Law Office of Himanshu Chhabra

31/10/2025

The Supreme Court on Friday (October 31) issued a set of directions to ensure that investigating agencies do not arbitrarily issue summons to advocates in criminal cases over the legal advice given by them to the accused.

A bench comprising Chief Justice of India BR Gavai, Justice K Vinod Chandran and Justice NV Anjaria pronounced the decision in the suo motu case taken by the Court over the issue of investigating agencies arbitrarily summoning advocates representing accused.

While the Court refrained from issuing any guidelines and ruled out the need for Magisterial supervision before the issuance of summons, it issued certain directions.

"We have tried to harmonise the evidentiary rule with the procedural rule and issued the following directions," Justice Vinod Chandran said.

Directions

1. Section 132 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam is a privilege conferred on the client obliging the advocate not to disclose any professional communications made in confidence. Investigating officers in the criminal cases, Station House Officers conducting preliminary enquiry in a cognizable offence, shall not issue a summons to an advocate who represents the accused to know the details of the case, unless it is covered under any of the exceptions under Section 132 BSA. When a summons is so issued to the advocate under any of the exceptions, it shall exclusively specify the facts on which the exception is sought to be relied upon, and shall also be issued with the consent of a superior officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police, who shall record his satisfaction as to the exception in writing before the summons is issued.

2. A summons so issued shall be subject to judicial review at the instance of the advocate or the client under Section 528 BNSS.

3. The advocate on whom there is an obligation of non-discolosure is one who is engaged in a litigation or in a non-litigatious or a pre-litigation matter.

4. Production of documents from the possession of an advocate of the client will not be covered by the privilege under Section 132, either in a civil case or a criminal case. In a criminal case, the production of a document directed by a court or an officer shall be complied with by production before the Court under Section 94 of the BNSS being regulated also by Section 165 of the BSA. In a civil case, the production of document shall be regulated by Section 165 of BSA and Order 16 Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code. On production of documents, it shall be upon the Court to decide any objections with respect to the order to produce and the admissibility of the document after hearing the advocate and the party whom the advocate represents.

5. The production of digital devices under Section 94 BNSS, if directed by an investigating officer, the direction shall only be to produce it before the jurisdictional court. On production of a digital device by the advocate before the Court, the Court shall issue notice to the party with respect to whom the details are sought to be discovered from the digital device, and hear the party and the advocate on any objection to the production of the digital device, discovery from it and the admissibility of that discovery. If the objections are overruled by the Court, the device shall be opened only in the presence of the party and the advocate, who will be enabled due assistance of a person having expertise in digital technology of their choice.While examining the digital device, care shall be taken by the Court not to impact the confidentiality with respect to the other clients of the advocate, and disclosure shall be confined to what is sought by the investigating officer, if it is found to be permissible and admissible.

5. In-house counsels will not be covered under the protection under Section 132 BSA as they are not advocates practising in Courts. In-house counsel will be however entitled to protection under Section 134 BSA in so far as any communication made to the legal advisor, which however cannot be claimed for the communications between the employer and the in-house counsel.

With the above directions, the suo motu case was disposed of. The summons issued to the lawyer in the Special Leave Petition was quashed.

Justice K Vinod Chandran pronounced the judgment. The details will be known once the judgment is uploaded.

As per the BSA, the privilege of non-disclosure under Section 132 is not available to :

(a) any such communication made in furtherance of any illegal purpose;

(b) any fact observed by any advocate, in the course of his service as such, showing that any crime or fraud has been committed since the commencement of his service.

During the hearings, Attorney General for India R Venkataramani, Solicitor General of India Tushar Mehta, Senior Advocate and Supreme Court Bar Association President Vikas Singh, Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association President Vipin Nair etc., submitted their suggestions. Senior Advocates Siddharth Luthra, Vijay Hansaria, Amit Desai, Ranjit Kumar etc, appearing for different bar associations, also gave their suggestions.

SCBA, the SCAORA and other bar associations submitted to the Court that any summons issued to a lawyer should only be after a magistrate's approval, and it should not be prima facie assumed that the fees received for the legal advice are from the proceeds of crime.

