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23/11/2015

A fresh update on the view of Supreme Court in a reportable judgment on illegible signatures cannot be a ground to reject the secondary evidence.

The Supreme Court has held that merely because the signatures in some of the documents were not legible and visible that cannot be a ground to reject the secondary evidence. Apex Court bench of Justices M.Y. Eqbal and C. Nagappan allowed the appeal by setting aside the High Court order in the case ofRakesh Mohindra v. Anita Beri & ors..
In this case, Trial court had admitted a photocopy of document, saying that the applicant has been able to comply with the provision of Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act as it has come in evidence that the original was handed over by the applicant to DEO Ambala and hence it could be admitted. The High Court had set aside this order by Trial Court which was challenged in this appeal before the Apex court.
The court observed that pre-conditions for leading secondary evidence are that such original documents could not be produced by the party relied upon such documents in spite of best efforts, unable to produce the same which is beyond their control. “The party sought to produce secondary evidence must establish for the non-production of primary evidence. Unless, it is established that the original documents is lost or destroyed or is being deliberately withheld by the party in respect of that document sought to be used, secondary evidence in respect of that document cannot accepted.”, the court said. The court also said that if a party wishes to lead secondary evidence, the Court is obliged to examine the probative value of the document produced in the Court or their contents and decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence.
Merely because the signatures in some of the documents were not legible and visible that cannot be a ground to reject the secondary evidence, the bench held. However, the court added that mere admission of secondary evidence, does not amount to its proof. The genuineness, correctness and existence of the document shall have to be established during the trial and the trial court shall record the reasons before relying on those secondary evidences, the bench clarified.

18/08/2015

An Adulterous wife cannot claim maintenance : Madras High Court.
The Madras High Court, in M.Chinna Karuppasamy Vs. Kanimozhi , has held that a divorced wife is living in ‘illicit relationship’ with man other than her former husband is disqualified from claiming maintenance from her former husband. Justice Nagamutthu further held that “The decree obtained by the husband for divorce on proving the adulterous life of the wife cannot give a license to her to continue to live in illicit relationship and to get her right to claim maintenance revived.” The court also distinguished the facts of this with earlier decisions of Supreme Court which had held that Section 125(4) of the Code of Criminal procedure does not apply to divorced wife. The Judgment reads “so far as adultery is concerned, in my considered view, the above Judgment cannot be made applicable, because even after the decree of divorce, the divorced wife carries the obligation not to live in relationship with any other man.”
In this case, Civil Court had granted decree for divorce dissolving the marriage, precisely on the ground that the wife was living in adultery. During the pendency of the said matrimonial dispute before the Family Court, wife filed petition claiming maintenance before CJM court which did not allow the petition. But she preferred revision and the District court allowed it and set aside the order of the Trial Court and directed the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs.1,000/- per month towards her maintenance. The husband then approached the High Court.
As per Section 4 of Section 125 of the Code, “No wife shall be entitled to receive an [allowance for the maintenance or the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case may be,] from her husband under this section if she is living in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband, or if they are living separately by mutual consent“.
In Rohtash Singh Vs. Ramendri 2000 (3) SCC 180 , The Supereme Court has held that Section 125(4) is not applicable to a divorced wife. Distinguishing the present case with precedent set by Supreme Court, Madras High Court held this judgment is not applicable to the facts of the case. The court held “a divorced wife cannot live with her former husband and there is no question of her taking the consent of her former husband to live separately. That is the reason why, the Supreme Court has held that for a divorced wife sub-section (4) of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not applicable”, but in this case, “even after the decree of divorce, the divorced wife carries the obligation not to live in relationship with any other man.”
The court further held “if a woman lives in adultery, whose marriage is still subsisting, she is not entitled for maintenance from her husband. Suppose, a decree for divorce is granted on the ground of her living in adultery, can it be said that the said disqualification of which she was suffering from all along, during the subsistence of the marriage, will cease to exist, because of the decree for divorce?. The prudent answer to this question shall be an emphatic – “No”.”
During the course of arguments it was also contended that the decree granted by the Civil Court is an ex-parte decree on the ground that the wife was living in adultery and the said ex-parte decree though binding on the parties, is not binding on the Criminal Court. But the Court held that in view of Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, if once the decree for divorce is granted on the ground of adultery, such finding is relevant for deciding the issue of adultery in the present case. The court also held that there can be no difference between a decree on contest and an ex-parte decree, since, like a decree on contest, an ex-parte decree is also a decree passed on proof of the claim made by means of sufficient evidence. The court observed “When once such a decree is in force, it is not possible forThe court observed “When once such a decree is in force, it is not possible for this Court to take a different view contrary to the decree granted by the Civil court”.

