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ARJUN SAI Krishnan, Kochi (2026)

30/04/2026

The District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (East), Delhi, comprising Sukhvir Singh Malhotra (President) and Ravi Kumar (Member), has held Fujitsu General (India) Pvt. Ltd. liable for deficiency in service for selling a defective air conditioner that failed to provide adequate cooling shortly after installation. The Commission observed that the exhaustive number of service calls made by the consumer proved the existence of an inherent defect that the company's technicians failed to resolve.

Facts of the Case

The complainant, Vaibhav Singh Bhadana, purchased a 3-ton split AC from an authorized dealer of Fujitsu General on February 17, 2025, for ₹1,14,000. Upon installation, the Opposite Party (OP) claimed that a conventional wall installation was not feasible, forcing the complainant to construct a separate stand at an additional cost of ₹15,329.

Due to the cold weather in February, the AC was first used on May 11, 2025, at which point the complainant discovered it was not cooling properly. Between May 11 and May 21, 2025, the complainant made numerous calls to the company. On May 19 alone, 11 calls were made. A technician who eventually visited handled the unit unprofessionally, causing scratches and grease marks on the indoor unit, and ultimately failed to fix the issue, stating that the “gas is less.”

Subsequently, a legal notice was issued, but no action was taken, leading to the filing of the consumer complaint alleging deficiency in service and seeking refund, compensation, and costs.

Although notice was issued and served upon Fujitsu General India Pvt. Ltd., the company neither appeared nor filed a written statement before the Commission. Consequently, the allegations made by the complainant remained unrebutted.

Observations & Decision

The Commission noted that the complainant successfully established the purchase of the AC and the repeated complaints made regarding its malfunctioning. It observed that the AC failed to provide proper cooling despite installation and service attempts, and that numerous service requests and calls demonstrated persistent defects in the product. The technician deputed by the opposite party also failed to resolve the issue. The absence of any rebuttal by the opposite party further strengthened the complainant's case.

The Commission also observed that the testimonies of a neighbour and a mechanical engineer produced by the complainant were not relied upon, being hearsay and unsupported by documentary proof of expertise. However, the testimonies of the complainant and his wife were accepted as they were primary witnesses to the hardship suffered.

The Bench held that even in the absence of formal expert opinion, the sheer volume of service calls made between May 11 and May 21, 2025, sufficiently established that the AC was not functioning and suffered from an inherent defect which could not be rectified by the company's technician. Accordingly, the Commission found clear deficiency in service on the part of the opposite party for selling a defective product and failing to provide adequate after-sales service.

The Commission allowed the complaint, held the opposite party liable, and directed refund of ₹1,14,000/- to the complainant with interest @7% per annum from the date of filing of the complaint, subject to return of the AC. It further directed payment of ₹25,000/- as compensation and ₹10,000/- towards litigation costs.

The claim for reimbursement of the cost incurred for installation of a separate stand was rejected. The Commission also directed that the order be complied with within 30 days, failing which the amounts would carry interest @9% per annum until realization.

*Case Title: Vaibhav Singh Bhadana vs. Fujitsu General India Pvt Ltd.*

*Case No.: DC/78/CC/238/2025*

29/04/2026

S.27 Evidence Act | Joint Statements By Different Accused Admissible If They Lead To Distinct Discoveries: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court has held that joint or simultaneous disclosure statements made by different accused persons are admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, provided such statements lead to the discovery of distinct and relevant facts connected with the crime.

A Bench comprising Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice KV Viswanathan delivered the ruling while deciding criminal appeals filed by two convicts challenging their conviction in a murder case arising from Karnataka. The Court ultimately acquitted the appellants, but clarified the legal position on the evidentiary value of joint disclosure statements under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

Background

The case arose from the disappearance and murder of a woman in Karnataka in March 2013. The victim went missing on March 23, and her charred skeletal remains were discovered four days later in a forest area.

According to the prosecution, her brother had borrowed a large sum of money and gold from her and, to avoid repayment, conspired with the three other accused. It was alleged that the accused abducted her, murdered her, and later burnt the body to destroy evidence.

