Jurist Legal Consultant GB

16/02/2026

It is well settled that in respect of ordinary criminal offences, a Court may assume cognizance under Section 190, Cr.P.C. either upon receipt of a police report under Section 173, Cr.P.C. or upon a private complaint. Contrarily, the legislative scheme governing offences under Chapter XVII-B, PPC conspicuously restricts the initiation of proceedings at the instance of the general public. A comparative reading of Section 462-O, PPC alongside Sections 195 and 196, Cr.P.C. is instructive in this regard. Under Section 195, Cr.P.C., cognizance of specified offences is taken only upon a written complaint by a public servant or a Court, without any statutory requirement of recording reasons prior to taking such cognizance. Section 196, Cr.P.C., on the other hand, imposes a bar on the taking of cognizance of certain offences except upon a complaint or sanction by the Federal or Provincial Government or an authorized officer. Notably, several offences enumerated in Section 196, Cr.P.C., such as those under Sections 123-B, 171J, 153-A and 505, PPC, are cognizable in nature. Consequently, FIRs are duly registered and investigations conducted, yet cognizance by the Court is conditioned upon the requisite complaint or sanction at the stage of framing of charge. A similar legislative pattern is discernible in Section 7 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, which mandates prior sanction for prosecution, notwithstanding the fact that an FIR is registered and investigation is carried out under the said law.

A complaint lodged by a duly authorized officer, culminating in the registration of an FIR under Section 462-I, PPC, is procedurally sufficient and legally efficacious to enable the competent court to assume cognizance of the matter and proceed in accordance with Section 462-O, PPC. It is pertinent to mention here that the legislative intent underlying Section 462-O, PPC, is to ensure regulatory oversight and accountability and not to engraft an additional procedural impediment or superfluous layer of formality which would unnecessarily protract or frustrate the course of criminal justice. Needless to mention here that once the criminal law is set in motion through the registration of an FIR on the basis of a complaint by an authorized officer, the court is fully empowered to take cognizance of the offence without insisting upon the filing of a separate or subsequent complaint. In view of the above, the impugned order cannot be sustained and is hereby set aside.
Crl.Misc.No.66147-M of 2020
(Farhan Anwar Vs. ASJ, Faisalabad & two others)
Date of hearing: 03.02.2026
2026LHC1071

08/02/2026

سٹوڈنٹ اور نوجوان وکلاء کے لیے بہترین کیس ریفرنسز
ACQUITTAL – UNDER S. 249-A, Cr.P.C.

Reference: Criminal Trial.

Scope. Provision of S. 249-A, Cr.P.C. gives right to accused to move application for his acquittal

which is can be even prior to framing of charge. Court, in case of dismissal of application moved under

S. 249-A, Cr.P.C. should discuss the entire material available on record with probably case on the

basis of which reasonable grounds appeared to continue the trial. By enacting reasonable grounds

appeared to continue the trial. By enacting S. 249-A and 265-K, Cr.P.C. the Legislature in its wisdom

does not leave the question of recording evidence as condition before taking action under either of the

provisions; and the use of expression at any stage of the case was indicative enough of the intention

that any such stage could be the very initial stage, after taking cognizance or it could be a middle stage

after recording some proceedings and/or even it could be late stage as well. Section 249-A, Cr.P.C.

empowers the Presiding Officer of the Court to acquit accused at any stage of the trial; and only

requirement to be fulfilled, firstly, is that hearing is to be given to the prosecutor and the counsel of

accused; and secondly, reasons are to be recorded in support of conclusion that the charge is

groundless. [2012 P. Cr.L.J. 999]

 Where the charge is groundless and there is no possibility of conviction of accused then the evil

should be nipped in the bud even prior to the framing of the charge and proceedings against him

should be dropped. [2009 YLR 169]

 Though no clog of time was on exercise of inherent powers by the Courts which could be used at

any stage, but since power of the Trial Court under S. 249-A, Cr.P.C., and under S. 265-K, Cr.P.C.,

was co-extensive with the power of High Court under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C., F.I.R., if required, should

be quashed at pre-trial stage only when cognizance was not taken by the Court otherwise the

matter should be left at the discretion of Trial Court. [2005 P. Cr.L.J. 899]

 Special or peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, could not warrant filing of application

under S.249-A, Cr.P.C. at a stage when the entire prosecution evidence has been recorded and the

case is fixed for recording of statement of accused under S.342, Cr.P.C. [2012 P. Cr.L.J. 76, PLD

1992 S. C. 353 rel Magistrate under S. 249-A, Cr.P.C., is bound to issue notice to the State and that discretion could

only be exercised after hearing both parties, but after submission of challan in the Court. [2005 P.

