Dauda Ajadosu and Company

28/11/2023

The two companies that once dominated the mobile phone market📱. But are now two of the biggest company failures in history.⁠
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Let's talk about where these two companies went wrong. ⁠
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Nokia’s mistake was the fact that they didn’t want to drastically change the user experience. They underestimated the importance of software and the transition to smartphones.⁠
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Long after the iPhone’s release, Nokia insisted that its superior hardware designs would still win over users.⁠
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In 2008, Nokia finally decided to compete with Android.
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BlackBerry’s fall was not seeing iPhone as a direct competitor and its loyalty to their operating system - despite the significant flaws.⁠
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Compared to Apple and Android devices, BlackBerry had very few apps.⁠You see, the problem?
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If we can learn a thing or two from this, it is to take action before a problem is already too big of a mess to fix.

21/04/2023

*FHC Orders Chief Ajadosu to Sue CBN over the Bank's Refusal of Access to Its Recruitment Information*

_According to him, "the palpable shocking waves of 'japa syndrome" presently bedeviling our system is due to lack of transparency in the recruitment exercises into the so called juicy and lucrative FG MDAs. A situation that has made it unfavorable if not impossible for common graduates to secure employment in a free, meritorious and competitive environment. This situation has made some graduates to play second fiddle in the Nigerian employment ecosystem," Chief Ajadosu remarked._
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The Federal High Court sitting in Abuja, on 17th April, 2023, has granted High Chief...

21/04/2023

*Court Orders Osun Traditional Chief To Sue CBN For Withholding Information*

The Federal High Court sitting in Abuja, on 17th April, 2023, has granted High Chief Dauda Ajadosu, an Abuja based legal practitioner leave to file a suit under the Freedom of Information Act again…

12/10/2022

A.G OF THE FEDERATION v. ANUEBUNWA
(2022) LPELR-57750(SC)

ISSUE
INTERNATIONAL LAW - EXTRADITION
- Whether Section 84 of the Evidence Act applies to extradition proceedings

PRINCIPLE
"The very able and plausible argument of counsel for appellant has prompted a very thorough investigation of all the authorities referred to by counsel, and all within the reach of this Court, and after such investigation, I am entirely satisfied, upon reason and largely preponderant authority that to seek to adopt the procedure in Section 84 of the Evidence Act in determining the admissibility of documents duly authenticated in foreign jurisdictions is incurably defective. Extradition Proceedings, like the undefended list procedure, as well as election petitions, are sui generis and as such are strictly guided by their own law i.e. the Extradition Act and Extradition Proceeding Rules. It is not to be lumped together and confused with other species of criminal proceedings that are expected to follow normal procedure. The purpose of hearing in an extradition proceeding, which is in fact purely at the discretion of the Attorney- General is to determine whether the requisition made shows sufficient cause to warrant extradition. It appears to me, that the Court below misconstrued the provisions of Sections 1 and 2 of the Evidence Act. By virtue of Section 1 of the Evidence Act, all evidence adduced in accordance with the provisions of the Act shall be generally admissible in Court proceedings. However, where evidence has been excluded from the application of the Evidence Act, by any other legislation validly in force, it shall be admissible in accordance with the conditions for its admissibility as may be specified in that other law or Act, as the case may be. This is the current position of the law in Section 2 of the Evidence Act. Section 17 of the Extradition Act, being a specific enactment that relates to the admissibility of duly authenticated foreign documents (extradition package) to an extradition proceeding, clearly falls under the exceptions provided under Section 2 of the Evidence Act in relation to the application of Section 84 of the Evidence Act as the Extradition package did not emanate from Nigeria." Per CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, JSC (Pp 78 - 80 Paras F - D)

Law Diary, and Sam Atoe & Company

03/10/2022

IMPLICATIONS OF USE OF CYBERSTALKING BY VICTIMS OF ADULTERY IN NIGERIA

Introduction
Let me clear the doubt of readers of this piece ab initio that whatever I write here is purely within the prism of law and has nothing to do with moral opinion or religious view. It is purely within the gamut of the Nigerian law. It is good I also underscore the fact that morality and law howsoever intertwined are not the same and can never be. They are therefore like proverbial two streams flowing together but their waters do not mix. With reverence to Law Lord Denning who thundered in one of his landmark decisions that God forbid a day when morality becomes business of law. This is because what is law is clear so is morality.

