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We deal with Civil, Criminal, Family cases ( Dissolution of Marriage by way of khula, maintenance etc) , Guardian & Ward ( custody of minor), Succession certificate, Letter of Administration, Custom, FBR , Corporate , Banking , property,Labour matters.

05/12/2025

2025 P Cr. L J 1919

-Statutes are undoubtedly an important source of law, but their effectualness as law has a great deal to do with the way they are regarded by the judges of any country---The brute fact remains that the statutes do not interpret themselves---Their meaning, their import and their application to the concrete situation of life, must await the sanction of the court.
Illegal Dispossession Act 2005---

----Ss. 3 & 7 Illegal Dispossession Act 2005---Complaint---Eviction and mode of recovery as an interim relief passed in a complaint under S.7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005---Possession orders passed as interim relief, invalidity of---Specificity and proper procedural consideration, lack of---Scope and effect---Interim relief, grant of---Stage---"During trial", meaning of---Petitioner ( accused ) challenged an order handed down by the Trial Court whereby, in pursuance of inquiry report of SHO, he (petitioner) had been directed to hand over the possession of one room in the subject property to the respondent /complainant---Plea of the petitioner / accused was that impugned order was not sustainable in law as under the provisions of S.7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 (' the Act 2005'), the possession cannot be restored to the complainant as an interim relief before trial---Whether power of interim relief (to put the owner / occupier) in possession was enshrined in S.7 of the Act 2005---Held: Grant of interim relief within meaning of S.7(1) of the Act 2005 was subject to condition "during the trial"---The said stage is the condition precedent---The use of word by legislature "during the trial" in S.7(1) of the Act 2005 is of significance---The expression "during the trial" is not as common sense assumes---In the present case, records revealed that before delivery of copies to the accused and framing of charge, the Trial Court passed the impugned order---The procedural stage, as envisaged under the Act 2005 being a special law, was altogether disregarded prior to the issuance of the impugned order---When the law prescribes a specific manner for performing a particular act, it must be carried out in that prescribed manner alone and not otherwise---Ex*****on or implementation constitutes the process through which a judicial order is enforced, thereby enabling the successful party to derive the intended benefit from such order---While it is not in dispute that the complainant was the uncle of the accused, the familial relationship stood overshadowed by the severity of the disputes, which were of such a grave nature that they could not be resolved within the family or the local community, ultimately necessitating judicial intervention---Significantly, the complainant/respondent had explicitly alleged in the complaint that the accused/petitioner had extended threats of murder---However, perusal of the complaint did not reveal how many rooms existed in the house in question, nor whether any room had an independent or direct access to the street---The police report was also silent on these critical particulars---Likewise, the cursory evidence adduced by respondent /complainant did not specify either the number of rooms or the existence of any room with a direct approach to the passage---In said context, the direction to hand over possession of "one room" in the subject property appeared inconsistent with both the legal framework and the factual assertions made in the private complaint as well as the cursory evidence on record---Furthermore, the impugned order stated that, in the event of non-compliance by the petitioner/accused, the concerned Station House Officer (SHO) shall effect possession in favour of the complainant, however, in the absence of a precise identification of the room-in-question, such a direction effectively delegated to the law enforcement agency the judicial function of specifying which room was to be handed over-an action which was legally impermissible---Accordingly, the directive to implement the handing over of possession became incapable of ex*****on due to lack of specificity and judicial certainty---Said portion of the impugned order, being devoid of essential judicial safeguards and precision, was liable to be set aside even on this singular ground---High Court set-aside the impugned order for suffering from material illegality and procedural irregularity, rendering it unsustainable in the eye of law---

JUDGEMENT.................---By means of instant criminal revision under Section 435/439 of Cr.P.C. read with Section 9 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 ('the Act'), petitioner has challenged the order dated 25.09.2024 handed down by learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Mandi Bahauddin whereby petitioner has been directed to hand over the possession of one room in the subject property to the respondent No.2/complainant.

2. Pithily, on 04.06.2024, respondent No.2 filed a private complaint under Section 3 of the Act against the petitioner before the Court of Addl. Sessions Judge, Mandi Bahauddin maintaining that he was the owner of the property/plot No.54 and he constructed house over it. The petitioner, who is real nephew of respondent No.2, dispossessed him from the said house in the month of March, 2022.

3. Learned trial court recorded cursory statement of the respondent No.2 as well as his witnesses on 27.06.2024 and petitioner/accused was summoned on 22.08.2024, thereafter the court summoned report from S.H.O. regarding previous and present possession over the disputed house, in pursuance of the same, detailed report was submitted on 15.09.2024. On 25.09.2024, the learned trial court passed the order/direction to the petitioner/accused to hand over the possession of one room in the subject property to respondent No.2/complainant. Feeling dismayed, petitioner brought the instant criminal revision.

4. Mr. Khalid Pervaiz Warriach, Advocate learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that impugned order is not sustainable either in law or on facts. The police had submitted report in clear words that the possession of the subject property was with Muhammad Afzal, petitioner as well as brother of the complainant. While referring to Section 7 of the Act, further adds that possession cannot be restored to the complainant as an interim relief before trial. The Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 was enacted on 30.06.2005 and it was published in the Gazette of Pakistan on 07.07.2005. Police report clearly conveys that petitioner was in possession of the house from almost 35 years, with the strength of that report, says that petitioner was in possession of the house before enactment of the Act. The Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 is not applicable with retrospective effect.

5. Mr. Aftab Hussain, Advocate learned counsel for the respondent No.2/complainant while opposing the said contentions and supporting the impugned order, contends that petitioner was an illegal occupant whereas the respondent No.2 was owner of the house. The petitioner was directed only to hand over possession of one room as an interim relief.

6. Hearkened, record perused.

7. Statutes are undoubtedly an important source of law, but their effectualness as law has a great deal to do with the way they are regarded by the judges of any country. The brute fact remains that the statutes do not interpret themselves. Their meaning, their import and their application to the concrete situation of life, must await the sanction of the court and, to borrow the felicitous phrase of Gray "it is with the meaning declared by the courts, and no other meaning, that they are imposed upon the community as Law."

8. In the under discussion special law, power of interim relief/to put the owner or occupier, as the case may be, in possession is enshrined in Section 7 of the Act. Before attending the legality of the impugned order, it would be apposite to have a glance upon Section 7(i) of the Act which is as under:

"7. Eviction and mode of recovery as an interim relief.- (1) If during trial the Court is satisfied that a person is found prima facie to be not in lawful possession, the Court shall, as an interim relief direct him to put the owner or occupier, as the case may be, in possession."

