GACA Law Office

15/09/2026

Pinatawan ng ng indirect contempt ang isang bar review coach dahil sa pagpapakalat ng maling impormasyon tungkol sa 2023 Bar Examinations sa Facebook, matapos niyang sabihin na susuriin ang nasabing pagsusulit gamit ang artificial intelligence o AI.

Sa isang Per Curiam na Desisyon, idineklara ng En Banc ng Korte Suprema na may pananagutan si Edgar S. Dizon, administrador ng Facebook group na Bar Law for Dummies, dahil sa indirect contempt. Pinagmulta siya ng Korte ng PHP 30,000 at iniutos ang pag-alis ng kanyang pangalan sa listahan ng mga pumasa sa 2016 Bar Examinations.

Noong Setyembre 21, 2023, nag-viral ang isang post mula sa Facebook group at account na Tsidkenu Dizon na artificial intelligence (AI) umano ang sasala at magwawasto sa 2023 Bar Exams, kasabay ng payong:

“ALWAYS START WITH YES or NO.
Yan ang unang hahanapin ng AI Checking to sort out the correct answers.”

Dahil dito, kinailangang imbestigahan ng Office of the 2023 Bar Chair (BCO), sa pamumuno ni Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, ang pinagmulan ng post at alamin ang naging epekto nito sa pagsusulit. Naglabas din ito ng advisory na nililinaw na apat na human examiner para sa bawat subject ang susuri sa mga pagsusulit, na pawang eksperto sa kani-kanilang larangan.

Sa halip na alisin ang post, nagbanta pa si Dizon na magsasampa ng kaso laban sa Korte at hiniling nito na humingi ang Korte ng tawad sa loob ng 24 oras. Nagpadala rin siya ng ilang email sa Judiciary Public Assistance Section ng Korte Suprema na nagsasabing nagkaroon ng chilling effect sa kanya ang advisory. Itinanggi niyang nagpakalat siya ng maling impormasyon at hiniling sa Korte na maglabas ng pahayag na nagwawasto sa advisory.

Inamin ni Dizon na siya ang may-ari ng Facebook account matapos siyang atasan ng Korte na ipaliwanag kung bakit hindi siya dapat patawan ng indirect contempt dahil sa panghihimasok sa pagsasagawa ng 2023 Bar Examinations. Gayunman, itinanggi niyang sinabi niyang AI ang susuri sa mga pagsusulit, at iginiit na ginamit niya sa kanyang post ang mga salitang “TO HELP.”

Hindi nakumbinsi ang Korte at pinanagot si Dizon sa ilalim ng Rule 71, Section 3 ng Rules of Court, na nagpaparusa sa ilegal na panghihimasok sa mga proseso ng korte sa labas ng courtroom, mga gawaing nakasisira sa dangal ng mga hukuman o nagpapahina sa tiwala ng publiko sa pangangasiwa ng hustisya, at hindi awtorisadong pagsasagawa ng abogasya bilang indirect contempt.

Sinabi ng Korte na ang post ni Dizon ay makakaapekto sa integridad ng Bar Exams at ng Korte Suprema mismo na siyang nangangasiwa sa propesyon ng pag-aabogasya.

Napatunayan din na nagdulot ng kalituhan at pangamba ang maling impormasyon. Kinailangan ng mga opisyal ng Bar na ilaan ang kanilang limitadong oras at gamit sa pagtukoy sa pinagmulan ng post, pakikipag-ugnayan sa mga ahensiya ng pamahalaan, pagpapalabas ng mga paglilinaw, at pagtugon sa maraming katanungan.

Binalaan din ng Korte si Dizon laban sa hindi awtorisadong pagpapraktis ng abogasya dahil nagsagawa siya ng mga bar review coaching session at nagsulat ng ilang bar review materials kahit hindi siya abogado. Inamin ni Dizon na bagama’t pumasa siya sa 2016 Bar Examinations, hindi pa siya nanunumpa bilang abogado dahil sa mga nakabinbing kasong kriminal laban sa kanya.

Sa kanyang Separate Concurring Opinion, sumang-ayon si Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen na dapat parusahan si Dizon dahil sa pagsira sa integridad ng Bar Examinations. Gayunman, binigyang-diin din niya ang pangangailangang timbangin ang kapangyarihan ng Korte na magparusa sa contempt at ang karapatang konstitusyonal sa malayang pagpapahayag, kabilang ang lehitimong pagpuna sa mga hukuman.

Basahin ang press release sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=172950.

Basahin ang Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/4734-in-re-social-media-posts-of-edgar-s-dizon/.