It goes without saying that law is a social instrument which regulates human activities in the society and any person whose right has been or is being violated, breached or infringed has ample opportunity to redress same before the court of law. That is the reason one of the functions of law in human society is that it regulates our social and business interactions.

Furthermore, one of the human contractual relationships regulated by our law is marriage. Marriage is a social and legal relationship. However, there are legal regulations to maintain the sanctity of marriage and to prevent actions deemed offensive to public sensibilities. Every legal system, therefore, presents a conception of marriage, which states what validly constitute a marriage, stipulates actions that are wrong, and provides ground for its dissolution/remedy.
Bigamy & Adultery
Can we talk of Bigamy in passing? A writer stated that it is a subset of marriage under the law. What is bigamy? According to Black’s Law Dictionary, bigamy can be defined as ‘the act of marrying one person while still legally married to another’. The type of marriage we talk about here is marriage under the Act or what laymen would refer to as ‘court marriage’. It is needless to bother you that our customary marriage is an ally to polygamy or polygyny. Bigamy is a criminal offence. This offence is governed by the Criminal Code Act and the Penal Code Act. While Criminal Code is applicable in the Southern part of the country, Penal Code is applicable in Northern Nigeria. I mean to say any person who is married under the Marriage Act (Statutory Law) and further proceeds to get married to any person other than the recognized spouse shall render him liable for the offence of bigamy. This was established in the case of Hyde v. Hyde {L.R.} 1 P. & D. 130 where Lord Penzance gave the most widely accepted definition of Marriage under English Law (Statutory Marriage) as ‘the union of one man and one woman, voluntarily entered into for life, to the exclusion of all others’. In some climes, they are already expanding the horizon of this simple definition of marriage.
Let me quickly say that what is next to bigamy under the institution of marriage is adultery as a junior brother. Adultery is the voluntary sexual in*******se between a married person and a person who is not their spouse. Let us take note that the difference between adultery and fornication is that while the later is a voluntary sexual in*******se between unmarried persons, the former is a voluntary sexual in*******se between a person who is statutorily married and another person who is not his or her spouse.

Any spouse who other party in marriage commits the offence of adultery and who finds it intolerable has a right to file for separation of marriage and such a party may claim damages. To this, adultery can be a valid ground for separation of marriage or divorce. A partner can file for divorce solely on the ground that the other partner is having extra marital affairs and that extra marital affairs have caused the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage.

Despite the fact that adultery can serve as a ground for divorce, it should however be noted that it is not a crime in Southern states of Nigeria, hence a partner cannot be punished for cheating on the other partner especially in the southern region of Nigeria. Our reliance is on the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Aoko v. Fagbemi (1961) 1 ALL NLR 400, where the court held that a woman who has been accused of cheating on her husband could not be convicted for adultery in the southern states of Nigeria because adultery was not prescribed as an offence in any written law in those states. This case also serves as landmark to the constitutional principle that on no account should a person be punished for any offence or whatsoever that is not prescribed as an offence in any written law in Nigeria. We refer to Section 36(12) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).

On adultery, Sections 387 and 388 of Penal Code stipulate the punishment of imprisonment for two years, and/or with a fine. Also, section 15(2)(b) of the Matrimonial Causes Act states that: “ The court hearing a petition for a decree of dissolution of a marriage shall hold the marriage to have broken down irretrievably if the respondent has committed adultery and the petitioner finds it intolerable to live with the respondent” Where the spouse condones the act of adultery, the court will not terminate the marriage, as held in Alabi v. Alabi (2007)LCN/2269(CA).

Remedy available to a spouse who husband or wife committed adultery
Section 31 of the Matrimonial Causes Act further provides that a party to a marriage can claim damages for adultery if such an act is not condoned and was not perpetrated for up to three years before such a claim is made.

