What are the opening hours?

Monday 8am - 5pm Tuesday 8am - 5pm Wednesday 8am - 5pm Thursday 8am - 5pm Friday 8am - 5pm Saturday 8am - 12pm Sunday 9am - 12pm

http://www.tanandtanlawfirm.com/

Tan & Tan Law Firm, Broce Street, San Carlos City (2026)

10/10/2026

A N N O U N C E M E N T 📣

09/10/2026

The (SC) has ruled that probate courts, which settle a deceased person’s estate, may require banks to explain withdrawals from the deceased person’s accounts to determine whether the funds are part of the estate.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC’s Third Division upheld the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC) order requiring Union Bank of the Philippines (UnionBank) to explain withdrawals from the accounts of the late Ignacio T. Arroyo and submit related email exchanges.

During the settlement of Arroyo’s estate, the estate administrators discovered that money had been withdrawn from his UnionBank accounts after his death without the heirs’ knowledge.

The RTC, upon motion of the heirs, required UnionBank to explain the withdrawals and submit additional records, including emails exchanged between bank officers and a certain Atty. Fe. This was upheld by the Court of Appeals.

UnionBank challenged the ruling before the SC, arguing that the RTC had exceeded its authority as a probate court. The bank claimed that the withdrawals were made under a survivorship agreement and were used, among others, to settle Arroyo’s existing obligations. It also argued that any attempt to recover the funds should be brought in a separate civil case.

In upholding the RTC, the SC explained that while probate courts have limited powers, they may provisionally determine whether property belongs to a deceased person’s estate. Under Rule 87 of the 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘵, they may also require persons suspected of concealing or taking estate property to answer questions and account for it.

In this case, the bank accounts were admittedly in Arroyo’s name. The RTC merely sought to determine how much money was in the accounts when he died and whether the funds should be included in the estate.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=174678

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/e-02776-union-bank-of-the-philippines-vs-bernardina-arroyo-tantoco-and-alicia-rita-m-arroyo/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

08/10/2026

The 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤, during its session on October 7, 2026, approved amendments to the 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘵 (A.M. No. 25-03-14-SC) to make it easier for Filipino spouses to prove a foreign divorce when seeking its recognition in Philippine courts.

Under the amendments, which will take effect 15 days after they are posted on the Supreme Court Website, Filipino spouses seeking recognition of a foreign divorce under Article 26(2) of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 will no longer need to prove the applicable foreign law when filing their petition. They will only need to prove that the foreign divorce took place.

The amendments introduce Section 48-A of Rule 39, which presumes that a foreign divorce between a Filipino and a foreign spouse allows the foreign spouse to remarry under foreign law, unless the divorce decree itself states that it is only a limited divorce.

The party opposing the petition now bears the burden of proving that the divorce is not absolute.

The new rule also presumes that an English translation of a foreign divorce document is accurate if the translator certifies its accuracy under oath.

These presumptions are disputable; they may be challenged with contrary evidence, under Section 3 of Rule 131.

The amendments, however, leave the existing legal framework unchanged. A petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce is still required, and the substantive requirements of Article 26(2) of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 remain the same.

Recognition of a foreign divorce may still be opposed on grounds such as lack of jurisdiction, lack of notice, fraud, or a clear mistake of law or fact.

The amendments were approved upon the recommendation of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, and in consultation with Associate Justices Amy C. Lazaro-Javier and Jhosep Y. Lopez, and the Sub-Technical Working Group on the Concerns of Overseas Working Filipinos Regarding the Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees/Reports (Sub-TWG).

During consultations with the Sub-TWG, the Department of Foreign Affairs identified several challenges. Foreign family laws are often spread across different jurisdictions, making them difficult to obtain. Some countries have no designated official who can certify these laws, while foreign ministries generally do not provide official English translations.

Through these amendments, the Supreme Court aims to remove unnecessary barriers and make it easier for Filipinos to exercise their rights under the law.

Read the full text of the Press Briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=174621.

The full text of the Supreme Court 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 Resolution A.M. No. 25-03-14-SC shall be uploaded to the Supreme Court Website once available.

06/10/2026

The has upheld the cancellation of a man’s life insurance policy for failing to disclose important information about his medical condition, reiterating that proof he intended to deceive the insurer is not required.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the Supreme Court 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 denied the petition for review on 𝘤𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘳𝘢𝘳𝘪 of the Heirs of Indalicio Monera (“Heirs”) and dismissed their complaint against Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation (MB Life) and Meycauayan Rural Bank, Inc. (Meycauayan Bank).

Monera took out loans from Meycauayan Bank, some of which were secured by a mortgage on a parcel of land and a group credit life insurance policy issued by MB Life. Under the policy, the insurance proceeds would be paid to the bank in case of Monera’s death.

When Monera applied for another credit life insurance policy, he signed a health declaration stating that he had not been sick for seven or more consecutive days, nor had he consulted a doctor for any illness in the last five years.

