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Established in 1975, DRS Chambers is a full service Law Office that has carved a niche for itself in Litigation Services in the jurisdiction of Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench and its Subordinate Courts in Uttar Pradesh, India. Our Practice Areas include Advisory, Arbitration and Litigation services in a wide spectrum of law. Expert lawyers, subject matter consultants and efficient paralegals

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09/08/2026

Case Details
Case: Sandeep Singh Hora v. State of U.P.
Court: High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench
Case No.: Criminal Appeal No. 1594 of 2018
Neutral Citation: 2026:AHC-LKO:54575-DB
Court No.: 11
Coram: Hon’ble Abdul Moin, J. and Hon’ble Pramod Kumar Srivastava, J.
Reserved on: 21.07.2026
Delivered on: 07.08.2026

Facts of the Case

The appellant, Sandeep Singh Hora, was the husband of the deceased, Navpreet Kaur, whom he married on 12.12.2009. The prosecution case was that after the marriage, the deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband and other in-laws in connection with demands for dowry.

On 24.08.2010, the deceased allegedly made several telephone calls to her father and informed him that the harassment by her husband and in-laws had increased. She was assured that her father would come the following day to take her back. However, during the intervening night of 24/25.08.2010, the informant was informed that his daughter had died.

An FIR was registered under Sections 498-A, 304-B, 406 and 411 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. After investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted against the appellant, his father, mother and sister.

The Trial Court convicted the appellant under Sections 304-B, 498-A and 406 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. He was sentenced to life imprisonment under Section 304-B IPC, besides separate sentences under the other provisions. He was, however, acquitted of the alternative charge under Section 302 IPC.

Submissions on Behalf of the Appellant
Before the High Court, the counsel of appellant Sri Rishad Murtaza did not challenge his conviction on merits and confined his appeal to the quantum of sentence.
It was submitted that although Section 304-B IPC prescribes a minimum sentence of seven years and permits imprisonment for life, the extreme punishment of life imprisonment cannot be imposed without assigning cogent reasons. It was argued that the Trial Court had not properly considered the aggravating and mitigating circumstances while imposing the maximum sentence.

The appellant had already undergone 6 years, 4 months and 19 days of actual imprisonment, which became 7 years, 5 months and 21 days with remission. It was further submitted that there was no adverse report regarding his conduct or antecedents during the period of incarceration and that he had no previous criminal antecedents.
Reliance was placed upon G.V. Siddaramesh v. State of Karnataka, (2010) 3 SCC 152, and Hem Chand v. State of Haryana, (1994) 6 SCC 565.

Submissions on Behalf of the State and Complainant
The complainant and the learned A.G.A. opposed the reduction of sentence. It was submitted that the deceased was a recently married woman who died an unnatural death within a few months of marriage and that the prosecution had established cruelty and harassment in connection with dowry demands.
It was further submitted that the appellant, being the husband, was primarily responsible for the deceased's care and protection and that the offence was a serious social evil. Reliance was placed upon Madan v. State of U.P., (2023) 15 SCC 701.

Order of the Court

The High Court confined its consideration to the quantum of sentence, since the appellant had not challenged his conviction on merits.
The Court examined the principles governing sentencing under Section 304-B IPC. It noted that Section 304-B prescribes a minimum punishment of seven years, which may extend to imprisonment for life. However, the Court emphasised that the maximum punishment of life imprisonment cannot be awarded mechanically.
Relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Madan v. State of U.P., the Court observed that while determining the appropriate sentence, the Court must take into account both aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
The High Court further relied upon Hem Chand v. State of Haryana, wherein the Supreme Court had held that although Section 304-B IPC permits imprisonment for life, the extreme punishment should be reserved for rare cases and should not be imposed in every case of dowry death.
The Court also referred to G.V. Siddaramesh v. State of Karnataka, where the Supreme Court had upheld the conviction under Section 304-B IPC but reduced the sentence from life imprisonment to ten years' rigorous imprisonment.