The trial court convicted all four accused. The High Court upheld the conviction. However, only two appellants approached the Supreme Court.

The issue was whether multiple accused pointing to the same place or object, already discovered through one accused, could be treated as valid discovery under Section 27.

According to the prosecution, all four accused gave a joint statement regarding the place where the woman was killed and the dead body was burnt. The police took all of them in a vehicle. One of them got down from the vehicle, and showed the spot where the victim was killed. Later, the other three were also brought one by one, and they also showed the same spot, and said the body was burnt there.

The Court noted that the panch witness has not deposed about the specific statement given by the appellants.

Joint statements not per se inadmissible; but there must be specificity and distinctiveness

The Court, referring to State NCT Of Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC 600, noted that joint disclosures or simultaneous disclosures, per se, are not inadmissible under Section 27. The said precedent also acknowledged the practical difficulties in ascertaining who exactly said what in such joint statements. Reference was also made to the 2025 judgment in Nagamma @ Nagarathna & Ors. Versus The State of Karnataka that greater care must be exercised while evaluating joint disclosures.

The Court observed that the High Court committed an error in accepting the joint statement. Firstly, the panch witness did not specify the exact statements given by each accused. There was nothing to even remotely indicate that there was discovery of any fact at the instance of the appellants admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

Information should relate to distinct facts

The Court stated that the information should directly and distinctly relate to the facts discovered. In essence, the Court stressed that a fact can be “discovered” only once and cannot be repeatedly relied upon against multiple accused.

“Where, therefore, a fact has already been discovered any information given in that behalf afterwards cannot be said to lead to the discovery of the fact. There cannot be a rediscovery. Where the information as to the fact said to have been discovered is already in the possession of the police, the information given over again does not actually lead to any discovery so that its discovery over again in consequence of the information given by the accused is rightly inadmissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act."

The Court agreed that there could be situations where multiple accused give the same information to the police in quick succession. However, even in such a case, "unless the guarantee of the truth and voluntary nature of such statements is obtained by the discovery of a distinct fact, the provisions of Section 27 would not, in any manner, help the prosecution. "

"Take for instance, two or three accused persons make statements in quick succession giving an information of some or similar nature, and then proceed to discover different facts from different places. In such a case even though the statements made by them is treated as “joint” yet the discovery is not joint because it is the discovery of different facts from different places. Such discoveries guarantee the protection contemplated by Section 27 and therefore can be of good use to the prosecution."

The Court said that in precedents such as Lachhman Singh v. State (1952) 1 SCC 362 and State v. Chhotelal Mohanlal AIR 1955 Nag 71, the joint statements were accepted "only because it could be said that the statement made by each accused related to the facts thereby discovered “distinctly”."

Regarding the present case, the Court said :

“…the evidence is purely of a joint discovery of the same mental fact said to have been made by all the four accused simultaneously with the result that it is not possible to say which statement of a particular accused relates distinctly to the discovery of a particular mental fact. Thus, in the present case, the safeguards contemplated by Section 27 are not evident, and in the absence of these safeguards, the discovery evidence of two particular places i.e., the place where the deceased was killed and the place where her dead body was burnt cannot be utilized against the appellants.”

The Court noted that discoveries made based on the disclosure statements of multiple accused persons cannot be used against another accused person when such disclosure statements fail to discover different facts from different places.

The Court also found that the primary circumstance relied upon by the prosecution was that the accused were last seen with the deceased shortly before her disappearance. However, the Court emphasised that this circumstance alone cannot sustain a conviction.

The Court held that it would be “too risky” to conclude guilt solely on the basis of the last seen evidence without additional incriminating material linking the appellants to the crime.

In view of the gaps in the chain of evidence and the absence of corroboration beyond the last seen circumstance, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the conviction of the appellants.