The law provides for civil remedy. It is noteworthy that damages for adultery are compensatory. In awarding damages for adultery, the court considers:

loss suffered by the petitioner
injury to petitioner’s honor and feelings
hurt to family life and value of the adulterous spouse to the claimant.
In a nutshell, the claimant has remedy in torts to remedy himself or herself.

CYBERSTALKING/CYBERBULLYING
The Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, Etc) Act, 2015 is relatively new law. The law provides for an effective, unified and comprehensive legal, regulatory and institutional framework for the prohibition, prevention, detection, prosecution and punishment of cybercrimes in Nigeria. Section 24 of the Act provides for Cyberstalking and Cyberbullying.

A writer defined Cyberstalking as a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to feel fear. On the other hand, cyber-bullying is described as the use of information and communication technology, for the harassment or mistreatment of another. Typically, it is carried out against a victim who is distant; although in some situations the perpetrator(s) may be proximate to the victim. Examples of cyber-bullying include posting repetitive offensive comments or photos on social media and or creating fake online profiles to belittle another person. It sometimes involves death threats and “doxing”. Because cyber-bullying does not necessarily involve physical contact between an offender and a victim, there is a tendency to downplay its effects; however, it can cause psychologically and emotionally harm to the victim. As such, cyber-bullying, harassment, and hoaxes have been linked to teen depression, low self-esteem and tragedies of su***de. Cyberbullying is widespread, particularly amongst young people and as technology advances, it creates more avenues for cyber-bullying.
Pursuant to the Cybercrimes Act, 2015, there are five different forms of cyberstalking. That is, where a person;
knowingly sending grossly offensive, pornographic, indecent, menacing or obscene messages.
knowingly sending a false message for the purpose of causing harm.
knowingly transmitting any communication to bully, threaten or harass another, causing fear of death violence or bodily harm;
knowingly transmitting a message with a threat to kidnap, or any ransom for the release of any kidnapped person;
knowingly transmitting any threat to harm the property or reputation of a person.

The penalty for cyber-stalking varies depending on the exact form committed. The Cybercrimes Act provides that a defendant who does anything, which he is prohibited from doing, commits an offense and shall be liable on conviction to a fine of not more than N10, 000,000.00 or imprisonment for a term of not more than 3 years or to both such fine and imprisonment.
The law further provides that in the case of paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection 2 of section 24 of the Act, a person who is commits the offence shall be liable to imprisonment for a term of 10 years and/or a minimum fine of N25,000,000.00; and (ii) in the case of paragraph (c) and (d), to imprisonment for a term of 5 years and/or a minimum fine of N15,000,000.00.

The court sentencing or otherwise dealing with a person convicted of an offence under subsections (1) and (2) may also make an order, which may, for the purpose of protecting the victim or victims of the offence, or any other person mentioned in the order, from further conduct which amounts to harassment or will cause fear of violence, death or bodily harm; prohibit the defendant from doing anything described/specified in the order.
Also, a defendant who does anything which he is prohibited from doing by an order under this section, commits an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine of not more than N10,000,000.00 or imprisonment for a term of not more than 3 years or to both such fine and imprisonment.

Conclusion
Can anyone ask himself, is taking law into your own hands an offence in Nigeria? Your guess is not different from mine. I can answer in affirmative. Hypothetically speaking, if you arrest a suspect in your house, would you set him ablaze and put it on Facebook in an hysteric manner of showing that you are a champion? Correctional Centres may be your next abode or Kuje.

What we failed to realize is that what the lady did is not un-analogous to what those boys who punished on their own judgement for blasphemy are doing. No one says adultery is not an offence but can you publish the offence premised on your own judgment? It is against the constitutional principle of fair hearing and natural justice for an accuser to also act as an arbiter. Such is far from any recognized principle of modern democracy. Finally, a victim of such barbaric treatment of cyberstalking or cyberbullying would have his or her right protected and remedied under Fundamental Human Rights apart from criminal prosecution that is readily available to the accused person (a person who bullies).