It was opined that the trial Court had not struck an appropriate balance between the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The Trial Court had principally relied upon the fact that the death was unnatural, that cruelty had been established and that the offence was heinous, but had not furnished cogent reasons for imposing the maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
The Court also noted that there was no direct evidence connecting the appellant with the actual death of the deceased. The conviction under Section 304-B IPC was based upon the statutory presumption applicable to dowry death cases.
It was also considered that the appellant had already undergone 6 years, 4 months and 19 days of actual imprisonment and that no adverse report concerning his conduct or antecedents had been placed before the Court during this period. The appellant was stated to be about 40 years of age, while the incident had occurred approximately 16 years earlier.
Considering the law laid down by the Supreme Court and the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court held that the present case did not fall within the category of a “rare case” warranting the maximum punishment of life imprisonment.
Order of the Court

The appeal was partly allowed.

The conviction of Sandeep Singh Hora under Section 304-B IPC was affirmed, but the sentence of imprisonment for life was reduced to ten years' rigorous imprisonment.
The period already undergone by the appellant was directed to be adjusted in accordance with Section 428 Cr.P.C./Section 528 BNSS, 2023.
The convictions and sentences imposed under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act were confirmed.

Edited by
Adv Swati Sinha
High Court Lucknow
[email protected]

04/08/2026

Case Details
Case Title: Dr. Ravi Kant Sharma & Another v. State of U.P. & Another
Case No.: Criminal Appeal No. 1936 of 2026
Court: High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench
Coram: Hon'ble Justice Subhash Vidyarthi
Decision Date: 28.07.2026
Facts of the Case

The appellants challenged the order of the Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Hardoi, discharging the accused under Section 250 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. The prosecution case arose from an FIR lodged by Dr. Ravi Kant Sharma, a Medical Officer posted at the Community Health Centre, Bilgram, alleging that the accused, a retired Junior Warrant Officer of the Indian Air Force, entered the hospital premises, quarreled with another doctor, assaulted the complainant when he intervened and also hurled caste-based abuses. Following investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted under various provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The accused sought discharge on the ground that he had visited the CHC only for administration of a tetanus injection after sustaining an injury, that the hospital staff refused treatment despite repeated requests, and that he had been falsely implicated.

Submissions on Behalf of the Appellants

The appellants submitted that the trial court erred in discharging the accused despite the FIR, statements of witnesses, medical evidence and the charge-sheet disclosing a prima facie case. It was contended that the allegations clearly attracted the provisions of the SC/ST Act and that the accused ought to face trial.

Submissions on Behalf of the Respondent

The counsel for the respondent contended that he had no prior acquaintance with the complainant and was unaware of his caste. Therefore, the essential ingredients of the offences under the SC/ST Act were absent. It was further submitted that the prosecution story was inherently improbable, that the medico-legal examination had been conducted by a doctor who was himself involved in the incident, thereby affecting its credibility, and that the prosecution was a false implication arising out of a dispute regarding refusal of medical treatment.

Order of the Court

The High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order of discharge passed by the trial court.
The Court held that the allegations failed to establish the essential ingredients of the offences under the SC/ST Act. It observed that there was no material to indicate that the accused knew the complainant or his caste before the incident. The Court also noted that the complainant used the surname "Sharma", which is ordinarily associated with members of the Brahmin community and, in some cases, certain Other Backward Classes. It observed that it was an exceptional circumstance for a person belonging to a Scheduled Caste to use the surname "Sharma". In the absence of any allegation or evidence that the accused had prior knowledge of the complainant's caste, it could not be inferred that the alleged abuse or assault was intended to humiliate him on account of his caste. Consequently, the provisions of the SC/ST Act were held to be inapplicable.
The Court further found significant infirmities in the prosecution case. It observed that the medico-legal examination of the complainant had been conducted by another doctor who was himself an alleged victim of the same incident, which violated the principles of natural justice and rendered the medical report unreliable. The Court also noted that neither the FIR nor the witness statements disclosed the reason for the altercation, whereas the defence version—that the accused had gone to the CHC for treatment after sustaining an injury and was denied a tetanus injection—appeared to be a more natural and probable explanation.