*Cause Title: ANAND JAKKAPPA PUJARI VERSUS THE STATE OF KARNATAKA (with connected case)*

*2026 INSC 417*

21/04/2026

*The Supreme Court has reiterated that while hearing a second appeal, it is impermissible for the High Courts to reopen and disturb the factual findings of the Court below by re-appreciating the evidence.*

A bench of Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice Prasanna B. Varale dismissed an appeal filed by the defendant, who was aggrieved by the High Court's affirmation of the First Appellate Court's decree of specific performance. The Appellant-defendant alleged that the fact-based findings recorded by the First Appellate Court on readiness and willingness, extension of time, and payment of cash money were erroneous, which was not re-appreciated by the High Court to arrive at a just conclusion.

The dispute arose from a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell agricultural land executed in 1988. While the trial court denied specific performance and granted only refund of part consideration, the first appellate court reversed the decision and decreed specific performance, finding that the plaintiff had proved payment, extension of time, and readiness and willingness.

The High Court, in second appeal, declined to interfere, holding that no substantial question of law arose, leading to an appeal before the Supreme Court.

Dismissing the appeal, the judgment authored by Justice Mithal observed :

"It is settled in law that the findings of fact howsoever erroneous, cannot be reopened and disturbed in second appeal which is required to be adjudicated only upon the substantial question of law, if any, arising therein. Thus, the argument that the High Court in second appeal ought to have examined the evidence to ensure the correctness of the findings of the First Appellate Court has no legs to stand and fails."

The Court said that unless the High Court frames a substantial question of law, it is impermissible for it to re-appreciated or disturb the fact-based findings, even though the same appears to be erroneous.

“…the findings as returned by the First Appellate Court on readiness and willingness, extension of time and payment of cash money are not perverse and illegal, which may warrant any interference.”, the court observed, pointing out that in the absence of a substantial question of law, the High Court is barred from re-examining the fact-based findings.

“…the argument that the High Court in second appeal ought to have examined the evidence to ensure the correctness of the findings of the First Appellate Court has no legs to stand and fails.”, the Court held.

Accordingly, the decree made by the First Appellate Court was maintained.

*Cause Title: RUSSI FISHERIES P. LTD. & ANR. VERSUS BHAVNA SETH & ORS.*

*2026 INSC 339*

18/04/2026

കേരള ഹൈക്കോടതി: വിൽപത്രം എഴുതി നിർവ്വഹിച്ചതിന് ശേഷം അതിൽ വരുത്തുന്ന ഏത് മാറ്റത്തിനും, ഇന്ത്യൻ സക്സഷൻ ആക്റ്റിലെ സെക്ഷൻ 71 പ്രകാരം നിർദ്ദേശിച്ച രീതിയിൽ സാക്ഷ്യപ്പെടുത്തൽ നടത്തിയിട്ടില്ലെങ്കിൽ നിയമപരമായ അംഗീകാരമുണ്ടാകില്ലെന്ന് വീണ്ടും ഉറപ്പിച്ചു.

പ്രോബേറ്റ് (Probate) കോടതിയുടെ അധികാരപരിധി: വിൽപത്രത്തിൽ അനുമതിയില്ലാതെ വരുത്തിയ മാറ്റത്തിന്റെ ഫലം പരിശോധിക്കുന്നത് പ്രോബേറ്റ് കോടതിയുടെ അധികാരപരിധിയിൽ വരുന്നതാണ്.

ജസ്റ്റിസ് എസ്. മനു ആണ് വിധി പുറപ്പെടുവിച്ചത്.

കേസിന്റെ വിശദാംശങ്ങൾ:
മരിച്ച കുഞ്ഞികൃഷ്ണ കുറുപ്പ് 1993-ൽ എഴുതിയ വിൽപത്രത്തിലാണ് തർക്കം. അതിൽ ‘മകൾ’ എന്ന മലയാള വാക്ക് ‘മക്കൾ’ എന്നാക്കി മാറ്റിയിരുന്നു. ഇത് ഒരു മകൾക്ക് മാത്രം ലഭിക്കേണ്ട സ്വത്ത് എല്ലാ അവകാശികൾക്കും (സഹോദരങ്ങൾ) ലഭിക്കുന്ന രീതിയിലാക്കി.