Vikas Singh cited the Jacob Mathew case, which held that FIRs against doctors in medical negligence cases can be registered only after a preliminary examination by an expert committee comprising doctors. He suggested adopting a similar measure with respect to the summons to advocates, with the Magistrate exercising oversight.

Solicitor General Tushar Mehta however opposed this suggestion, saying that it would amount to creating a special protection for a class of persons, which would violate the principle of equality under Article 14. The SG further added that a lawyer who is directly involved in a crime cannot claim any protection.

Attorney General also objected to the suggestion for Magisterial oversight, saying that it will amount to giving a "long rope." AG also said that in-house counsel, General counsel etc, will also get the same privileges as a lawyer.

What Led To The Present Case?

The suo motu case followed the controversy created by the action of the Enforcement Directorate in issuing summons to two Senior Advocates- Arvind Datar and Pratap Venugopal. Following the protests by the bar associations, the ED withdrew the summons issued to the lawyers and issued a circular stating that summons to lawyers cannot be issued without the prior permission of the ED Director.

Later, a bench comprising Justice KV Viswanathan and Justice NK Singh expressed concerns over the trend of police and investigative agencies summoning advocates, and referred the matter to the Chief Justice of India. This development happened in a case where the Gujarat Police summoned an advocate who represented an accused. Staying the notice issued to the lawyer, the bench observed that summoning advocates will undermine the independence of the legal profession and consequently impact the fair administration of justice. Following the intervention by Justice Viswanathan's bench, the suo motu case was registered on July 4.

Case : In Re : Summoning Advocates Who Give Legal Opinion or Represent Parties During Investigation of Cases and Related Issues | SMW(Cal) 2/2025

30/10/2025

29/10/2025

The Supreme Court on Tuesday (October 28) acquitted a former Assistant Labor Commissioner booked for allegedly accepting a Rs. 3,000/- bribe, noting that the factum of demand and acceptance of the bribe was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

A bench of Justices PK Mishra and Joymalya Bagchi set aside the Andhra Pradesh High Court's decision which interfered with the well-reasoned trial court's decision acquitting the appellant-accused, after noting that the prosecution case was marred by inconsistencies, where the sole testimony of the complainant regarding the bribe demand remained uncorroborated, making his testimony unreliable.

“In the instant case, too, the sole basis of the prosecution to prove demand and acceptance is the narration of the complainant, a close scrutiny of which reveals serious infirmities. At the outset, the complainant has no proof other than his own oral statement that he visited the appellant on 25.09.1997, wherein the appellant allegedly made his first demand for a bribe.”, the Court said, pointing towards the uncorroborated testimony of the complaint.

Further, the Court found that there was no independent witness to the alleged demand of the bribe, as the person who was directed to remain present as an independent witness by the Police, remained outside the accused's office, doubting the complainant's version of the bribe demand by the accused.

The prosecution built a case on the pretext that since the tainted amount was found in the drawer near the accused's desk, the presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, arises for an offence under Section 7 for demanding illegal gratification, putting a reverse onus on the accused to disprove the presumption.

Rejecting the prosecution's case, a judgment authored by Justice Mishra reiterated that “the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act is not automatic and arises only once the foundational facts of demand and acceptance are proved.” The Court found the factum of demand and acceptance to be doubtful as the complainant's testimony remained uncorroborated and there was no independent witness justifying the demand of the bribe by the Appellant-accused.

“Moreover, what we find particularly troubling is the complainant's conduct in directing Rajender, the mediator and accompanying independent witness, to remain outside the appellant's office during the crucial half-hour in which the alleged demand and acceptance occurred. This was contrary to the explicit instructions of the DSP. Rajender could consequently make no positive statement on whether the appellant demanded or accepted any bribe, and this gap is candidly admitted by the prosecution itself.”, the court said.

The tainted notes were found in the drawer of the appellant's table. However, there was no proof that he directed the complainant to place them there. The Court reiterated that mere recovery of currency notes, without proof of demand and voluntary acceptance, is insufficient for conviction. (See Rajesh Gupta vs. State, 2022 INSC 359)

Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, and the order of acquittal was restored.

Cause Title: P. SOMARAJU VERSUS STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1040

28/10/2025

The Supreme Court on Monday (October 27) held that when the owner of a vehicle establishes that it was used for transporting narcotic substances without his knowledge or connivance, he cannot be denied interim custody of the vehicle pending trial.