9. Grant of interim relief within meaning of Section 7(1) of the Act was subject to condition "during the trial". The said stage is the condition precedent. The use of word by legislature "during the trial" in Section 7(1) of the Act is of significance importance. The expression "during the trial" is not as common sense assumes.

10. In the latest case law reported as "Niaz Ahmed and another v. Aijaz Ahmed and others" (PLD 2024 SC 1152), in a case relating to the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, in para 12, Hon'ble Supreme Court expounded the said section, term/expression endorsed the stage as under:-

QUOTE

12. Present case requires determination as to what are the conditions for invocation and application of section 7 of IDA, 2005 and whether, in law, the view taken by the learned trial court and High Court is correct. For the sake of convenience, Section 7 is reproduced below:-

7. Eviction and mode of recovery as an interim relief.---(1) If during trial the Court is satisfied that a person is found prima facie to be not in lawful possession, the Court shall, as an interim relief direct him to put the owner or occupier as the case may be, in possession.

The intent behind section 7 ibid is to grant interim relief during the course of the trial.

13. Bare perusal of section 7(1) of the Act reveals three principal considerations/conditions; Firstly, the jurisdiction conferred thereby is exercisable during the trial only. Thus, interim relief can be granted by the court when trial is still in progress even when the guilt of accused has not been established; Secondly, the use of expression "prima facie" indicates that court has to only form a prima facie opinion and must be satisfied that accused is "not in lawful possession" of the property. This requirement is less onerous and distinct from reaching a conclusive finding or determination that the accused has entered the property without lawful authority with intent to dispossess, grab, or control the immovable property as specified in the third and fourth elements of section 3 of the Act. The use of the expression "not in lawful possession by the Legislature appears to be a deliberate choice reflecting a less stringent criterion to enable interim relief during the trial this is because the offence under section 3 can only be proved/otherwise at the conclusion of the trial, and Finally, if the court finds that section 7 is applicable then it is duty bound to provide interim relief specified therein.

Thus, interim order under section 7 of the Act can be passed when prima facie it is established to the satisfaction of the Court that the accused is in unlawful possession of the immoveable property and complainant is either owner or was in a lawful possession of the immoveable property before dispossession.

14. Now what needs to be determined is whether these conditions stand fulfilled in the present case. Firstly, grant of interim relief is subject to condition "during trial". The expression "trial" has been interpreted by this Court in the case of "Haqnawaz and others v. The State and others" (2000 SCMR 785), wherein it has been held that:

"From a review of the above provisions of the Code, it is quite clear to us that taking of cognizance of a case by a Court is not synonymous with the commencement of the trial in a case. Taking of cognizance of a case by the Court is the first step, which may or may not culminate into the trial of the accused. The trial in criminal case, therefore, does not commence with the taking of the cognizance of the case by the Court".

Thus, use of word by the legislature "during the trial" in section 7(1) of the IDA, 2005 is of significant importance. There is no cavil to the proposition that taking of cognizance is not commencement of the trial. Trial of a case commences with the framing of the charge.

UNQUOTE

11. Now, I would like to attend the facts/stage of this case on the yardstick/checklist of the supra law as well as interpretation of the expression. The certified copies presented by the learned counsel for the petitioner indicate that before delivery of copies to the accused and framing of charge, learned trial court passed the impugned order. Learned counsel for the respondent No.2 also not disputed, before framing of charge, the under discussion order was passed. The initial stage is quite visible even from the impugned order, which is reproduced as under:

"Further, it is notable that the complainant, despite of the fact that he is the owner of the subject property, has been illegally dispossessed by the accused from the subject property and the accused without any title of ownership is enjoying the possession of subject property. At this initial stage, the accused is directed to hand over the possession of one (1) room in the subject property to the complainant and further matter should be decided afterwards. If the accused does not comply with the direction contained in this order, then the S.H.O. concerned is directed to affect the possession of complainant over the subject property there off.

Now to come up for report of S.H.O. regarding delivery of possession on 03.10.2024."

12. The procedural stage, as envisaged under the special law, was altogether disregarded prior to the issuance of the impugned order. It is a well-settled principle in the administration of justice that when the law prescribes a specific manner for performing a particular act, it must be carried out in that prescribed manner alone and not otherwise.

13. Ex*****on or implementation constitutes the process through which a judicial order is enforced, thereby enabling the successful party to derive the intended benefit from such order. While it is not in dispute that the complainant is the uncle of the accused, the familial relationship stands overshadowed by the severity of the disputes, which were of such a grave nature that they could not be resolved within the family or the local community, ultimately necessitating judicial intervention. Significantly, the complainant/respondent had explicitly alleged in the complaint that the accused/petitioner had extended threats of murder.

14. A careful and meticulous perusal of the complaint, however, does not reveal how many rooms exists in the house in question, nor whether any room has an independent or direct access to the street. The police report is also silent on these critical particulars. Likewise, the cursory evidence adduced by respondent No. 2 does not specify either the number of rooms or the existence of any room with a direct approach to the passage.

15. In this context, the direction to hand over possession of "one room" in the subject property appears inconsistent with both the legal framework and the factual assertions made in the private complaint as well as the cursory evidence on record. Furthermore, the impugned order states that, in the event of non-compliance by the petitioner/accused, the concerned Station House Officer (SHO) shall effect possession in favour of the complainant, however, in the absence of a precise identification of the room in question, such a direction effectively delegates to the law enforcement agency the judicial function of specifying which room is to be handed over-an action which is legally impermissible.

16. Accordingly, the directive to implement the handing over of possession becomes incapable of ex*****on due to lack of specificity and judicial certainty. This portion of the impugned order, being devoid of essential judicial safeguards and precision, is liable to be set aside even on this singular ground.

17. In light of the above discussion, this criminal revision is allowed with the observation that the impugned order dated 25.09.2024 suffers from material illegality and procedural irregularity, rendering it unsustainable in the eye of law and the same is accordingly set aside.
Criminal Revision No. 63117 of 2024
Muhammad Afzal Versus The State

We deal with Civil, Criminal, Family cases ( Dissolution of Marriage by way of khula, maintenance etc) , Guardian & Ward ( custody of minor), Succession certificate, Letter of Administration, Custom, FBR , Corporate , Banking , property,Labour matters.

