Black Robe Maven

26/09/2026

WHO DECIDES THE COMMERCIAL TERMS OF INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION?

Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta & Ors.
[2019] 16 S.C.R. 275 | (2020) 8 SCC 531

A landmark judgment on the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors (CoC) under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

WHAT DID THE SUPREME COURT HOLD?

1. Commercial wisdom belongs to the CoC.
NCLT and NCLAT cannot substitute their commercial judgment for that of the creditors.

2. Equitable treatment ≠ equal payment.
Different classes of creditors may receive different recoveries based on their legal rights, security interests and statutory position.

3. Judicial review is limited.
Sections 30(2), 31 and 61(3) define the statutory boundaries of interference.

4. Resolution must be time-bound.
The 330-day CIRP framework was upheld, subject to exceptional flexibility in the interests of justice.

5. Approved plans must achieve finality.
The resolution process cannot be undermined by indefinite belated claims.

PRACTICAL TAKEAWAY FOR LAWYERS
A challenge to a resolution plan must identify a statutory violation, material irregularity or a specific ground under the IBC.

Mere disagreement with the commercial distribution of proceeds is not enough.

THE CORE PRINCIPLE:
The CoC decides the commercial bargain. Tribunals enforce the Code, not their own idea of fairness.
LEADING CASES SERIES • NO. 57

NCLT NCLAT SupremeCourtOfIndia CorporateLaw LeadingCasesSeries AmodKrBidhuri

23/09/2026

21/09/2026

SHOULD THE SUPREME COURT ITSELF BE SUBJECT TO RTI?

CPIO, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal
[2019] 16 S.C.R. 424 | 2019 INSC 1233 | (2020) 5 SCC 481

Can judicial independence coexist with transparency?

The Supreme Court answered yes but neither value is absolute.

A Constitution Bench held that the Supreme Court is a “public authority” under the RTI Act, and the office of the CJI forms part of that institutional framework.

But RTI does not mean unrestricted access.

KEY PRINCIPLES
01 Judiciary is within RTI
The Supreme Court cannot place itself outside the statutory transparency framework.

02 Transparency has limits
Privacy, confidentiality and statutory exemptions continue to operate.

03 Judges retain privacy
Public office does not extinguish the right to privacy under Section 8(1)(j).

04 Public interest ≠ public curiosity
Information is not automatically disclosable merely because it concerns a public institution or public figure.

05 Asset declaration ≠ contents
Whether a judge submitted an asset declaration may be disclosed; its contents attract privacy protection, subject to the RTI framework.

06 Third-party information matters
Section 11 procedure must be followed where the information concerns a third party.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE

Judicial independence ≠ secrecy.

Transparency ≠ unrestricted disclosure.

The real constitutional challenge is to ensure accountability without compromising legitimate privacy, confidentiality and judicial independence.

ONE-LINE MEMORY FORMULA

CPIO, Supreme Court v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal = Judiciary is subject to RTI, but transparency operates within privacy, confidentiality and judicial independence.

LEADING CASES SERIES • NO. 56

SupremeCourtOfIndia ConstitutionalLaw JudicialIndependence JudicialTransparency Privacy IndianConstitution LegalEducation LawStudents Advocate SupremeCourt

20/09/2026

Our founder Amod kr Bidhuri | AOR- SCI with fellow advocates in Supreme Court of India

15/09/2026

When can a court interfere with an arbitral award?

Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI
[2019] 7 SCR 522

The Supreme Court’s answer is fundamental:

SECTION 34 IS NOT AN APPEAL.

After the 2015 amendment to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, judicial review of arbitral awards became significantly narrower.

The Court held:

• Public policy is narrow - it cannot be used to conduct a merits review.

• Patent illegality must go to the root - a mere erroneous interpretation or application of law is insufficient.

• Courts cannot reappreciate evidence or substitute their own view for that of the arbitral tribunal.

• Natural justice remains protected — a party must receive a meaningful opportunity to present its case.

• The arbitrator cannot rewrite the contract - the tribunal remains bound by the parties’ contractual mandate.

The practical lesson

A Section 34 petition should not be drafted like an appeal.

The first question should always be:

What precise statutory ground makes this award vulnerable?

Denial of opportunity → Section 34(2)(a)(iii)
Beyond submission → Section 34(2)(a)(iv)
Public policy → Section 34(2)(b)(ii)
Patent illegality → Section 34(2A)

The distinction is critical.