27/07/2015

1 July: Black Money Act effective.

2 July: Black Money Rules on asset valuation & procedures notified.

6 July: FAQ Circular issued.

30 Sep: Deadline for declaring offshore assets under the Compliance Scheme.

31 Oct: Deadline for Revenue to intimate declarant about information it has from other sources on declarant’s assets.

31 Dec: Deadline for making payment of tax and penalty under Compliance Scheme.

07/07/2015

Federal officials say an F-16 fighter jet and a small plane have collided in midair in South Carolina.

06/07/2015

RES JUDICATA BASED ON CIVIL COURT ACTION REJECTED IN OPPRESSION AND MIS-MANAGEMENT CASES

The principles of Res Judicata are not applicable in cases where the reliefs sought are different in nature based on statutory rights and could not have been granted by an earlier court.

Removal and appointment of Directors and fraudulent increase in the authorized share capital of the company by forging documents amount to oppression.

The Company Law Board, New Delhi Bench (“CLB”) recently in the case of Shri Narottam Singh (“Petitioner”) v. M/s Notam India Private Limited & Ors.1 held that parties to a dispute need not withdraw a civil suit before they approach CLB (under Section 397 & 398 of the Companies Act, 1956), as CLB can grant remedies that a civil court cannot. This judgment clarifies the scope and application of res judicata principle in the cases of Oppression and Mis-management.

M/s Notam India Private Limited (“Respondent No. 1”) is a company incorporated by the Petitioner and Respondent No. 2 to carry real estate business. Both the brothers were Directors in Respondent No. 1. According to the Petitioner, the Respondent No. 2 without notice to the Petitioner increased the share capital based on forged documents as well manipulated the company records. The Respondent No. 2 also got his wife, Respondent No. 3 fraudulently appointed as the Director on the Board of Respondent No. 1. The Petitioner realizing the fraud committed by Respondents filed a company petition under Sections 397 & 398 read with Section 402 against them alleging oppression and mis-management and conducting the affairs of the company in a prejudicial manner. Prior to the filing of the company petition, the Petitioner had filed a civil suit on the same cause of action in Ghaziabad. The chronology of events leading to the present company petition is provided below:-

Sr. No.

Date

09.04.2009

O.S. 818 of 2009 Civil Suit was filed in Ghaziabad civil court

2

21.07.2009

Interlocutory application seeking temporary injunction to restrain Respondent Nos. 2-3 in relation to business of Respondent No. 1 was dismissed.

3

21.08.2009

Application filed for withdrawal of Civil Suit

4

11.08.2009

Company Petition was filed

5

18.08.2009

Company Petition was mentioned stating that civil suit has already been withdrawn and CLB passed an order directing Respondent No. 1 to provide fortnightly bank statements.

6

24.08.2009

Civil Suit was dismissed without giving any liberty to initiate new proceedings.

The civil suit was dismissed at a later point after company petition was filed and it was submitted that dismissal of civil suit did not come in the way of filing the company petition as jurisdiction of CLB under Sections 397 and 398 is unique and enabling in nature and orders are passed on equity.

ISSUES

a) Whether the present company petition is maintainable before CLB?

b) Whether following acts of Respondents are oppressive in nature:-

Appointment of Respondent No. 3 as a Director of Respondent No. 1;
Petitioner was seized of Directorship on an alleged letter of resignation;
Fraudulent increase in authorized share capital.