Dauda Ajadosu is an Abuja based legal practitioner
and Principal Partner @ Dauda Ajadosu and Co
No. 14, Okemesi Crescent, Garki 2 Abuja.
+2348115488787
[email protected]

18/06/2022

https://citylawyermag.com/2022/06/16/lawyers-must-use-phones-in-police-stations-says-gadzama/

14/06/2022

*Emmanuel Tayo Ogunjide becomes the new Chairman, NBA Gwagwalada Branch*

_……. Promises a truly responsive and totally inclusive Bar_

*_In his maiden but brief remarks shortly after taking his oaths of office and allegiance as Chairman, Mr Ogunjide promised to live up to the expectations of the branch in line with his campaign promises while seeking for the position."_*

*The icing on the cake of his gratitude to God and humanity were members of his campaign team; ETOTRATIB/THINK TANK which he specially recognized and acknowledged as the solid rock of Gibraltar behind his success...*

....... Promises a truly responsive and totally inclusive Bar     Following the election of the Gwagwalada Branch of the Nigeria Bar Association

14/06/2022

FROM THE DESK OF OGAGA EMOGHWANRE ESQ* 🥰✍️🙏🤗👆🤝👏💙

HABIBU v. STATE
(2015) LPELR-26006(CA)

Issue
EVIDENCE - PUBLIC DOCUMENT -
Categories of public documents that are admissible

