NBN, Forchstrasse 199, Bassersdorf (2026)

21/02/2026

France–China Nuclear Cooperation: From Project Delivery to System-Level Alignment

The joint declaration issued on 10 December 2025 by China and France confirms that nuclear cooperation between the two countries has entered a new phase. The statement does not announce a new reactor project. Instead, it consolidates a structured framework that extends beyond construction into lifecycle management, fuel security, innovation, and industrial coordination.

The declaration explicitly references the intergovernmental agreements signed in 1982 and 1997, reaffirming that the cooperation remains anchored in formal state-level commitments. Nuclear energy is framed as a clean, low-carbon baseload source essential to energy security and climate objectives. This positioning aligns both countries within a long-term policy narrative rather than a short-cycle commercial announcement.

The most operationally relevant part of the statement lies in its emphasis on third-generation pressurized water reactors, lifetime extension of existing plants, decommissioning of permanently closed units, and radioactive waste management. These themes indicate that cooperation is moving further downstream into plant operation, asset life management, and end-of-cycle responsibilities. This is not symbolic diplomacy. It reflects shared challenges facing mature nuclear fleets.

The declaration also highlights future-oriented domains: small modular reactor development, artificial intelligence applications in manufacturing processes, digitalisation and automation, and non-electric applications such as heat and medical isotopes. The wording remains cautious—“explore the possibility”—but it signals that cooperation is expected to evolve into technology integration and industrial digital upgrading rather than replicate past reactor export structures.

Fuel supply and uranium resource security are explicitly mentioned. This is strategically significant. By linking nuclear fuel coordination, equipment manufacturing, and supply-chain stability, the statement acknowledges that resilience of the nuclear industrial chain is now a central policy concern. This moves cooperation beyond project-level coordination into systemic supply-chain alignment.

Fusion energy and ITER participation are reaffirmed as joint commitments. While fusion remains long-term, the continued Franco-Chinese engagement in ITER confirms alignment at the highest technological frontier of peaceful nuclear development.

Equally notable is the emphasis on regulatory cooperation. The statement stresses nuclear safety, nuclear security, and non-proliferation commitments under the IAEA framework. The focus on regulatory dialogue, experience exchange, and institutional coordination suggests that future cooperation will depend as much on supervisory compatibility as on industrial capability.

Finally, the declaration references France’s initiative to triple global nuclear capacity by 2050, with China expressing support for that ambition within the broader carbon-neutrality context. This positions both countries as advocates of global nuclear expansion, though without announcing joint third-country deployment.

Taken together, the joint statement signals continuity rather than expansion. France–China nuclear cooperation has shifted from flagship construction symbolism to systemic industrial coordination. The emphasis now lies in lifecycle management, innovation, supply-chain resilience, regulatory alignment, and long-term talent development.

In nuclear power, durability often outweighs visibility. The declaration confirms that the bilateral framework remains embedded and institutionally anchored, even as the commercial focus evolves.

20/02/2026

Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Program: Ulken Construction Advances, Second Site Defined

Kazakhstan has transitioned from pre-project planning to active construction work on its first nuclear power plant near Ulken in the Almaty Region, with preparatory and engineering activities reported since August 2025. The plant, led by a consortium with Rosatom as lead, is slated for operation in the 2035–2036 timeframe and comprises two VVER-1200 Generation III+ units.

Simultaneously, the Kazakh government has approved a site for a second nuclear power plant adjacent to the first facility in the Zhambyl district, under official decree issued in early 2026. This government resolution formalizes planning for sequential deployment of nuclear capacity in the south.

These steps follow the 2024 national referendum in which a majority of voters endorsed nuclear power deployment, and the establishment of the Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan for Atomic Energy (Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Agency) in 2025 to oversee nuclear sector development.

For suppliers and EPCs, active construction initiation means the engineering, procurement, and site services market has moved beyond feasibility into ex*****on, particularly for infrastructure, geological verification, and long-lead nuclear safety systems. Rosatom’s lead role anchors the technology baseline (VVER-1200) and indicates that Russian nuclear supply chains and qualification frameworks will dominate near-term procurement for plant modules.