“The arbitrator got the facts wrong” is not, by itself, a Section 34 ground.

Ssangyong therefore strikes the right balance: minimal judicial intervention, strong arbitral autonomy, but no compromise with natural justice, statutory limits or the contractual mandate.

One-line memory formula:

Ssangyong = Section 34 is supervisory, not appellate.

LEADING CASES SERIES • NO. 53

JudicialReview ArbitralAwards CommercialLaw IndianArbitration LegalPractice LeadingCasesSeries

04/09/2026

What is the IBC really designed to achieve?

Not merely debt recovery.

In Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., [2019] 3 SCR 535 | (2019) 4 SCC 17, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional architecture of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

The Court made one principle unmistakably clear:

IBC is primarily about resolution, revival and maximisation of value.

The Supreme Court upheld the distinction between financial creditors and operational creditors, recognising that they occupy different positions within the insolvency framework.

It also upheld:

• The creditor-driven Committee of Creditors structure
• The different mechanisms under Sections 7, 8 and 9
• The 90% CoC threshold for withdrawal under Section 12A
• The eligibility restrictions under Section 29A
• The role of Information Utilities
• The constitutional validity of the Section 53 liquidation waterfall

The practical lesson for lawyers

An IBC proceeding is not an ordinary recovery action.

Counsel must identify:

What is the debt?
Who is the creditor?
Has CIRP been admitted?
Is there a pre-existing dispute?
Is Section 29A implicated?
What is the role of the RP, CoC and NCLT at the relevant stage?

The architecture of the Code matters as much as the underlying claim.

The rule to remember

IBC = Resolution + Revival + Value Maximisation

Not simply:

Debt + Recovery

Leading Cases Series | No. 52

SupremeCourtOfIndia CorporateLaw CommercialLaw Insolvency NCLT NCLAT CommitteeOfCreditors Section29A Section12A FinancialCreditors OperationalCreditors LegalEducation IndianLaw LeadingCasesSeries ConstitutionAtTheCore AmodKrBidhuri

01/09/2026

When two regulators have jurisdiction over the same conduct, who moves first?

The Supreme Court answered this in CCI v. Bharti Airtel Ltd., [2018] 14 SCR 489 | (2019) 2 SCC 521.

The dispute concerned Reliance Jio’s allegations that incumbent telecom operators had delayed or denied Points of Interconnection.

The key question:

Can CCI investigate before the sectoral regulator resolves the underlying regulatory dispute?

The answer:

TRAI first. CCI second.

Where a competition inquiry depends upon unresolved sector-specific regulatory or contractual questions, the specialised regulator must determine those issues first. CCI can then examine the competition-law consequences.

Why it matters

TRAI regulates telecom matters such as interconnection and licensing.

CCI protects competition and examines anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance.

TRAI’s jurisdiction does not exclude CCI’s jurisdiction. But CCI cannot bypass the specialised regulatory process where its inquiry depends upon questions within TRAI’s domain.

Practical takeaway

Before approaching CCI in a regulated-sector dispute, identify whether the case depends on unresolved questions of:

• Sectoral regulation
• Licence conditions
• Interconnection obligations
• Contractual rights

Map the regulatory architecture before choosing the forum.

Memory formula

Sectoral regulator → regulatory dispute

CCI → competition consequences

TRAI first. CCI second.

Leading Cases Series | No. 51

CompetitionAct CorporateLaw SupremeCourtOfIndia IndianLaw LegalEducation LeadingCasesSeries AmodKrBidhuri

28/08/2026

Can a moral wrong be a crime?

In Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2018), the Supreme Court gave a powerful constitutional answer.

A five Judge Constitution Bench unanimously struck down Section 497 IPC, which criminalised adultery.

But this was not a judgment declaring adultery morally acceptable.

It was a judgment about equality, dignity, privacy and individual autonomy.

What did the Court hold?

1. Marriage does not destroy individual autonomy.
A person does not surrender constitutional rights simply by entering into marriage.

2. A wife is not the property of her husband.
Section 497 was built around a deeply patriarchal assumption that treated the husband as the person whose consent mattered.

3. Section 497 violated equality.
The law created an unequal gender-based criminal framework and was incompatible with Article 14.

4. Privacy protects intimate choices.
The State cannot intrude into the most intimate sphere of human relationships without constitutional justification.

5. Not every moral wrong is a crime.
Adultery may have matrimonial or civil consequences.

But that does not automatically justify imprisonment by the State.

The constitutional transformation

From ownership to autonomy.