സെക്ഷൻ 71 ന്റെ വ്യവസ്ഥ: ഈ സെക്ഷൻ പ്രകാരം, വിൽപത്രത്തിൽ വരുത്തുന്ന മാറ്റം അല്ലെങ്കിൽ തിരുത്തൽ, മാറ്റത്തിന് സമീപം ടെസ്റ്റേറ്ററുടെ (വിൽപത്രം എഴുതിയയാളുടെ) ഒപ്പും സാക്ഷികളുടെ ഒപ്പും ചേർത്ത് സാക്ഷ്യപ്പെടുത്തിയില്ലെങ്കിൽ അതിന് യാതൊരു ഫലവും ഉണ്ടായിരിക്കുന്നതല്ല.

കോടതിയുടെ നിരീക്ഷണം: ഈ കേസിൽ, സെക്ഷൻ 71 പ്രകാരം ആവശ്യമായ സാക്ഷ്യപ്പെടുത്തൽ (testator/witness certification) ഇല്ലാത്തതിനാൽ വിൽപത്രത്തിൽ കൃത്രിമം നടന്നതായി കോടതി കണ്ടെത്തി. 2006 ഡിസംബർ 6-ന് രജിസ്റ്റർ ചെയ്ത വിൽപത്രം 2006 ഡിസംബർ 13-ന് മാത്രം തിരികെ സമർപ്പിച്ചതും (വിശദീകരിക്കാത്ത കാലതാമസം) മാറ്റത്തിനുള്ള സാധ്യതയെ ബലപ്പെടുത്തുന്നുവെന്നും കോടതി നിരീക്ഷിച്ചു.

പ്രോബേറ്റ് കോടതിയുടെ അധികാരപരിധിയെക്കുറിച്ച്:

· വിൽപത്രത്തിലെ മാറ്റങ്ങൾ (obliteration, interlineation, alteration), സംശയാസ്പദമായ സാഹചര്യങ്ങൾ (suspicious circumstances), സെക്ഷൻ 71 ന്റെ വ്യവസ്ഥകൾ എന്നിവ പരിശോധിക്കുന്നത് പ്രോബേറ്റ് കോടതിയുടെ പരിധിയിൽ തന്നെ വരുന്നു.
· സെക്ഷൻ 295 പ്രകാരം ഒരു കേസ് ‘സ്യൂട്ട്’ ആയി പരിവർത്തനം ചെയ്യപ്പെട്ടാലും, അത് ഒരു പൂർണ്ണ സിവിൽ വ്യവഹാരമായി മാറുന്നില്ല. പ്രോബേറ്റ് കോടതിയുടെ അന്വേഷണ പരിധി, വിൽപത്രത്തിന്റെ സാധുത, ശരിയായ നിർവ്വഹണം, അത് മരിച്ചയാളിന്റെ അവസാനത്തെ ഇച്ഛാപത്രമാണോ എന്ന് എന്നിവയിൽ ഒതുങ്ങുന്നു.

ഫലം: ഹൈക്കോടതി അപ്പീൽ തള്ളി, വിൽപത്രത്തിലെ തർക്കിത മാറ്റം (മകളെ മക്കൾ എന്നാക്കിയത്) അസാധുവാണെന്നും യഥാർത്ഥ രൂപത്തിലുള്ള (മകൾക്ക് മാത്രം) വിൽപത്രത്തിന് പ്രോബേറ്റ് അനുവദിച്ചും ട്രയൽ കോടതിയുടെ വിധി ശരിവച്ചു.

കേസിന്റെ പേര്: പി. ലക്ഷ്മികുട്ടി അമ്മ & മറ്റുള്ളവർ v. വി.കെ. ഇന്ദിര & മറ്റൊരാൾ
കേസ് നമ്പർ: MFA(Indian Succession Act) 18/2019

18/04/2026

The Kerala High Court recently clarified that anticipatory bail can be denied solely on the ground that an accused fails to disclose that he is aboard at the time of filing the application.

Dr. Justice Kauser Edappagath relied on the Division Bench decision in Anu Mathew v. State of Kerala and observed:

“it is the primary duty of an accused applying for pre-arrest bail from abroad in a court in India to disclose that he is abroad. He must also undertake to come to India when directed by the Court. The failure to disclose in the bail application that the accused was abroad at the time of filing the application alone would disqualify him from obtaining the extraordinary relief of pre-arrest bail. In other words, if an accused conceals that he was abroad when filing the application, that alone is enough for the Court to decline to exercise its discretion under Section 438 of Cr. P.C./Section 482 of BNSS in his favour.”