The designation of a second plant site in the Zhambyl district suggests multi-unit deployment planning rather than a one-off pilot. This progression tightens demand timing for civil works, grid integration engineering (notably with **KEGOC – grid operator), and local fabrication escalation beyond basic fuel supply.

Kazakhstan’s nuclear strategy is also shaping fuel-cycle industrial positioning. National uranium producer NAC Kazatomprom continues expanding midstream capabilities, including fuel-pellet fabrication reaching design capacity, which influences supply negotiations and generic fuel-supply contracts for new reactors.

For financiers and export credit actors, construction milestones reduce ex*****on ambiguity and clarify sovereign risk profiles, but longer value-chain dependencies are crystallizing around specific technology families and international partners—most visibly through Rosatom’s procurement footprint.

The dual-site movement, with sequential deployment in the Ulken–Zhambyl complex, signals a regional nuclear cluster strategy rather than isolated deployments. Silent winners are early engagement firms able to secure civil works and grid interface scopes before technology-locked engineering packages; silent losers are late-market entrants reliant on open technology competition once design baselines are set.

19/02/2026

Turkey’s Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant looks set to enter commissioning stages in 2026, with key milestones on construction completion and grid readiness driving market momentum. Construction of Unit 1 at Akkuyu is reported ~99 % complete, and authorities continue to target first electricity output this year.

Russia’s state‑owned Rosatom remains the primary builder and operator under a build‑own‑operate model, and Ankara secured additional financing (~$9 bn) late last year to support ongoing activities.

Commissioning preparations include energising grid switchgear and advancing systems tests, but final operational start still hinges on regulatory clearances, full systems verification, and supply chain continuity.

There are no additional reactors beyond Akkuyu’s four‑unit project in active pre‑operational status — plans for other plants like Sinop remain in planning or stalled without ex*****on timelines.

Turkey’s nuclear market is transitioning from extended construction ambiguity into late‑stage delivery uncertainty — a critical inflection point.

Market confirmation: Independent sources now consistently show Akkuyu Unit 1 nearing completion and commissioning tasks underway, reducing the risk of cancellation and shifting focus to operational validation.

Energy security: If Akkuyu delivers first power in 2026, Turkey will effectively enter the small club of countries generating nuclear electricity in its region — a diversification away from heavy reliance on imported gas and coal.

Ex*****on risk: Persistent dependency on foreign financing and technology (notably Rosatom) leaves commissioning sensitive to geopolitical and supply chain shocks. The project has already navigated delays tied to sanctions and equipment redirections.

For vendors, investors, and policymakers, this year’s commissioning and regulatory outcomes at Akkuyu will define Turkey’s nuclear credibility and prospects for further projects.

• Independent industry trackers note final commissioning and systems testing as key commercial delivery milestones — not just construction percentages.
• Ankara’s broader nuclear ambitions (Sinop, SMRs, localization) lack concrete timelines without confirmed post‑Akkuyu strategic planning.
• Nuclear integration into the grid introduces new operational risk profiles for utilities and regulators, especially around grid stability and licensing maturity.

18/02/2026

Indonesia: SMRs Remain on the Agenda, but Decision Authority Is Still Missing

Indonesia continues to examine small modular reactors (SMRs) as a long‑term option, but institutional authority to move from study to ex*****on remains unassigned.

Government energy planning documents allow for nuclear power beyond the mid‑2030s, with SMRs frequently cited as a better fit for Indonesia’s archipelagic grid. However, no presidential or cabinet decision has designated nuclear as a project of national ex*****on.

Regulatory readiness sits with Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency, which maintains a functioning nuclear safety framework and international safeguards compliance. While BAPETEN has referenced SMR licensing concepts publicly, no licensing process for a power reactor—large or small—has been launched.

Research, including reactor technology assessment, is coordinated under National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN). These activities remain analytical and pre‑commercial, with no transition into project development.

The state utility Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN) continues to model nuclear and SMRs in long‑term system scenarios. Crucially, PLN has not been instructed to sponsor or deliver a nuclear project, and no site selection, financing structure, or procurement pathway exists.

There is no verified evidence of a live SMR pilot project or vendor down‑selection approved by the Indonesian government.

Indonesia is often described as an “SMR frontrunner” in Southeast Asia. The reality is more constrained.