The Court clarified that the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Seizure, Storage, Sampling and Disposal) Rules, 2022 (“2022 Disposal Rules”) cannot divest the Special Court constituted under the NDPS Act to order interim release of the confiscated vehicle when the owner prima facie establishes that he is unconnected with the seized contraband.

A bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta heard the appeal filed by a lorry owner whose vehicle was intercepted and thereafter confiscated by the police for allegedly carrying a NDPS substance. Despite the Appellant prima facie establishing that he was unconnected with the transporting of the contraband, as his lorry was used for carrying iron sheets, both the Special Court and the Madras High Court rejected his plea for interim release of the vehicle, holding that the NDPS Act and the 2022 Disposal Rules precluded the Court from granting such relief.

Before the Supreme Court, the Appellant argued that the impugned decisions erred in concluding that the 2022 Disposal Rules bar the release of the confiscated vehicle to the rightful owner. He added that the 2022 Disposal Rules were subordinate legislation framed under the NDPS Act whose Section 60(3) doesn't bar interim release of the vehicle when the owner proves lack of knowledge or connivance, therefore any interpretation otherwise would be ultra vires to the parent statute.

Setting aside the impugned decisions, the judgment authored by Justice Mehta, accepting the Appellant's argument, observed that subordinate legislation cannot override the provisions of the parent statute. The 2022 Disposal Rules, the Court said, must be read in harmony with the NDPS Act and not in conflict with its express provisions.

“Accordingly, we have no hesitation in holding that the Rules of 2022 cannot be interpreted as divesting the Special Courts of their jurisdiction to entertain an application for interim custody or release of a seized conveyance under Sections 451 and 457 of CrPC [Sections 497 and 503 of BNSS]. The authority of the Special Court to pass appropriate orders for interim custody during the pendency of the trial, as well as to make final determination upon its conclusion, continues to operate independently of the disposal mechanism envisaged under the said Rules. Any interpretation to the contrary would lead to anomalous and unjust consequences by depriving a bona fide owner of his property without judicial scrutiny or an opportunity of hearing, an outcome wholly inconsistent with the statutory scheme of the NDPS Act and contrary to the fundamental principles of natural justice.”, the Court observed.

Reference was drawn to the recent case of Tarun Kumar Majhi v. State of West Bengal (2025), a vehicle is not liable to be confiscated if the owner proves that the vehicle was used by the accused person without the owner's knowledge or connivance and that he had taken all reasonable precautions against such use of the seized vehicle by the accused person.

“The principle enunciated in the aforesaid decision makes it abundantly clear that confiscation or otherwise of a conveyance is to be determined finally, only upon conclusion of the trial, and until such adjudication, the ownership rights of the owner, who prima facie establishes that he is unconnected with the seized contraband, from claiming the seized vehicle cannot be extinguished. It further underscores that the power of confiscation is coupled with a duty to observe procedural fairness and to ensure that no prejudice is caused to an innocent owner who had neither knowledge nor willfully participated or connived to commit the offence under the NDPS Act.”, the Court said, referring to Tarun Kumar Majhi (supra).

“Where the owner is able to demonstrate that the conveyance was used in violation of the NDPS Act without his knowledge or connivance and that due diligence was exercised, the vehicle cannot be confiscated merely because it was used in the commission of an offence under the said Act.”, the Court added.

When the NDPS Act bars the confiscation of a vehicle if the owner is able to show that it was used without his knowledge or connivance to transport the contraband, then the NDPS Rules cannot be interpreted as barring the interim release of the vehicle, the Court stated.

Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, and the seized lorry was ordered to be released to the Appellant as part of the interim measure till pendency of trial.

Cause Title: DENASH VERSUS THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1032

17/10/2025

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19/06/2025

The Delhi High Court has made it clear that the legal notice sent to a cheque drawer over dishonor of the instrument, must specifically demand the payment of 'cheque amount'.

In the absence of such demand, the preconditions to institute proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 do not stand fulfilled.

Justice Amit Mahajan held,

“The language of Section 138(b) of the NI Act provides that the payee or the holder in due course ought to make a demand for the payment of “the said amount of money” by giving a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque. The term “the said amount of money” as occurring in Section 138 of the NI Act refers to the cheque amount.”

