na ambag ng bawat isa.

Nagsama ang dalawang babae bilang magkarelasyon. Isang taon matapos ang kanilang relasyon, bumili sila ng isang bahay at lupa, at napagkasunduan nilang isa sa kanila na lamang ang irehistrong pangalan para mapadali ang mga transaksyon sa bangko.

Nang maghiwalay sila, napagkasunduan nilang ibenta ang ari-arian at hatiin nang pantay ang kita. Isa sa kanila ang lumagda sa isang Acknowledgment na nagpapatunay na ang isa pa ay nag-ambag ng halos 50% ng gastos sa pagbili at pagpapagawa ng bahay.

Gayunpaman, kalaunan ay hindi siya pumayag na ibenta ang ari-arian at itinanggi niya na ang dating karelasyon niya ay isa ring may-ari nito.

Para maprotektahan ang kanyang karapatan, ang dating kapareha ay naglagay ng adverse claim sa titulo ng ari-arian at humiling ng paghahati nito. Nang hindi ito magtagumpay, nagsampa siya ng kaso para sa paghahati ng real estate at kabayaran sa danyos, gamit ang Acknowledgment bilang patunay ng pagiging magkatuwang na may-ari.

Pinagbigyan ng Korte Suprema ang reklamo para sa paghahati ng ari-arian, habang nilinaw nito ang mga probisyon sa Family Code na namamahala sa ugnayan sa ari-arian ng mga magkasintahang nagsasama ngunit hindi kasal.

Ang Artikulo 147 ay naaangkop sa mga magkasintahang hindi pa kasal ngunit maaaring magpakasal ayon sa batas. Ang ari-ariang nakuha habang sila’y nagsasama ay ipinapalagay na pagmamay-ari ng magkatuwang.

Samantala, ang Artikulo 148 ay naaangkop sa mga magkasintahang hindi pinapayagang magpakasal. Tanging ang mga ari-ariang nakuha sa pamamagitan ng aktuwal na ambag ang itinuturing na pagmamay-ari ng magkatuwang.

Dahil ang Family Code ay nagpapahintulot lamang ng pag-aasawa sa pagitan ng lalaki at babae, itinuring ng Korte Suprema na ang mga magkaparehong kasarian ay sakop ng Artikulo 148.

Dito, napagpasyahan ng Korte Suprema na ang nilagdaang Acknowledgment, kung saan inamin ng isang kapareha na nagbayad ang isa pa ng halos kalahati ng gastos sa ari-arian, ay itinuturing na may bisa at sapat na patunay ng aktuwal na ambag. Ito ang nagpatibay sa pagiging magkatuwang na may-ari.

Basahin ang Press Release sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160462.

Basahin ang kabuuang teksto ng Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160431.

Basahin ang Concurring Opinion ni Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160444.

Basahin ang Concurrence ni Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160439.

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC Public Information Office: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

22/02/2026