05/12/2025

2025 P Cr. L J 1931

----S. 7 Illegal Dispossession Act 2005---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.369---Interim relief---Restoration of possession of disputed property to the complainant from the accused---Retrieval of possession, seeking of---Scope---Relevant provision(s) of law, absence of---Entertaining of a prayer by the Court---Scope---Court becoming functus officio---Scope---Possession of plot-in-dispute was handed over to the complainants through bailiff in compliance of the order of the Trial Court under provisions of S.7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005; later, during the trial yet with the delay of almost three months, a petition was moved by brother of the accused (petitioner) praying that the possession be restored to him---Claim /stance of the petitioner was that he was in fact in possession of plot-in-dispute and bailiff had wrongly handed over the possession to complainants---Petitioner filed revision as his said application was dismissed by the Trial Court---Validity---Report of bailiff revealed that nowhere he (bailiff) mentioned that plot-in-dispute was owned and possessed by the petitioner, rather the proceedings were smoothly conducted and possession was handed over to the complainant without any resistance or counter claim agitated at the spot---Thus, the bailiff, on the day petitioner moved the Trial Court, had already handed over the vacant possession to the complainant of the plot at the spot---Petitioner, in spite of being queried, failed before the Court to justify his stance through relevant provision of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, or by mentioning any provision of law under which the petitioner was empowered to file petition for the decision of his application which was not even decided during the pendency of complaint---Once complaint was decided (which though resulted into acquittal) the Trial Court became functus officio and was not empowered to decide the grievance of the petitioner---Pertinently, the petitioner also approached High Court with a considerable delay after his application had been decided about eight years ago---Court becomes functus officio after it passes and signs any order---Under S.369 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, no Court when it has signed its judgment, will alter or review the same, except to correct a clerical error---No court including High Court can review its order passed in criminal jurisdiction as the Court would become functus officio after it has passed and signed the order---

JUDGENT.................---Through this criminal revision petition filed under section 439 read with section 561-A Cr.P.C., Mian Sohaib ul Rehman (petitioner) seeks setting aside the order dated 29.01.2019 passed by the Mr. Muhammad Naeem Sheikh, Learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Lahore who was pleased to dismiss the application for restoration of possession of plot filed by the petitioner.

2. Arguments heard and record perused.

3. Perusal of record reveals that Muhammad Bashir along with Fakir Muhammad filed complaint on 13.12.2005 under section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 and during the proceedings of the complaint, he also filed an application under section 7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 on 12.06.2006 for the restoration of possession of property. The said application was accepted vide order dated 21.07.2006 and bailiff handed over the vacant possession of the plot to Muhammad Bashir in compliance of the court order. The report of bailiff is very much relevant in this regard as nowhere bailiff mentioned in his report that plot in dispute was owned and possessed by present petitioner Mian Sohaib ur Rehman rather the proceedings were smoothly conducted and possession was handed over to Muhammad Bashir without any resistance or counter claim agitated at the spot. The petitioner on 29.07.2006 filed application under section 203 Cr.P.C. and he made a prayer that the complaint filed by Muhammad Bashir (respondent No.1) be dismissed and order dated 21.07.2006 whereby the order for the restoration of possession was made be suspended till the final decision of the application whereas bailiff on the day of filing of application had already handed over the vacant possession to the complainant of the plot at the spot. The complaint ultimately met with the fate of acquittal of accused vide judgment dated 20.07.2011 and till that day, neither said application was decided which had become infructuous because compliance of the court order was made nor it was agitated to be decided in accordance with law and after the acquittal made on 20.07.2011, the petitioner with the delay of almost three months on 05.10.2011 filed application for the restoration of possession with the claim that he was in fact in possession of land and bailiff wrongly handed over the possession to complainants but petitioner has failed to justify his stance through relevant provision of law before the court because inspite of query, the learned counsel for the petitioner has miserably failed to mention any provision of law under which the petitioner was empowered to file petition for the decision of application which was not decided during the pendency of complaint filed under section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005.

4. Furthermore, during the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon document No.7116, Book No.1, Volume No.403 dated 27.07.2004 on the basis of which he is claiming himself to be owner of the land in dispute which was never in possession of Mian Maqsood Ahmed (respondent/accused in complaint) but it is crystal clear from record that Mst. Almas Fakhra, etc. being the legal heirs of Mian Muhammad Azam have filed suit regarding cancellation of said sale deed which is pending since 2007 against petitioner and Mian Maqsood Ahmad who is real brother of present petitioner. Both were impleaded as defendants in the titled suit in which present petitioner Mian Shoaib ur Rehman through filing of written statement mentioned that he has sold 10 marlas land to someone else and handed over vacant possession to that person. During the pendency of suit for cancellation of document the petitioner was not entitled to ask criminal court for the restoration of possession and once complaint was decided which resulted into acquittal vide order dated 20.07.2011 the trial court become functus officio and was not empowered to decide the grievance of the petitioner who get his application decided in the year 2019 and approached this Court with the considerable delay. Reference in this regard can be made to the case reported as Ali Kuli Amin Ud Din v. Muhammad Zafar and others (2012 PCr.LJ 1136) wherein hon'ble court held as under

S.369. Court not to alter judgment. Scope. Court becomes functus officio after it passes and signs any order. No court including High Court can review its order passed in criminal jurisdiction.

Similar view was taken in the case reported as Iqbal v. The State and another (2001 PCr.LJ 1634). The relevant portion is reproduced below for reference sake:-

No Court when it had signed its judgment, would alter or review the same, except to correct a clerical error. High Court could not review its own order passed in the criminal jurisdiction as the Court would become functus officio after it had passed and signed the order.

5. In view of above discussion, instant criminal revision being devoid of any force is hereby dismissed.

Criminal Revision No. 10045 of 2019
Mian Sohaib-ur-REhman Versus Muhammad Bashir

We deal with Civil, Criminal, Family cases ( Dissolution of Marriage by way of khula, maintenance etc) , Guardian & Ward ( custody of minor), Succession certificate, Letter of Administration, Custom, FBR , Corporate , Banking , property,Labour matters.

12/11/2025

ILLEGAL DISPOSSESSION ACT:

2016 S C M R 1931
[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Amir Hani Muslim, Mushir Alam, Maqbool Baqar, Faisal Arab and Khilji Arif Hussain, JJ

Shaikh MUHAMMAD NASEEM---Appellant

Versus

Mst. FARIDA GUL---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No. 04-K of 2012, decided on 22nd July, 2016.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 30.09.2011 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in Cr. Revision Application No. 07/2011)

📍(a) Illegal Dispossession Act (XI of 2005)---

----S. 3---Illegal possession of property---Complaint under Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005---Offenders that could be prosecuted under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 could not be restricted to only those who possessed the credentials and antecedents of 'land grabbers' or 'Qabza Group'---Provisions of S. 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 clearly demonstrated that whosoever committed the act of illegal dispossession, as described in the said Act against a lawful owner or a lawful occupier, he could be prosecuted under its provisions without any restriction. [Muhammad Akram v. Muhammad Yousaf (2009 SCMR 1066), Mumtaz Hussain v. Dr. Nasir Khan (2010 SCMR 1254) and Shahabuddin v. The State (PLD 2010 SC 725) held to be good law]---[Bashir Ahmad v. Additional Sessions Judge (PLD 2010 SC 661) and Habibullah v. Abdul Manan (2012 SCMR 1533) declared to be not good law].

