30/05/2026
Where relief is sought to set aside an act or order of a government officer made in his official capacity, the matter is governed by Article 14 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908, which prescribes a period of one year from the date of such act or order.
C.P.L.A.1600-L/2014
Province of Punjab through District Officer (Revenue), Bhakkar, etc v. Zulfiqar, etc
PLJ 2026 SC 322.......
PLJ 2026 SC 322
Once the revenue hierarchy has decided the matter, any civil challenge should ordinarily remain confined to examining the legality of such orders on the basis of the existing record, rather than permitting parties to initiate a fresh round of litigation by leading additional oral and documentary evidence through a full-fledged civil trial. In the present case, the respondents’ approach appears to have been to relitigate the entire controversy afresh, which not only defeats the statutory scheme but also amounts to an abuse of process. Such conduct is impermissible particularly in view of the doctrine of election, whereby a litigant, having consciously chosen one statutory remedy and pursued the same to its logical conclusion, cannot be allowed to reopen the matter through another forum merely because the outcome did not suit him Before parting, we are constrained to observe that Courts are under a solemn obligation to jealously guard public property and to ensure that entries in the revenue record, alleged allotments, or fiscal mutations do not become instruments for the unlawful deprivation of State land through defective proof, procedural laxity or collusive conduct. It is equally important to underscore that where the statute provides a complete mechanism of adjudication before the revenue hierarchy, and parties exhaust such remedies up to the highest competent forum, the initiation of a fresh round of litigation before the Civil Court by way of a full-fledged trial, with the object of re-opening settled controversies by leading additional oral and documentary evidence, is neither conducive to certainty in administration of justice nor consistent with the scheme of the law. In such circumstances, the proper recourse ordinarily is to assail the final order of the competent revenue authority by invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, rather than embarking upon a parallel and protracted civil trial. Such parallel proceedings not only undermine the finality attached to decisions of statutory forums but also encourage litigants to engage in forum-shopping, thereby burdening civil courts with disputes which essentially fall within the domain of revenue administration. Civil Courts, no doubt, retain jurisdiction under section 9, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to examine whether the acts or orders of special tribunals were passed with lawful authority and in accordance with law, but such jurisdiction is circumscribed and cannot be permitted to operate as an appellate forum to conduct a complete retrial on merits. The sanctity of revenue proceedings, the discipline of statutory remedies and the principle of finality must be preserved, otherwise public administration and the justice system would remain hostage to endless cycles of litigation.
C.P.L.A.1600-L/2014
Province of Punjab through District Officer (Revenue), Bhakkar, etc v. Zulfiqar, etc
Mr. Justice Shahid Bilal Hassan
20-01-2026....
PLD 2026 SC 177
PLJ 2026 SC 313
MUST READ JUDGEMENT of Larger (5 members) Bench of Supreme Court of Pakistan.
The law governing the withdrawal of suits, as laid out in Rule 1 of Order XXIII, CPC, encompasses two fundamental provisions:
(a) a plaintiff has the inherent right to abandon a suit or any portion of his claim without seeking prior permission from the Court. However, this right comes with the caveat that once a suit or a part of it is abandoned, the plaintiff cannot initiate a fresh suit based on the same cause of action. It is crucial to note that the plaintiff cannot withdraw a suit while simultaneously reserving the right to file a fresh suit on the same grounds. Furthermore, the defendant cannot compel the plaintiff to continue with the proceedings.
(b) In specific situations outlined in Sub-rule (2), the Court may grant the plaintiff permission to withdraw from a suit, thereby allowing the opportunity to initiate a fresh suit on the same cause of action. Such permission, when granted by the Court, serves to safeguard the plaintiff from the restrictive effects of Order II Rule 2 and Section 11 of the CPC.