From patriarchy to equality.

From social morality to constitutional morality.

Joseph Shine therefore sits alongside Puttaswamy and Navtej Singh Johar in a broader constitutional movement protecting dignity, privacy and personal choice.

The central lesson is simple:

The Constitution does not permit the State to punish private conduct merely because society considers it immoral, particularly when the law itself rests upon discriminatory assumptions.

Leading Cases Series | No. 50

Know the Law. Understand the Constitution. Protect Rights.

Article21 RightToPrivacy IndividualAutonomy HumanDignity ConstitutionalMorality TransformativeConstitutionalism FundamentalRights IndianConstitution SupremeCourtOfIndia LegalEducation LeadingCasesSeries ConstitutionAtTheCore RuleOfLaw AmodKrBidhuri

28/08/2026

50. Joseph Shine v. Union of India
The Case That Decriminalised Adultery and Reaffirmed Equality, Privacy and Individual Autonomy

Citation
Joseph Shine v. Union of India
[2018] 11 SCR 765
(2019) 3 SCC 39
AIR 2018 SC 4898

Bench Strength: 5 Judges, Constitution Bench
Decision: Unanimous
Judgment Delivered: 27 September 2018

The Supreme Court struck down Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the corresponding procedural provision under Section 198 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Background
Section 497 IPC made adultery a criminal offence.
But the provision did not treat men and women equally.

Under the statutory scheme, a man could be prosecuted for having s*xual in*******se with a married woman without the consent or connivance of her husband.

The woman herself could not be punished as an abettor.

More fundamentally, the law treated the husband as the person whose consent mattered.

The wife was effectively placed within a legal framework that treated her s*xual autonomy as subordinate to her husband’s authority.

Section 198 CrPC complemented Section 497 by determining who could initiate a prosecution for adultery.

The constitutional challenge therefore raised a much deeper question than whether adultery should be criminalised:
Can the State enforce a criminal law founded upon an unequal and patriarchal conception of marriage?

Issues Before the Court
The Constitution Bench considered:
1. Whether Section 497 IPC violated Articles 14, 15 and 21?
2. Whether the provision discriminated against women on the basis of s*x?
3. Whether treating the husband as the legally aggrieved person violated women’s dignity and autonomy?
4. Whether criminalising adultery amounted to an unconstitutional intrusion into the privacy of marriage?
5. Whether Section 198 CrPC, which governed prosecution for adultery, was constitutionally valid?
6. Whether adultery could legitimately remain a criminal offence when it could continue to operate as a civil ground for divorce?

Arguments
Petitioner’s Arguments
The petitioner argued that Section 497:
* Created an unconstitutional gender distinction.
* Treated women as subordinate to their husbands.
* Denied women equal s*xual and personal autonomy.
* Violated Articles 14, 15 and 21.
* Permitted the State to intrude excessively into the private sphere of marriage.
* Was based upon outdated patriarchal assumptions.

Union of India’s Position
The Union defended the provision primarily on the basis that criminalisation of adultery served to protect the sanctity and stability of marriage.

The constitutional question was therefore whether preserving marital stability could justify a criminal law that itself operated through gender inequality and intrusion into individual autonomy.

Judgment
The Supreme Court unanimously held that adultery should not be treated as a criminal offence.

It struck down Section 497 IPC as unconstitutional and also invalidated Section 198 CrPC insofar as it dealt with prosecution for the offence of adultery.

The Court overruled earlier decisions including Sowmithri Vishnu v. Union of India and V. Revathi v. Union of India, which had upheld the constitutional validity of the adultery regime.

The judgment did not declare adultery morally acceptable or abolish its consequences in matrimonial law.

Adultery could continue to have civil consequences, including serving as a ground for divorce under applicable matrimonial law.

The critical distinction was:
A wrong in a marriage does not automatically have to become a crime against the State.

Major Holdings
1. Section 497 Violated Article 14
The provision created an irrational and discriminatory classification.

It treated the husband as the person whose consent could determine whether an offence existed.

The wife had no equivalent legal authority.

The Court found the provision manifestly arbitrary and inconsistent with constitutional equality.

2. The Law Was Based on Patriarchal Assumptions
Section 497 effectively proceeded on the assumption that a wife was subject to her husband’s control.

The Court rejected this conception.

A constitutional democracy cannot treat a woman as the property or subordinate of her husband.

3. Women’s Dignity and Autonomy Matter
The Court connected equality with individual dignity and autonomy.

Women cannot be constitutionally treated as passive subjects whose choices are controlled by husbands or by paternalistic State legislation.