Provisions of section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 described the offence of Illegal possession of property exhaustively but did not describe the offenders in specific terms. On the contrary, said section used the general terms 'no one' and 'whoever' for the offenders. Use of such general terms clearly indicated that the widest possible meaning was attributed to the offenders.

Terms such as 'Land grabbers', 'Qabza Mafia' or 'Qabza Group' identifying a specific category of offenders had not been used in the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The term 'property grabbers' appearing in the Preamble of the said Act had been used in general sense, it could not be identified with any particular category of offenders in order to restrict the scope and applicability of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 to a particular category of offenders.

Provisions of section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 clearly demonstrated that whosoever committed the act of illegal dispossession, as described in the said Act against a lawful owner or a lawful occupier, he could be prosecuted under its provisions without any restriction.

Muhammad Akram v. Muhammad Yousaf 2009 SCMR 1066; Mumtaz Hussain v. Dr. Nasir Khan 2010 SCMR 1254 and Shahabuddin v. The State PLD 2010 SC 725 held to be good law.

Bashir Ahmad v. Additional Sessions Judge PLD 2010 SC 661 and Habibullah v. Abdul Manan 2012 SCMR 1533 declared to be not good law.

📍(b) Illegal Dispossession Act (XI of 2005)---

----S. 3---Illegal possession of property---Complaint under Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005---Maintainability---Civil litigation with regard to illegal dispossession from immoveable property pending in court between the parties---Irrespective of any such civil litigation that may be pending, where an offence, as described in the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, had been committed, the proceedings/complaint under the said Act could be initiated as the same would be maintainable in law. [Findings in Zahoor Ahmed v. The State (PLD 2007 Lahore 231) and Bashir Ahmad v. Additional Sessions Judge (PLD 2010 SC 661) were held to be not sustainable in law].

Any Act which entailed civil liability under civil law as well as criminal penalty under criminal law, such as the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, a person could be tried under both kinds of proceedings, which were independent of each other. Once the offence reported in the complaint stood proved against the accused within the confines of the provisions of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 then he could not escape punishment on the ground that some civil litigation on the same issue was pending adjudication between the parties.

Irrespective of any civil litigation that may be pending in any Court, where an offence, as described in the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, had been committed, the proceedings under the said Act could be initiated as the same would be maintainable in law.

Zahoor Ahmed v. The State PLD 2007 Lah. 231 and Bashir Ahmad v. Additional Sessions Judge PLD 2010 SC 661 held to be not sustainable in law.

Nemo for Appellant.

Abdullah A. Munshi, Advocate Supreme Court and K. A. Wahab, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent.

Shahdat Awan, P.G. for the State.

Date of hearing: 22nd July, 2016.

🔴 JUDGMENT

FAISAL ARAB, J.---In the present appeal, the appellant, who claims to be a tenant of the respondent, filed Criminal Complaint No.130 of 2010 in the Court of Sessions, Karachi-East under the provisions of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 alleging that on 08.01.2010 while he was away, the servants and some hired persons of the respondent entered his rented premises and forcibly took its possession. The said criminal complaint was dismissed as not maintainable by the Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 13.12.2010 for the reason that a Civil Revision Application No. 77 of 2007 wherein the restoration of possession of the same rented premises has been sought by the Appellant is pending adjudication in the High Court of Sindh. The appellant challenged the order of the Additional Sessions Judge before the High Court in Criminal Revision No.7 of 2011 which was dismissed. While doing so the High Court not only adopted the same reasoning as that of the Additional Sessions Judge but also placed reliance on the judgment delivered by a three member bench of this Court in the case of Bashir Ahmad v. Additional Sessions Judge (PLD 2010 SC 661) wherein the scope and applicability of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 was restricted. It was held that only such offenders can be prosecuted who possess the credentials and antecedents of 'land grabbers' or 'Qabza Group' and no one else. As in the impugned judgment, the High Court has placed reliance on Bashir Ahmad's case supra, we deem it appropriate to refer to the judgment delivered by a five member bench of this Court recently decided on 18.07.2016 in Civil Petition No.41/2008 along with Civil Appeals Nos. 2054/2007 and 1208/2015 (Gulshan Bibi and others v. Muhammad Sadiq and others), which resolved the conflict between two sets of judgments of three member benches of this Court, including Bashir Ahmad's case supra. The first set comprised of the cases of Muhammad Akram v. Muhammad Yousaf (2009 SCMR 1066), Mumtaz Hussain v. Dr. Nasir Khan (2010 SCMR 1254) and Shahabuddin v. The State (PLD 2010 SC 725). These cases do not impose any restriction as to category of persons who could only be prosecuted under the provisions of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The second set comprised of cases of Bashir Ahmad v. Additional Sessions Judge (PLD 2010 SC 661) and Habibullah v. Abdul Manan (2012 SCMR 1533) wherein it was held that only those possessing the credentials and antecedents of 'land grabbers' or 'Qabza Group' can be prosecuted thereby restricting the scope and applicability of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The five member bench of this Court in Gulshan Bibi's case supra while examining both the sets of cases came to the conclusion that it was not the intention of the legislature that only a particular category of persons can be prosecuted under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. Thus the second set of cases was declared not to be a good law. For ease of convenience, the reasons that prevailed with the five members bench are briefly explained below:-

2. The substantive provisions of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, which describe the offence and the offender are contained in section 3 of the Act. It reads as follows:-

"3. Prevention of illegal possession of property, etc. (1) No one shall enter into or upon any property to dispossess, grab, control or occupy it without having any lawful authority to do so with the intention to dispossess, grab, control or occupy the property from owners or occupier of such property.

(2) Whoever contravenes the provisions of the subsection (1) shall, without prejudice to, any punishment to which he may be liable under any other law for the time being in force, be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to ten years and with fine and the victim of the offence shall also be compensated in accordance with the provision of section 544-A of the Code."