The Court also took note of the investigating officer's case diary, which recorded that doctors' associations were agitated over the incident and that there was apprehension of protests and breach of peace.

According to the Court, this indicated that the investigation may have been influenced by external pressure.
Relying upon several decisions of the Supreme Court concerning misuse of the SC/ST Act and abuse of the criminal justice system, the Court held that the present prosecution was a gross abuse of the process of law.

The Court further observed that the facts prima facie disclosed commission of an offence under Section 217 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (corresponding to Section 182 IPC) by the complainant himself.

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, the discharge of the accused was upheld, and a copy of the judgment was directed to be communicated to the Director General, Medical Health and the Additional Chief Secretary, Medical Health, Government of Uttar Pradesh.

Case lawe relied Upon
Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra
Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India
Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand
Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman v. State of Maharashtra
Ishwar Chand Sharma v. State of U.P., 2026

Edited by
Adv Swati Sinha
High Court, Lucknow [email protected]

02/08/2026

Case Details
Case: Dinesh Kumar & Ors. v. State of U.P. (Connected with Smt. Bitta Devi & Anr. v. State of U.P.)
Case Nos.: Criminal Appeal No. 1768 of 2016 and Criminal Appeal No. 1773 of 2016
Court: High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench
Coram: Hon'ble Justice Rajesh Singh Chauhan and Hon'ble Justice Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary
Date of Judgment: 27 .07.2026

Facts of the Case

The appeals arose from a common judgment passed by the Additional Sessions Judge (F.T.C.), Shravasti, whereby the husband, parents-in-law and brothers-in-law of the deceased were convicted under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The Trial Court sentenced all the appellants to imprisonment for life under Section 304-B IPC, besides imposing sentences under the remaining offences. They were, however, acquitted of the charges under Sections 147, 148, 302 IPC
According to the prosecution, Meena Devi was married to appellant Dinesh Kumar about six years prior to the incident. Although dowry was allegedly given according to the family's financial capacity, the accused subsequently demanded an additional sum of ₹1,00,000 and a motorcycle. It was alleged that the deceased was continuously subjected to physical and mental harassment on account of the unmet demand.

About nine to ten days before the incident, she informed her family members that she and her infant daughter had been threatened with death if the additional dowry was not arranged. On the night of the incident, Meena Devi and her fifteen-month-old daughter were found murdered inside the matrimonial home with sharp-edged weapon injuries.

Submissions on Behalf of the Appellants

The appellants contended that the prosecution had failed to establish the essential ingredients of Section 304-B IPC, particularly the requirement that the deceased had been subjected to cruelty or harassment "soon before her death". It was argued that the allegations regarding dowry demand were general in nature, the prosecution witnesses were interested witnesses, and there were material inconsistencies in their testimonies. The appellants also questioned the recovery of the alleged weapon and submitted that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction.
On the question of sentence, the appellants highlighted that they had already undergone prolonged incarceration, with some having completed more than seventeen years of custody including remission.

It was argued that life imprisonment under Section 304-B IPC is discretionary and should not be imposed in every case, particularly when the Trial Court had not assigned any special reasons for awarding the maximum punishment.

Submissions on Behalf of the State

The State supported the judgment of conviction by submitting that the prosecution had successfully established all the ingredients of dowry death. It was contended that the evidence of the deceased's brother, sister-in-law, mother and the mediator of the marriage consistently established persistent dowry demands and harassment shortly before the death. The State further submitted that the medical evidence corroborated the prosecution case and that the statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act was fully attracted.

Observations and Findings of the Hon'ble Court
The Court held that the marriage had taken place within seven years of the occurrence and that the deaths had occurred under unnatural circumstances inside the matrimonial home. Upon examining the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, the Court found that the demand of ₹1,00,000 and a motorcycle had continued until about nine to ten days before the occurrence. The Court held that such evidence satisfied the requirement of harassment "soon before death" under Section 304-B IPC.
The Court further observed that the testimonies of the material prosecution witnesses remained substantially consistent and were duly corroborated by the medical evidence.