In the facts of the case, two cheques for a sum of ₹50,000/- each were dishonoured, thereby amounting to a total of ₹1,00,000/-.

Accordingly as per the mandate of Section 138 of the NI Act, the Court held, the petitioner (cheque holder) was required to make a demand for a sum of ₹1,00,000/- from the respondents (cheque drawer).

However, the legal demand notice failed to make a demand for the payment of the cheque amount. Rather, it stated “you are called upon to clear all the dues of my client within 15 days of this notice by way of demand draft failing which my client will be under constrained to file a civil suit as per the available position in each case to recover its dues.”

“The same does not qualify as a demand for money as is stipulated under Section 138 of the NI Act…the legal demand notice failed to make a demand for the payment of cheque amount. The legal notice sent by the petitioner though mentions that the subject cheques were issued towards part payment of the total dues, however, the demand is made for the entire outstanding amount mentioned in the notice,” the Court held.

It also noted that the Respondent had dislodged the presumption against it under Section 139, by raising a probable defence that— the Petitioner issued double bills for the same consignment.

In view of the above, the Court upheld the Magistrate Court order dismissing the complaint filed by the Petitioner under Section 138.

Appearance: For the Appellant : Mr. Anand Ranjan, Mr. Abhishek Kumar Singh & Mr. Alok Kumar, Advs. For the Respondents : Ms. Dharini Windlass, Adv. through V.C

Case title: Barun Bhanot v. M/S Annie Impexpo Marketing Pvt Ltd & Anr

Case no.: CRL.L.P. 45/2018

19/05/2025

The Supreme Court recently held that, in an appeal against conviction, an Appellate Court cannot invoke its powers to enhance the sentence when neither the state, the victim, nor the complainant has filed an appeal or revision seeking such enhancement.

The Court said that an appellate court cannot enhance the sentence in an appeal filed by the convict, as it violates the principle of fairness and the statutory scheme under Section 386(b)(iii) Cr.P.C., which prohibits enhancement in such appeals. For enhancement, a separate appeal needs to be filed by the State/victim, the court clarified.

“In our considered view, the appellate court, in an appeal filed by the accused cannot, while maintaining the conviction, enhance the sentence. While exercising its appellate jurisdiction at the instance of the convict, the High Court cannot act as a revisional court, particularly, when no appeal or revision has been filed either by the State, victim or complainant for seeking enhancement of sentence against accused.”, the bench comprising Justices BV Nagarathna and SC Sharma observed.

In this case, the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court, while deciding an appeal against conviction filed by the convict (for penetrative sexual assault under the POCSO Act and IPC), exercised its revisional powers and remanded the matter to the trial court for reconsideration of the sentence enhancement.

Finding the High Court's approach to be erroneous, the Court clarified that while the High Court has suo motu revisional powers under Section 401 Cr.P.C. to enhance sentences in appropriate cases, this power cannot be exercised in an appeal filed by the accused.

The Court noted that the High Court erred in remanding the case for enhancement of sentence when the accused was the appellant, as this left him worse off than before.

“it must be noted that for exercise of powers of the appellate court for enhancement of sentence in an appeal filed either by the State or the complainant or the victim, the CrPC provides that the appellate court can reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused or order him to be retried by a court competent to try the offence or alter the finding by maintaining the sentence or with or without altering the finding, alter the nature or the extent, of the sentence but not so as to enhance the same. Thus, the power to enhance the sentence can be exercised by the appellate court only in an appeal filed by the State, victim or complainant provided the accused has had an opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement. It is further provided that the appellate court shall not inflict greater punishment for the offence which in its opinion the accused has committed, than might have been inflicted for that offence by the court passing the order of sentence under appeal.”, the court observed.

“In the above facts and circumstances, we find that the learned Single Judge of the High Court was not right in remanding the matter to the Special Court for enhancing the sentence to be imposed on the appellant-accused, that too, in an appeal filed by accused seeking setting aside of a judgment of conviction and sentence imposed on him. Consequently, the Special Court was not right in enhancing the sentence from rigorous imprisonment for seven years, which was earlier awarded, to life imprisonment by following the aforesaid direction.”, the court added.