The stipulations found in Order XXIII Rule 1, CPC, represent a noteworthy exception to the established common law principle of non-suit. Consequently, an application made by a plaintiff under Sub-rule (2) cannot be equated with the unilateral right granted under Sub-rule (1). The latter offers a straightforward path for withdrawal. At the same time, the former necessitates a formal request for a special concession from the Court, contingent upon demonstrating compelling circumstances that merit such a concession. While the grant of leave as envisaged in Sub-rule (2) lies within the discretion of the Court, this discretion must be exercised judiciously and with careful consideration. The legislative intent governing this discretion is clearly articulated in Sub-rule (2), which outlines two distinct scenarios: one in which the Court is convinced that a suit would inevitably fail due to some procedural defect, and the other where the Court recognizes sufficient grounds that warrant the plaintiff’s ability to initiate a fresh suit concerning either the entirety of the subject matter or a portion of a claim. Clause (b) of Sub-rule (2) imposes a clear obligation on the Court to ascertain the adequacy of the grounds presented for permitting the plaintiff to commence a new suit regarding the same claim or part of a claim centred on the identical cause of action. In fulfilling this duty, the Court is mandated by the Code to evaluate all pertinent factors, including the implications of allowing a party to re-engage in litigation based on the same underlying issues. This scrutiny becomes increasingly vital when the application is filed at the appellate or second appellate stage. If leave is granted in such circumstances, it could empower the unsuccessful plaintiff to evade any unfavourable decrees previously rendered against them, essentially allowing a fresh examination of the dispute from a clean slate. Furthermore, this process might disadvantage the contesting defendant, who could lose the benefits of adjudications by the courts below. Additionally, permitting the withdrawal of a suit with the option to file anew could annul rights that have been vested in the defendant or even third parties. Thus, appellate or second appellate courts must approach these matters with a discerning mindset, ensuring stringent adherence to the stipulations outlined in Order XXIII Rule 1(2) of the CPC when exercising their discretionary powers to authorise the withdrawal of a suit with permission to file a new suit on the same cause of action. An equally significant consideration is the potential for wasteful expenditure of public time through the withdrawal of suits at the appellate stage, particularly in light of the pressing backlog of cases in lower courts and the consequential delays in their resolution. The efficient functioning of the judicial system, especially during periods of record case accumulation, underscores the need for careful deliberation in such matters.
The implications of Order XXIII, Rule 1 CPC, as detailed above, have led us to conclude that when a suit is withdrawn with permission to initiate a fresh suit, that permission effectively leaves the parties in the same legal position as if the original suit had never been filed.
This is important because the principle of law is that
It is a well-established principle of law that, under Order VI, Rule 17 of the CPC, amendments to the original plaint that alter the character of the claim are not permitted, even if the nature of the suit remains the same. Similarly, amendments to a written statement that change the entire complexion of the defence are also not allowed.
Civil Appeal No.3347 of 2022
Mst. Sakina Bi, etc vs Barkat Hussain, etc.....
PLJ 2026 SC 287
The revenue hierarchy being a quasi-judicial forum has limited jurisdiction of rectification, specifically, regarding record of rights, periodic record or correction of entries in the register of mutations. Their decisions are administrative and tentative in nature, which neither determine the title of the parties nor resolve the factum of fraud. However, when an aggrieved person challenges the title or validity of the record or mutation, on the plea of fraud or misrepresentation, such controversy requires evidence to prove, which is not within the domain of revenue authorities. For such purpose, the civil court has the ultimate jurisdiction by virtue of section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure (‘CPC’). Section 172 of the Act of 1968 does not debar the civil court from adjudicating on fundamental question of ownership and legality of record or mutation assailed particularly on the ground of fraud. The decision of the civil court regarding determination of question of title and factum of fraud in the record of rights is therefore, binding upon the revenue hierarchy. The jurisdiction of civil courts is barred only in respect of the matter specifically provided for in section 172 of the Act of 1967.
Direct Civil Appeal No. 02-K of 2023
Abdullah and others vs Waryam and others