CONTENTIONS OF PARTIES

Arguments of the Petitioner

The Petitioner had filed its withdrawal application before the civil court prior to initiating proceedings before CLB. The Petitioner relying on the case of M/s SVT Spinning Mills Pvt. & Ors v. M. Palanisami2 argued that company petition cannot be dismissed on the sole ground that earlier proceeding was disposed of without liberty to initiate proceedings on the same cause of action as the reliefs sought in a company petition under Sections 397 & 398 proceedings are unique and cannot be granted by any court other than CLB. The decision in the civil court was not a final order and no decision was taken on the issues which formed the subject matter of the present company petition.

In addition to the issue on maintainability of the company petition, the Petitioner further submitted that Respondent No. 2 had forged his signatures on the alleged resignation letter and the board resolution allowing appointment of Respondent No. 3 as the new director of the company. The Petitioner submitted that Respondent No. 3 was never appointed as a director of the company in any of the Board meetings that he attended. The Petitioner alleged that Respondent No.2 committed fraud and forged Petitioner’s signatures to change signatories of bank accounts and manipulated with the company records along with Respondent No. 3 against the interest of Petitioner.

Arguments of the Respondent

The Respondents submitted that the company petition was not maintainable as same reliefs were sought in a civil suit earlier, where the interlocutory application had already been dismissed. The Respondents submitted that due to an apprehension of not getting any interim reliefs the Petitioner had filed the company petition and had approached CLB with unclean hands. The Respondents denied the allegations on forgery and held that plea of forgery required substantial evidence and therefore to be adjudicated by a civil court.

JUDGMENT AND ANALYSIS

CLB while passing the order in favour of the petitioner dealt with the following issues.

a) Maintainability of the Company Petition for Oppression and Mismanagement

Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 restricts a person from filing a fresh suit in which the matter in issue was either directly and substantially an issue in a former suit between the same parties.3 The CLB held that it is true and undisputable that when a proceeding is withdrawn unconditionally, there shall not be any later proceeding on the same cause of action, however when the reliefs sought are different and cannot be granted by the civil court in an earlier proceeding, then withdrawal of such earlier suit without liberty to initiate fresh proceedings on the same cause of action shall not render the company petition non-maintainable. The CLB held that the right provided under Sections 397 and 398 are statutory in nature and vested with parties to prevent oppression and mis-management against member or company. Such reliefs cannot be granted by civil court and therefore the principles of res judicata are not applicable in the present case and no liberty was required while withdrawing earlier proceedings.

It is also important to note that CLB while dealing with this issue to understand the chronology of events observed that application for withdrawal was made prior to filing the company petition and the civil suit was actually dismissed after filing of the company petition. The CLB held that dismissal of civil suit post filing of the petition did not constitute approaching CLB with unclean hands as Petitioner had filed the withdrawal application prior in time and not due to objections being raised on maintainability of the company petition and distinguished it from other cases.4

b) Removal of the Petitioner from directorship of Respondent No. 1 and appointment of Respondent No. 3 were oppressive

Any change in the directorship of the company is required to be notified to the Registrar of Companies (“RoC”), whereas in the present case no such information was filed with RoC showing either the removal or appointment of a new director. Based on the evidence produced, CLB held that considering Petitioner was the majority shareholder it could not be assumed that he would resign leaving his shareholding and guarantees. The alleged resignation letter used by the Respondent No. 2 to show that Petitioner ceased to be director was held invalid in the circumstances without considering the opinion of experts and dealing with the issue of forgery.

Further the Board Resolution passed reflecting the appointment of Respondent No. 3 as the new director of Respondent No. 1 was also held to be invalid considering there was no record on her appointment for two years from the date of alleged appointment, Form 32 was not filled and all this was highlighted only when Petitioner sought to change the mode of operation of bank accounts. CLB held that all these acts together amounted to oppression against the Petitioner and Respondent No. 3 could not continue as Director on the board of Respondent No. 1.

c) Fraudulent increase of authorized capital amounted to Oppression

Increase in the authorized share capital of a company requires board’s approval subject to provisions of the company’s articles of association. Such resolution can be passed in a board meeting provided the notice was duly issued to all the members and directors of the company in this regard. In the present case, no such notice was given to the Petitioner rendering the increase in the authorized capital invalid. The CLB held that considering the strained relationship between the parties it does not seem that the Petitioner would have agreed to allow a change in the shareholding pattern prejudicial to his interest and therefore held the allotment invalid and oppressive to the Petitioner.

