Asif Ali Jokhio & Co.

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26/10/2025

پولیس کیخلاف زیر تحویل شخص کی ہلاکت، ریپ یا ضرب شدید کے الزامات کی صورت میں آرٹیکل 106 پولیس آرڈر 2002 کے تحت جوڈیشل انکوائری ہو سکتی ہے

Art 106 of the Police Order 2002 covers the conduct of judicial inquiry with a request to Chief Justice of the High Court under intimation to the Government to appoint a Judge not below the District and Sessions Judge for said purpose.

If the Provincial Police Complaints Authority receives from the District Public Safety Commission or Head of District Police any report of death, r**e or serious injury to any person in police custody it would take steps to preserve evidence relating to such incident and request the Chief Justice of the High Court under intimation to the Government to appoint a Judge not below the District and Sessions Judge for a judicial enquiry.

Clauses (c) & (d) of Article 155(1) of Police Order 2002 are relevant to the subject under discussion because for willful breach or neglect of any provision of law or of any rule or regulation or any order which the police is bound to observe or obey or guilty of any violation of duty, FIR can be registered as being cognizable offences but under Article 155(2) of the Police Order, it still needs a sanction for prosecution in the form of report in writing by an officer authorized in this behalf under the rules. Article 2 (xxiii) of Police Order, 2002 says, ‘rules’ means rules made under this Order and as per Article 186 of Police Order, 2002 “Existing police deemed to be constituted under this Order” therefore, Police Rules,1934 shall also be deemed applicable until the new rules are framed. As per Police Rules, 1934, Deputy Inspector General of Police is the authorized officer for granting sanction for prosecution.

It is held that for initiation of departmental action against any rank of police officer/official, different authorities are authorized in the police hierarchy but for judicial prosecution respective Deputy Inspector General of Police is the authorized officer. Therefore, despite registration of FIR, sanction of prosecution shall further determine the continuation of proceedings against the accused police officer/official. If such sanction is not available then court cannot proceed further. This situation has impliedly been met under section 230 of Cr.P.C.

If required sanction is not given then court can stay the proceeding in trial of such offence or Prosecutor can drop the prosecution of such offence under section 10(3)(f) of the Punjab Criminal Prosecution Service (Constitution, Functions and Powers) Act, 2006.

Types of offences if committed under Article 156 of the Police Order, 2002, do not require any sanction of authorized officer and being punishable up to five years would be cognizable as per second schedule of Cr.P.C. under segment “offences against other laws”, therefore after registration of FIR it shall be prosecuted through a normal course of trial. However, offence under Article 157 being punishable up to one year shall be non-cognizable as per above scheme; thus, for such offence action can be taken as per Section 155 of Cr.P.C. meant for investigation into non-cognizable offences but if some cognizable offences are also attracted in the series of act, then it shall also be investigated with cognizable offences without the permission of a magistrate.

If a complaint of neglect, failure or excess committed by any police officer/official is received by the ex-officio Justice of the Peace, he can simply pass it to District Police Officer concerned for placing it before the Police Complaints Authority who is authorized to channelize it as per Article 36 of the Police Order, 2002, or ex-officio justice of the peace can direct the aggrieved person to approach the Police Complaints Authority by filing an application and further course of action shall be taken care of by the said authority under the law. If both the directions are not met, ex-officio justice of the Peace can proceed as per law suggested above.

Establishment of Provincial Police Complaints Authority is essential for action on derelictions of police.

WP 10957/23
Hafeez Ullah Vs Additional Sessions Judge etc.
Mr. Justice Muhammad Amjad Rafiq
2023 LHC 3905

Note: This order has been pronounced on 05.06.2023, thereafter, dictated, prepared and signed on 06.07.2023.

26/10/2025

PLJ 2013 lhr 143...

----“Legal obligation”--Minors are entitled to be maintained by father in manner befitting status and financial condition of father and for this reason Family Court is under an obligation while granting maintenance allowance, to keep in mind financial condition and status of father--Courts are under legal obligation to make an inquiry in this regard. [P. 148] E.

26/10/2025

2020 YLR 44 (b)

S. 22 A. Cr.P.C.
Ex_officio Jop is not supposed to act mechanically by simply considering the version of events narrated by a party applying for registration of FIR, but instead, in order to safeguard against misuse or abuse of such process, must apply his mind and satisfy himself that, primafacie, some material is available on record to support such version.

2022 S C M R 1S. 497(1), third & fourth provisos---Offence not punishable with death---Bail---Delay in conclusion of the...
26/10/2025

2022 S C M R 1

S. 497(1), third & fourth provisos---Offence not punishable with death---Bail---Delay in conclusion of the trial---Extent and scope of the right of an accused to bail on the statutory ground of delay in conclusion of the trial under the third proviso to S. 497(1), Cr.P.C. and the exceptions to such right provided under the fourth proviso, stated.

Part (a) of third proviso to section 497(1), Cr.P.C. envisaged that in an offence not punishable with death, the trial of the accused was to be concluded within a period of one year from the date of detention of the accused, and in case the trial was not so concluded, the law mandated the release of the accused on bail. The accused, thus, had a statutory right to be released on bail if his trial for such offence was not concluded within a period of one year from the date of his detention. Period of one year for the conclusion of the trial began from the date of the arrest/detention of the accused and it was of little importance as to when the charge was framed and the trial commenced. The purpose and objective of the provision was to ensure that the trial of an accused was conducted expeditiously and the pre-conviction detention of an accused did not extend beyond the period of one year, in cases involving offences not punishable with death. In such cases, if the trial of an accused was not concluded within a year of his detention, the statutory right to be released on bail ripened in his favour.