Cr.L.J. 252]

 For seeking acquittal in a case of groundless charge, normally the Trial Court was to be approached

in the first instance. But such rule was not absolute and it was not always necessary for its strict

compliance. In appropriate cases, more particularly when quashing of proceedings was sought,

deviation was permissible. Even otherwise, there was no bar under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C., to entertain

application directly by High Court. [2005 YLR 3153]

 Acquittal of accused at investigation stage when accused were produced for remand without giving

notice to State would not be sustainable. [2005 P. Cr.L.J. 714]

 Court is empowered even to decline to frame the charge, if no charge is made out or evidence is

insufficient. [2008 P. Cr.L.J. 161]

 During inquiry under S. 200 Cr.P.C., some evidence produced which prima facie made out a case

against the accused. Section 249-A is not attracted. [2008 P. Cr.L.J. 11]

 Once acquittal has taken place and legal remedy available to challenge the same has been availed

without any success, then comes to exist two orders in favour of accused for no interference, even

if another reasonable conclusion is possible on the basis of evidence on record. [1994 P. Cr.L.J.

1920]

 When the accused had been convicted in the main case, he would become entitled to acquittal in

a case which is an offshoot of the main case. [2012 MLD 1315]

 Acquittal by extending benefit of doubt to such acquittal of accused would not bring his case within

ambit of malicious prosecution entitling him to claim damages from complainant rationale behind

the proportions stated. [2012 MLD 1]

Power of Magistrate. Where Court is reasonably convinced that a criminal charge cannot be

sustained, going on trial is not necessary, but charge cannot be said to be groundless within the

meaning of S. 249-A Cr.P.C. if reasonable opportunity is not provided to prove the allegation.

Recording of prosecution evidence is not a condition precedent for acquitting accused. Magistrate can

deal with application at any time irrespective of the fact whether charge is framed or not. [2003 YLR

2749]

 Magistrate under this section is bound to issue notice to the State and that discretion can only be

exercised after hearing both parties and after submission of challan in the Court. [2005 P. Cr.L.J.

252] At any stage. Application u/s 249-A, can be file, taken up for hearing and deciding at any time or

stage of the proceedings, during recording of evidence or when such exercise is over. [2005 SCMR

1544]

 Order u/s. 249-A can be passed even before recording evidence. [2004 P. Cr.L.J. 1068]

 Party can move for acquittal at any stage of the proceedings and there is no legal bar or requirement

that the application for acquittal can only be moved before the trial Court after recording of

evidence of all the witnesses. [PLD 2008 Kar. 567]

Revision. Order of executive Magistrate cannot be revised by judicial Magistrate S. 30 as power to

revise the order of Magistrate lay with the Court of Session. Order of Magistrate acquitting accused

cannot be challenge u/s. 435/439-A, Cr.P.C. [2008 YLR 1526]

Supreme Court. Magistrate is empowered under S. 249-A, Cr.P.C., to acquit accused person at any

stage of the case, if after hearing the prosecutor and accused and for reasons to be recorded he

considers that charge is groundless or that there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any

offence. [PLD 2009 S. C. 102]

 Section 249-A, Cr.P.C. is an exception to normal rule that acquittal takes place after full trial. This

provision reflects a compromise between collective good of society and rights of an individual

offender. Idea is to spare offender rigors of full trial if Court at any stage finds that charge is

groundless and prosecution is not likely to succeed. [PLJ 2004 S. C. 2]

 Usually a criminal case should be allowed to be disposed of on merits after recording of

prosecution evidence, statement of accused under S. 342, Cr.P.C., and under S. 340(2), Cr.P.C.,

if so desired and hearing the arguments of both the parties. Provisions of S. 249-A, S. 265-K and

S. 561-A of the code of Criminal Procedure should not normally be pressed into action for deciding

the fate of a criminal case. [2005 SCMR 1544]