Basahin ang Separate Concurring Opinion ni Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/4734-separate-concurring-opinion-senior-associate-justice-marvic-m-v-f-leonen/.

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

15/09/2026

15/09/2026

The (SC) has ruled that appearing intoxicated, smelling of alcohol, or being found near empty liquor bottles is not, by itself, enough to establish a violation of the election liquor ban.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, the SC’s Third Division acquitted Mcgill Esquillo Omandam (Omandam), ruling that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he consumed alcohol during the prohibited period as stated under Section 261(dd)(1) of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), or the “COMELEC liquor ban.”

Omandam was arrested on the eve of the elections after police responded to reports of rowdiness. Arresting officers said he appeared intoxicated, smelled of alcohol, spoke with a slurred voice, and moved groggily. The police also recovered two empty bottles of Tanduay Rhum near the scene.

The SC explained that the OEC prohibits the taking of intoxicating liquor during the election liquor ban, which covers the day before the election and election day. The prosecution has to prove that the accused actually consumed alcohol during that period.

In this case, however, none of the arresting officers saw Omandam drinking. The prosecution relied solely on circumstantial evidence.

While circumstantial evidence may support a conviction, the SC stressed that the circumstances taken together must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt and rule out any reasonable explanation of innocence.

The SC found that the prosecution failed to meet this standard. It based its case solely on observations of Omandam’s appearance and other unsupported circumstances.

The SC noted that the offense is not typically committed in secret and could have been easily verified through readily available means, such as field sobriety, breath analyzer, or chemical tests. However, the police did not conduct any of these, nor did they take photographs or videos to document Omandam’s alleged intoxication.

Although two empty liquor bottles were recovered, the police did not examine them for fingerprints or conduct forensic tests to determine whether Omandam handled them.

The SC ruled that these omissions undermined the accuracy and fairness of the investigation. Taken together, they cast doubt on the reliability and sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence.

Read more at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=173139

Read the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=173133

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

09/09/2026

Nilinaw ng na walang kapangyarihang humawak ang National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) sa isang alitan kung ang dalawang panig na sangkot dito ay hindi kapwa katutubo mula sa iisang grupo.

Sa isang Desisyong isinulat ni Kasangguning Mahistrado Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, isinantabi ng Ikatlong Dibisyon ng Korte ang petisyong naglalayong utusan ang isang hukom na bawiin ang desisyon nito sa isang kasong ejectment laban sa mag-asawang nagsasabing kabilang sila sa isang katutubong pamayanan (Indigenous Peoples o IP). Iginiit ng mag-asawa na, bilang mga miyembro ng katutubong pamayanan, dapat umiral ang kanilang mga kaugalian at tradisyonal na batas sa paglutas ng kanilang alitan, alinsunod sa Republic Act No. 8371 o Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA).

Nag-ugat ang kaso sa isang reklamong unlawful detainer na inihain ni Kristoffer R. Co Uy (Co Uy) para paalisin sa ari-ariang nakarehistro sa kanya ang mag-asawang Elvin at Jocelyn Sending (mga Sending).

Kapwa pumanig kay Co Uy ang Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Regional Trial Court, at Court of Appeals (CA), at iniutos ng mga ito sa mga Sending na lisanin ang ari-arian.

Matapos maging pinal ang desisyon at habang ipinatutupad ito, kinuwestiyon ng mag-asawa ang hurisdiksiyon ng MCTC. Iginiit nila na kabilang sila sa Lumad KKK-Alimaong Higaonon Tribe, isang grupo ng mga katutubo. Sa unang pagkakataon, sinabi rin nila na dapat gamitin ang mga kaugalian, tradisyon, at nakagawiang pamamaraan ng kanilang komunidad sa paglutas ng alitan tungkol sa ari-arian, alinsunod sa IPRA. Sa ilalim ng IPRA, nasa hurisdiksiyon ng National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) ang mga alitang may kinalaman sa mga karapatan ng mga katutubo.

Dinala ng mag-asawa ang kaso sa Korte Suprema matapos tanggihan ng MCTC ang kanilang mosyon na ipagpaliban ang pagpapatupad ng desisyon. Iginiit nila na ang Higaonon Tribe at ang Dadantulan Tribal Court, at hindi ang MCTC, ang dapat na may hurisdiksiyon sa kanilang kaso.

Hindi sumang-ayon ang Korte Suprema at nilinaw na, sa ilalim ng Section 66 ng IPRA, may hurisdiksiyon lang ang NCIP sa mga alitang may kinalaman sa mga karapatan ng mga katutubo kung ang lahat ng partido ay kabilang sa iisang katutubong grupo. Kung may isang partido na hindi kabilang sa parehong katutubong pamayanan, nasa regular na hukuman ang hurisdiksiyon sa kaso.