It also held that the hostile nature of the recovery witness did not materially affect the prosecution case, as the remaining evidence was sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellants. Consequently, the statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act operated against the appellants, who failed to rebut the same.
While considering the sentence, the High Court noted that the Trial Court had awarded the maximum punishment of life imprisonment without recording any specific reasons for doing so.

The Court also considered the long period of incarceration already undergone by the appellants, their conduct during custody, absence of criminal antecedents and other mitigating circumstances while examining the question of sentence.
Decision of the Court
The High Court dismissed the appeals insofar as the conviction was concerned and affirmed the conviction of the appellants under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC read with Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

However, on the question of sentence, the Court partly allowed the appeals by modifying the sentence of life imprisonment awarded under Section 304-B IPC to the period already undergone by the appellants. The sentences under Section 498-A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, along with the fine imposed by the Trial Court, were maintained. The appellants who had already undergone the modified sentence were directed to be released, subject to compliance with the conditions mentioned in the judgment.

Cases Relied Upon
The High Court referred to several decisions of the Supreme Court, including V.K. Mishra v. State of Uttarakhand, Hem Chand v. State of Haryana, State of Karnataka v. M.V. Manjunathegowda, G.V. Siddaramesh v. State of Karnataka, Hari Om v. State of Haryana, Bhajju v. State of M.P., Paulmeli v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ramesh Harijan v. State of U.P

Edited by
Adv Swati Sinha
High Court Lucknow
[email protected]

30/07/2026

Case Details
Case: Neerajpal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (Criminal Appeal No. 372 of 2018)
Court: Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench
Coram: Hon'ble Justice Rajesh Singh Chauhan and Hon'ble Justice Rajeev Bharti
Date of Judgment: 23 July 2026

Facts of the Case

The case arose from the r**e and murder of a minor girl. Following investigation, the appellant, Neerajpal, was prosecuted and convicted by the Trial Court under Sections 302, 376 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code.

The conviction was primarily founded on circumstantial evidence, including the "last seen" theory, alleged recoveries, DNA evidence and the conduct attributed to the accused.
Aggrieved by his conviction and sentence, the appellant preferred the present criminal appeal contending that the prosecution had failed to establish an unbroken chain of circumstances and that the investigation suffered from serious procedural and evidentiary lapses.

Submissions on Behalf of the Appellant
The appellant submitted that:
The prosecution failed to prove the "last seen" circumstance through reliable and independent evidence.
The alleged recoveries were doubtful as the independent witnesses either turned hostile or were not examined.
No credible evidence established a nexus between the recovered articles and the commission of the offence.
The DNA report was inadmissible in evidence as the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the biological samples and did not examine the DNA expert.
Serious defects in the investigation created substantial doubt regarding the prosecution story, entitling the appellant to the benefit of doubt.

Submissions on Behalf of the State
The State argued that:
The circumstances proved by the prosecution formed a complete chain pointing towards the guilt of the appellant.
The DNA report conclusively connected the appellant with the crime.
The medical evidence established that the victim had been subjected to sexual assault before her homicidal death.
The Trial Court had rightly relied upon the DNA report, recoveries and other circumstantial evidence while recording conviction.

Findings of the High Court

Last Seen Theory Not Proved

The High Court observed that the prosecution failed to establish the "last seen" circumstance beyond reasonable doubt. The principal witness was found unreliable and his testimony lacked independent corroboration. Another witness projected by the prosecution also failed to support the case.
Accordingly, the Court held that the "last seen" theory could not be treated as an incriminating circumstance.

Recoveries Not Reliable

The Court found significant infirmities in the alleged recoveries.
It noted that independent recovery witnesses either turned hostile or were withheld by the prosecution. The alleged recovery of the mobile phone and driving licence did not establish any direct connection between the appellant and the offence. Further, the prosecution failed to produce any forensic evidence linking the recovered clothes or slippers with the crime.
In these circumstances, the recoveries were held to be unreliable and incapable of sustaining conviction.