CLB directed an independent audit to be conducted to ascertain whether siphoning of funds had taken place based on the allegations raised. The CLB appointed a chartered accountant firm to submit their report within 30 days and disposed of the company petition.

CONCLUSION

This ruling sets an important footstep towards defining the scope and application of res judicata principle in the cases of Oppression and Mismanagement and distinguishes the same with respect to any other civil suits which is generally barred by virtue of the application of the said principle. However, pointing out this exception, CLB said that parties to a dispute are under no obligation to obtain liberty before withdrawal of suit from civil court to approach CLB under Section 397 &398 as it offers unique and exclusive remedies under the statute that cannot be availed through any other forum/civil court. Adjudication under Sections 397 and 398 is different and tested on the anvil of equity and not on the legality of an act.

02/07/2015

JURIDIQUE has finally come up with a 3P Blanket Compliance solution and 5-in1 Contract Model.

We are innovating and designing even in the field of law. We are undergoing a testing operation of few other models and hope to rule out the details once testing is over.

02/07/2015

Mexico Oil Spill Gulf Litigation

Officials in Florida, Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana announced an $18.7 billion settlement with BP on Thursday that resolves years of litigation over the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill.

The settlement announcement comes as a federal judge was preparing to rule on how much BP owed in federal Clean Water Act penalties after millions of gallons of oil spewed into the Gulf. Individual states also were pursuing litigation. Most of those penalties were to be distributed among the states for environmental and economic restoration projects along the Gulf Coast.

The settlement money will be used to resolve the Clean Water Act penalties; resolve natural resources damage claims; settle economic claims; and resolve economic damage claims of local governments, according to an outline filed in federal court Thursday morning.

In arguing against such a high penalty, BP has said its spill-related costs already were expected to exceed $42 billion — even without the Clean Water Act fine. It's also unclear how much BP will end up paying under a 2012 settlement with individuals and businesses claiming spill-related losses.

Costs incurred by BP so far include an estimated $14 billion for response and cleanup and $4.5 billion in penalties announced after a settlement of a criminal case with the government.

In 2012, BP reached the settlement with plaintiff's lawyers over economic and property damage claims arising from the spill. In its first-quarter earnings report for 2015, BP said it could estimate at least a $10.3 billion cost. But it also stressed that the cost could be higher, depending on how many legitimate claims were filed by a recently passed deadline.

Earlier this year, a federal judge in New Orleans concluded the third phase of a civil trial pitting the oil giant against the federal government. He had already made two key rulings: that BP acted with "gross negligence" in the rig explosion that resulted in the spill; and that 3.19 million barrels of oil — nearly 134 million gallons — spewed into the Gulf as a result. BP had appealed both those rulings, which set the stage for the a possible multibillion-dollar Clean Water Act penalty.

09/05/2015

APEX COMPETITION REGULATOR DECLARES BCCI NOT-OUT ON APPEAL

Competition Appellate Tribunal allows appeal filed by Board for Control of Cricket in India due to failure by the Competition Commission of India to follow procedures.
Competition Appellate Tribunal reiterates significance of complying with principles of Natural Justice.
INTRODUCTION

The Competition Commission of India (“Commission / CCI”) based on a complaint filed by a cricket enthusiast- Mr. Surinder Singh Barmi in February, 2013 had imposed a fine on the Board for Control of Cricket in India (“BCCI”) of INR 52.24 Crores for abusing its dominant position in contravention of Section 4(2) (c) of the Competition Act, 2002 (“Act”) (“CCI Order”). The Commission in addition to imposition of fine had also directed BCCI to cease and desist from any practice of denying market access to potential competitors through inclusion of one-sided clauses in any agreement in the future, deletion of certain clause in media agreements as well as usage of its regulatory powers in the process of deciding matters relating to its commercial functions. Consequently this decision was challenged by the BCCI before the Competition Appellate Tribunal (“COMPAT”) which stayed the penalty as well as the directions issued by the Commission and thereafter allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the Commission due to breach of principles of natural justice.