Indonesia has:
• credible demand growth,
• a technically competent regulator,
• sustained policy curiosity around SMRs.

Indonesia lacks:
• a single accountable project owner,
• political authorisation to build,
• clarity on cost recovery and tariffs,
• a bankable delivery model.

For vendors, Indonesia is a policy‑engagement market, not a sales market. For financiers, risk remains undefined because sovereign commitment has not materialised.

Until authority shifts from research bodies to an executing entity, SMRs remain conceptual infrastructure.

Indonesia’s transition strategy still relies on coal optimisation, gas, renewables, and grid expansion. SMRs are positioned as a future flexibility tool, particularly for remote regions and industrial clusters. Progress will depend less on technology choice and more on governance decisions at the presidential level.

17/02/2026

Vietnam: Nuclear Power Re‑enters Strategic Debate, but No Project Is Live

Vietnam has reopened high‑level discussion on nuclear power as a long‑term energy security option, but no nuclear project has been reinstated or approved.

Following sustained power demand growth and recurring supply stress, nuclear energy has resurfaced in policy and expert forums as a potential post‑2035 option. This marks a shift from the firm cancellation of the Ninh Thuận nuclear programme in 2016, but it does not constitute a reversal decision.

The state utility Vietnam Electricity (EVN) continues to focus on grid expansion, renewables, gas, and coal optimisation. Nuclear power is not included as an executable asset in EVN’s current investment pipeline.

Government planning discussions reference nuclear only at a conceptual and strategic level. There is:
• no reinstated national nuclear programme,
• no assigned project owner,
• no active regulatory licensing process,
• no vendor engagement or site redevelopment.

The former Ninh Thuận sites remain inactive, with no verified construction or preparatory activity underway.

Vietnam is frequently cited as a “returning” nuclear market. In practice, it is not a market yet.

What has changed:
• political willingness to talk again about nuclear,
• acknowledgement that non‑nuclear pathways may face limits beyond 2035.

What has not changed:
• the absence of a build mandate,
• unresolved cost and financing concerns,
• lack of public acceptance groundwork,
• no delivery institution.

For vendors and investors, Vietnam is a strategic watchlist country, not a near‑term opportunity. Any credible shift would require a formal government resolution and a complete programme reset — neither exists today.

16/02/2026

Indonesia: Nuclear Studied as a Strategic Option, Not Yet a Build Programme

Indonesia continues to position nuclear power as a long‑term strategic option, with activity concentrated on policy studies, regulatory preparedness, and technology assessment, not ex*****on.

The national energy framework allows for nuclear inclusion in the long run, but no government decision has authorised a nuclear power project. Nuclear is framed as a contingency for post‑2035 energy security and decarbonisation rather than an active infrastructure programme.

Regulatory oversight sits with Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency (BAPETEN), which has a functioning safety and licensing framework for nuclear installations but has not been tasked with licensing a commercial power reactor. Research and nuclear technology development are handled under National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN) following the consolidation of Indonesia’s research bodies.

The state utility Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN) has explored nuclear scenarios — including small modular reactors — in system planning studies. These activities remain non‑binding assessments. No site has been selected, no project company established, and no procurement or licensing process initiated.

There is no verified evidence of a live reactor procurement or vendor selection process in Indonesia.

Indonesia is often described as Southeast Asia’s most credible future nuclear market. Structurally, that may be true — but commercial reality lags far behind the narrative.

What exists:
• a large, growing power system,
• a functioning nuclear regulator,
• sustained policy‑level interest.

What does not:
• a political decision to build,
• a nuclear project sponsor,
• an approved siting process,
• a bankable delivery model.

For vendors and financiers, Indonesia remains pre‑market. Engagement today is limited to:
• policy and system‑planning support,
• regulatory cooperation and capacity building,
• feasibility‑level SMR discussions with no conversion path.

Any claim of imminent Indonesian nuclear construction is not supported by formal signals.

Indonesia’s energy transition still has room to manoeuvre through coal retirement pacing, gas, renewables, and interconnection. Nuclear remains a strategic hedge against long‑term demand growth and emissions pressure, not a near‑term solution. Movement toward ex*****on would require a clear presidential mandate and explicit project ownership — neither is in place.