Principles
"On the submission that Exhibits 2, 7 A and 6 are public documents within Section 102(a) which have not been certified and also that only their certified true copies and not their originals are admissible in evidence by virtue of Sections 104(1)-(3) and 105 of the Evidence Act and on the authority of Tabik Investment Ltd. Vs. GTB Plc. (Supra), it is important to consider not only whether Exhibits 2, 6 and 7 A are public documents but also whether if public documents they are, only their certified true copies but not their original copies are admissible in evidence. Generally, by Section 88 of the Evidence Act 2011, documents shall be proved by primary evidence except in the cases mentioned in the Act; thus, contents of documents, may, by Section 85 of the Evidence Act, be proved either by primary or secondary evidence. While primary evidence means the document itself produced for the inspection of the Court, [section 86(1)], secondary evidence by Section 87 (a)-(e) includes:- "(a) Certified copies given under the provision hereafter contained in the Act". By these definitions, documents are either primary or secondary evidence. In the case of primary evidence, the document itself produced for the inspection of the Court is the admissible primary evidence and in the case of secondary evidence, Section 89 provides for the circumstances when and the types of secondary evidence admissible in each of the specified situations. For instance and for the purpose of this issue under consideration, secondary evidence of the contents of a document may be given when the original is a public document within the meaning of Section 102, Section 89 (e) or where the original is a document of which a certified copy is permitted by the Evidence Act or any Law in force in Nigeria, to be given in evidence [Section 89 (f)]. What then, by the Evidence Act determines whether a document is a public or private document? The following documents are, by Section 102 referred to as public documents:- "(a) documents forming the official acts or records of the official acts of - (i) The sovereign authority; (ii) Official bodies and tribunals; or (iii) Public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, whether of Nigeria or elsewhere; and (b) Public records kept in Nigeria of private documents". Any other document that does not fall within this categorization, is simply called a private document by Section 103. The documents in contention being statements of the Appellant recorded by the Police officers who are said to be public officers and the medical report emanating from the Government Hospital said to be a public office are contended to be public documents within Section 102 (a)(iii) of which secondary evidence are admissible, the nature of which by Section 90 (1) (c), is the certified true copy of the document but no other evidence is admissible. Once a public document is certified in accordance with Section 104, copies of such certified documents are presumed to be regular and may, by Section 105 be produced in proof of the contents of the public document or any part of it of which it purports to be copy(ies) of. The sum effect of the foregoing Sections 85, 86-90, 102-105 provisions, is that the contents of a document may be proved either by producing the original document itself in the primary form referred to by the Evidence Act as the primary evidence, or in its absence, a copy of the original document and of the type of the permissible copy, referred to as the admissible secondary evidence of the original. Where the document, is a public document, the only permissible copy of the original document admissible is the certified true copy (C.T.C) and no other copy. ARAKA VS. EGBUE (2003) 17 NWLR (Pt. 848) 1 at 6 ONOBRUCHERE & ANOR. VS. ESEGINE (1986) 1 NSCC 343, 356, KUBOR & ANOR VS. DICKSON & ORS. (2012) LPELR - 9817 (SC), AWOPE VS. OSANIBI & ORS. (2009) LPELR - 3954 (CA). It is therefore beyond argument that the only admissible secondary copy of a public document is the certified true copy and no other type. The documents tendered and admitted in this case as Exhibits 2, and 7 A, & 6 are the original statements of the Appellant as recorded by the PW 4 and 6 and the medical report issued by the General Hospital, respectively, in their original form. They are therefore the primary and not the secondary copies of the documents which by Sections 86 and 88 are admissible as primary evidence, see ONOBRUCHERE VS. ESEGINE (1986) NWLR (Pt 19) 799 DAGGASH VS. BULAMA (2004) 14 NWLR (Pt. 892) 144. Learned Counsel to the Appellant has argued on the authority of Tabik Investment Co. Ltd Vs. GTB (Supra) that the primary evidence of a public document is not admissible in evidence, but its certified true copy. The said case of Tabik Investment Co. Ltd Vs. GTB (Supra) relied upon by the Appellant's counsel I must say, with respect to the Counsel was quoted out of context and does not support his preposition as there is no such pronouncement of law made by the Supreme Court in the said case. The main issue before the apex Court for determination in the Tabik's case (Supra) was whether a public document is admissible in evidence without proper certification in that the legal fees for certification was not paid. In other words, whether a public officer is exempted from the payment of or the receipt of payment for the legal fees for the certification of a public document in the custody of a public servant before securing the certified true copy of the public document and if not so exempted, whether the document is admissible without payment of the requisite fees. The Court answered the first arm of the question in the negative to the effect that there was no such exemption and that even if there was any, it did not avail the Appellants who were not Government Officials or Government Agencies. Although the Supreme Court Per Rhodes Vivor JSC held that a Police Officer is a public officer and all documents from the Police especially documents to be used in Court are public documents which require certification, there is no pronouncement therein made by the learned jurist which prohibits the admissibility of original documents or that requires certification of original documents before being admitted in evidence. There is therefore no support in the Tabik's case for the Appellant's preposition. On the contrary, several decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court abound that primary evidence of a public document is not only admissible in evidence but it is also the best admissible evidence of the document, see ONOBRUCHERE VS. ESEGINE (Supra), ITEOGU VS. LPDC (2009) 17 NWLR (Pt 1171) 614 SC, DAGGASH VS. BULAMA (Supra). Only recently, the Supreme Court in PDP VS. INEC (2014) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1437) at p. 563 para B-C in no Uncertain terms, unequivocally and tersely reaffirmed the law that:- "the only categories of public documents that are admissible are either the original document itself or, in the absence of such original, certified copies and no other". That was exactly what the trial Court did by admitting the original statements of the Appellant as Exhibits 2 and 7 A as well as the original copy of the medical report as Exhibit 6. Of course, it goes without saying that the original document requires no certification. There is therefore no basis to hold that the conviction of the Appellant based on Exhibits 2, 6, and 7 A is wrong simply because a trial within trial was not conducted or to discountenance or expunge the said exhibits which were properly admitted by the trial Court." Per AMINA AUDI WAMBAI, JCA (Pp 15 - 22 Paras E - B)

27/05/2022

https://www.facebook.com/207553239622632/posts/1853956134982326/

EFCC & Police Can Break and Damage Any House In Order to Search and Arrest Suspects, Even Without Warrants.
By Onyekachi Umah,Esq.

The EFCC, Police and other law enforcement agencies have the right to break any door or window in a house/place in order to gain entrance, search and arrest a suspect with or without a warrant of arrest (so far as there is an authority to arrest).

The option to break and forcefully gain entrance becomes necessary after the law enforcement agents are denied access to a house/place, even after they have introduced themselves, their ….