The applicant before the Court was the sole accused in a crime alleging offences punishable under Sections 64(1), 64(2)(m) [Punishment for r**e], 69 [Sexual in*******se by employing deceitful means, etc.], 143(1)(f) and 143(2) [Trafficking of person] of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; Section 66E [Punishment for violation of privacy] of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and Section 376 [Punishment for r**e] of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The prosecution allegation is that in 2017, the applicant took the de facto complainant to his house on the pre-text of discussing their marriage with his parents, got her intoxicated and committed r**e on her. It is also alleged that he recorded the sexual acts on his phone and then, committed sexual in*******se with her for years thereafter by threatening that he would publish these recordings.

The applicant's counsel submitted that the applicant was innocent and was falsely implicated in the case. It was also contended that there were materials to connect him with the crime. However, the prosecution opposed the bail and argued that his release would affect the investigation.

The Court remarked that pre-arrest bail cannot be granted as a matter of course and a special case must be made out with sufficient reasons:

“The law regarding the grant or refusal of pre-arrest bail is well settled. Pre-arrest bail cannot be granted as a matter of course. The power under Section 482 of BNSS could be exercised only when a special case is made out, that too, recording reasons thereof. Perusal of the case diary reveals that the accusation made against the applicant is very serious in nature, and it prima facie shows a premeditated criminal act on his part.”

Taking note of the fact that the applicant was abroad while filing the plea and this fact was not disclosed in his bail application, the Court opined that this alone was sufficient ground to deny him bail.

Thus, the Court dismissed the bail application.

Case No: Bail Appl. No. 1536 of 2026

Case Title: Shahir Basheer v. State of Kerala

2026 : KER : 26413

12/04/2026

In a dispute pertaining to election of the Management Committee of District Milk Unions in Rajasthan, the Supreme Court recently held that District Milk Unions are independent co-operative societies not amenable to writ jurisdiction of High Courts.

A bench of Justices BV Nagarathna and R Mahadevan observed that the Rajasthan High Court erred in entertaining pleas challenging bye-laws framed by the District Milk Unions, as the District Milk Unions cannot be characterized as "instrumentalities of State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution.

"In the present case, the District Milk Unions are autonomous, member driven bodies governed by the provisions of the Act, 2001, the Rules framed thereunder, and their bye-laws. They are neither departments of the State nor owned, financially controlled, or administratively dominated by the State in a manner that would render them instrumentalities of the State within the meaning of Article 12" it said.

"The fact that such societies are subject to statutory regulation, oversight by the Registrar or supervision by the State Co-operative Election Authority does not detract from their essential character as independent co-operative institutions. Furthermore, the disputes raised pertain essentially to the internal governance and electoral framework of co-operative societies and do not disclose any breach of a statutory or public duty of a public law character", the Court added.

Background

The dispute pertained to elections to the Management Committee (Boards of Directors) of various District Milk Unions in the State of Rajasthan. Particularly, the challenge was against Bye-law Nos. 20.1(2), 20.1(4), 20.2(7) and 20.2(9) framed by the District Milk Unions which prescribed qualifications for contesting the elections to the Board of Directors.

Certain representatives of Primary Societies, which are members of District Milk Unions, challenged the Bye-Laws by way of writ proceedings before the High Court. A Single Judge held the Bye-Laws ultra vires. In intra-Court appeal, a Division Bench affirmed the Single Bench's judgment. Aggrieved, the appellants, who were not party in the writ proceedings, approached the Supreme Court.

Court Observations

Insofar as the appellants raised a challenge to the High Court entertaining the underlying pleas under Article 226, the Court held that a writ would lie against a non-State entity only where it performs public duties, discharges public functions or is alleged to have acted in breach of statutory or constitutional obligations of a public character.