The Scene Behind

BCCI is a society registered under Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975. It is engaged primarily in controlling and promoting cricket in India, framing laws governing it and is also responsible for the selection process of teams to represent India in Test Matches, ODIs and Twenty 20 matches played in India or abroad. The BCCI in the year 2008 had started a professional domestic T20 cricket league tournament known as Indian Premier League (“IPL”), which over the years has developed to become a global brand with an estimated brand value of more than USD 4.1 billion in 2010. However this valuation fell considerably to USD 2.9 billion in 2012 due to the various controversies shrouding the league.1

Mr. Surinder Singh Barmi, (hereinafter referred to as “Informant”) filed a complaint under Section 19(1) (a) of the Act, against BCCI alleging anti-competitive activities in relation to operation of IPL. He alleged irregularities in the grant of franchise rights for team ownership, irregularities in the grant of media rights for the coverage of the league as well as irregularities in the award of sponsorship rights and other local contracts related to the organisation of the IPL. Based on these allegations, the CCI ruled under Section 26(1) that a prima facie case existed and directed the Director General (“DG”) to investigate it. On the basis of the report submitted by the DG, it was observed that the process for grant of franchisee agreements for infinitum tenure was unfair and discriminatory, as also the mechanism of awarding the media rights for a period of 10 years caused appreciable adverse effect on the market.

KEY ISSUES

Before the Commission:-

The key issues that were considered by the CCI in this matter were, firstly, what is the legal status of BCCI, secondly, whether BCCI could be considered an enterprise for the purposes of the Act, and finally whether BCCI had abused its dominant position in the relevant market in contravention of Section 4 of the Act. The last issue would involve defining the relevant market, assessment of dominance by the BCCI in the relevant market, as well as analysis of the conduct of the BCCI for contravention of Section 4 of the Act.

Before COMPAT:-

Whether the CCI Order ought to be set aside due to violation of the principles of natural justice?

Whether the Commission was correct in relying upon TRP ratings and other news reports available online in its findings, without affording an opportunity to controvert the same?

Whether the Commission was right in making observation in context of Clause 9.1 (c) (i) of the Media Rights Agreement when no references were made to it during the hearing?

COMMISSION’S ORDER

A. De facto status of BCCI

BCCI contended that it did not perform the role of a regulator. However, contrary to such assertions, BCCI continued to loosely refer itself as custodian/regulator or organiser of cricket in India, depending on their functions both in their oral and written submissions. The CCI on the basis of facts on record and the submissions of BCCI held that though no ‘statutory status’ / regulatory backing, is accorded to BCCI but their actions in terms of laying down the rules of the game and team selection, affiliation to International Cricket Council (“ICC”) fall within the ambit of a regulatory role.

Further, CCI examining the current structure of BCCI held that being an autonomous body; it performs regulatory functions despite no recognition from the Government. The Government has also sought to include BCCI within its ambit though no documentary evidence exists to categorise BCCI as a national association, but vide its submissions before the Apex Court has stated that they would fall under the umbrella of Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports. The CCI also examined plethora of other factors like ICC regulations which mandates cricket matches played in a particular territory of its member requiring its approval thereby recognising the regulatory role. The CCI held that ‘Donning two hats by BCCI without clarity on roles merits an examination on whether BCCI is a regulator and whether in its capacity as custodian of cricket it extends its role to organising of events’. Based on the factors listed above, CCI concluded that BCCI is a de facto regulator of cricket in Indi a.

