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ALTAR ADVOCATES, Port Harcourt (2026)

21/06/2022

Do not be caught on the wrong side of the law. Before you act or take that step, seek legal advice. Don't just get mad, get smart. It pays to tread on the part of caution.

13/06/2022

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Shot by a litigant unnoticed

14/08/2021

*"A visit to the locus in quo is to lend support to the oral and documentary evidence led in the Court room. It is not the purpose of such visit to give more weight to the detriment of the oral evidence which prove some hard facts which the observation at the locus in quo cannot supply."*
*MALLAM vs. AFTIKUS(2020)LCN/14263(CA)*

ISSUE: VISIT TO LOCUS IN QUO-Whether a court can rely on the evidence of a person at locus in quo who is not a witness in a matter to clarify doubt that arose from the evidence of parties in court(Issue is mine)

PRINCIPLE:
"From the evidence of the appellant and his witnesses, it was not possible to ascertain that the location and identity of the land in dispute are outside the portion previously litigated upon. For this reason, the parties requested that the trial Court should visit the land in dispute, thus the visit to the locus in quo. In the trial Court, the boundaries given by the PW1 and PW3 differ from the boundaries given by the Respondent and his witnesses. The essence of a visit to locus by the Court is for the Court to see, in this case the land in dispute in the presence of the parties. In *ORUGBO VS. UNA (2002) LPELR–2778 (SC) P. 27, PARAS. A-E,* his Lordship *Tobi, JSC,* gave the essence of a visit to locus thus: "The major essence of inspection of locus is to bring to the fore the evidence of both parties without bias. It is a forum to allow parties show the Court important boundaries and landmarks to enable the Court decide the issue or issues in dispute. Where parties are given equal opportunity at the locus to show boundaries and landmarks, show other evidence in their favour, an appellate Court will not throw out the findings of the trial Court…” See *GWAMILE VS. IDIH & ANOR. (2008) LPELR–44139 (CA) PP. 33 – 34, PARAS. D–A; ATANDA VS. ILIASU (2012) LPELR–19662 (SC) P. 20, PARAS. C–E and BRIGGS VS. BRIGGS (1992) LPELR–804 (SC) PP. 31–32, PARAS. D–A.* What is seen at the locus is real evidence and it is the most satisfactory proof. The parties in this case agreed to the visit to the locus for inspection, for the Court to see the land in dispute and whether it forms part of the land earlier litigated upon by the same parties. Both parties were present and were free to ask questions and clarify the boundaries and exact location of the portion of land now in dispute if need be. Before the visit to locus, the parties had given evidence in Court with their witnesses. The essence of the visit was for the Court and the parties to see and clarify the location of the land in dispute, the parties not having agreed as to whether the land in dispute formed part of the land previously litigated upon by the same parties. At page 142 of the printed records of appeal, in its judgment, the trial Court held thus: "From the evidence so far considered with issue 1, it’s evidence (sic) that the parties in Suit No. TRSJ/86/2010 and the present suit is between same parties. From the confirmation of the position of the land in dispute, the Court on the application of the parties visited the land in disputed (sic) and saw for its eyes, that the land in dispute described in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the statement of claim and statement of the plaintiff on oath forms part the large (sic) piece of farmland belonging to the defendant. And which was litigated upon with the evidence of Jechoniah Samuel Dako, that his father Samuel Dako, from whom the plaintiff claim the land through purchase, had no land there Samuel Dako never sold his land to the plaintiff because he (Jechoniah Samuel Dako) is still in possession of the father’s farmland.”