 Court can use S. 561-A, Cr.P.C., to save a party from harassment and abuse of process of

Court. [1993 SCMR 1873]

 A party can move for acquittal at any stage of the proceeding. [1997 SCMR 1503]

 Where upon the material on record a safe assessment can be made that the accused cannot be

convicted, any further delay in the proceedings would be nothing but an abuse of process of the

Court. [1994 SCMR 798]

RMS LEGAL INN Lawyer & Law Firm

03/02/2026

Historic Judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan:
“Consummation (Rukhsati) Is Not a Precondition for Maintenance”
(2026 SCMR 1)
Can a husband lawfully refuse to provide maintenance merely because the wife has not been sent off to the matrimonial home after marriage?
The Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan, in 2026 SCMR 1 (Ambreen Akram v. Asadullah Khan), has conclusively settled this long-standing legal controversy in favour of women by filling a critical legal vacuum.
📜 Salient Features of the Judgment:
Commencement of Right to Maintenance:
The right of a Muslim woman to maintenance arises immediately upon the solemnization of Nikah. It is not dependent upon rukhsati or physical cohabitation.
Legal Status of Rukhsati:
Rukhsati is merely a social and cultural practice. It has no independent recognition or binding legal status under Islamic law or the laws of Pakistan.
Nikah as a Complete and Binding Contract:
The offer and acceptance at the time of Nikah conclusively establish the wife’s willingness to discharge marital obligations. Consequently, the husband becomes legally bound to provide maintenance from that moment.
Protection of Women’s Dignity:
Linking maintenance with rukhsati or physical availability is violative of the constitutional guarantees of dignity, equality, and protection of women.
💡 Message of the Court to the Judiciary:
The Supreme Court observed that judges are not merely dispute resolvers; they are also reformers who must employ sensitive, rights-based, and gender-just language to safeguard women’s rights.
📢 Legal Awareness:
No husband can now escape his financial responsibility on the pretext that rukhsati has not taken place. This landmark judgment dismantles the traditional misuse of power whereby husbands delayed rukhsati to economically coerce or harass their wives.
A decisive step towards rule of law and women’s empowerment.
Written by:
Sardar Rafiq Ahmad Khan Lund
Advocate High Court, LLM, PhD (Law Scholar)
Criminal Side, District Courts, Dera Ghazi Khan, Pakistan
📞 Cell / WhatsApp: 0333-6023706
📧 Email: [email protected]
📘 Facebook ID: Rafiq Khan Lound Adv
📄 page: Rafiq Khan Advocate High Court LLM
⚖️
سپریم کورٹ آف پاکستان کا تاریخی فیصلہ:
“نان و نفقہ کے لیے رخصتی شرط نہیں”
(2026 SCMR 1)
کیا شوہر اس بنیاد پر نان و نفقہ سے انکار کر سکتا ہے کہ شادی کے بعد ابھی رخصتی نہیں ہوئی؟
سپریم کورٹ آف پاکستان نے مقدمہ عنبرین اکرم بنام اسد اللہ خان (2026 SCMR 1) میں خواتین کے حق میں ایک تاریخی اور فیصلہ کن اصول طے کرتے ہوئے اس دیرینہ قانونی ابہام کو ہمیشہ کے لیے ختم کر دیا ہے۔
📜 فیصلے کے اہم نکات:
نان و نفقہ کے حق کا آغاز:
مسلمان عورت کا نان و نفقہ کا حق نکاح کے فوراً بعد پیدا ہو جاتا ہے۔ اس حق کا رخصتی یا ازدواجی ہم بستری سے کوئی تعلق نہیں۔
رخصتی کی قانونی حیثیت:
رخصتی محض ایک سماجی اور ثقافتی رسم ہے، جس کی اسلامی قانون یا ملکی قانون میں کوئی مستقل اور آزاد قانونی حیثیت نہیں۔
نکاح ایک مکمل اور لازم معاہدہ:
نکاح کے وقت ایجاب و قبول اس امر کا قطعی ثبوت ہے کہ عورت ازدواجی ذمہ داریاں ادا کرنے کے لیے آمادہ ہے، لہٰذا اسی لمحے سے شوہر پر نان و نفقہ واجب ہو جاتا ہے۔
خواتین کے وقار اور مساوات کا تحفظ:
نان و نفقہ کو رخصتی یا جسمانی دستیابی سے مشروط کرنا آئینِ پاکستان میں دی گئی عورت کی عزت، وقار اور برابری کی ضمانتوں کے منافی ہے۔
💡 عدلیہ کے لیے سپریم کورٹ کا پیغام:
عدالتِ عظمیٰ نے واضح کیا کہ ججز صرف تنازعات کے فیصلے کرنے والے نہیں بلکہ اصلاح کار بھی ہیں، جنہیں خواتین کے حقوق کے تحفظ کے لیے حساس اور حقوق پر مبنی زبان اختیار کرنی چاہیے۔
📢 قانونی آگاہی:
اب کوئی شوہر “رخصتی نہیں ہوئی” کا بہانہ بنا کر نان و نفقہ سے انکار نہیں کر سکتا۔ یہ فیصلہ اس استحصالی روایت کا خاتمہ کرتا ہے جس کے ذریعے بعض مرد رخصتی میں تاخیر کر کے عورت کو مالی طور پر ہراساں کرتے تھے۔
قانون کی بالادستی اور خواتین کو بااختیار بنانے کی جانب ایک مضبوط قدم۔
تحریر:
سردار رفیق احمد خان لند
ایڈووکیٹ ہائی کورٹ، ایل ایل ایم، پی ایچ ڈی (لا اسکالر)
کرمنل سائیڈ، ڈسٹرکٹ کورٹس، ڈیرہ غازی خان
📞 موبائل / واٹس ایپ: 0333-6023706
📧 ای میل: [email protected]
📘 فیس بک آئی ڈی: Rafiq Khan Lound Adv
📄 فیس بک پیج: Rafiq Khan Advocate High Court LLM