B. Whether BCCI is an enterprise for the purpose of the Act?

BCCI contended that being a “not-for-profit” organisation, it is engaged in promoting and encouraging the game, thereby not within the purview of the provisions of the Act. The BCCI also submitted that its commitments are neither driven by nor conditional upon commercial considerations since the revenue obtained by BCCI is ploughed back into the game of cricket. BCCI in support of its contentions placed reliance on the Supreme Court judgment of Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (MoI&B), Govt. of India (GoI) and Ors Vs. Cricket Association of Bengal and Others2 , wherein it was held that sporting organisations should not be placed at par with other business organisations as their objective of organising events is not for commercial benefit but educating and promoting sports.

The CCI considering the DG’s Report and submissions made by BCCI held that the Act focuses on the functional aspects of an entity rather than institutional aspects. The nature of activity would decide whether the entity is an enterprise for the purposes of the Act or not, rather than the form of the entity and analysed the very rationale of insertion of Section 2(h)3 of the Act. The CCI placed further reliance on various international judgments4 as well as Indian judgments5 on the aspect of definition of enterprise and in light of a similar case involving the chess federation concluded that BCCI is an enterprise for the purpose of the Act, and therefore, well within the jurisdiction of the Commission.

In essence, the CCI held that the concept of “enterprise” as envisaged under the Act appears to be used in relation to the main activity carried out by the enterprise and not a one - off commercial activity. The activities of sports organisations also fall within the ambit of an “enterprise” and treated at par like any other business organisations to the extent of its entrepreneurial activities are concerned. The fact that BCCI is a “not-for-profit” organisation does not take it out of the ambit of definition of an “enterprise”, only exception is permissible in relation to sovereign functions of the Government.

C. Abuse of Dominant Position by BCCI in the relevant market

a) Determining the relevant market;

The CCI held that basic premise for determination of alleged abuse of dominance is establishing that one party is in a dominant position in the relevant market. The CCI doing so made an in-depth analysis of the components to a market, viz. the producer on the supply side, the consumer on the demand side and the underlying product or service. Further, CCI held that the Act considers relevant market to comprise of goods and services which could be interchangeably used by consumers and viewed from the demand perspective based on characteristics of the product, price and intended use.

The DG had considered the relevant market to be the “underlying economic activities which are ancillary for organizing the IPL Tewenty-20 cricket under the aegis of BCCI.” The CCI acknowledged that cricket match having its unique characteristics cannot be substituted for any other form of entertainment including other sports/entertainment as, every sports event is unique in itself and has its own characteristics that differentiate it from other sporting events or other entertainment events. During the course of investigation, reliance was also placed on Target rating points (TRP Ratings) used as a basis to compare different genres of entertainment against the viewership attracted by IPL. On the basis of above factors, CCI held that though entertainment is the ultimate goal, definition of relevant market in this case cannot be substituted.

Thereafter, CCI narrowing the definition examined the differences between the two broad categories of events viz. First Class/International events (only Indian players) and Private Professional League Cricket (includes foreign players) events to establish the definition of relevant market. Both having separate characteristics and objectives reflected that the relevant market is the organization of Private Professional Cricket Leagues/Events in India.

b) Assessment of Dominance of BCCI in market for Organization of Private Professional League Cricket events

Having established that BCCI is de facto regulator for cricket in India, assessment of dominance of BCCI in the market for Organisation of Private Professional Leagues stems from the same power. CCI relying on the bye-laws of ICC held that BCCI approval is critical to operation of prospective private professional leagues and access to the vital inputs (stadium, list players) thereby constituting an important source of dominance for BCCI.

For assessing BCCI’s position in the relevant market, CCI considered important factors like availability and access to infrastructure, control over players which contribute to the success of a league all being made available only through BCCI.