Read more via: https://sabilaw.org/efcc-police-can-damage-any-house-to-make-arrest/

24/05/2022

OPUTA JSC: FIGHT TOUGH, NOT ROUGH.

In ENGINEERING ENTERPRISES v ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KADUNA STATE [1987] 2 NWLR (Part 57) 381 (SC), 413D–H, Oputa JSC emphasized three points about the facts section of a brief:

(1) it must be honest and straightforward;
(2) it must include all relevant and salient facts; and
(3) it must be truly factual, not argumentative.

Oputa JSC went on to highlight the salutary impact of a candid facts section on the advocate’s integrity and professionalism: “Honest and frank statement of all the facts (the good and the ugly) will no doubt inspire confidence.”

Oputa JSC recognized that the duty of candor in the facts section does not require the advocate to present the facts neutrally: “The [facts section] affords counsel a wonderful opportunity to state the equities of the case in such a way that the Court will feel that justice will be done by deciding as is urged by the brief-writer.”

Oputa JSC concluded that the facts must find their root in the record: “The facts … must of course be facts supported by the record and there should therefore be a cross-reference … to the pages of the record of proceedings where those facts can be found. Accuracy thus implies a correct, fair, straightforward and honest statement of the facts of the case.”

- Chinua Asuzu

Sam Atoe and Company

19/05/2022

"An important aspect of a lawyer's job is developing and managing relationships with clients (or the client's employees, if the lawyer works in-house for a government or corporation). The client-lawyer relationship is explained in six steps.

First, the relationship begins with an intake interview where the lawyer gets to know the client personally. The second step is discovering the facts of the client's case.

Thirdly is clarifying what the client wants to accomplish. The fourth step is where the lawyer shapes the client's expectations as to what actually can be accomplished. The second to last step begins to develop various claims or defenses for the client. Lastly, the lawyer explains her or his fees to the client."

_Wikipedia.

Olamiji Martins LP

15/05/2022

FRN v. ONONYE
(2018) LPELR-45067(CA)

*Right of a complainant to compound the offences in a charge and also cause a withdrawal of same*