31/01/2026

31/01/2026

سپریم کورٹ کا تاریخی فیصلہ: ایس ایچ او کو "بخدمت جناب" لکھنے پر پابندی، ایف آئی آر میں شہری کو "اطلاع دہندہ" قرار دینے کا حکم

31/01/2026

249-A power of magistrate to aqcuite accused at any stage of proccedings

PLJ 2004 SC 2
PLD 1981 SC 607
NLR 1999 PCRLJ 137
2003 YLR 274
2005 PCRLJ 252
PLD 1984 SC 428
PLD 1999 SC 1063
2000 MLD 605
1991 PCRLJ 1381
1985 SCMR 257
PLD 1991 LAH 268
1999 MLD 1645
PLD 1999 SC 1063
2003 PCRLJ 12
PLJ 2003 AJ&K
2004 PCRLJ 1068

Locus Poenitentie U/S 121 of General Clause Act

PLD 1997 KARACHI 450
1998 SCMR 2745
2002 CLC 1464
2004 YLR 2047
2003 CLC 1196
2000 CLC 443
PLD 1964 SCMR 407
1001 SCMR 15
PLD 1985 AJK 17
PLD 1975 KARACHI 373
1994 MLD 751

Pre- Emption

1988 SCMR 892
1996 CLC 161
2001 SCMR 495
1991 MLD 506
2008 PLD MARCH/APRIL
Mian peer v/s Fakir mohammad
PLD 2007 SC 121
1991 SCMR 112

Accused not named in F.I.R

2006 YLR 1664
2006 YLR 712
2006 PCRLJ 423
2006 PCRLJ 1070
2006 PCRLJ 986
2006 PCRLJ 612
2006 PCRLJ 418
2006 YLR 418
2006 YLR 1404
2006 YLR 1872

Check dishounor / 489-F

PLJ 2004 545

PLD 99 KARACHI 121

PCRLJ 2004 343

PLD 95 SC 34

2004 PLJ LAHORE 522

Plea of Alibi

2005 MLD 1756
2005 MLD 1267
2005 MLD 415
2006 YLR 749
2006 PCRLJ 184
2004SCMR 1019
2005 PCRLJ 1269

Identification Parade

2006 MLD 14
2005 YLR 657
2006 MLD 431
2005 YLR 1404
2006 YLR 673
2005YLR 3151
Identification Parade not Held

Benefit of doubt

PLJ2005 Cr.C Lah 47
2006 MLD 614
2006 MLD 595
PLJ 2005 Cr.C.Pesh 999
2006 PDr.LJ 1033
2005 YLR 3141
Benefit of doubt