The CCI also touched upon reasons for the possible failure of the independently promoted Indian Cricket League (“ICL”) and held that while it cannot be conclusively said that ICL’s failure was solely attributable to BCCI’s dominance, it can be said that BCCI’s dominance was definitely a factor in ICL’s failure. The CCI relied on the DG’s report which laid down the reasons for the failure of the league as, lack of infrastructure facilities, BCCI/ICC’s refusal to approve the league and provide infrastructural support, among other reasons that might be relevant. The CCI concluded that owing to regulatory role, monopoly status, control over infrastructure, players, ability to control entry of other leagues, historical evidences that BCCI is in a dominant position in the market for organizing private professional league cricket events in India.

c) Analysis of conduct of BCCI for any contravention of Section 4 of the Act

CCI having established the relevant market and BCCI’s dominant position therein proceeded to examine whether BCCI has abused its dominance in contravention of Section 4 of the Act. CCI acknowledged the uniqueness associated with organising Private Professional League Cricket but did not place reliance on the documentary evidence provided with respect to failure of ICL owing to BCCI dominance as the same pertained to a period when the provisions of Section 3 and 4 of the Act were not notified.

The CCI examined related issues, including the procedures followed and the agreements entered into, to determine whether there was any anti-competitive conduct on the part of BCCI. Interestingly, CCI in its main Order did not deal with the issues pertaining to the Franchise Agreement, but the same has been dealt extensively in the dissenting order. On examination of the IPL media rights agreement between BCCI and MSM for a period of 10 years, CCI noted Clause 9.1(c)(i), which reads as follows:

“BCCI represents and warrants that it shall not organize, sanction, recognize, or support during the Rights period another professional domestic Indian T20 competition that is competitive to the league”.

Thus the Commission noted that the, BCCI has clearly bound itself not to organize, sanction, recognize any other private professional domestic league/event which could compete with IPL. The above clause gains increasing significance in light of the sole right been given to the BCCI by the ICC, by virtue of ICC member regulations whereby, only members of ICC are authorised to permit/deny the entry of any league. The ICC regulations read as follows:-

‘A cricket match will be deemed to be “Disapproved Cricket’ if it has not been approved by the Member in whose territory it is played.’

The Commission held that Clause 9.1(c) (i) clearly and unambiguously amounts to a practice through a contractually binding agreement resulting in denial of market access to any potential competitor, and is decidedly a violation of Section 4(2)(c) of the Act.

The CCI held that creation of monopoly by a regulatory power is an overreach to protect the market and the regulatory power to approve an event should not be used for this purpose. BCCI being involved in discharging both regulatory and commercial functions, the roles often tend to overlap leading to usage of its regulatory powers in entering commercial agreements. The CCI held that by explicitly agreeing not to sanction any competitive league during the currency of media rights agreement BCCI has used its regulatory powers in arriving at a commercial agreement, which is at the root of a violation of Section 4(2) (c).

DISSENTING AND SUPPLEMENTARY ORDER

Shri M.R. Tayal while delivering the dissenting view, discussed at length on the aspect of franchise rights and whether such agreement amounted to any form of bid rigging between BCCI-IPL and the bidders as alleged by the Informant. The Hon’ble Member was of the view that circulating such standard agreements was essential as the same was required to be entered by multiple bidders, thereby following a fair and non-discriminatory process. Further, agreements entered between BCCI and the bidders was largely in the form of a vertical arrangement and not between competitors or persons engaged in “identical or similar trade of goods or provision of services” and thus held that no bid rigging arrangements could exist among such entities leading to violation of Section 3(3) of the Act. However, he concurred that BCCI is in a dominant position by virtue of being the sole authority responsible for regulating game of cricket in India, having membership of ICC, recognising one cricket board/aut hority and exercising monopoly powers in relation to commercial activities.

Hon’ble Member, Mr. Prasad in his supplementary Order looking into the issue of grant of media rights held that grant of such exclusive rights for a period of ten years would put the entity in an advantageous position, promoting market power and barriers for new entrants thereby leading to violations under Section 3(1) of the Act creating appreciable adverse effect on the market. Mr. Prasad directed that reasonable time-frame should be fixed for both media and franchise agreement and tendering process in a fair and transparent manner should be followed in relation to sponsorship agreements.