15/02/2026

Malaysia: Nuclear Remains Explicitly Non‑Operational Despite Policy Discourse

Malaysia continues to exclude nuclear power from operational energy planning, despite periodic policy‑level references to its long‑term potential.

The Ministry of Energy Transition and Water Transformation acknowledges nuclear energy only at a conceptual level in decarbonisation discussions. There is no cabinet‑approved nuclear programme, no implementation roadmap, and no decision to move from analysis into preparation.

Regulatory authority remains with the Department of Atomic Energy Malaysia, whose mandate covers radiation safety, radioactive materials, and international safeguards. The department does not license nuclear power plants, and no legislative or institutional reform process to enable power‑reactor licensing has been launched.

Malaysia’s national utility, Tenaga Nasional Berhad, has not initiated feasibility studies, siting work, or technology assessments for nuclear power. No nuclear project entity exists, and no budget line supports nuclear project development.

There is no verified public evidence of reactor vendor engagement tied to a Malaysian nuclear power project.

Malaysia is frequently cited in regional commentary as a “latent” nuclear market. The evidence does not support that characterisation.

What is absent:
• a political mandate,
• nuclear power legislation,
• a power‑reactor licensing authority,
• utility‑level project development,
• or structured vendor interaction.

As a result, Malaysia is not investable from a nuclear new‑build perspective. Any claims of momentum reflect policy conversation, not market movement.

For industry players, credible engagement today is limited to:
• regulatory and safeguards cooperation,
• academic and human‑capital development,
• energy‑system modelling and policy advisory work.

Commercial positioning around reactors, EPC, or financing would be unsupported by facts.

Malaysia’s energy system retains ample flexibility through gas, renewables, and regional interconnection. Nuclear functions as a long‑term hedge, not a response to immediate system constraints. Without a decisive political or security trigger, Malaysia is likely to remain in deliberate non‑ex*****on mode.

14/02/2026

Malaysia’s Nuclear Posture: Long‑Term Option Preserved, No Project Signal

Malaysia maintains nuclear power strictly as a long‑term strategic option, with no active programme, no project sponsor, and no ex*****on pathway.

The Ministry of Energy Transition and Water Transformation references nuclear energy intermittently in long‑range decarbonisation and energy‑security discussions, but no cabinet decision has authorised nuclear project development. Nuclear is not included as a committed capacity option in near‑ or mid‑term planning.

Regulatory responsibility remains with the Department of Atomic Energy Malaysia, whose mandate is limited to radiation protection, nuclear safety oversight for non‑power applications, and international safeguards compliance. The regulator is not structured, staffed, or mandated to license a nuclear power plant, and no reform process to that effect has been launched.

Malaysia’s national utility, Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB), has not initiated any nuclear feasibility, siting, or procurement activity. No project company exists, and no site screening has been conducted.

There is no public record of reactor vendor engagement with Malaysian authorities in the context of a nuclear power project.

Malaysia is often mentioned in regional nuclear speculation, but the evidentiary record does not support market readiness.

Key constraints:
• no political mandate,
• no nuclear power legislation,
• no empowered nuclear licensing authority,
• no utility‑led project development,
• no vendor pre‑engagement.

For industry participants, Malaysia is not a pipeline market. The only credible engagement channels today are:
• policy dialogue and academic cooperation,
• regulatory benchmarking and safeguards support,
• human‑capital development tied to non‑power nuclear uses.

Any commercial positioning around reactors, EPC, or financing would be unsupported by formal signals and misaligned with Malaysia’s current stance.

Malaysia’s energy system retains significant flexibility through gas, interconnection, and renewables. Nuclear functions as a strategic hedge against long‑term uncertainty rather than an investment priority. Without a decisive political trigger — such as fuel‑supply shock or binding net‑zero legislation — nuclear is likely to remain dormant.

13/02/2026

Thailand’s Nuclear File: Policy Endorsement Holds, Ex*****on Remains Deferred

Thailand continues to treat nuclear power as a long-term policy option, not an ex*****on-ready project. The Ministry of Energy maintains nuclear in national energy planning as a potential post-2035 baseload source, but no nuclear power plant project has been launched, and no site or technology has been selected.