Custody of minor

CUSTODY OF MINOR

1. 2003MLD 977
2. 2003 CLC 1492
3. 2003 CLC1265 LAH
4. 1994 MLD 1199
5. 1983 SCMR 480
6. 1981 NLR 741
7. 1983 SCMR 481
8. 1996 CLC KAR
9. 2003 MLD 980

Bail in r**e cases

PCRLJ 2006 CR.C LAHORE 433
PLJ 2006 CR,C LAH 101
PLJ 2006 CR.C LAH 106
PLJ 2005 CR.C LAH 813
PLJ 2005 CR.C LAH 542
2003 YLR 1757
PLJ 2003 CR.C LAH 640

Bail in R**e cases under hadood ordinance Sec 10/11

1984 PCRLJ 365
NLR 1993 56
86 PCRLJ 1587
PLD 84 SC 23
PLD 59 LAH 677
1990 ALD 92 (1)
1990 ALD 435 (2)

Delay in FIR in that cases

1990 ALD 546
NLR 1993 PESH 480

Decoy witness

1994 PCRLJ 292
1989 PCRLJ 1324/1334

Excused of accused in court

1980 PCRLJ 1---3
PLD 1988 KAR 535
1989 PCRLJ 1652
PLD 1993 373

Bail
Bail means to hand over an accused into the hands of surety from the custody of state.

Definition of bail after arrest U/S 497 Cr.P.C
PLJ 2006 SC (AJ & K ) 65.

Principles of bail after arrest.
1. Prima facie case 1991 MLD 1435
2. Appreciation of evidence 2004 PCr.LJ127
3. Benefit of doubt 199 PCr.Lj 582
4. Recovery 1998 MLD 1366
5. Delay in trial PLD 2005 Karachi 201

Distinction between bail after arrest and bail before arrest

2005 PCr.Lj 546 2005 YLR 3133

Grounds of Bail after Arrest

(i) Further Inquiry U/S 497
PLJ 2006 Cr.C.Lah 885 (Grant)
2005 YLR 2532(Grant)
PLJ 2006 Cr.C.Lah 97 (Grant)
2005 MLD 1072 (Grant)

(ii) Delay in Lodging FIR

PLJ 2006 Cr.C(Lah)117 (Grant)
2006 YLR 1863
2006 YLR 1563
2006 YLR 712
2006 PCr.LJ 1087
2006 YLR 712

Stay order 39 rule 1-2

1989 SCMR 130
1992 SCMR 138
1988 PLD S.C 1509
2000 SCMR 780
AIR 37 LAH 288
2003 CLC 16595

Grounds of bail before

2006 YLR 1305
2006 MLD 559
2006 MLD 1046
2006 PCRLJ 234
PLJ CRC(LAH)173
2006 MLD 491

Neccessary party

1906 MLD 195
1986 MLD 18
1957 LAH 882
1970 SCMR 839
1987 LAH 336/307

Ejectment of tenent for personal use

1996 SCMR 1097
1997 SCMR 1062
1991 SCMR 1831
1991 SCMR 2337

1987 MLD 715
1987 MLD 2367
1987 MLD 1078
1988 MLD 1974

NLR 1997 CIVIL 290
NLR 1999 AC 523
NLR 1997 CIVIL 706

PLJ 2003 SC 65

PLD 1987 KARACHI 180

1991 CLC 1381
1991 SCMR 1759

Judgements for maintainance of children to the father

PLD 1881 LAHORE 280
PLD 1986 LAHORE 272
PLD 1958(W.P)LAHORE 596
1985 MLD 96
NLR 1991 CLJ 430
1987 CLC 247. Rafiq Khan Lound Adv 03336023706 Rafiq Khan Advocate High Court LLM 0333 6023706 Rafiq Khan Lound Adv Rafiq Khan Advocate High Court LLM