In terms of the aforesaid, the Court allowed the appeal, upholding the conviction and reducing the sentence to the original seven years' imprisonment. Since the Appellant-accused had suffered a term excess to seven years imprisonment, the Court ordered his release.

Case Title: SACHIN VERSUS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 592

14/05/2025

The Himachal Pradesh High Court dismissed an appeal by United India Insurance Co. Ltd., holding that although the 'Act only policy' in motor vehicle insurance covers only third-party damages and injuries but if the Insurance Company is charging premium for personal accident coverage of the driver, it is liable to indemnify the driver.

Justice Satyen Vaidya: “Since the insurer has charged a premium of Rs. 100/- for personal accident of owner and driver, it cannot get itself absolved from indemnifying the insured”.

Background Facts:

On 08.07.2012, a Maruti car met with an accident near District Shimla. The vehicle went off the road and rolled down into about 150 feet deep gorge. At the time of accident, the vehicle had four occupants, including the driver, Vijay Thakur. However, the driver and occupant of front passenger seat , died as result of accident and the other two who were seated in the back seat survived.

A petition was filed by the family of the deceased driver, Vijay Thakur, before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Shimla under Section 163 A of the Motor Vehicles Act, seeking compensation based on the structured formula provided under the Act.

The insurance company submitted that the insured had purchased an “Act only insurance policy” that only covers third-party liabilities and does not extend coverage to the driver. It further contended that the driver's conduct was in violation of Rule 3 of Central Motor Vehicles Rules, as we was driving with a learner's license.

The Motor Claims tribunal noted that the deceased had a salary of Rs.2500/-per month and was 22 years old at the time of death. It awarded a compensation of Rs. 7,35,000/- to the deceased's family, directing the insurance company to pay the amount for their loss.

Subsequently, the insurance company filed an appeal against the award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal.

Findings:

The Court noted that a perusal of the insurance policy revealed that the insured had paid premium of Rs. 740/- towards third party coverage and Rs. 100/- towards personal accident coverage for the owner-driver. Hence, since a premium had been paid specifically for the accident of the owner-driver, the insurer could not deny compensation.

Regarding the issue of driver having only a learner's license, the Court observed that he was accompanied by another person, holding a valid driving license who was instructing him. Thus, there was no violation of Rule 3 of Central Motor Vehicles Rules.

Therefore, the Court disposed of the appeal, holding that the Insurance company is liable to indemnify the driver under an 'Act Only Policy' when a specific premium has been charged for personal accident coverage of the driver.

Case Name: United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v/s Ram Lal & Ors.

Case No.: FAO No.236 of 2017

Date of Decision: 10.04.2025

13/05/2025

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18/04/2025

The Supreme Court today (April 17) held that the power under Section 216 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) cannot be invoked to delete charges already framed against an accused, as it can only be used to add or alter the existing charges.

The analogous provision to Section 216 CrPC in the BNSS is Section 239.

“We are in agreement with the view that once charges have been framed by the Trial Court in exercise of the powers under Section 228 CrPC, the accused cannot thereafter be discharged, be it through an exercise of the powers under Sections 227 or 216 CrPC. It is reiterated that the language of Section 216 CrPC provides only for the addition and alteration of charge(s) and not for the deletion or discharge of an accused. If the Legislature had intended to empower the Trial Court with the power to delete a charge at that stage, the same would have been expressly and unambiguously stated. Therefore, at such a stage of the trial, the accused must necessarily either be convicted or acquitted of the charges that were so framed against him. No shortcuts must be allowed.”, the Court observed.

The Court approved the Allahabad High Court's decision Dev Narain v. State of U.P. and Another, 2023 SCC OnLine All 3216, where it was held that a power to delete charges is not conferred on the Court under Section 216 Cr.P.C.

“It was added that a charge once framed, it must lead either to an acquittal or conviction at the end of the trial and charges cannot be permitted to be deleted mid-trial.”, the court noted.

The bench comprising Justices JB Pardiwala and Manoj Misra was hearing two criminal appeals where the trial court in effect deleted the charge framed for the offence under the provisions of the NDPS Act and then transferred the file to the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate for proceeding in accordance with the provisions of the Drugs & Cosmetics Act, without arriving at a decision to acquit the accused as regards the charges already framed under the provisions of the NDPS Act.