Less than a month after getting the second policy, Monera died. When his loans became due, Meycauayan Bank filed a claim with MB Life, but the insurer denied it after learning that before applying for the policy, Monera had been diagnosed with cancer.

In denying the petition of the Heirs, the Supreme Court cited the 𝘐𝘯𝘴𝘶𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, which allows an insurer to cancel an insurance policy when an applicant fails to disclose information, whether intentionally or unintentionally. Information is considered material if it could have affected the insurer’s decision to issue the policy.

In this case, Monera did not state that he had undergone surgery, consulted doctors, and had been diagnosed with cancer, even though he declared otherwise in the health declaration form.

The Supreme Court explained that Monera’s failure to disclose his true health status was material because it would have influenced MB Life’s assessment of his insurance application, including whether to approve it and under what terms.

The Supreme Court also clarified that insurers do not need to prove that the insured intended to deceive them.

Read the full text of the Press Release:
https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=174351

Read the full text of the Decision: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168794

Read the Dissenting Opinion of Senior Associate Marvic M.V.F. Leonen: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=172227

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=172230

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=172233

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

02/10/2026

The has voided a couple’s marriage after finding that they falsely claimed five years of cohabitation to avoid obtaining a marriage license.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC’s Third Division denied the petition of the Republic of the Philippines which sought to declare a couple’s marriage valid despite the absence of a marriage license.

The couple had lived together as husband and wife since December 2003. In 2006, the husband left for Israel to work and returned in 2009 to marry his wife. To facilitate their marriage without the required license, the couple executed an 𝘈𝘧𝘧𝘪𝘥𝘢𝘷𝘪𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘰𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯, claiming they had lived together for six years and were thus exempt from the marriage license requirement under the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦.

In 2013, the husband filed a petition to declare the marriage void, arguing the 𝘈𝘧𝘧𝘪𝘥𝘢𝘷𝘪𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘰𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 they executed was false because he was in Israel for most of the period it covered.

The SC explained that while Article 3(2) of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 provides that one of the formal requisites of a marriage is a valid marriage license, Article 34 of the same provides an exception to this requirement for couples who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and have no legal impediment to marry each other.

Citing the 2000 case of 𝘕𝘪ñ𝘢𝘭 𝘷. 𝘉𝘢𝘺𝘢𝘥𝘰𝘨, the SC stressed that the five-year cohabitation period is counted back from the marriage date. The couple must have lived together continuously and exclusively, without interruption or a third party.

In this case, the SC said that the testimony of the husband showed the couple had not lived together continuously for five years, making their 𝘈𝘧𝘧𝘪𝘥𝘢𝘷𝘪𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘰𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 to the solemnizing officer false. His testimony also supported the finding that they failed to meet the five-year requirement.

The SC found that from 2001 to 2004, before the husband left for Israel, they lived separately and only occasionally shared a rented room with relatives. From 2005 to 2009, while the husband was in Israel, there was no evidence that they presented themselves as spouses or that he intended to return to the Philippines to live with his wife.

The SC thus ruled that there was not enough evidence to prove that the couple continuously and exclusively cohabited as husband and wife for a period of five years immediately preceding the celebration of their marriage.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=174170.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168047.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

02/10/2026

The En Banc, during its session today, September 30, 2026, directed the Office of the President, the Senate, the House of Representatives and the Comelec to comment on the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo Macalintal challenging the constitutionality of RA 12326, as well as his request for a TRO and/or SQAO.

The respondents were given a non-extendible period of five calendar days from notice.

RA 12326, enacted on September 24, 2026, fixed the terms of barangay officials and members of the Sangguniang Kabataan to five years and postponed the November 2026 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections (BSKE) to November 2028.

Macalintal argues that the new law violates the electorate’s right to vote by postponing the 2026 BSKE under the guise of fixing the officials’ term of office.

He claimed that it effectively allows incumbent barangay and SK officials to “hold over” their positions for three years, or from December 2025 to November 2028.

Read the Press Briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=174115

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/

02/10/2026

The (SC) 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤, during its session today, September 30, 2026, dismissed the petitions filed by Victor D. Rodriguez, Berteni Cataluña Causing, and Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., challenging the Senate Impeachment Court’s interpretation of the two-thirds vote required to convict in an impeachment case, due to procedural grounds including lack of standing and prematurity.

On September 23, 2026, the Senate Impeachment Court ruled that the phrase “all the Members of the Senate” under Article XI, Section 3(6) of the Constitution refers only to senators who are legally and actually able to participate in the impeachment proceedings at the time of the vote.

Rodriguez argued that the Impeachment Court effectively amended the Constitution by adding a qualification not found in its text. He asked the SC to nullify the ruling and declare that any change to Article XI, Section 3(6) must go through the constitutional process for amendment or revision. He also sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the implementation of the ruling.

Causing argued that senators who remain in office should still be counted even if they are in hiding, detained, or medically unable to attend. He prayed for the issuance of a status quo ante order (SQAO) and/or TRO to stop any final vote on Vice President Sara Z. Duterte’s conviction while his petition was pending. He also sought to compel Senators Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada, Jr., Rodante Marcoleta, and Ronald “Bato” dela Rosa to participate in the impeachment trial and the Senate to take the necessary steps to secure their attendance.