DNA Evidence Could Not Be Relied Upon

While acknowledging that the medical evidence conclusively established r**e and homicidal death, the Court held that the DNA evidence failed to legally connect the appellant with the offence.

The Court noted several serious deficiencies:
The DNA expert who prepared the report was never examined.
The prosecution failed to prove the chain of custody of the biological samples.
The Malkhana In-charge was not examined.
No evidence was led regarding the preservation, sealing and safe transmission of the samples to the Forensic Science Laboratory.
The DNA report was merely exhibited through the Investigating Officer, who had no role in conducting the scientific examination.
The Court reiterated that scientific evidence can be relied upon only when every stage of collection, preservation, sealing, transportation and examination of the samples is duly proved in accordance with law.
Trial Court Erred in Solely Relying Upon DNA Report
The High Court held that the Trial Court committed a serious error in placing implicit reliance upon the DNA report without ensuring that it had been proved through competent expert evidence.
The Court also declined to rely upon a supplementary DNA report produced during the pendency of the appeal, observing that remanding the matter after the appellant had already undergone nearly fourteen years of incarceration would result in grave prejudice.
Chain of Circumstantial Evidence Incomplete
Upon evaluating the prosecution evidence as a whole, the High Court concluded that the chain of circumstances was far from complete.
The Court reiterated the settled principle that each incriminating circumstance must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and that all such circumstances must collectively exclude every hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to satisfy this fundamental requirement.
Case Laws Relied Upon
The High Court placed reliance upon, inter alia:
Rahul v. State (NCT of Delhi)
Raj Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi)
Subhash Chand v. State of Rajasthan

Decision
Allowing the appeal, the Allahabad High Court held that the prosecution had failed to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court concluded that:
the "last seen" theory was not proved;
the alleged recoveries were unreliable;
the DNA evidence suffered from fatal evidentiary defects owing to the failure to prove the chain of custody and examine the expert witness; and
the chain of circumstantial evidence remained incomplete.
Accordingly, the conviction and sentence of the appellant, Neerajpal, were set aside and he was acquitted of all charges by extending the benefit of doubt.

Edited by
Adv Swati Sinha
High Court Lucknow
[email protected]

27/07/2026

Case: Gulzar Ali v. State of U.P. & Others
Court: High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench
Case No.: Application U/S 482 Cr.P.C. No. 5373 of 2026
Coram: Hon'ble Justice Shree Prakash Singh
Decision Date: 15 July 2026

Facts of the Case

The applicant challenged an order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Unnao, rejecting an application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. seeking summoning of three witnesses—particularly two experts who had assisted a mentally challenged victim while recording her statements under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. The applicant contended that the allegation of r**e surfaced for the first time during the victim's statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., whereas the FIR contained only allegations of outraging modesty. Since the experts facilitated the recording of these statements, their evidence was asserted to be crucial for a fair adjudication of the case.

Submissions on Behalf of the Applicant

The counsel for the applicant argued that:
The victim was mentally challenged and her statements were recorded with the assistance of expert officials.
Material improvements were made in the Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement, including the first allegation of r**e.
The testimony of the experts was essential to assess the circumstances in which these statements were recorded.
The application was not intended to delay the proceedings but to ensure a just trial.
Reliance was placed on Natasha Singh v. CBI (2013) 5 SCC 741, which recognizes the wide scope of Section 311 Cr.P.C. where evidence is necessary for a just decision.

Submissions on Behalf of the State

The State represented by AGA opposed the application, contending that:
The application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. was filed nearly three years after the recording of the prosecution witness's statement.
Since the proposed witnesses had never been examined-in-chief, permitting their examination at such a late stage was impermissible.
The application was liable to be rejected due to the advanced stage of the trial.

Observations of the Court

The Hon'ble Court found that the proposed witnesses were material witnesses because they had assisted in recording the statements of a mentally challenged victim. The Court observed that the prosecution itself had failed to examine these witnesses despite their direct involvement in the investigative process.
Interpreting Section 311 Cr.P.C., the Court reiterated that the provision grants the widest possible discretion to summon or recall any witness at any stage of the trial if such evidence appears essential for a just decision. The Court emphasized that the objective is to discover the truth rather than to adhere to procedural technicalities.
The Court further held that the trial court had committed an error by rejecting the application solely because the proposed witnesses had not been examined-in-chief. Such reasoning, according to the High Court, is contrary to the very object of Section 311 Cr.P.C., which permits summoning of any material witness before pronouncement of judgment whenever justice so desires.