(Underlining is ours to lay emphasis)

3. It is evident from the provisions of section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 that it describes the offence exhaustively but does not describe the offenders in specific terms. On the contrary, it uses the general terms 'no one' and 'whoever' for the offenders. The use of such general terms clearly indicates that the widest possible meaning was attributed to the offenders. The three member bench of this Court in Bashir Ahmed's case supra however has held that under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 only those can be prosecuted who possess the credentials and antecedents of 'land grabbers' or 'Qabza Group' and none else. In reaching such conclusion, Bashir Ahmed's case adopted the reasoning contained in the judgment of the Lahore High Court in the case of Zahoor Ahmed v. The State (PLD 2007 Lahore 231). The first reason that prevailed with the Lahore High Court in Zahoor Ahmed's case was the use of the term 'property grabbers' in the preamble of the Act, which was made basis to restrict its scope and applicability. We may state that the term 'property grabbers' is not one of those terms that is popularly associated with any particular class of offenders such as the terms 'Land grabbers', 'Qabza Mafia' or 'Qabza Group'. In fact none of the popular terms which are identified with a specific category of offenders have been used anywhere in the Act. As the term 'property grabbers' appearing in the preamble of the Act has been used in general sense, it cannot be identified with any particular category of offenders in order to restrict the scope and applicability of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 to a particular category of offenders. Additionally, the substantive provision of Illegal Dispossession Act i.e. section 3 expressly uses general terms such as 'no one' and 'whoever' for the offender. This clearly indicates that the widest possible meaning is to be attributed to these terms. Thus the provisions of section 3 clearly demonstrate that whosoever commits the act of illegal dispossession, as described in the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 against a lawful owner or a lawful occupier, he can be prosecuted under its provisions without any restriction.

4. To reach the conclusion which it did, the Lahore High Court judgment in Zahoor Ahmed's case apart from using the term 'property grabbers' that finds mention in the preamble had also placed reliance on the caption of the Working Paper that was prepared by the law ministry at the time of laying the Illegal Dispossession Bill before the parliament. The caption of the Working Paper states "The object of the proposed Bill is to provide deterrent punishment to the land grabbers and Qabza Group and to provide speedy justice and effective and adequate relief to the victims dispossessed of immovable property by unlawful means ." It can be seen that the terms 'land grabbers' and 'Qabza Group' that were there in the caption never found their way in any provision of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The second part of the caption of the Working Paper narrates " .. to provide speedy justice and effective and adequate relief to the victims dispossessed of immovable property by unlawful means .". In our view the object contained in this second part of the caption of the Working Paper was in fact achieved as is evident from the contents of the substantive provisions of the Act, which are unambiguous and unequivocal and while interpreting them do not lead to any absurdity. In Gulshan Bibi's case supra the five member bench of this Court had referred to a judgment from English jurisdiction in the case of Pepper v. Hart [1992] 3 WLR 1032 wherein it was held that the exclusionary rule whereby reference to Parliamentary materials was prohibited should be relaxed so that the courts may reach the true meaning of the enactment. However, such a conclusion was qualified i.e. it was held that such a course is to be adopted only in situations where the legislation is ambiguous or obscure or while interpreting the provision it leads to an absurdity. While interpreting the scope of the provisions of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 the larger bench of this Court in Gulshan Bibi's case supra did not find any ambiguity, obscurity or absurdity in the substantive provisions of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 that would have warranted reference to the relevant Parliamentary material. In paragraphs 6 to 8 of Gulshan Bibi's case the five member bench of this Court held as follows:-

"5. A bare reading of subsection (1) of section 3 the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 shows that terms like dispossess, grab, control or occupy have been used which clearly mean that illegal dispossession in all forms have been made an offence and by the use of the terms 'no one' and 'whoever' in subsections (1) and (2) of section 3, anyone and everyone who commits such an offence was made liable for punishment. The very use of the terms like 'no one' and 'whoever' are clearly intended to convey the widest possible meaning for the offenders. Thus without any distinction any person who illegally dispossesses, grabs, controls or occupies property of a lawful owner or occupier shall be liable for prosecution under the provisions of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The second set of cases has however restricted the scope and application of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 to a particular class of offenders only i.e. those who possess the credentials or antecedents of being 'land grabbers' or Qabza Group by placing reliance on the term 'property grabbers' that appears in the preamble of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. From the mere use of the term 'property grabbers' in the preamble one cannot reach the conclusion that the legislature intended that a complainant must first establish that the accused possesses the credentials or antecedents of being a professional land grabber or member of a Qabza Group in order to maintain his complaint under the said Act. The term 'property grabber' can be construed to refer to anyone who has committed the act of grabbing someone's property illegally. Limiting the scope and application of the provisions of the main enactment to a particular class of offenders and that too on the basis of a term used in the preamble would not only deflect the Court to go into issues which are not subject matter of the complaint that is before it but at the same time such an interpretation would violate the cardinal principle of the statutory construction that where the language of the substantive provision of an enactment is clear and not open to any doubt then the preamble cannot be used to curtail or enlarge its scope. Thus where the enactment is clear and unambiguous, the preamble cannot be used to undermine the clear meaning of the provisions of the Act or give it a different meaning. Only where the object or meaning of an enactment is not clear, the preamble may be resorted to in order to explain it. So the preamble is to be resorted only to explain and give meaning to any provision of the enactment where its language is open to doubt or is ambiguous or susceptible to more than one meaning. In the presence of the general terms like 'anyone' or 'whoever' that have been used to describe the offender, which are clear and wide in their application, the scope of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 cannot be confined to any particular class of offenders.

6. It would also be not out of place to mention here that reference to Legislative history is permissible only as an aid to construction of legislation which is ambiguous or obscure or the literal meaning of which leads to an absurdity i.e. from the text of a statute, the court is unable to decipher the real intent of the Legislature. Where the text is clear and there exists no ambiguity, resort to the legislative history may actually be counter-productive. This is because legislative history contains sporadic accounts and arguments made by the parliamentarians and the final outcome of debates and arguments made in the parliament could be much different. Therefore, the real intention of the parliament is to be first and foremost ascertained from the provisions of the enactment itself and frequent resort to the legislative history is not warranted. In this regard the case of Pepper v. Hart [1992] 3 WLR 1032, a judgment from English jurisdiction, can be referred with considerable advantage.