The Appellant had alleged that the trial Court failed to hear evidence from witnesses during the locus but used its personal observations and statement of Buba Jio in determining that the land in dispute was part of the land that had been litigated upon in Suit No. TRSJ/86/2010. Section 127 (2)(a) and (b) has set out the procedure to be followed at a visit to locus or inspection thus:
127 (2) “When an inspection of property under this Section is required to be held at a place outside the Court room, the Court shall either:-
(a) be adjourned to the place where the subject matter of the said inspection may be and the proceeding shall continue at that place until the Court further adjourns back to its original place of sitting, or to some other place of sitting, or
(b) attend and make an inspection of the subject matter only, evidence, if any, of what transpired there being given in Court afterwards, in either case the defendant: if any, shall be present.”
Evidence obtained at the visit is real and reliable because the Court sees the subject matter in contention, in this case, the location of the land in dispute which the parties were not agreed on its location in proximity with the land previously litigated upon by the parties. The parties had the opportunity to clarify issues at the locus, ask questions and to be questioned concerning any grey area over what was on ground and/or concerning the evidence already adduced in Court for clarification. The trial Court in his “personal observations” being challenged by the Appellant at page 122 of the printed records of appeal noted thus: "The Court is here following the application of the plaintiff for a locus visit to the land in dispute. Today being 30–4–2018, the Court conversed (sic) at the locus and the plaintiff is ordered to walk through the boundary edge of the land in dispute.”
Further at page 123 of the records noted as follows: "The portion of the land as draw (sic) in the diagram is identified by the plaintiff that he bought from Samuel Dako. But the portion outside the diagram he said we bought from the father of the defendant.
The defendant on his part said it is the entire large land that belongs to his father.”
Further at page 125: "The issue for this visit is ascertain (sic) the land in dispute before this Court from the land earlier litigated upon before Hon. Justice N. S. Adi where terms of settlement drafted and agreed by the parties was entered as the judgment in that suit.
This called for the interest of justice summon a witness namely Buba Jio to the West. He told this Court that his son’s name is Michael who also did not testify in Court though he was one the (sic) defendant’s witness.”
Further at page 126, the trial Court noted thus: "This land in dispute belongs to Jenkin that is the father of the defendant. When he was coming here the defendant’s father used to farm here he is bounded by Samuel Dako.”
Thereafter, the trial Court asked questions from Buba Jio who was summoned by the Court to the locus; the parties explained the boundaries and the owners of the land surrounding the land in dispute in the presence of the Court and the boundary neighbours. The Appellant had the opportunity to ask questions and to answer questions put by the trial Court. The visit was for clarification on the already adduced evidence in Court, the parties having closed their respective cases before the visit to locus. At the inspection, the boundaries and boundary men were confirmed in the presence of the parties, the Appellant did not fault the questions asked by the trial Court at the locus or disagree with those that were identified as the boundary neighbours and did not dispute the fact that the land in dispute was part of the land earlier litigated upon by both parties. There was nothing wrong in the Court inviting Buba Jio a boundary neighbour to the West of the land in dispute even though he was not a witness at the trial." *Per UWA, JCA.*