30/01/2026

عبوری حکمِ امتناعی (Interim Injunction) — دعویٰ برائے ہرجانہ تحت Defamation Ordinance, 2002
🫢
Defamation کے مقدمات میں، جہاں الزامات سنگین نوعیت کے ہوں اور تاحال ثابت نہ ہوئے ہوں، عدالتیں محدود نوعیت کا عبوری حکمِ امتناعی جاری کرنے کا اختیار رکھتی ہیں تاکہ مدعی کو ناقابلِ تلافی نقصان سے بچایا جا سکے۔

اگرچہ آزادیٔ اظہار ایک نہایت اہم آئینی حق ہے، لیکن یہ حق مطلق نہیں۔ اسے ہر صورت میں کسی فرد کی عزت، وقار اور ساکھ کے بنیادی حق کے ساتھ متوازن رکھنا ضروری ہے۔

عدالتیں ایسے معاملات میں عدالتی احتیاط (judicial restraint) سے کام لیتی ہیں، یعنی مقدمہ کے زیرِ التواء ہونے کے دوران فریق کی شہرت کے تحفظ کو یقینی بناتی ہیں، مگر ساتھ ہی یہ بھی خیال رکھا جاتا ہے کہ عبوری حکم حتمی فیصلے پر اثر انداز نہ ہو اور اصل معاملہ میرٹ پر ہی طے کیا جائے۔

30/01/2026

P L D 2026 Supreme Court 20

Columns-13 and 16 of Nikanama---Interpretation---Mentioning of dower amount in Column-13 and immovable property in Column-16---Family court held the wife entitled to dower mentioned in Column No.16 in the form of property; Appellate Court found her entitled to dower amount mentioned in Column-13 and property in Column-16; whereas High Court held that claim of dower mentioned in Column-16 was in lieu of the amount mentioned in Column-13, thus, if the latter obligation was discharged, then the wife was not entitled to recover the dower mention in Column 16---Validity---If the interpretation of the High Court is accepted then dower agreed to be paid in cash would have the effect of virtually making dower in other forms such as immovable or movable property redundant, which would negate the basic concept of dower i.e. parties out of free will agreeing to dower in any form provided it has a marketable value---Parties may, therefore, agree to dower being paid in cash in addition to and distinct from dower in any other form, such as immovable or movable property---Headings of columns in the Nikahnama are definitely not the determinant factor nor can they prevail over the intention of the parties, which would negate the very concept of dower---High Court had virtually rendered the right to dower agreed between the parties in the form of immoveable property as redundant by subjecting its effectiveness to fulfilling the obligation recorded under Column-13---Dower is obligatory and it could be anything which has a marketable value---It can be in the form of cash or property or both---Parties may agree to dower in the form of immovable property in addition to cash---Entry in Column-13 is definitely not a rider to entries in Columns-14, 15 and 16 as was held by High Court---Appellate court had correctly appreciated that the evidence and its interpretation regarding the entries in columns-13, 14 and 16 was in accordance with what the parties had intended at the time of ex*****on of the Nikahnama---Judgment of the High Court was, therefore, set-aside and the judgment and decree of the appellate court was restored---

Columns Nos.13 and 16 of Nikahama---Distinction---Expressions used in Column No.16 “in lieu of”, “whole” and “portion”---Scope---Column 13 is titled 'amount of dower', which is generally construed as referring to dower in the form of amount of cash as being distinct from its other forms and does not refer to nor is construed as the value of the total dower agreed upon by the parties in all its forms because the parties may have intended and agreed to giving dower in its different forms i.e. cash as well as immovable property---Urdu version uses the expression 'raqam', which could be construed as cash only---Likewise, the headings of Columns Nos. 14 and 15 may also be understood as having reference to Column 13 and being distinct from Column 16---It is obvious from a plain reading of the expressions used in the heading of Column No.16 that it specifically refers to dower in the form of property---Expression 'in lieu’ has been used in the context of the 'whole' or any 'portion' of the dower---Dower may only be agreed in the form of property and, therefore, it would amount to giving such a property in lieu of the whole dower, however, the property may also be agreed as portion of the whole dower and in such an eventuality it has been intended to be given in addition to dower in some other form e.g. cash---Expression ‘in lieu’ has definitely not been used with reference to the amount of dower recorded in Column 13 as has been erroneously construed by the High Court---Column 16 further requires the recording of 'specification' and 'valuation' of the property agreed between the parties as dower, which further highlights that the column is specifically meant for recording the dower in the form of property, whether agreed upon to be part or whole of the dower.