The state-owned utility Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) has conducted technical and economic studies, including on small modular reactors, strictly at desktop and scenario-analysis level. These studies have not translated into project preparation, siting, or procurement activity.

On the regulatory side, the Office of Atoms for Peace (OAP) functions as Thailand’s independent nuclear regulator. OAP’s current remit is limited to radiation safety, research reactors, and international safeguards. It is not licensing nuclear power plants, nor has it opened any nuclear new-build licensing pathway.

No reactor vendor has been selected, shortlisted, or formally engaged in a licensing or pre-licensing process.

Thailand is often cited as a “next-wave” nuclear market in Southeast Asia, but the policy–ex*****on gap remains wide.

Key characteristics of the current phase:
• nuclear power is politically acknowledged but institutionally unprioritised,
• regulatory capacity is not yet structured for power-reactor licensing,
• utility work is confined to internal studies, not project development,
• and no public record exists of vendor engagement at project level.

For suppliers and financiers, Thailand is not a near-term sales market. The only defensible engagement today lies in:
• regulatory capacity-building,
• human capital development,
• energy-system modelling,
• and long-horizon feasibility support.

Any hardware-led positioning would be premature and unsupported by formal signals.

Thailand’s cautious stance reflects energy security comfort, strong gas and import flexibility, and high political sensitivity to nuclear siting. Absent a power-supply shock or explicit cabinet mandate, nuclear is likely to remain policy-reserved rather than activated through this decade.

12/02/2026

Saudi Arabia’s First Nuclear Power Phase: Potential Sites Circulate, Commitments Do Not

Saudi Arabia’s first nuclear power phase remains governance-defined but site-undeclared, despite a small set of potential locations recurring in technical studies and legacy planning work.

As of today, no Saudi authority — including the Nuclear and Radiological Regulatory Commission or King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy — has issued a site-licensing decision, environmental permit, or land-use approval for a nuclear power plant.

That said, two coastal locations continue to appear in academic assessments, preparatory studies, and long-standing programme references:
• Umm Huwayd, on the Gulf coast
• Khor Duweihin, near the Saudi–Qatar maritime zone

These sites are typically cited for cooling-water availability, grid proximity, and strategic depth. Importantly, they remain candidate sites only. Their repeated appearance reflects technical screening, not regulatory selection.

In parallel, Saudi authorities have not locked a Phase-1 capacity figure. Public references continue to describe large-reactor classes (approximately 1.2–1.6 GWe per unit) without confirming unit count or aggregate GW.

What is stable is the programme’s strategic objective. Official Saudi sources frame nuclear power primarily as baseload electricity generation supporting energy-mix diversification and long-term supply security under Vision 2030. Desalination and hydrogen appear as secondary or contextual considerations, not as first-phase drivers.

For suppliers, EPCs, and financiers, the mention of potential sites without formal designation is not noise — it is a deliberate sequencing signal.

Key implications:
• Site optionality is preserved. Civil scope, marine works, and infrastructure interfaces remain open variables, delaying irreversible EPC commitments.
• Early competition is institutional, not geographic. Vendors are being filtered on regulatory readiness, safeguards compatibility, QA systems, and documentation discipline rather than on site-specific ex*****on credentials.
• Capacity flexibility is intentional. Without a declared GW target, Saudi Arabia retains leverage to scale unit count, technology choice, and financing structures.

From a bankability standpoint, this approach limits early sunk costs while maximising negotiating power over technology, consortium composition, and financing architecture.

The recurrence of Umm Huwayd and Khor Duweihin functions as a technical boundary marker, not a commitment. It allows Saudi institutions to signal seriousness and preparedness while avoiding premature lock-in. Vendors that treat these locations as confirmed sites risk misallocating resources; those that treat them as planning envelopes can position more effectively.

11/02/2026

Philippines’ Nuclear File: Regulatory Architecture Firms Up While Technology and Sites Remain Open

The Philippines is advancing its nuclear programme through regulatory structuring and early project preparation, led by the Department of Energy of the Philippines (Kagawaran ng Enerhiya).

The Department of Energy has issued a national nuclear energy framework positioning nuclear power as a future baseload option within the long-term energy mix. The framework explicitly distinguishes the Pioneer Nuclear Power Plant, a proposed new-build project with a 2032 commercial operation target, from the legacy Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, which was completed decades ago but never commissioned and is not the reference asset for the current programme.