*ANGULU vs. KELEDI & ORS.(2021)LCN/15164(CA)*

ISSUE: EVIDENCE AT LOCUS IN QUO-Whether evidence at locus in quo should lend support to the oral and documentary evidence led in the court room(Issue is mine)

PRINCIPLE:
"The learned trial Court and the parties and their respective counsel were on the disputed land. As rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant, the essence of visit to locus in quo was for the trial Court to have a first-hand information regarding the position of the respective parties. The trial Judge will thus not only avail himself of mere belief but of what he sees there. See *Umar v. Bayero University (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt. 86) at 93; Kenon v. Tekam (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt. 121) 366 at 373.* The visit to the locus in quo and observation made thereat are material and ought to be evaluated and findings made thereon. Belief obviously is strengthened by seeing.
Concerning the visit to the locus in quo in the instant case, the learned trial Judge had this to say: "At locus- in-quo, the plaintiffs showed the land in dispute as described in Court with Living Faith Church and Amadiyya as boundary. This Court observed that the land in dispute is a village and has many developments on it. The plaintiffs showed the Court the land starting from old Keffi–Abuja road bounded by Living Faith Church, Ahmadiyya School, Tumudna stream and back to old Abuja–Keffi road. The area from evidence is called AutaGurgu as well as Tumudna. The defendant agreed that the land shown by the plaintiffs is the land in dispute. The plaintiffs also showed bounding adjacent land bounding the disputed land down side by the east as their land also.
The 2nd plaintiff showed an old house and claim (sic) it belong to their father Kuyawi but was given to Musa Gambo – chief of AutaGurgu though the defendant disputed this fact.
The defendant at the locus in quo claimed this was the land the area Court gave him.
The plaintiffs in answer to question put to him by the defence counsel told the Court that the village is called Tumudna. Both the plaintiffs and defendant claim ownership of trees on the land. The DW1 and 3 showed the Court their houses on the disputed land. After the visit parties were given the opportunity to file their final written addresses of which…" (See pages 340–341 of the record of appeal).
Given the circumstances of this case, it could be inferred that the visit to the locus in quo was to enable the trial Court see the physical features as testified by the witnesses in Court and to clear ambiguities in the testimony of the witnesses, if any. In line with this is the case of *Ocheni Atomeyi v. Idakwo Achimogu (1980) NWLR, page 90, ratio 1,* where the Supreme Court held thus: "A visit to the locus in quo is to lend support to the oral and documentary evidence led in the Court room. It is not the purpose of such visit to give more weight to the detriment of the oral evidence which prove some hard facts which the observation at the locus in quo cannot supply." See further *Igwe v. Kalu (2002) 26 WRN, page 58 at 64-65, ratio 5.* It was obvious from the observation of the learned trial Court at the locus in quo, that the parties were of one mind as regards the identity of the land in dispute. Much as I agree with the submission of counsel for the appellant that the trial Court was satisfied about the existence of the land, the features thereon and the boundary neighbours, I do not however, agree with him that it was the Court’s conclusive observation and findings thereat, that it was the defendant/appellant who gave land to all the people found there to build on. Statements made by the respective parties at the locus did not seem to be on oath or by way of formal taking of evidence. It was rather a casual forum devoid of Court room trappings, for the parties to show features such as boundaries and landmarks and at the same time afford the trial Court the opportunity to clear and clarify doubts arising from the parties’ evidence in Court. That the learned lower Court failed to make explicit finding of facts thereon, is of no import on the justice of the case.
Therefore, the claim by the defendant/appellant that it occasioned miscarriage of justice on his case is unfounded, more so as he failed to point out how and whence the miscarriage of justice occurred. Courts act on sworn evidence of witnesses as opposed to unsworn loose statements which lack evidential and probative value. In the case of *Nkebisi v. State (2010) 5 NWLR Pt. 1188, pg. 471 at 478 or (2012) 7 QRR pg.535, ratio 22,* the apex Court held as follows: "An appellant who relies on improper evaluation of evidence to set aside a judgment has the onus to identify or specify the evidence improperly evaluated or not evaluated and to show convincingly that if the error complained of had been corrected, the conclusion reached would have been different and in favour of the party complaining of wrong evaluation.
Indeed, and as rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents, the appellant failed to show how the decision of the trial Court would have been in his favour had the trial Court “properly” evaluated the statements, though devoid of oath, and made at the locus in quo. It is my humble view that the question suggestive of the fact that the learned trial Judge failed to properly evaluate the proceeding at the locus in quo, does not arise after all in the circumstances of this case. This is because the learned trial Judge based his decision on the cogent and admissible evidence led before the Court by the respective parties. Issue 2 (two) is in this light resolved in favour of the respondents and against the appellant." *Per ABIRU, JCA.*

11/08/2021

COURT DECLARES RSG, NOT FIRS, ENTITLED TO COLLECT VAT, RELATED TAXES IN RIVERS.

The Federal High Court sitting in Port Harcourt has declared that it is the Rivers State Government and not the Federal Inland Revenue Services (FIRS), that should collect Valued Added Tax (VAT) and Personal Income Tax (PIT) in the State.

The court, presided over by Justice Stephen Dalyop Pam, has also issued an order of perpetual injunction restraining the Federal Inland Revenue Service and the Attorney General of the federation, both first and second defendants in the suit, from collecting, demanding, threatening and intimidating residents of Rivers State to pay to FIRS, personnel income tax and Value Added Tax.

Justice Pam made the assertion while delivering judgement in Suit No. FHC/PH/CS/149/2020, filed by the Attorney General for Rivers State (plaintiff), against the Federal Inland Revenue Service (first defendant) and the Attorney General of the Federation (second defendant).

The Court, which granted all the eleven reliefs sought by the Rivers State Government, stated that there is no constitutional basis for the FIRS to demand for and collect VAT, Withholding Tax, Education Tax and Technology levy in Rivers State or any other State of the Federation, being that the constitutional powers and competence of the Federal Government is limited to taxation of incomes, profits and capital gains which does not include VAT or any other species of sales, or levy other than those specifically mentioned in items 58 and 59 of the Exclusive Legislative List of the Constitution.

The judge dismissed the preliminary objections filed by the defendants that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the suit and that the case should be transferred to Court of Appeal for interpretation.