7. From what has been discussed above it is evident that no provision of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 imposes any precondition on the basis of which a particular class of offenders could only be prosecuted. The Act aims at granting efficacious relief to lawful owners and occupiers in case they are dispossessed by anyone without lawful authority. Section 3(1) of the said Act by using the terms 'anyone' and 'whoever' for the offenders clearly warns all persons from committing the offence described therein and when found guilty by the court are to be punished without attaching any condition whatsoever as to the maintainability of the complaint. So all that the Court has to see is whether the accused nominated in the complaint has entered into or upon the property in dispute in order to dispossess, grab, control, or occupy it without any lawful authority. Nothing else is required to be established by the complainant as no precondition has been attached under any provision of the said Act which conveys the command of the legislature that only such accused would be prosecuted who holds the credentials and antecedents of 'land grabbers' or 'Qabza Group'. It does not appeal to reason that for commission of an offence reported it the complaint filed under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 the Legislature would intent to punish only those who hold history of committing a particular kind of offence but would let go an accused who though has committed the offence reported in the complaint but does not hold the record of committing a particular kind of offence. In our view trial of a case is to be relatable to the property which is subject matter of the complainant, pure and simple. Any past history of the accused with regard to his act of dispossession having no nexus with the complaint cannot be taken into consideration in order to decide whether the accused stands qualified to be awarded a sentence under the Act or not. Once the offence reported in the complaint stands proved against the accused then he cannot escape punishment under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005.

8. In view of the above discussion we conclude that in any proceedings initiated under Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, the issues which fall for decision would be whether the offence against a lawful owner or occupier, as described in the complaint, has taken place and whether it is the accused who has committed it without any lawful authority. Anyone found committing the offence described in section 3 would be amenable to prosecution under the provisions of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 and no past record of the accused needs to be gone into by the court."

5. In the impugned judgment it was also held that where civil litigation with regard to illegal dispossession from immoveable property is pending between the parties, the proceedings under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 cannot be maintained. This finding is also based on the decision of the Lahore High Court in Zahoor Ahmed's case (PLD 2007 Lahore 231, reasoning of which was adopted by three member bench of this Court in Bashir Ahmed's case (PLD 2010 SC 661). We are of the view that such a finding is also not sustainable in law. Any act which entails civil liability under civil law as well as criminal penalty under criminal law, such as the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 then a person can be tried under both kinds of proceedings, which are independent of each other. Once the offence reported in the complaint stands proved against the accused within the confines of the provisions of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 then he cannot escape punishment on the ground that some civil litigation on the same issue is pending adjudication between the parties. No one can be allowed to take law in his own hands and unlawfully dispossess an owner or lawful occupier of an immovable property and then seek to thwart the criminal proceedings initiated against him under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 on the pretext that civil litigation on the issue is pending adjudication between the parties in a court of law. Therefore, irrespective of any civil litigation that may be pending in any Court, where an offence, as described in the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, has been committed, the proceedings under the said Act can be initiated as the same would be maintainable in law.

6. The above are the detailed reasons of our short order of even date whereby while relying on five Member Bench judgment of this Court dated 18.07.2016 rendered in the case of Gulshan Bibi v. Muhammad Sadiq in Civil Petition No. 41/2008 and Civil Appeals Nos.2054/2007 and 1208/2015, this appeal was disposed of and the matter was remanded back to the learned Trial Court for its disposal on merits.

MWA/M-52/SC Order accordingly.🔴 2016 S C M R 1931
[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Amir Hani Muslim, Mushir Alam, Maqbool Baqar, Faisal Arab and Khilji Arif Hussain, JJ

Shaikh MUHAMMAD NASEEM---Appellant

Versus

Mst. FARIDA GUL---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No. 04-K of 2012, decided on 22nd July, 2016.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 30.09.2011 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in Cr. Revision Application No. 07/2011)

📍(a) Illegal Dispossession Act (XI of 2005)---

----S. 3---Illegal possession of property---Complaint under Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005---Offenders that could be prosecuted under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 could not be restricted to only those who possessed the credentials and antecedents of 'land grabbers' or 'Qabza Group'---Provisions of S. 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 clearly demonstrated that whosoever committed the act of illegal dispossession, as described in the said Act against a lawful owner or a lawful occupier, he could be prosecuted under its provisions without any restriction. [Muhammad Akram v. Muhammad Yousaf (2009 SCMR 1066), Mumtaz Hussain v. Dr. Nasir Khan (2010 SCMR 1254) and Shahabuddin v. The State (PLD 2010 SC 725) held to be good law]---[Bashir Ahmad v. Additional Sessions Judge (PLD 2010 SC 661) and Habibullah v. Abdul Manan (2012 SCMR 1533) declared to be not good law].

Provisions of section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 described the offence of Illegal possession of property exhaustively but did not describe the offenders in specific terms. On the contrary, said section used the general terms 'no one' and 'whoever' for the offenders. Use of such general terms clearly indicated that the widest possible meaning was attributed to the offenders.

Terms such as 'Land grabbers', 'Qabza Mafia' or 'Qabza Group' identifying a specific category of offenders had not been used in the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The term 'property grabbers' appearing in the Preamble of the said Act had been used in general sense, it could not be identified with any particular category of offenders in order to restrict the scope and applicability of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 to a particular category of offenders.

Provisions of section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 clearly demonstrated that whosoever committed the act of illegal dispossession, as described in the said Act against a lawful owner or a lawful occupier, he could be prosecuted under its provisions without any restriction.

Muhammad Akram v. Muhammad Yousaf 2009 SCMR 1066; Mumtaz Hussain v. Dr. Nasir Khan 2010 SCMR 1254 and Shahabuddin v. The State PLD 2010 SC 725 held to be good law.

Bashir Ahmad v. Additional Sessions Judge PLD 2010 SC 661 and Habibullah v. Abdul Manan 2012 SCMR 1533 declared to be not good law.

📍(b) Illegal Dispossession Act (XI of 2005)---

----S. 3---Illegal possession of property---Complaint under Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005---Maintainability---Civil litigation with regard to illegal dispossession from immoveable property pending in court between the parties---Irrespective of any such civil litigation that may be pending, where an offence, as described in the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, had been committed, the proceedings/complaint under the said Act could be initiated as the same would be maintainable in law. [Findings in Zahoor Ahmed v. The State (PLD 2007 Lahore 231) and Bashir Ahmad v. Additional Sessions Judge (PLD 2010 SC 661) were held to be not sustainable in law].

Any Act which entailed civil liability under civil law as well as criminal penalty under criminal law, such as the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, a person could be tried under both kinds of proceedings, which were independent of each other. Once the offence reported in the complaint stood proved against the accused within the confines of the provisions of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 then he could not escape punishment on the ground that some civil litigation on the same issue was pending adjudication between the parties.

Irrespective of any civil litigation that may be pending in any Court, where an offence, as described in the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, had been committed, the proceedings under the said Act could be initiated as the same would be maintainable in law.

Zahoor Ahmed v. The State PLD 2007 Lah. 231 and Bashir Ahmad v. Additional Sessions Judge PLD 2010 SC 661 held to be not sustainable in law.