Reliance on Supreme Court Precedents

The High Court relied upon the following decisions:
Manju Devi v. State of Rajasthan
Natasha Singh v. CBI

ORDER PASSED BY THE HON’BLE COURT
Allowing the petition, the Allahabad High Court set aside the trial court's order dated 15.05.2026. The matter was remitted to the trial court with a direction to reconsider the application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. afresh, in accordance with law, within eight weeks from the production of a certified copy of the order.

Edited by
Adv Swati Sinha
High Court
Lucknow

17/07/2026

Case Details
Case: Adeem Ali v. State of U.P. & Others
Court: Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench
Case No.: Criminal Appeal No. 1258 of 2026
Judge: Hon'ble Justice Zafeer Ahmad

Facts of the Case

The appellant challenged the order dated 25.03.2026 passed by the Special Judge (SC/ST Act), Lakhimpur Kheri, whereby cognizance was taken and summons were issued against him in Special Trial No. 28 of 2026 arising out of Case Crime No. 833 of 2025. The prosecution had invoked Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 along with Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Aggrieved by the cognizance and summoning order, the appellant approached the High Court by filing the present criminal appeal.

Submissions by Counsel for the appellant

Counsel for the appellant contended that the impugned order was cryptic, non-speaking and had been passed without proper application of judicial mind. It was argued that the trial court had ignored its earlier order dated 29.10.2025 refusing judicial remand of the appellant under Section 69 BNS and the provisions of the SC/ST Act. The appellant further submitted that the Investigating Officer had no authority to subsequently add those offences merely by recording the statements of two witnesses, thereby attempting to circumvent the earlier judicial order. It was also argued that neither the FIR nor the statements recorded under Sections 180 and 183 of the BNSS disclosed that the victim belonged to a Scheduled Caste. In support of these submissions, reliance was placed on Sonu v. State of U.P., Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra and Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand.

Submissions by Counsel for the Respondent

A.G.A. opposed the appeal and submitted that during the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer recorded the statements of additional witnesses and, on the basis of the material so collected, submitted a charge-sheet under the relevant provisions of the BNS and the SC/ST Act. It was argued that while taking cognizance, the Special Judge duly considered the police report and the material collected during investigation in accordance with the settled principles governing cognizance. Reliance was placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhushan Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi).

Order of the Court
The High Court observed that taking cognizance under the BNSS and issuance of summons are two distinct stages of criminal proceedings. At the stage of cognizance, the court is only required to examine whether the material placed before it prima facie discloses the commission of an offence and not to undertake a detailed appreciation of evidence or examine the defence of the accused. The Court held that a detailed or elaborate order is not necessary at the stage of cognizance so long as the order reflects application of judicial mind to the material collected during investigation.

The Court further held that an earlier order refusing judicial remand does not amount to an adjudication on the legality of the investigation nor does it restrict the statutory powers of the Investigating Officer to continue investigation, collect further evidence and submit an appropriate police report. Consequently, such an order cannot prevent the trial court from independently considering the police report while taking cognizance.
With regard to the reliance placed on Hitesh Verma, Pramod Suryabhan Pawar and Sonu, the Court held that the principles laid down in those decisions relate to appreciation of evidence during trial. Similarly, the contention regarding the victim's caste status was held to be a question of evidence which could only be examined during trial and not at the stage of taking cognizance.
Finding no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order dated 25.03.2026, the High Court dismissed the criminal appeal at the admission stage while clarifying that the observations made in the order shall not influence the trial on merits.

Case Laws Relied Upon
The appellant relied upon
Sonu v. State of U.P
Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra,
Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand.

Edited by
Adv Swati Sinha
High Court Lucknow [email protected]

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