Registered Nikahnama, nature of---Evidentiary value---Scope---Significance of the Nikahnama is evident from the fact that a presumption of truth is attached to it and, once it is registered, it enjoys the status of a public document---Likewise, there is a presumption of truth regarding the entries recorded in the Nikahnama---Nikahnama is a civil contract and it consists of terms agreed upon by the parties---Foundational principle of Nikah is the free consent of the contracting parties.

Dower (mehr on demand)---Ambiguity qua entries in Columns Nos.13 and 16 of Nikahnama---Determining factor---Headings/ Columns of the form of Nikahnama---Scope---Neither the headings nor the Columns of the form of the Nikahnama, prescribed by the Rules under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, are conclusive or sacrosanct, rather it is the intent of the parties which would be the determining factor---Any ambiguity in a contract is to be resolved by ascertaining the real intention of the parties and in order to interpret the terms of contract, the court has to first ascertain the intention of the parties---Headings of the prescribed form of the Nikahnama are, therefore, guidance of the parties and they do not enjoy the status of conclusively determining the intention of the parties.

Form of Nikahnama---Correctness of entries---Duty of Nikah Registrar---Scope---Failure to perform such duty---Effect---Correctness of the entries also depends on the competence, knowledge and experience of the licensed Nikah Registrar---Nikah or marriage contract may have been performed in the absence of a licensed Nikah Registrar as is contemplated under S.5(3) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (Ordinance)---Subsection (2A) was inserted in S. 5 of the Ordinance through the Muslim Family Laws (Amendment) Act, 2015, in the Province of Punjab, which makes it a mandatory duty of the Nikah Registrar or any other person who solemnizes the nikah to 'accurately' fill all the columns of the Nikahnama form with the specific answers of the bride or the bridegroom---Failure to fulfill this onerous obligation attracts penal consequences which have been expressly provided under S.5(4)(i) of the Ordinance ---Headings and expressions used in the prescribed form are, therefore, not free from being misconstrued and grossly misinterpreted, particularly if the Nikah Registrar or any other person solemnizing the Nikah lacks experience, knowledge or proper understanding of the principles governing the marriage contract.

Dower---Meaning, forms and scope---Marriage in absence of dower---Validity---Existence of dower---Presumption---Dower is a mandatory condition for a valid and effective marriage contract---Validity of a marriage remains unaffected even if the parties have not expressly mentioned it in the marriage contract because, in such eventuality, reasonable dower, 'Mehr-ul-Misel, is presumed---Dower is given by the husband to the wife and its determination would be subject to consent of the wife---Dower is the exclusive right of a bride, which is relatable to a thing which has marketable value---It can either be in the form of cash or property or both--It may be prompt or deferred---If the parties have not specified the nature of the payment of dower, then it is presumed to be prompt as provided under S. 10 of the Ordinance---Dower is an essential condition for giving effect to a valid marriage contract---It becomes the exclusive property of the wife because it has many benefits for both the parties---It is financial security for the wife and its determination must be guided by informed understanding of the bride regarding her rights---An unconditional declaration of dower in the form of immovable property leads to creating the exclusive ownership of the bride upon the ex*****on of the Nikahnama and she cannot be deprived of her rights relating thereto in any manner---Dower in the form of cash is distinct from its other forms.

Nikahnama---Terms and conditions---Interpretation---“Whether, in cases of ambiguity, the rights recorded in the relevant columns should be interpreted in favour of the husband on the ground that he bears the financial liabilities?”---Held: Such an understanding is contrary to the concept and the fundamental principles relating to a Nikah i.e. a marriage contract---Law enforced in Pakistan relating to marriage contracts explicitly recognizes the rights of both the parties, the bride and the groom, to give free consent in order to enter into a contractual bond of marriage and the freedom to negotiate and settle the terms and conditions---Both the contracting parties must have informed understanding of their respective rights and the entries which are required to be recorded in the Nikahnama---Court, while deciding a dispute and interpreting the terms and conditions of the parties, has to take into consideration whether the free consent or free will of the parties was compromised on account of the attending circumstances, such as cultural and social influences.
Civil Petitions Nos. 768 and 827 of 2022
Mst. FAKHRA JABEEN and others Versus WASIF ALI

30/01/2026

2024 SCMR 1071
PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C) 1
VVVVI.MUST READ JUDGEMENT.
PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C) 1
سپریم کورٹ کا یہ فیصلہ پڑھ کر ضمانت کے معاملات میں اصول مساوات (rule of consistency) کی حقیقی تشریح اور سکوپ پوری طرح سمجھ میں آجائیگا۔

The scope of rule of consistency in bail matters.
[Benchmark for applying the rule of consistency is not only the role attributed to the accused in the FIR but also the material collected in the investigation.]