"From Pages 38-40 of the record, at the resumed sitting of the Court on 23/3/16, Mr. M.M Gwani Esq. appeared for the prosecution. Mr. Hippo Onwuegbuke Esq., appeared with R.O. Awo Esq. as holding a watching brief for the complainant. Ada Obinna-Edozie Esq (Mrs) appeared for the Defendant, Mrs Ada Obinna- Edozie Esq., informed the Court that the complainant was no longer interested in the prosecution of the charge and had in fact written to that effect to Economic and Financial Crimes Commission on 18/12/14. Mr. Onwuegbuka confirmed that the complainant has no intention of prosecuting the defendant and would not appear in Court to give evidence. Mr. Gwani insisted that the complainant is actually the state and urged the Court to ignore both Defence counsel and the counsel holding brief for the complainants. The Court then ruled as follows on page 40 of the Record: "Having considered the submissions of all the learned counsel in this case i.e. the learned defence counsel- Ada Obinna Edozie, Esq; the learned prosecuting counsel- M.M. Gwani, Esq., and Hippo Onwuegbuke, Esq., holding the brief of the Complainant, I am satisfied that there is no need for us to continue to have this charge on our cause list. In particular, Section 187 of the Administration of Criminal Justice of Anambra State 2010 is very clear on what to be done to a charge in the event of non-appearance in Court of the complainant, where the Defendant voluntarily appears in Court. In the instant case, the complainant is not in Court today and has never appeared in Court for the four times this charge came before this Court. This is clear indication that he is not interested in the prosecution of the charge. He has followed it up by sending his counsel, Hippo Onwuegbuke Esq. a very senior Counsel, to come to Court and inform us of their intention to discontinue the prosecution of the Defendant. It will serve no useful purpose for any of the parties involved in this charge to insist on its retention on our cause list as the end result is obvious - a mere waste of time of the Court, the EFCC and the defence. In the circumstance, particularly pursuant to Section 187 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Law of Anambra State, this charge is hereby dismissed. I want to say that the argument by learned Appellant's counsel that the Appellant's counsel was not heard on that day is not borne out by the clear records of the trial Court. The Court is not a stenographer bound to record everything said by counsel. What is important is that presence of the Appellant's Counsel was noted, the fact that counsel gave a submission was noted even in the bench ruling. There is in my humble view no viable challenge to the decision of the Court on the grounds of lack of fair hearing. It would have sufficed for me to adopt as mine the succinct reasoning, conclusion and orders of the learned trial judge set out which cannot be faulted. However, I will add that the argument of learned Appellant's Counsel that the complainant is a third party to the proceedings, whose views are irrelevant as he has no locus standi is completely misconceived. The complainant brought the charge and the charge of issuing dishonoured cheques can only be proved with his cooperation. According to Section 187 of the Administration of Criminal Justice law of Anambra State 2010, where the complainant fails to turn up in Court when the charge is put to the accused, the charge is liable to be struck out for want of prosecution. That section is similar to that of Section. 351(1) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 which states as follows: When the case is called, the Defendant appears voluntarily in obedience to the summons or is brought before the Court under a warrant, and the complainant having, to the satisfaction of the Court, had due notice to the time and place of hearing, does not appear in person or in the manner authorized by a written law, the Court may dismiss the complaint. However, absence of a complainant even though it is a good reason, it is not a good enough reason because in this case, the complainant was represented by a counsel holding a watching brief on his behalf. I think Section 355 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act which is in pari materia with Section 191 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Law of Anambra State is more apt. It states as follows: Where a complainant at any time before the final order is made in a case, satisfies the Court that there are sufficient grounds for permitting him to withdraw his complaint, the Court may permit him to withdraw the complaint and shall thereupon acquit the defendant. I cannot given the importance and position given to the complainant see how the said complainant can be regarded as a third party to the proceedings with no locus standi as claimed by the Appellant's Counsel. Even though at the trial Court, the learned counsel for the complainant and the defence counsel did not use the particular phraseology, compounding of offence by the complainant is what has happened in this case. My Lord Augie JSC explained this whole point in PML NIG LTD v. FRN (2017) LPELR-43480(SC) where the difference between compounding a crime and compounding an offence was well explained. Compounding a crime is an offence which is defined as agreeing not to prosecute a crime that one knows has been committed or agreeing to hamper the prosecution (In both cases for material or financial consideration). Compounding of Offence on the other hand is an act on the part of the victim who decides to pardon the offence committed by the accused person and requests the Court to exonerate him. This does not mean the offence was not committed, it only means the victim is willing to pardon it, or has accepted some form of compensation for what she or he has suffered, so the compounding of the offence terminates the legal proceedings against the offender and he/she is entitled to an acquittal. I would not here go into the enforcement of the provisions of Section 14(2) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act which is not the basis of the arguments of learned Appellant's counsel. I would add that the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission can prosecute offences created by the "Dishonoured Cheques Offences Act 1977" and such offences falls within the province of offences relating to financial malpractices. Of Course, I understand the public policy implication of compounding offences by complainants. It is clear that where the offence is committed against tax payers and the citizens of this country, (for example, cases of corruption) no one citizen can come out as a complainant to presume to compound such an offence. Only the State itself who could complain against corruption can withdraw the charge by way of Nolle Prosequi. Also for public policy reasons, where Life has been lost, the State is the complainant as the State must protect the right of the person whose life was unlawfully taken away by another who is not in a position to compound the offence even if he/she would have been willing to do so if alive. These are not the scenarios in this case. However, I can only conclude that the primary complainant in this case has the right to compound the offence and cause a withdrawal of the charge against the accused. If at all, the Federal Republic of Nigeria in this case was a secondary complainant who was unable or unwilling to put into effect the provisions of Section 14 (2) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act as it would relate to the circumstances of this case even after the primary complainant had written officially to withdraw the complaint and to effectually compound the offence." Per HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, JCA (Pp 5 - 12 Paras D - B)