Sa kasong ito, hindi kabilang si Co Uy sa anumang katutubong grupo. Ipinaliwanag ng Korte Suprema na hindi magiging patas kung isasailalim siya sa mga kaugaliang batas ng isang katutubong pamayanan na hindi naman siya kasapi.

Napansin din ng Korte Suprema na walang ipinakita ang mga Sending na anumang ebidensiyang nagpapatunay sila ay katutubo. Hindi rin nila naipaliwanag ang kanilang mga kaugalian, istrukturang pampulitika, mga institusyon, o proseso ng paggawa ng mga desisyon.

Binigyang-diin ng Korte Suprema na hindi basta-basta maaaring balewalain o ipawalang-bisa ang isang pinal na desisyon, lalo na kung nabigyan ang mga partido ng pagkakataong ilahad at ipagtanggol ang kanilang panig, at ang desisyon ay nabuo matapos ang masusing pagsusuri sa kaso.

Napag-alaman ng Korte Suprema na ginamit lang ng mga petisyoner ang awtoridad ng NCIP para maiwasan ang pagpapatupad ng pinal na desisyon laban sa kanila. Inihayag lamang nila na kabilang sila sa isang katutubong grupo nang nasa yugto na ng pagpapatupad ng desisyon ang kaso, sa kabila ng kanilang paglahok sa mga paglilitis sa barangay at sa mga regular na hukuman. Dahil dito, nagkaroon ng pagdududa ang Korte sa kredibilidad ng kanilang pahayag na sila ay mga miyembro ng isang katutubong pamayanan.

Inatasan ng Korte Suprema ang mag-asawa na lisanin ang nasabing ari-arian sa loob ng 30 araw mula nang matanggap nila ang Desisyon.

Basahin ang Press Release sa: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-ncip-jurisdiction-over-ip-disputes-requires-both-partiesto-be-from-same-indigenous-group/

Basahin ang kabuuang teksto ng Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/271354-spouses-elvin-sending-datu-gibo-and-jocelyn-sending-bae-orange-vs-kristopper-rahda-co-uy-atty-jocelyn-pesquera-henry-p-canete-jr-and-hon-ameli-amor-r-estrada-presiding-judge-of-t/

Basahin ang Concurring Opinion ni Kasangguning Mahistrado Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/271354-concurring-opinion-justice-alfredo-benjamin-s-caguioa/

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

09/09/2026

by the numbers:

On Day 2 of the 2026 Bar Examinations, 12,017 or 99.9% of the 12,029 examinees who showed up on the first day continued their journey toward becoming members of the legal profession.

06/09/2026

To all our Bar Takers, you’ve got this! ⚖️

The Legal Education Board stands with you as you take this important step toward joining the legal profession. Years of study, sacrifice, perseverance, and dedication have brought you to this moment.

As you face the Bar Examinations, trust in your preparation, believe in your abilities, and approach each question with clarity, confidence, and composure. Let everything you have learned and everything you have worked for carry you through.

The Board is cheering for you every step of the way.

May your efforts lead you toward a meaningful career in law, guided by competence, integrity, compassion, and a genuine commitment to service.

Good luck, Bar Takers! May this milestone bring you one step closer to becoming the kind of lawyer you aspire to be.

06/09/2026

The (SC) has ruled that evidence of credit card hacking cannot be seized under a search warrant that authorizes only the search for illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia unless they are discovered in plain view.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC’s Third Division acquitted an accused of violating Republic Act No. (RA) 8484, or 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘈𝘤𝘤𝘦𝘴𝘴 𝘋𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘤𝘦𝘴 𝘙𝘦𝘨𝘶𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 1998. Section 9(e) of the law prohibits the possession of counterfeit access devices, including fake credit cards.

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) received information that the accused was involved in illegal drug activities and computer hacking, particularly credit card fraud.

To verify the report, the NBI instructed the informant to buy methamphetamine hydrochloride (𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶) from the accused. Laboratory test later confirmed that it was indeed 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶.

The NBI obtained a search warrant for violation of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, authorizing the search for 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶 and other drug-related items.

During the search of the accused’s residence, NBI agents seized several items including computers, ATM cards, laptops, a money counter, a dry seal, and a card-scheming device.

They also recovered two American Express credit cards bearing the name “V S Tan.” An American Express manager later confirmed that the cards were fake because their numbers did not match the records of the original account holder.

Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals convicted the accused based on the evidence seized in the implementation of the search warrant.

The SC reversed the conviction and explained that, as a general rule, authorities may seize only items specifically described in a search warrant. One exception is the plain view doctrine, which allows officers to seize evidence they discover while lawfully present in a place.

For the 𝘱𝘭𝘢𝘪𝘯 𝘷𝘪𝘦𝘸 𝘥𝘰𝘤𝘵𝘳𝘪𝘯𝘦 to apply, the officers must have a lawful reason to be in the place where the evidence is found; the discovery must be inadvertent or unintentional; and it must be immediately clear that the item may be connected to a crime.

The SC found that only the first requirement was met.

The search warrant covered only illegal drugs and related paraphernalia. It did not authorize the seizure of credit cards or other access devices.

Their discovery of the credit cards was also not made in plain view. The credit cards were inside a non-transparent bag. Their contents could not be seen until the bag was opened. Even then, the cards did not appear fake on their face. Their alleged connection to a crime became apparent only because of the NBI’s prior information and their subsequent verification by American Express.

Although the NBI agents were lawfully inside the accused’s residence, their discovery of the credit cards was not accidental. The agents already had information linking the accused to alleged credit card fraud and hacking but did not obtain a search warrant covering those offenses.

The SC thus ruled that the credit cards were unlawfully seized and could not be used as evidence against the accused. Without them, the prosecution failed to prove his guilt under RA 8484.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=172645

Read the full text of the Decision athttps://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/273931.pdf

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

01/09/2026

Nagpasya ang na ang affidavit of desistance, o isang sinumpaang salaysay na nag-uurong ng reklamo, ay lubhang kahina-hinala kapag ginawa ng isang biktima ng pananamantala at hindi maaaring gamiting batayan para isantabi ang kasong trafficking.

Sa Desisyong isinulat ni Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, pinagtibay ng Ikatlong Dibisyon ng Korte Suprema ang hatol sa isang babae sa qualified trafficking in persons na kinasasangkutan ng isang menor de edad. Hinatulan ang babae ng pagkabilanggo habambuhay, pinagmulta ng PHP 2,000,000, at pinagbabayad ng PHP 600,000 bilang danyos.

Kapitbahay ng menor de edad ang babae na humikayat sa biktima na magbigay ng serbisyong seksuwal sa isang lalaki kapalit ng pera. Tumanggap ang biktima ng PHP 15,000 mula sa lalaki na kinuha din ng babae kalaunan. Binilhan ng babae ang biktima ng selpon at binigyan siya ng PHP 3,000.

Nagsampa ng reklamo laban sa babae ang ina ng menor de edad matapos malaman ang insidente. Tumestigo ang biktima sa korte pero kalaunan ay pumirma siya ng affidavit of desistance para iurong ang kaso.

Inamin ng menor de edad sa cross-examination na tumanggap siya ng PHP 30,000 kapalit ng pagpirma sa affidavit na inihanda ng abogado ng babae. Nang tanungin ng trial court, iginiit ng menor de edad na totoo ang kanyang naunang testimonya.

Sa pagpapatibay ng hatol na nagkasala ang babae sa kasong qualified trafficking in persons sa ilalim ng Republic Act No. 9208, o ang Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003, as amended, sinabi ng Korte Suprema na hindi dapat isantabi ang mga kasong human trafficking batay lamang sa mga affidavit of desistance na ginawa ng mga biktima o ng kanilang mga magulang o legal na tagapag-alaga.

Paliwanag nito, dapat maging maingat sa pagtanggap sa mga affidavit of desistance na ginawa ng mga biktima ng pananamantala dahil maaaring bunga ang mga ito ng pamimilit, panggigipit, o undue influence. Lalo itong mahalaga kapag mga bata ang mga biktima na maaaring hindi lubos na nauunawaan ang mga epekto ng pagbawi sa kanilang testimonya.

Binigyang-diin nito na kapag naisampa na sa korte ang isang kasong kriminal, hindi na maaaring ang nagrereklamo ang magpasya kung dapat ituloy ang kaso. May interes ang Estado na usigin ang krimen at ito ang naaapektuhan kapag isinantabi ang kasong kriminal. Hindi sapat na dahilan para isantabi ang kaso dahil lang sa isang affidavit of desistance, lalo na kung ginawa habang nililitis ang kaso.

Basahin ang press release sa //sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=172431.

Basahin ang Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=167240.