PENALTY

The CCI having established BCCI of contravening provisions of the Act directed them to:-

Cease and desist from any practice denying market access to potential competitors, including inclusion of similar clauses in any agreement in the future;
Cease and desist from using its regulatory powers in any way in the process of considering and deciding on any matters relating to its commercial activities;
Deletion of Clause 9.1(c)(i) in the Media Rights Agreement; and
Penalty of INR 52.24 Crores.
The CCI while determining the penalty held that the abuse by BCCI being grave, the quantum of penalty to be levied should be commensurate with the gravity of the violation. While levying the penalty, several factors including economic power of BCCI, nature of barriers created and whether such barriers can be surmounted by the competitors and the type of hindrances by the dominant enterprise against ent ry of competitors into the market were considered. The CCI held that BCCI being the de facto regulator misusing the position had gained tremendously from the IPL format of the cricket in financial terms, owing to there being no other competitor in the market or anyone being allowed to emerge due to BCCI’s strategy of monopolizing the entire market imposed penalty of 6% of the average annual revenue of BCCI for past three years under Section 27(b) of the Act.

JUDGMENT- COMPAT

Aggrieved by the order of the CCI, the BCCI approached COMPAT under Section 53B of the Act due to violation of principles of natural justice. BCCI contended that the relevant market considered by both the Director-General and Commission differed substantially and no opportunity of hearing had been given to BCCI to rebut it. Further, the Commission had placed reliance on information available in the public domain including unreliable newspaper reports and information available on the internet that was not disclosed to BCCI, thereby depriving them of their right to rebut the same. The DG Report made no reference to Clause 9.1(c) (i) of the Media Rights Agreement, which was heavily relied upon by the Commission, enlarging the scope of the enquiry despite no finding qua that clause by DG or any notice and opportunity being afforded to BCCI. The Commission submitted that all material was provided to the parties and the order did not suffer from any legal infirm ity.

COMPAT initially found a prima face case in favour of BCCI and ordered that only 25% of the penalty imposed by CCI be paid within one month. The recovery of the rest of the amount was stayed until further orders. Considering the contentions of both the parties, COMPAT while relying on settled propositions of natural justice in a plethora of cases held that the impugned order was vitiated due to violation of the principles of natural justice.

COMPAT held that BCCI did not get any opportunity to contest the proposed determination of the ‘relevant market’ by the Commission. It clarified that if the Commission wanted to differ with the DG on the issue of ‘relevant market’ them notice stating its intention to do so and opportunity of hearing should have been given to BCCI. Additionally, COMPAT also held that reliance on TRP and TAM ratings available online in the public domain was wrong since the Commission had failed to disclose the information/material being used to arrive at findings to BCCI, thereby denying the opportunity of controverting the same and per se do not constitute legally acceptable evidence. Furthermore, any discussion on Clause 9.1(c) (i) of the Media Agreement vitiated the BCCI’s right of being heard since the same was neither referred in the DG’s Report nor in the Commission’s order under section 26(1) of the Act or any arguments advanced at the time of hearing.

CONCLUSION

The Commission’s order was considered to be a timely move to curtail the practices adopted by BCCI by virtue of it being the sole regulator in the cricketing arena. The Commission had imposed penalty of 6% of the average annual revenue for past three years. However, the Commission’s order had failed to address the issues pertaining to significant violations under Section 3 of the Act and the nature of several agreements entered between BCCI and the bidders in relation to franchise, media and sponsorship rights which were alleged to have been an abuse of the dominant position in the relevant market. The main CCI Order having failed to analyse the anti-competitive effects created in the market by entering into such perpetual or long-term agreements on an exclusive basis had formed the basis for the challenge to the said CCI Order leading to appeal before COMPAT.

COMPAT looked into the procedural loopholes and the Commission’s failure to comply with the principles of natural justice. COMPAT has laid stress on the significance of parties being heard as also the opportunity of controverting the evidence placed against it. The merits of the matter were not considered by COMPAT and remitted it back to the Commission for fresh disposal on grounds of vitiated proceedings. The importance of abiding by procedure and principles of natural justice have been given importance by COMPAT notwithstanding the force in arguments of the Commission on abuse of dominance by BCCI, ensuring that all future orders by the CCI would need to be in compliance with procedural laws to be tenable under law.

source@Nish*th Desai Associates

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