Aggrieved by the High Court's decision to uphold the trial court's findings, the Department of Revenue Intelligence approached the Supreme Court.

Setting aside the impugned findings, the Judgment authored by Justice Pardiwala observed:

“We are, therefore, of the view that both the Trial Court and the High Court committed an error in holding that the offence under the provisions of the NDPS Act is not made out. The Trial Courts in both the appeals could also not have discharged/deleted the charge under the NDPS Act framed against the accused persons while disposing of an application under Section 216 CrPC. This is something not permissible within our criminal procedure and the High Court unfortunately failed to take notice of this aspect.”, the court observed.

Since the Respondents-accused concerned in both the appeals were not acquitted in their respective trials, the Court directed that they be tried by the concerned Special Judge, NDPS, in accordance with law.

Case Title: DIRECTORATE OF REVENUE INTELLIGENCE VERSUS RAJ KUMAR ARORA & ORS.

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 434

10/04/2025

The Punjab and Haryana High Court refused to grant the interim custody of the 3-and-a-half-year-old son to the mother from the father, observing that the child is happy with the father and uprooting him would not be in his best interest.

Justice Vikram Aggarwal refused to consider allegation levelled against the child's father by the mother about his involvement with another girl.

"Though, such allegations are common in matrimonial disputes and parties often level allegations and counter allegations, upon interaction with the respondent, it was found to be his concern about the said alleged relationship. Under such circumstances, in the considered opinion of this Court, for the present, the welfare of the child would be to remain with the respondent," said the Court.

The Court was hearing the revision plea challenging the order of Family Court, vide which the application, filed by the wife for the grant of interim custody of the minor child was dismissed.

The couple got married in 2019, and certain differences cropped up between them, as a result of which a divorce by mutual consent was filed.

In 2021, a joint statement was filed stating all the disputes were amicably settled and the custody of the minor child had been handed over by the wife to the husband and that she would not claim his custody and visitation rights in future.

In 2024, the wife appeared before the Family Court and gave a statement that she did not wish to take divorce and that she wanted back the custody of the minor child.

A petition under Section 7 read with Section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act, seeking custody of the minor child was filed by the wife which was dismissed.

After hearing the submissions, the Court noted that the proviso to Section 6 (a) of the the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 lays down that the custody of a minor who has not completed the age of five years shall ordinarily be with the mother.

It considered the question, whether the situation is a normal situation warranting the custody of the minor child to be with the mother or there are certain circumstances out of the ordinary which would impel this Court to not hand over the interim custody of the minor child to the mother at least at this stage, the petition for custody being pending before the Family Court.

The judge upon examining the circumstances found that, "The petition filed under Section 13-B of the HMA, 1955 contained a specific recital that parties had agreed that the custody of the minor son Aadhish would remain with the respondent-husband and that the petitioner-wife would not claim custody or meeting rights even in future."

It also rejected the stand taken by the wife that the custody of the minor child was handed over to the respondent by keeping her in the dark is unacceptable.

The Court observed that the wife earns Rs. 10,000 from tuition whereas the husband is in the work of digital marketing and is stated to be working from home. "He is stated to be earning a reasonable amount with which the child can be looked after."

Justice Aggarwal highlighted that when the mother was not in the chamber for personal interaction session and only the child was there with the father, the father was asked to leave the chamber and the moment the father got up, the child started crying inconsolably stating that he would not leave his father.

"It cannot be denied that being of a very tender age, the child would cling to the parent with whom he has been living for a while. If the custody is given to the mother, the child may behave in the same manner if the custody is again attempted to be given to the father," added the Court.

In the light of the above, the Court concluded that the situation in hand is "not an ordinary situation" and noted that the custody of the child is with the father for the last more than one year now.

Hence it opined that, to forcibly give the interim custody of the child to the mother at this stage may have an adverse impact on the mental well being of the child who, as already noted, appeared to be quite comfortable in the custody of the father.

Consequently, the plea was dismissed.

Mr. Sanjiv Kumar Aggarwal, Advocate and Mr. Tejas Bansal, Advocate for the petitioner alongwith petitioner and minor child.

Mr. Ankit Chahal, Advocate for the respondent alongwith respondent.

Title: ### v. ###