Nemo for Appellant.

Abdullah A. Munshi, Advocate Supreme Court and K. A. Wahab, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent.

Shahdat Awan, P.G. for the State.

Date of hearing: 22nd July, 2016.

🔴 JUDGMENT

FAISAL ARAB, J.---In the present appeal, the appellant, who claims to be a tenant of the respondent, filed Criminal Complaint No.130 of 2010 in the Court of Sessions, Karachi-East under the provisions of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 alleging that on 08.01.2010 while he was away, the servants and some hired persons of the respondent entered his rented premises and forcibly took its possession. The said criminal complaint was dismissed as not maintainable by the Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 13.12.2010 for the reason that a Civil Revision Application No. 77 of 2007 wherein the restoration of possession of the same rented premises has been sought by the Appellant is pending adjudication in the High Court of Sindh. The appellant challenged the order of the Additional Sessions Judge before the High Court in Criminal Revision No.7 of 2011 which was dismissed. While doing so the High Court not only adopted the same reasoning as that of the Additional Sessions Judge but also placed reliance on the judgment delivered by a three member bench of this Court in the case of Bashir Ahmad v. Additional Sessions Judge (PLD 2010 SC 661) wherein the scope and applicability of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 was restricted. It was held that only such offenders can be prosecuted who possess the credentials and antecedents of 'land grabbers' or 'Qabza Group' and no one else. As in the impugned judgment, the High Court has placed reliance on Bashir Ahmad's case supra, we deem it appropriate to refer to the judgment delivered by a five member bench of this Court recently decided on 18.07.2016 in Civil Petition No.41/2008 along with Civil Appeals Nos. 2054/2007 and 1208/2015 (Gulshan Bibi and others v. Muhammad Sadiq and others), which resolved the conflict between two sets of judgments of three member benches of this Court, including Bashir Ahmad's case supra. The first set comprised of the cases of Muhammad Akram v. Muhammad Yousaf (2009 SCMR 1066), Mumtaz Hussain v. Dr. Nasir Khan (2010 SCMR 1254) and Shahabuddin v. The State (PLD 2010 SC 725). These cases do not impose any restriction as to category of persons who could only be prosecuted under the provisions of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The second set comprised of cases of Bashir Ahmad v. Additional Sessions Judge (PLD 2010 SC 661) and Habibullah v. Abdul Manan (2012 SCMR 1533) wherein it was held that only those possessing the credentials and antecedents of 'land grabbers' or 'Qabza Group' can be prosecuted thereby restricting the scope and applicability of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The five member bench of this Court in Gulshan Bibi's case supra while examining both the sets of cases came to the conclusion that it was not the intention of the legislature that only a particular category of persons can be prosecuted under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. Thus the second set of cases was declared not to be a good law. For ease of convenience, the reasons that prevailed with the five members bench are briefly explained below:-

2. The substantive provisions of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, which describe the offence and the offender are contained in section 3 of the Act. It reads as follows:-

"3. Prevention of illegal possession of property, etc. (1) No one shall enter into or upon any property to dispossess, grab, control or occupy it without having any lawful authority to do so with the intention to dispossess, grab, control or occupy the property from owners or occupier of such property.

(2) Whoever contravenes the provisions of the subsection (1) shall, without prejudice to, any punishment to which he may be liable under any other law for the time being in force, be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to ten years and with fine and the victim of the offence shall also be compensated in accordance with the provision of section 544-A of the Code."

(Underlining is ours to lay emphasis)

3. It is evident from the provisions of section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 that it describes the offence exhaustively but does not describe the offenders in specific terms. On the contrary, it uses the general terms 'no one' and 'whoever' for the offenders. The use of such general terms clearly indicates that the widest possible meaning was attributed to the offenders. The three member bench of this Court in Bashir Ahmed's case supra however has held that under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 only those can be prosecuted who possess the credentials and antecedents of 'land grabbers' or 'Qabza Group' and none else. In reaching such conclusion, Bashir Ahmed's case adopted the reasoning contained in the judgment of the Lahore High Court in the case of Zahoor Ahmed v. The State (PLD 2007 Lahore 231). The first reason that prevailed with the Lahore High Court in Zahoor Ahmed's case was the use of the term 'property grabbers' in the preamble of the Act, which was made basis to restrict its scope and applicability. We may state that the term 'property grabbers' is not one of those terms that is popularly associated with any particular class of offenders such as the terms 'Land grabbers', 'Qabza Mafia' or 'Qabza Group'. In fact none of the popular terms which are identified with a specific category of offenders have been used anywhere in the Act. As the term 'property grabbers' appearing in the preamble of the Act has been used in general sense, it cannot be identified with any particular category of offenders in order to restrict the scope and applicability of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 to a particular category of offenders. Additionally, the substantive provision of Illegal Dispossession Act i.e. section 3 expressly uses general terms such as 'no one' and 'whoever' for the offender. This clearly indicates that the widest possible meaning is to be attributed to these terms. Thus the provisions of section 3 clearly demonstrate that whosoever commits the act of illegal dispossession, as described in the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 against a lawful owner or a lawful occupier, he can be prosecuted under its provisions without any restriction.

4. To reach the conclusion which it did, the Lahore High Court judgment in Zahoor Ahmed's case apart from using the term 'property grabbers' that finds mention in the preamble had also placed reliance on the caption of the Working Paper that was prepared by the law ministry at the time of laying the Illegal Dispossession Bill before the parliament. The caption of the Working Paper states "The object of the proposed Bill is to provide deterrent punishment to the land grabbers and Qabza Group and to provide speedy justice and effective and adequate relief to the victims dispossessed of immovable property by unlawful means ." It can be seen that the terms 'land grabbers' and 'Qabza Group' that were there in the caption never found their way in any provision of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The second part of the caption of the Working Paper narrates " .. to provide speedy justice and effective and adequate relief to the victims dispossessed of immovable property by unlawful means .". In our view the object contained in this second part of the caption of the Working Paper was in fact achieved as is evident from the contents of the substantive provisions of the Act, which are unambiguous and unequivocal and while interpreting them do not lead to any absurdity. In Gulshan Bibi's case supra the five member bench of this Court had referred to a judgment from English jurisdiction in the case of Pepper v. Hart [1992] 3 WLR 1032 wherein it was held that the exclusionary rule whereby reference to Parliamentary materials was prohibited should be relaxed so that the courts may reach the true meaning of the enactment. However, such a conclusion was qualified i.e. it was held that such a course is to be adopted only in situations where the legislation is ambiguous or obscure or while interpreting the provision it leads to an absurdity. While interpreting the scope of the provisions of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 the larger bench of this Court in Gulshan Bibi's case supra did not find any ambiguity, obscurity or absurdity in the substantive provisions of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 that would have warranted reference to the relevant Parliamentary material. In paragraphs 6 to 8 of Gulshan Bibi's case the five member bench of this Court held as follows:-