Justice Pam, who also dismissed objection raised by the defendants that the National Assembly ought to have been made a party in the suit, declared that the issues of taxes raised by the State government are issues of law that the court is constitutionally empowered to entertain.

He declared that after a diligent review of the issues raised by both the plaintiff and the defendants, the plaintiff has proven beyond doubt that it is entitled to all the eleven reliefs it sought in the suit.

The court agreed with the Rivers State Government that it is the State and not FIRS that is constitutionally entitled to impose taxes enforceable or collectable in its territory of the nature of consumption or sales tax, VAT, education and other taxes or levies, other than the taxes and duties specifically reserved for the Federal Government by items 58 and 59 of Part 1 of the Second Schedule of the 1999 constitution as amended.

Also, the court declared that the defendants are not constitutionally entitled to charge or impose levies, charges or rates (under any guise or by whatever name called) on the residents of Rivers State and indeed any state of the federation.

Among the reliefs sought by the Rivers State Government, is a declaration that the constitutional power of the Federal Government to impose taxes and duties is only limited to the items listed in items 58 and 59 of Part 1 of the second schedule of the 1999 constitution as amended.

The Rivers State Government had also urged the court to declare that, by virtue of the provisions of items 7 and 8 of the Part II (Concurrent Legislative List) of the Second Schedule of the constitution, the power of the Federal Government to delegate the collection of taxes can only be exercised by the State government or other authority of the State and no other person.

The State government had further asked the court to declare that all statutory provisions made or purportedly made in the exercise of the legislative powers of the Federal Government, which contains provisions which are inconsistent with or in excess of the powers to impose tax and duties, as prescribed by items 58 and 59 of the Part I of the Second Schedule of the 1999 constitution, or inconsistent of the power to delegate the duty of collection of taxes, as contained in items 7 and 8 of Part II of the Second Schedule of the Constitution, are unconstitutional, null and void.

Lead counsel for the Rivers State Government, Donald Chika Denwigwe (SAN), who spoke to journalists after the court session, explained that the case is all about the interpretation of the constitution as regards the authority of the government at the State and Federal levels to collect certain revenue particularly, VAT.

"So, during the determination of the matter, some issues of law were thrown up like, whether or not the case should be referred to the Court of Appeal for the determination of some issues.

"The court noted that the application is like asking the Federal High Court to transfer the entire case to the Court of Appeal. In which case, if the court so decides there will be nothing left to refer back to the Federal High Court as required by the constitution."

According to Denwigwe, the court refused that prayer and decided that the case was in its proper place before the Federal High Court and to determine it.

Donald Chika Denwigwe, SAN (middle) lead counsel to Government of Rivers State and Ken C.O. Njemanze, SAN (left) briefing journalists after the Federal High Court in Port Harcourt on Monday declared FIRS collection of Value Added Tax in Rivers State unconstitutional.

Speaking on the implication of the judgement, Denwigwe said it is now, unlawful for such taxes as VAT in Rivers State to be collected by any agency of the Federal Government.

“In a summary, it is a determination that it is wrong for the Federal government to be collecting taxes which are constitutionally reserved for the State governments to collect. The implication of the judgement is that the government (Federal and State) as an authority under the constitution, should be advised by the judgement that it is the duty of all government authorities to comply with and obey the law so long as the court has interpreted it and said what that law is.

“So, in other words, the issue of Value Added Tax (VAT) in the territory of Rivers State and Personal Income Tax should be reserved for the government of Rivers State.”

Counsel to FIRS, O.C. Eyibo said he will study the judgment and advise his client.

Kelvin Ebiri
Special Assistant (Media) Rivers State Governor

August 9, 2021

11/08/2021

*"...generally civil proceedings can go on simultaneously with criminal proceedings where the facts give rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. The aggrieved party need not await the result of the criminal proceedings before filing and maintaining a civil suit...the result of a criminal case cannot be used to establish a civil claim."* *Per SANKEY, JCA, vide EBONG vs.* *SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (2017)* *LPELR-43547*(CA).
*ABAVER vs ALAGA(2018)LPELR-46566(CA)*

ISSUE: COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION-Whether the existence of a criminal action will be a bar to a subsequent institution of a civil suit against the same party