As part of early project preparation, the Department of Energy has acknowledged a preliminary list of candidate locations for nuclear development. These include:
• the Bataan site (subject to full relicensing),
• the Cagayan Economic Zone Authority area (Santa Ana, Cagayan), and
• selected Palawan coastal areas.

No site has been designated, and none has entered licensing.

On the regulatory side, the Philippine Atomic Energy Regulatory Authority (PhilATOM) — established by Republic Act No. 12305 on 8 May 2024 — is now the independent authority responsible for nuclear safety, security, and licensing. PhilATOM is currently focused on regulatory capacity-building and framework development and is not yet accepting project licence applications.

No reactor technology has been selected for the Pioneer Nuclear Power Plant. Large light-water reactors and small modular reactors are referenced only at policy-study level, with technology choice explicitly deferred until after regulatory readiness and site screening.

For suppliers, EPCs, and financiers, the Philippines has crossed a critical threshold: regulatory separation and legal clarity now exist, even though the programme remains pre-procurement.

Foreign nuclear vendors have engaged the Philippine authorities at an exploratory and non-selective level. These interactions include:
• Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power,
• Rosatom State Atomic Energy Corporation, and
• EDF / Framatome.

Engagements have taken the form of courtesy calls, policy-level discussions, and technical briefings with the Department of Energy, with PhilATOM participation limited to informational, non-licensing exchanges. No vendor has been shortlisted, pre-qualified, or invited into regulatory review.

No public record exists of engagement between Philippine authorities and other major reactor vendors such as GE Hitachi, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, or Westinghouse in the context of the current nuclear programme.

This phase favours actors capable of supporting:
• site screening and exclusion studies,
• regulatory documentation and safety-case structuring,
• regulator training and international benchmarking, and
• financing models aligned with Philippine sovereign and utility risk tolerance.

Hardware-driven sales strategies remain premature.

The Philippines is deliberately sequencing nuclear entry to avoid repeating past political and financial failures. By separating regulatory readiness, site screening, and technology choice, Manila is prioritising institutional durability over speed, even at the cost of extended timelines.

10/02/2026

Turkey’s Nuclear Program: Akkuyu Moves Toward Commissioning as International Cooperation Broadens

Turkey’s nuclear program is entering a transition phase from construction to commissioning, centered on the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, a four-unit VVER-1200 project developed under a build-own-operate structure.

Unit 1 has moved beyond heavy construction into system completion, testing, and regulatory verification, shifting the project’s risk profile from fabrication and civil works toward documentation discipline, system integration, and regulator oversight. The Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NDK) remains the competent authority for licensing, commissioning approvals, and manufacturer qualification.

Beyond Akkuyu, Turkey continues to position nuclear as a long-term strategic pillar of its energy system. In this context, Ankara has formalised framework cooperation agreements with Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power, covering nuclear technology cooperation, workforce development, and industry collaboration. These agreements are non-project-specific and do not constitute EPC contracting or site allocation.

For suppliers and EPC interfaces, Akkuyu is crossing the threshold where differentiation shifts from manufacturing capability to commissioning readiness: testing support, punch-list closure, spare-parts strategy, and traceable documentation aligned with NDK requirements.

Localization signals matter because they define how foreign suppliers can still participate: not by bypassing Turkish industry, but by partnering into it with qualified scope, auditability, and NDK-compatible documentation. In practice, this increasingly implies structured cooperation with members of the Nuclear Industry Association of Turkey, which functions as a key interface for localization, qualification, and supplier alignment. The reported local content level at Akkuyu is therefore not a marketing detail; it is a structural gate for future work packages and follow-on nuclear programs.

The cooperation framework with Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power should be read in this context: not as an alternative EPC track for Akkuyu, but as capability-building optionality for Turkey’s post-Akkuyu nuclear roadmap.

Akkuyu is becoming Turkey’s reference project not only technically, but institutionally. Once commissioning milestones are achieved, supplier credibility in Turkey will increasingly be assessed against demonstrated performance within localized ex*****on frameworks, rather than paper references from other markets.

NBN

21/02/2026

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