What is the benchmark for applying the rule of consistency in granting bail to an accused?
In other words, what is that has to be compared between the case of the accused and the co-accused in order to determine consistency for the purpose of determining the applicability of the rule of consistency in granting bail under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CrPC”); w

Whether it is merely the role attributed to the accused and the co-accused in the FIR? or whether the role has to be assessed by compositely considering the FIR and the material collected during investigation by the Police?

The rule of consistency applied in bail matters is premised on the fundamental right to equality before the law guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan This right to equality before the law ensures that persons similarly placed in similar circumstances are to be treated in the same manner. In other words, among equals the law should be equally administered; the like should be treated alike. Article 25 of the Constitution does not prohibit different treatment to persons who are not similarly placed or who are not in similar circumstances. To claim equality before the law an accused person must therefore show that he and his coaccused who has been granted bail are similarly placed in similar circumstances. In other words, he must show that the prosecution case, as a whole, against him is at par with that against his co-accused who has been granted bail, and not distinguishable in any substantial aspect. The rule of consistency is also pillared on Articles 4 and 10A of the Constitution ensuring that level playing field and fairness is maintained in adjudicating cases of co-accused. The right to liberty under Article 9 of the Constitution has to be extended fairly and without discrimination to an applicant seeking bail.(Syed Naeem Ali Adv 03006762054)The rule of consistency in bail matters is fundamental to ensuring fairness, reducing arbitrary decision-making, and maintaining public confidence in the criminal justice system. It's a key aspect of the rule of law, ensuring that all individuals are treated equally under the law.

The rule of consistency in bail matters is attracted and applied after the grant of bail to a co-accused. Grant of bail by a court considers several factors like the contents of the FIR, the incriminating material collected by the police during investigation, the past history of the accused, etc. The grounds which form the basis for the grant of bail to a co-accused is thus the benchmark for grant of bail to the accused under the rule of consistency. Therefore, the court has to assess whether the role of the accused in the FIR, examined in the background of the material collected by the Police is the same as that of the co-accused, who has been granted bail. It is this congruence in the case of the co-accused and the accused that attracts the rule of consistency.

The offence of Qatl-i-Amd (intentional murder) involved in the present case, being punishable with death or imprisonment for life under Section 302, PPC, falls within the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1), CrPC. In the offences that fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1), CrPC, the post-arrest bail is granted on three grounds:

(i) under the first proviso to Section 497(1), CrPC, on the ground of the accused being a minor, or a woman, or a sick or infirm person;

(ii) under the third proviso to Section 497(1), CrPC, on the ground of delay in the conclusion of the trial beyond the period prescribed for no fault of the accused; and

(iii) under Section 497(2), CrPC, on the ground that there are no reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed the offence, but rather there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry into his guilt.

For the determination of the question under Section 497(2), CrPC, as to whether or not there exist any "reasonable grounds" for believing that the accused has committed the alleged offence, the courts have to appraise although tentatively the whole material available on the record of the case. This question cannot be determined by merely examining the contents of the FIR. Essentially, it is the tentative assessment of the evidence collected in the investigation both for and against the accused that is determinative of the said question. Likewise, to decide upon the applicability of the rule of consistency for granting bail under Section 497(2), CrPC, the courts have to examine the whole material available on the record of the case. Without doing so, it cannot be determined whether the accused who claims the benefit of this rule and his co-accused who has been granted bail are similarly placed in similar circumstances. We have, therefore, no doubt in our minds in holding that the benchmark for applying the rule of consistency is not only the role attributed to the accused in the FIR but also the material collected in the investigation.
Crl.P.298/2023
Mohammad Atif v. The State