PRINCIPLE:
"...The relevant question that should perhaps, be addressed at this point is whether there is in existence any principle of law which precludes the Respondent from seeking a civil remedy for assault against the Defendant either simultaneously during the pendency of the criminal trial or even after his conviction and sentence by the criminal Court had been set aside on Appeal. In Nigeria, the position remains that certain crimes also double as tortuous acts are therefore not only prohibited and punishable by the criminal Court but are also actionable as civil wrongs in the regular civil Courts. Some examples are the crime of assault as in the instant Appeal, while others are causing wrongful death through fatal accident cases, defamation and false imprisonment, which are torts and as well as crimes. In matters of this nature, the victim of a person's act, which has caused injury and damage, may therefore choose to seek remedy before the criminal or civil Courts.
The position is that a person can be on trial for both the criminal aspect and as well as the civil aspect at the same time. In such cases, the remedies are therefore concurrent; while the accused person's tort-feasor might be imprisoned for the crime committed, he could at the same time pay damages to the Plaintiff for the tort committed. See the popular O. J. SIMPSON trial officially titled PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA vs. ORENTHAL JAMES SIMPSON decided 3rd October, 1995 in Los Angeles, California in the US.
At common law, it was the position that where a tort was also a crime, the filing of criminal proceedings against the wrongdoer preceded the filing of a civil suit by the aggrieved party. This principle was known as the rule in SMITH v. SELWYN (1914) 3 KB 98 which states that where a civil wrong is also a crime,
prosecution of the criminal aspect must be initiated, or reasons for default of prosecution given, before any action filed by the Plaintiff in the civil Court can be heard.
When this rule was not observed and the Defendant had not been prosecuted or a reasonable excuse given for the lack of prosecution, the civil action by a Plaintiff could not proceed and it was bound to fail. Hence, the proper course when a civil suit was filed was for the Court to stay proceedings in the civil action until the criminal prosecution was finally completed. Nonetheless, the right of an aggrieved party to sue in tort was not affected, once the matter was reported to the police and the police in the exercise of their discretion decided not to press criminal charges.
These notwithstanding, the rule in SMITH v. SELWYN (supra) is no longer good law in Nigeria as it has ceased to apply in Nigeria. The rule has also been abolished in Britain where it originated from, as it was abolished by the Criminal Justice Act, 1967. Its non-applicability in Nigeria is also in view of the fact that it is a breach of the provisions of the Nigerian Constitution, 1999 (As amended) and other statutes such as the Criminal Code Act, 2004 and the Interpretation Act, 2004. Instructive in this regard are Sections 6(6) (b), 17(2) (e), 46(1) and 315 (3) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (As amended), which guaranteed a person's right of access to Court.
In the case of *VERITAS INSURANCE CO. LTD. vs. CITI TRUST INVESTMENTS LTD. (1993) 3 NWLR (PT. 281), 349 AT 365,* the applicability of the rule in Nigeria was considered by this Court per NIKI TOBI, JCA, (as he then was) held that in view of the combined provisions of the Nigerian Constitution 1999, the Criminal Code Act and the Interpretation Act, the rule no longer applies in Nigeria.
"It appears that the decisions to the effect that the rule (in Smith v. Selwyn) applies in Nigerian law were made per incuriam. It is my view that the rule is not applicable in Nigeria in view of the very clear two local statutory provisions. Section 5 of the Criminal Code Act ... is one, Section 8 of the Interpretation Act... is another. Let me state verbatim ad literatim the provisions of the two statutes: First, Section 5. The section provides that the Criminal Code: 'Shall not affect any right of action which any person would have had against another if the Act had not been passed'. Second, Section 8 (of the Interpretation Act). The section provides thus: 'An enactment shall not be construed as preventing the recovery of damages in respect of injury attributable to any act by reason only of the fact that the enactment provides for a penalty, forfeiture or punishment in respect of the act'. In the light of the above statutory provisions, it is not correct to contend... that the rule applied in this case. It does not. Apart from the clear position of our law, it does not even seem to be a sensible thing to stop a Plaintiff from instituting an action merely because the criminal action on the same matter has not been prosecuted. Certainly, a man who is aggrieved should have nothing to do with a criminal matter before instituting a civil action. The criminal matter is the concern of the State, so to say, while the civil matter is the concern of the aggrieved individual." See also the cases of *NDIBE vs. NDIBE (1998) 5 NWLR (PT. 551) 632; OKAFOR vs. MADUBUKO (2000) 1 NWLR (PT. 641) 473; EKERETE vs. UBA (2005) 9 NWLR (PT. 930) 401.* As noted by this Court in these cases, it is not part of Nigerian law that a complainant who runs to the Police to report a case does not have the right to further institute civil proceedings either simultaneously or subsequently even where the criminal charge and civil wrong have arisen from the same cause of transaction." *Per OHO, JCA.(Pp.9-14,Paras.C-A).*