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

27/08/2026

The 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤, during its session on August 26, 2026, acted on G.R. Nos. 260219 and 260231, 𝘋𝘢𝘵𝘶 𝘗𝘢𝘹 𝘈𝘭𝘪 𝘚. 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘶𝘥𝘢𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘶 𝘷. 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘮𝘮𝘪𝘴𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘯 𝘌𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴, 𝘚𝘩𝘢𝘳𝘪𝘧𝘢 𝘈𝘬𝘦𝘦𝘭 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘶𝘥𝘢𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘶, 𝘈𝘻𝘦𝘭 𝘝. 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘶𝘥𝘢𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘶, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘉𝘢𝘪 𝘈𝘭𝘪 𝘈. 𝘜𝘯𝘵𝘰𝘯𝘨, by denying with finality the motion for reconsideration filed by Datu Pax Ali S. Mangudadatu, affirming its earlier ruling that upheld the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for Governor of Sultan Kudarat and abandoned the “second placer rule.”

The SC held that the resulting vacancy should be filled by the Vice-Governor.

The “second placer rule” refers to the practice of declaring the candidate who received the second highest number of votes as the winner after the candidate with the highest number of votes is later found disqualified or ineligible.

Mangudadatu, in his motion, insisted that the second placer rule has clear basis in law and should not be abandoned.

The SC reiterated that no law authorizes the second placer rule. It emphasized that the 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 recognizes as elected only the candidate who received the highest number of votes.

The SC explained that when the winning candidate is later found ineligible to hold office, a permanent vacancy arises. For local elective positions covered by the 𝘓𝘰𝘤𝘢𝘭 𝘎𝘰𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘯𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 (LGC), that vacancy is filled through the rule on succession, not by proclaiming the second placer as the winner. Accordingly, the Vice-Governor succeeds to the position of Governor for the remainder of the term.

The SC clarified that its ruling is limited to local elective positions covered by the LGC. The case did not address the application or non-application of the second placer rule or succession rules for national elective positions, as these issues were not raised before the Court.

However, the SC stressed that succession for national elective positions like the President and Vice-President is governed exclusively by Article VII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯, which prescribe the order of succession when the President or Vice-President fails to qualify, dies, or is permanently disabled, removed from office, or resigns.

The SC also clarified that its ruling applies to pending cases, emphasizing that second placers have no vested right or entitlement to be declared the winner.

The full text of the August 26, 2026 Resolution in G.R. Nos. 260219 and 260231 will be uploaded to the Supreme Court website once available.

Read the full text of the Press Briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171947.

Read the full text of the SC’s April 25, 2025 Decision in G.R. Nos. 260219 and 260231 at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=146486.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attributionon-policy.

25/08/2026

The (SC) has ruled that Flying Risk Pay (FRP) under Republic Act No. (RA) 776, or 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘭 𝘈𝘦𝘳𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘴 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘗𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘱𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘴, may be granted only to Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) personnel whose duties are directly related to flight operations.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 upheld the Commission on Audit’s (COA) disallowance of FRP paid to certain CAAP officials and employees whose duties were primarily managerial, administrative, or financial.

Under Section 30 of RA 776, CAAP-licensed airmen and other authorized personnel who are required to make regular and frequent aerial flights in connection with their duties may receive FRP equivalent to 50% of their salary, provided they complete at least four hours of flight time per month.

In 2011, CAAP granted FRP to officials and employees who met the four-hour monthly flight requirement. Some recipients, however, held managerial, administrative, and finance positions and traveled by air mainly to attend conferences, seminars, public hearings, inspections, and similar activities.

COA disallowed PHP 323,579.50 in FRP payments, finding that the benefit was intended for personnel whose duties involved aerial and flight operations.

The recipients argued that they were entitled to FRP because RA 776 covers not only “airmen” but also “other authorized personnel,” even if their duties were not directly related to flight operations.

The SC upheld the disallowance.

Citing RA 776, which defines an “airman” as a pilot, mechanic, flight radio operator, aircraft crew member, or a person responsible for inspecting, maintaining, or repairing aircraft,” the SC clarified that the phrase “other authorized personnel” refers to personnel who are required to perform regular and frequent aerial flights as part of their official duties.

The SC also cited the 𝘎𝘰𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘯𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘈𝘤𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘈𝘶𝘥𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘶𝘢𝘭, which limits FRP to personnel whose duties are inherent in flight operations and excludes those who fly merely as passengers.

In this case, the recipient’s air travel was only incidental to their managerial, administrative, or financial duties. Their flights were for meetings, conferences, inspections, and other administrative activities, rather than for flight operations. As passengers, they were not entitled to FPR.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171845.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165944.

Read the full text of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa’s Concurring Opinion at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165939.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.