4. Adultery Falls Within the Sphere of Privacy
The Court recognised the intensely private nature of matrimonial relationships.

Turning adultery into a criminal offence enabled the State to intrude deeply into the intimate sphere of marriage.

Such criminalisation was not constitutionally justified.

5. Adultery Is Not Necessarily a Crime
The Court made an important distinction between:
Moral wrong
and
criminal wrong.

A person’s conduct may be morally objectionable or may provide a basis for civil consequences without necessarily justifying imprisonment or criminal punishment.

The Five Principles Laid Down
1. Marriage Does Not Destroy Individual Autonomy
Marriage does not transfer an individual’s constitutional identity or liberty to the spouse.

2. Women Are Equal Constitutional Citizens
The law cannot treat a wife as subordinate to her husband.

3. Privacy Protects the Intimate Sphere
The State must have compelling constitutional justification before entering deeply into private relationships.

4. Morality Alone Cannot Justify Criminalisation
Not every moral wrong should become a criminal offence.

5. Constitutional Morality Rejects Patriarchy
Traditional social assumptions cannot override equality, dignity and individual autonomy.

Constitutional Provisions
Article 14
Equality Before Law

Section 497 created an irrational and discriminatory legal framework based on gender and marital status.

Article 15(1)
Prohibition of Discrimination

The provision reflected discriminatory gender stereotypes and unequal treatment.

Article 21
Life, Personal Liberty, Dignity and Privacy
Criminalisation of adultery interfered with individual dignity, autonomy and the privacy of intimate relationships.

Ratio Decidendi
Section 497 IPC is unconstitutional because it violates Articles 14, 15(1) and 21 by treating women as subordinate to their husbands, denying equal autonomy and dignity, and permitting excessive State intrusion into the private sphere of marriage. Adultery may have civil consequences, but it cannot constitutionally be treated as a criminal offence on the basis of the patriarchal assumptions embedded in Section 497.

Why Section 497 Was Particularly Problematic
The structure of the offence revealed its underlying assumption.

A husband could effectively consent to another man having s*xual relations with his wife, and that consent could prevent the offence from arising.

The wife, however, had no corresponding power.

This led the Court to identify the deeper problem:
The law was not simply regulating adultery. It was regulating the husband’s proprietary interest in his wife.

That conception was incompatible with constitutional equality and dignity.

Joseph Shine and Transformative Constitutionalism
The judgment fits into the Supreme Court’s broader movement toward transformative constitutionalism.

The Court rejected the idea that historical existence alone can justify a law.

A provision may have existed for decades and still be unconstitutional.

Constitutional interpretation must respond to contemporary understandings of:
Equality
Dignity
Privacy
Autonomy
Individual liberty

The Court expressly treated the criminalisation of adultery as inconsistent with this constitutional transformation.

Key Precedents
Sowmithri Vishnu v. Union of India
Earlier upheld the constitutional validity of Section 497.

Overruled in Joseph Shine.

V. Revathi v. Union of India
Previously upheld the procedural framework surrounding prosecution for adultery.

Overruled in Joseph Shine.

Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)
Recognised privacy as a Fundamental Right and strengthened the constitutional protection of personal autonomy.

Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018)
Reaffirmed dignity, autonomy, equality and constitutional morality in the context of intimate personal choices.

Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017)
Strengthened constitutional scrutiny of practices rooted in discriminatory or arbitrary structures.

Why It Matters
Joseph Shine is not a judgment about encouraging adultery.

It is a judgment about the limits of criminal law.

The State cannot convert every moral or relational wrong into a crime.

More importantly, it cannot criminalise conduct through a legal framework founded on the assumption that:
a husband owns his wife’s s*xuality.

The constitutional transformation is therefore profound:
From ownership to autonomy.
From patriarchy to equality.
From morality imposed by the State to individual constitutional liberty.

Examination Takeaway
Rule to Remember
Section 497 IPC criminalising adultery was struck down as unconstitutional for violating Articles 14, 15(1) and 21. Marriage does not extinguish individual autonomy, and adultery may remain a civil or matrimonial wrong without being a criminal offence.

One-Line Memory Formula
Joseph Shine (2018): Adultery may be a matrimonial wrong, but it is not a crime; marriage does not destroy equality, dignity, privacy or individual autonomy.

Leading Cases Series | No. 50
Know the Law. Understand the Constitution. Protect Rights.