*NWAOBOSHI & ORS. vs. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA(2018)LPELR-45107(CA)*

ISSUE: COURT PROCEEDINGS-Whether a criminal matter and a civil action can run concurrently

PRINCIPLE:
"In the action at the Federal High Court, Asaba Division, the relief claimed, inter alia, was for a declaration that the subject property was validly and legally purchased from the Delta State Government. This is quite distinct from the processes in this instant matter which dwells on the source of the proceeds used to finance the purported valid and legal purchase of the property from Delta State Government, the allegation being that proceeds of crime were used for the purchase. It has been
held in *AKINGBOLA vs. EFCC* (supra) that an action such as one that spawned this appeal was not a civil matter but a quasi criminal matter. Equally in *FRN vs. VIJAY LALWANI (supra) at 31, Abiru, JCA,* stated: "...there is nothing preventing a simultaneous prosecution of a criminal charge along with a civil suit arising from the same transaction. And even where such specific local legislations exist, it is the civil matter that awaits the criminal prosecution, and not vice versa." The learned Justice of this Court continued at page 32, stating: "There is no statutory provision or principle of law that forbids a
trial Court from hearing a criminal charge brought against an accused person on the ground of there being a pending civil litigation against the accused person for the same transaction." In the light of the settled state of the law that this matter is a quasi criminal matter and that a civil matter and a criminal matter on the same transaction can proceed simultaneously, and if one is to await the other, it is the civil matter that will wait; could the pendency of the civil matter at the Federal High Court, Asaba Division, even if it had been disclosed, have afforded a reason why the lower Court would not have made the interim forfeiture order? Dealing with this poser the lower Court stated as follows at page 342-343 of the Records: "The action before Abang J. of Asaba Division is a civil Suit filed by the Respondents (herein). By the authority of *Akingbola vs. EFCC (2012) 9 NWLR Pt. 1306 at Pg. 475* the current action is quasi criminal as held by the Court of appeal. The action is meant for the preservation of the properties suspected to be proceeds of crime. The criminal liability as submitted by Counsel to the Appellants/Respondents, E. E. Iheanacho cannot be determined in Suit FHC/ASB/CS/28/2017 which is not a criminal charge and I do agree with the Counsel's submission. The current action is a preparatory to the foreseeable or intended charge meant for the purpose for prosecuting the Respondents herein. Can this Court then declare the proceedings of this Court as an abuse considering the circumstances of this action?" The Court continued at page 344 of the Records thus: "In the current action, the EFCC had put their intentions into manifestation by confiscating the res in order to preserve same as provided by their enabling Act as interpreted by the Court of Appeal in *Dangabar vs. FRN* (supra).
Considering the Court of Appeal decision that such procedure is quasi criminal, I believe what comes to mind is the famous case of Smith v. Selwyn (1914) KB 98 which is to the effect a civil action must await the outcome of a criminal prosecution on grounds of public policy. The above law is no more envogue (sic) as same has been abolished by the Criminal Justice Act of 1967 of England. It is considered anachronistic and archaic by our Appellate or Supreme Courts. The trend now is that both civil and criminal actions can proceed simultaneously and I so hold. As pointed out earlier in this ruling, the order of the Court was meant to preserve the res in preparation for prosecution. I see therefore no abuse." The lower Court then concluded at page 345: "...one may wish to ask whether if this Honourable Court had been hinted of the action in Asaba Division of the Federal High Court, whether the Court would still proceed to grant the order as it did? I have earlier ruled that both cases can proceed simultaneously and hence the question will be answered in the affirmative." Undoubtedly, the lower Court arrived at the correct decision. I will therefore resolve issue number one against the Appellants by answering the same in the negative. The lower Court did not err in law when it held that the suppression of the pendency of the civil matter at the Federal High Court, Asaba Division was not material to warrant the discharge of the interim forfeiture order." *Per OGAKWU, JCA.(Pp.20-23,Paras.A-F).*

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