"disputes which pertain purely to the internal management, governance or electoral processes of co-operative societies do not, as a matter of course, attract writ jurisdiction merely because such societies owe their incorporation to a statute. The existence of a statutory framework regulating such societies does not by itself convert internal disputes into matters of public law."

The Court found fault with the High Court's interference in the matter considering the nature and character of the respondent-societies as well as the availability of statutory remedy under the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 2001.

It said that disputes which are essentially private or internal in nature fall outside the ambit of judicial review under Article 226. Even existence of regulatory or supervisory control by the State is not determinative [Ref: General Manager, Kishan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. v. Satrughan Nishad]. However, a body, though not "State" within the meaning of Article 12, may become amenable to writ jurisdiction when the degree of State control is such that it alters the character of the body.

In arriving at the decision, the Court also referred to other judicial precedents on the subject, including, Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, Thalappalam Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. State of Kerala, and Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas.

With regard to the existence of a dispute resolution mechanism within the statutory framework, the Court noted that the issues raised pertained to internal governance and electoral process of the society. As such, they fell within the ambit of Sections 58(1) and 58(2)(c) [which covers “dispute arising in connection with the election of an officer of the society”] of the 2001 Act.

"The existence of such a self-contained, multi-tiered remedial framework evinces a clear legislative intent that disputes relating to elections and internal governance of co-operative societies be resolved within the statutory domain", the Court stated.

Ultimately, it was held that the High Court ought not to have entertained the underlying writ petitions.

"In entertaining the writ petitions and adjudicating upon the validity of the bye-laws, the High Court effectively bypassed the statutory dispute resolution mechanism and rendered the remedies under Sections 58 and 104-105 nugatory. Such an approach is contrary to the legislative scheme and undermines the discipline of exhausting statutory remedies."

19/03/2026

*The Supreme Court has held that it is impermissible for the High Courts to dispose of the quashing petition without determining the veracity of the prayer for quashing a FIR.*

A bench of Justices Prashant Kumar Mishra and N.V. Anjaria set aside the Allahabad High Court's order, which had mechanically disposed of the quashing petition by merely directing the police to follow the guidelines regarding an arrest laid down in Arnesh Kumar vs. State of Bihar (2014), without determining the veracity of the prayer for quashing and deciding the petition on its merit.

“…once a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and/or Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and/or Section 528 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is preferred, the same should be decided on merits, rather than dismissing the same as infructuous or by directing the Police to follow Arnesh Kumar vs. State of Bihar (supra).”, the court held.

The dispute between the parties concerns access to the burial ground at the public graveyard (Qabristan) at Village Dundahera, Ghaziabad, leading to the registration of an FIR.

The appellants-petitioners approached the High Court for the quashing of the FIR, but the High Court, without considering the merits of the challenge, disposed of the Writ Petition by directing the concerned Police to follow the order passed in the matter of Arnesh Kumar vs. State of Bihar, leading to an appeal before the Supreme Court by the accused persons.

Allowing the appeal, the bench noted that the High Court had erred in quashing the FIR without considering the merits of the matter.

“when petitioner(s) have sought quashing of the FIR, the High Court ought to have considered the merits of the matter and decided the same one way or the other, considering the material available and the applicable law.”, the court observed.

To recall, in the case of Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 880, a four-step process was laid down that ought to be considered by the High Court while hearing quashing petitions.

(i) Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the materials is of sterling and impeccable quality?

(ii) Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false.

(iii) Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant?

(iv) Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice?

*Referring to the tests laid down in Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani (supra), the Court noted that the High Court had disposed of the quashing petition mechanically, without deciding the petition on its merits.*

*“...the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the High Court for considering afresh on merits.”, the court held.*

*Cause Title: MD. MASHOOD & ORS. VERSUS THE STATE OF UP & ORS.*

*CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 1116 of 2026*
*Arising Out of SLP(Crl) 10669 of 2025*

*2026 INSC 259*

*Citation : 2026 Live Law (SC) 264*

19/03/2026

*The Kerala High Court on Thursday (19 March) disposed of a public interest litigation challenging the naming contest announced by Kerala State Beverages (Manufacturing and Marketing) Corporation (BEVCO) and Malabar Distilleries Ltd. inviting the public to suggest a name and logo for a proposed premium brandy product.*

The Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Soumen Sen and Justice Syam Kumar V.M disposed of the petition upon noting that the respondents have withdrawn the contest.