Francisco similarly argued that because the Constitution provides for a 24-member Senate, conviction requires the concurrence of at least 16 senator-judges. He maintained that senators who are detained, on medical leave, or temporarily absent remain members of the Senate and should therefore be counted. He also asked for an SQAO pending the resolution of his petition.

The dismissal of the petitions was based on procedural grounds such as lack of standing and prematurity, among others.

Read the full text of the Press Briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=174115

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

02/10/2026

The has ruled that waiving rights to inherited property may be considered a valid donation when it shows intent to donate and meets the legal requirements for a donation.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, the SC’s Second Division denied the consolidated petitions filed by Felix G. Cruz and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ (CA) rulings upholding the transfer of two inherited properties by Luis and Rosita Cruz to their sons, Robin and Osias.

The case involved two parcels of land left by Judy Cruz, who died single and without a will. She was survived by her parents, Luis and Rosita, and five siblings, including Felix, Robin, and Osias.

After Judy’s death, Luis and Rosita executed separate notarized 𝘞𝘢𝘪𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘪𝘨𝘩𝘵𝘴 over the properties in favor of Robin and Osias, who later executed an 𝘌𝘹𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘫𝘶𝘥𝘪𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘚𝘦𝘵𝘵𝘭𝘦𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘌𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘦 and registered the properties in their names.

Felix and his two other siblings, Doris and Henry, also executed waivers giving up any interest in the properties. Felix, who was the family lawyer, prepared these documents.

After their mother died, Felix sought to nullify the transfer of the properties and cancel the titles of Robin and Osias. Felix argued that the transfer was invalid and that the properties should have remained part of their mother’s estate, to which he was entitled to inherit as one of the heirs.

The SC upheld the ruling of the trial court and the CA dismissing Felix’s complaint and holding that the Waivers of Rights executed by Luis and Rosita constituted valid donations in favor of Robin and Osias.

The SC explained that when Judy died, ownership of her properties immediately passed to her parents as her legal heirs. Luis and Rosita therefore had the right to dispose of the properties.

Although the documents they executed were called 𝘞𝘢𝘪𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘪𝘨𝘩𝘵𝘴, the SC found that Luis and Rosita intended to donate the properties to Robin and Osias.

Under Article 749 of the 𝘊𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, a valid donation of real property requires: (1) a decrease in the donor’s property; (2) a corresponding increase in the donee’s property; (3) intent to donate; (4) ex*****on of the donation in a public document; and (5) acceptance by the donee. If the acceptance is in a separate document, the donor must be informed.

These requirements were met in this case. Luis and Rosita gave up their ownership of the properties in favor of Robin and Osias through notarized documents that expressly authorized the transfer. Robin and Osias, in turn, accepted the donation by executing the 𝘌𝘹𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘫𝘶𝘥𝘪𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘚𝘦𝘵𝘵𝘭𝘦𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 and registering the properties in their names. Their actions were made known to Luis and Rosita.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=174097.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168026.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

28/09/2026

The has adopted the term "𝘷𝘪𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘮-𝘴𝘶𝘳𝘷𝘪𝘷𝘰𝘳" when referring to persons who have experienced sexual violence.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC’s Third Division affirmed a man’s conviction for the r**e of a 12-year-old child.

The minor testified that while everyone was asleep, the accused, who was the common-law spouse of the minor’s mother, dragged the child outside the residence of her uncle, r**ed her, pointed a knife at her, and threatened to kill her if she told anyone about the incident.

She told her uncle and aunt that the accused had been sexually abusing her since she was nine years old. She did not report it earlier because she feared his threats.

The SC found all the elements of r**e present and the accused positively identified as the ra**st. In addition to the penalty of 𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘭𝘶𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘱𝘦𝘳𝘱𝘦𝘵𝘶𝘢 or up to 40 years in prison, the SC ordered the man to pay the victim-survivor PHP 450,000 in civil indemnity and damages.

The SC clarified its terminology in cases involving sexual violence. Rather than using the term "𝘷𝘪𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘮," it adopted "𝘷𝘪𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘮-𝘴𝘶𝘳𝘷𝘪𝘷𝘰𝘳" to acknowledge both the harm caused by the crime and the strength victims show in enduring and recovering from such violence.

As part of the government’s efforts to provide comprehensive support for victim-survivors, the SC also directed the Department of Social Welfare and Development to refer the minor to the proper r**e crisis center for assistance.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=174013.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168013.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

Tan & Tan Law Firm

10/10/2026

09/10/2026

08/10/2026

06/10/2026

02/10/2026

02/10/2026

02/10/2026

02/10/2026

28/09/2026

Address

Opening Hours

Website

Alerts

Shortcuts

Share

Category

Listing takedown request

Monday	8am - 5pm
Tuesday	8am - 5pm
Wednesday	8am - 5pm
Thursday	8am - 5pm
Friday	8am - 5pm
Saturday	8am - 12pm
Sunday	9am - 12pm