"5. A bare reading of subsection (1) of section 3 the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 shows that terms like dispossess, grab, control or occupy have been used which clearly mean that illegal dispossession in all forms have been made an offence and by the use of the terms 'no one' and 'whoever' in subsections (1) and (2) of section 3, anyone and everyone who commits such an offence was made liable for punishment. The very use of the terms like 'no one' and 'whoever' are clearly intended to convey the widest possible meaning for the offenders. Thus without any distinction any person who illegally dispossesses, grabs, controls or occupies property of a lawful owner or occupier shall be liable for prosecution under the provisions of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The second set of cases has however restricted the scope and application of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 to a particular class of offenders only i.e. those who possess the credentials or antecedents of being 'land grabbers' or Qabza Group by placing reliance on the term 'property grabbers' that appears in the preamble of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. From the mere use of the term 'property grabbers' in the preamble one cannot reach the conclusion that the legislature intended that a complainant must first establish that the accused possesses the credentials or antecedents of being a professional land grabber or member of a Qabza Group in order to maintain his complaint under the said Act. The term 'property grabber' can be construed to refer to anyone who has committed the act of grabbing someone's property illegally. Limiting the scope and application of the provisions of the main enactment to a particular class of offenders and that too on the basis of a term used in the preamble would not only deflect the Court to go into issues which are not subject matter of the complaint that is before it but at the same time such an interpretation would violate the cardinal principle of the statutory construction that where the language of the substantive provision of an enactment is clear and not open to any doubt then the preamble cannot be used to curtail or enlarge its scope. Thus where the enactment is clear and unambiguous, the preamble cannot be used to undermine the clear meaning of the provisions of the Act or give it a different meaning. Only where the object or meaning of an enactment is not clear, the preamble may be resorted to in order to explain it. So the preamble is to be resorted only to explain and give meaning to any provision of the enactment where its language is open to doubt or is ambiguous or susceptible to more than one meaning. In the presence of the general terms like 'anyone' or 'whoever' that have been used to describe the offender, which are clear and wide in their application, the scope of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 cannot be confined to any particular class of offenders.

6. It would also be not out of place to mention here that reference to Legislative history is permissible only as an aid to construction of legislation which is ambiguous or obscure or the literal meaning of which leads to an absurdity i.e. from the text of a statute, the court is unable to decipher the real intent of the Legislature. Where the text is clear and there exists no ambiguity, resort to the legislative history may actually be counter-productive. This is because legislative history contains sporadic accounts and arguments made by the parliamentarians and the final outcome of debates and arguments made in the parliament could be much different. Therefore, the real intention of the parliament is to be first and foremost ascertained from the provisions of the enactment itself and frequent resort to the legislative history is not warranted. In this regard the case of Pepper v. Hart [1992] 3 WLR 1032, a judgment from English jurisdiction, can be referred with considerable advantage.

7. From what has been discussed above it is evident that no provision of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 imposes any precondition on the basis of which a particular class of offenders could only be prosecuted. The Act aims at granting efficacious relief to lawful owners and occupiers in case they are dispossessed by anyone without lawful authority. Section 3(1) of the said Act by using the terms 'anyone' and 'whoever' for the offenders clearly warns all persons from committing the offence described therein and when found guilty by the court are to be punished without attaching any condition whatsoever as to the maintainability of the complaint. So all that the Court has to see is whether the accused nominated in the complaint has entered into or upon the property in dispute in order to dispossess, grab, control, or occupy it without any lawful authority. Nothing else is required to be established by the complainant as no precondition has been attached under any provision of the said Act which conveys the command of the legislature that only such accused would be prosecuted who holds the credentials and antecedents of 'land grabbers' or 'Qabza Group'. It does not appeal to reason that for commission of an offence reported it the complaint filed under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 the Legislature would intent to punish only those who hold history of committing a particular kind of offence but would let go an accused who though has committed the offence reported in the complaint but does not hold the record of committing a particular kind of offence. In our view trial of a case is to be relatable to the property which is subject matter of the complainant, pure and simple. Any past history of the accused with regard to his act of dispossession having no nexus with the complaint cannot be taken into consideration in order to decide whether the accused stands qualified to be awarded a sentence under the Act or not. Once the offence reported in the complaint stands proved against the accused then he cannot escape punishment under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005.

8. In view of the above discussion we conclude that in any proceedings initiated under Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, the issues which fall for decision would be whether the offence against a lawful owner or occupier, as described in the complaint, has taken place and whether it is the accused who has committed it without any lawful authority. Anyone found committing the offence described in section 3 would be amenable to prosecution under the provisions of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 and no past record of the accused needs to be gone into by the court."

5. In the impugned judgment it was also held that where civil litigation with regard to illegal dispossession from immoveable property is pending between the parties, the proceedings under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 cannot be maintained. This finding is also based on the decision of the Lahore High Court in Zahoor Ahmed's case (PLD 2007 Lahore 231, reasoning of which was adopted by three member bench of this Court in Bashir Ahmed's case (PLD 2010 SC 661). We are of the view that such a finding is also not sustainable in law. Any act which entails civil liability under civil law as well as criminal penalty under criminal law, such as the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 then a person can be tried under both kinds of proceedings, which are independent of each other. Once the offence reported in the complaint stands proved against the accused within the confines of the provisions of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 then he cannot escape punishment on the ground that some civil litigation on the same issue is pending adjudication between the parties. No one can be allowed to take law in his own hands and unlawfully dispossess an owner or lawful occupier of an immovable property and then seek to thwart the criminal proceedings initiated against him under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 on the pretext that civil litigation on the issue is pending adjudication between the parties in a court of law. Therefore, irrespective of any civil litigation that may be pending in any Court, where an offence, as described in the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, has been committed, the proceedings under the said Act can be initiated as the same would be maintainable in law.

6. The above are the detailed reasons of our short order of even date whereby while relying on five Member Bench judgment of this Court dated 18.07.2016 rendered in the case of Gulshan Bibi v. Muhammad Sadiq in Civil Petition No. 41/2008 and Civil Appeals Nos.2054/2007 and 1208/2015, this appeal was disposed of and the matter was remanded back to the learned Trial Court for its disposal on merits.

MWA/M-52/SC Order accordingly.

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