This statutory right to be released on bail was, however, subject to two exceptions: one was embodied in the third proviso itself and the second was provided in the fourth proviso to section 497, Cr.P.C. As per these exceptions, the right to be released on bail on the ground of delay in conclusion of the trial was not available to an accused if: (i) the delay in conclusion of the trial was occasioned by an act or omission of the accused or by any other person acting on his behalf, or (ii) the accused was a convicted offender for an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or was in the opinion of the court a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal or was accused of an act of terrorism punishable with death or imprisonment for life.

With respect to the first exception the act or omission on the part of the accused to delay the timely conclusion of the trial must be the result of a visible concerted effort orchestrated by the accused. Merely some adjournments sought by the counsel of the accused could not be counted as an act or omission on behalf of the accused to delay the conclusion of the trial, unless the adjournments were sought without any sufficient cause on crucial hearings, i.e., the hearings fixed for examination or cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, or the adjournments were repetitive, reflecting a design or pattern to consciously delay the conclusion of the trial. Thus, mere mathematical counting of all the dates of adjournments sought for on behalf of the accused was not sufficient to deprive the accused of his right to bail under the third proviso.

The second exception to the right of the accused to be released on bail on the ground of delay in conclusion of the trial was provided in the fourth proviso to section 497, Cr.P.C. According to which the provisions of the third proviso did not apply to the accused who was: (i) a convicted offender for an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life; or (ii) a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal, in the opinion of the Court; or (iii) an accused of an act of terrorism punishable with death or imprisonment for life.

Conditions (i) and (iii) above were self-explanatory and must be borne out from the record. Under condition (i), the accused must have been earlier convicted by a court of law for an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. Under condition (iii), the accused must be accused of an act of terrorism punishable with death or imprisonment for life. It was condition (ii) which required the Court to apply its judicious mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and make an opinion as to whether or not the accused was a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal. The words hardened, desperate or dangerous had been couched in between conditions (i) and (iii) and therefore signified the same sense of gravity and seriousness as to the nature of the offence and character of the accused. "Dangerous" meant harmful, perilous, hazardous or unsafe - someone who could cause physical harm or injury or death. "Hardened" was someone who was pitiless, hardhearted, callous or unfeeling and set in his bad ways and no longer likely to change, having a tendency of repeating the offence and was, thus, dangerous to the society. "Desperate" was someone who was reckless, violent and ready to risk or do anything; such person was, therefore, also dangerous to society. All the three words painted a picture of a person, who was likely to seriously injure and hurt others without caring for the consequences of his violent act. Therefore, for this exception to apply, there had to be material to show that the accused was such a person who would pose a serious threat to the society if set free on bail. In the absence of any such material, bail could not be denied to an accused on the statutory ground of delay in conclusion of the trial. Moundar v. State PLD 1990 SC 934 rel.

26/10/2025

P L D 2022 Supreme Court 112

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---
----S. 497(1), third and fourth provisos---Bail---Delay in conclusion of the trial---Scope of statutory bail under third proviso to S.497(1), Cr.P.C explained.

(i) The purpose and object of the third proviso to section 497(1), Cr.P.C. is to ensure that the trial of an accused is conducted and concluded expeditiously, and that the pre-conviction detention of an accused does not extend beyond the period of two years in cases involving an offence punishable with death, or one year in other cases;

(ii) The period of one year or two years, as the case may be, for the conclusion of the trial begins from the date of the detention of the accused in the case, not from the date when the charge is framed and trial commenced;

(iii) A statutory right to be released on bail accrues in favour of the accused if his trial is not concluded within the specified period, i.e., exceeding one year or two years as the case may be, from the date of his detention;

(iv) This statutory right of the accused to be released on bail is, however, subject to two exceptions: one is embodied in the 3rd proviso itself and the second is provided in the 4th proviso, which are: (a) the delay in conclusion of the trial is occasioned by an act or omission of the accused or by any other person acting on his behalf, and (b) the accused is a convicted offender for an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or is in the opinion of the court a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal, or is accused of an act of terrorism punishable with death or imprisonment for life;

(v) The act or omission on the part of the accused to delay the timely conclusion of the trial must be the result of a visible concerted effort orchestrated by the accused. Merely some adjournments sought by the counsel for the accused cannot be counted as an act or omission on behalf of the accused to delay the conclusion of the trial, unless the adjournments are sought without any sufficient cause on crucial hearings, i.e., the hearings fixed for examination or cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, or the adjournments are repetitive reflecting a design or pattern to consciously delay the conclusion of the trial;

(vi) Any delay attributable to the accused after the expiry of the periods stipulated under the 3rd proviso to section 497(1) Cr.P.C. is not relevant for determining his right to be released on bail on the statutory ground; and

(vii) The phrase "a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal" denotes an accused who is likely to seriously injure and hurt others without caring for the consequences of his violent act and will pose a serious threat to the society if set free on bail. Such tentative finding as to character of the accused must be based upon careful examination of the facts and circumstances of the case, supported by sufficient incriminating material.

26/10/2025

2015 SCMR 1077
Sentencing policy of Narcotics is not relevant at bail stage.

2015 SCMR 56
If the accused is summoned to face trial in private complaint, court required to direct him to execute bound for his appearance.

PLD 2015 Lah 213
Exhumation without the consent of legal heirs/family is not allowed.

PLD 2015 Lah 231
Information through SMS is validly accepted U/A 73 & 164 QSO.

2015 P.Cr.R 1249
Deyat of prevailing year is applicable when the decision is passed.

PLD 2015 Isl 85 (e)
2015 P.Cr.R 230
Prosecution is not bound to produce all witnesses. Material and nature witnesses are sufficient.

PLD 2015 Isl 85 (c)
Press clipping could be considered..

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