The plea alleged that the contest violates statutory prohibitions on liquor advertising and undermines the State's constitutional obligation to protect public health.

The impugned contest offered a cash prize of ₹10,000 for selected entries suggesting a name and logo for a new Indian Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL) brandy to be manufactured by Malabar Distilleries Ltd., a state-owned enterprise. The announcement was widely published across national and regional newspapers, television channels, and social media platforms.

The Court had earlier issued an interim stay on the naming contest by flagging concern over use of public exchequer.

Today, the 4th respondent, Malabar Distilleries Ltd. submitted before the Court that pursuant to the interim stay the respondents has not proceeded further with the contest and the same has been withdrawn.

It was further submitted that the respondents have coined a name for the new product and have not used any of the names suggested by the participants of the contest for the product.

The Court thus disposed of the petition noting that the contest has been withdrawn.

“In view of the fact that the contest announced by the respondents has been withdrawn, nothing further has to be decided. Accordingly the petition stands dismissed.” the Court orally ordered.

*Case Title: M.M. Sanjeev Kumar v. State of Kerala and Ors. and connected case*

*Case No: WP(PIL) 2/ 2026 and WP(PIL) 7/ 2026*

15/03/2026

*The Kerala High Court has held that a prior agreement of sale will prevail over a subsequent attachment before judgment, clarifying that an attaching creditor cannot claim rights over the property itself and can seek recovery only from the balance sale consideration payable to the vendor.*

*The Court observed that contractual obligations arising from an earlier agreement to sell cannot be defeated by a later attachment obtained in a money recovery proceeding.*

The Bench made the observation while allowing an ex*****on second appeal filed by a purchaser whose claim petition under Order XXI Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 had been dismissed by the executing court and affirmed by the District Court.

Justice Easwaran S. observed, “…it is beyond cavil that the order of attachment certainly operates to the extent of the balance amount which has been paid by the appellant in ex*****on of the same in pursuance to the decree for specific performance. Unfortunately, the courts below did not consider the above aspects in proper perspective. Thus, the approach of the courts below is clearly flawed and has been rendered without adverting to the basic tenets of law which governs the right of the party in a contract of sale. If the findings of the courts below are sustained, then necessarily, the rights of the parties flowing under the contract of sale become redundant...”.

In the matter the purchaser entered into an agreement of sale on May 18, 2013 with the judgment debtor and paid ₹51.88 lakh as advance. When the vendor failed to complete the sale, the purchaser filed a suit for specific performance, which was decreed on March 31, 2015. Meanwhile, another creditor had obtained an order of attachment before judgment in a separate money recovery suit concerning the same property.

The purchaser challenged the attachment, contending that his prior contractual rights arising from the sale agreement and the decree for specific performance could not be defeated by a later attachment.

Placing reliance on the Supreme Court judgment in Vannarakkal Kallalathil Sreedharan v. Chandramaath Balakrishnan and Another 1990 (3) SCC 291, the Court held that attachment before judgment does not affect rights that existed prior to the attachment, including contractual obligations arising from an earlier agreement to sell.

The Bench further observed that although a contract for sale does not create title in the property under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, it nevertheless creates enforceable equitable rights that courts must protect. An attaching creditor, the Court noted, cannot claim a better right than the judgment debtor.

Significantly, the Court also held that the earlier Division Bench judgment in Kumaran v. Kumaran 2011 (1) KLT 252, relied upon by the subordinate courts, was per incuriam as it failed to consider the binding Supreme Court precedent in Vannarakkal.

Accordingly, the Court set aside the orders of the subordinate courts, allowed the purchaser’s claim petition, and lifted the attachment over the property, while permitting the attaching creditor to seek recovery from the amount deposited by the purchaser pursuant to the decree for specific performance.

*Cause Title: Kesavan v. D. Chandran & Anr. [Neutral Citation: 2026:Ker:17081]*

ARJUN SAI Krishnan

30/04/2026

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