Atty. Dionaldo

11/03/2026

The SC has upheld the validity of a DOJ circular that raised the standard of proof in preliminary investigations and inquest proceedings from probable cause to prima facie evidence with reasonable certainty of conviction.

The (SC) 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 has upheld the validity of a Department of Justice (DOJ) circular that raised the standard of proof in preliminary investigations and inquest proceedings from probable cause to prima facie evidence with reasonable certainty of conviction.

In a Decision written by written by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 ruled that Department Circular No. 15, series of 2024 containing the 2024 𝘋𝘖𝘑-𝘕𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘴𝘦𝘤𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘚𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘪𝘤𝘦 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘯 𝘗𝘳𝘦𝘭𝘪𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘳𝘺 𝘐𝘯𝘷𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘨𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘐𝘯𝘲𝘶𝘦𝘴𝘵 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘤𝘦𝘦𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨𝘴 (𝘋𝘖𝘑 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴), is a valid exercise of the DOJ’s authority over prosecutorial processes.

Under the DOJ Rules’ new standard of proof in preliminary investigations and inquest, prosecutors must ensure that the evidence to charge a person with a crime must sufficiently establish all the elements and consequently warrant a conviction.

Atty. Hazel L. Meking questioned the DOJ Rules before the SC, claiming that the DOJ encroached on the SC’s constitutional authority to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts. She argued that the DOJ Rules effectively revised Rule 112, Section 3(a) of the 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘤𝘦𝘥𝘶𝘳𝘦, which provides that the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is probable cause.

The SC dismissed her petition and reiterated its ruling in 𝘈.𝘔. 𝘕𝘰. 24-02-09-𝘚𝘊, which recognized the DOJ’s authority to promulgate its own rules on preliminary investigations and inquest proceedings.

The SC held that the DOJ Rules govern only the conduct of preliminary investigations and inquests by prosecutors, which are executive functions. These Rules, however, do not extend to judicial proceedings as the power to promulgate rules of procedure over them remains under the authority of the Supreme Court.

The SC noted it had already recognized preliminary investigation as the exclusive domain of prosecutors when it revised the Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2005.

In 2024, through 𝘈.𝘔. 𝘕𝘰. 24-02-09-𝘚𝘊, the SC also ordered the repeal of provisions in Rule 112 which are inconsistent with the DOJ Rules to harmonize them.

The SC’s constitutional rule-making authority over judicial proceedings remains supreme, as well as its power to correct grave abuse of discretion in any prosecutorial rule or action that violates constitutional rights.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161871

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161853

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161858

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

23/02/2026

“ACQUITTAL VIA DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE IS FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE” - SC

ACQUITTAL VIA DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE IS FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE—SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court (SC) held that a judgment of acquittal via demurrer to evidence is final, unappealable, and immediately executory, noting that the State cannot appeal the same as it would violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy.

In a 10-page decision penned by Associate Justice Maria Filomena Singh, the SC's Third Division has affirmed the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) granting the demurrer to evidence in favor of Dr. Jovith Royales, effectively dismissing the falsification of private document charges filed against him by Marilao Medical and Diagnostic Inc.

Dr. Royales is the owner of Best Care, a clinic not authorized to issue Reverse Transcription Polymerase Chain Reaction (RT-PCR) tests. The Marilao Medical and Diagnostic Inc. alleged that Dr. Royales falsely used its name to process and issue RT-PCR test results.

After the prosecution presented its evidence, Dr. Royales filed a demurrer to evidence. The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) granted the demurrer and acquitted Dr. Royales. The MeTC found that the prosecution witnesses failed to identify the alleged falsified documents or prove that Dr. Royales ordered the falsification. While a scheme may have existed, there was no evidence directly linking Dr. Royales to it.

Marilao Medical filed a Petition for Certiorari (Rule 65) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) assailing the acquittal. Notably, Marilao Medical obtained the conformity of the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) for this petition, but not the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

The RTC dismissed the petition. It ruled that the OCP’s conformity was insufficient because the criminal aspect of the case must be prosecuted on behalf of the State, and the RTC believed the OSG was the proper party to represent the State in such actions. This prompted Mqrilap Medical to file a direct recourse before the Supreme Court.

In affirming the MeTC’s acquittal of Dr. Royales, it noted that a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable to protect the accused against double jeopardy. The only exception is a Rule 65 petition showing grave abuse of discretion—meaning the court acted in a capricious, whimsical, or arbitrary manner amounting to a denial of due process.

It noted that the MeTC correctly found that the prosecution failed to prove Dr. Royales' authorship or possession of the falsified documents. Being an officer/owner of the company (Best Care) does not create a presumption of authorship of falsified documents without evidence of actual possession or specific orders to falsify.

The SC also rejected Marilao Medical's assertion invoking presumption of authorship, which allows Dr. Royales, being the owner of Best Care, to possess and benefit from the documents. It noted that the presumption of authorship against a person in possession of a falsified document does not automatically apply to an officer of a company simply because the company produced the document.

Meanwhile, as to the procedural aspect, the SC held that the RTC erred in denying due course to the petition for certiorari on the ground that it bore the conformity of the City Prosecutor instead of the Solicitor General. It underscored that when a case is filed or pending in the RTC, including a Rule 65 petition, it is the provincial or city prosecutor, not the Solicitor General, who represents the state.

"Since Marilao Medical’s petition was filed before the RTC and had the express conformity of the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP), the requirement for state representation was satisfied," the Supreme Court said.

19/01/2026

01/01/2026

“The Supreme Court has ordered a lending app operator to pay damages to a client for accessing her contact list and sending messages about her outstanding loan, actions that harm her reputation.”

SUPREME COURT FINES LENDING APP FOR UNAUTHORIZED CONTACT ACCESS; CRIMINAL PROSECUTION RECOMMENDED

The Supreme Court (SC) has ordered a lending app operator to pay damages to a client for accessing her contact list and sending messages about her outstanding loan, actions that harmed her reputation

In a 16-page ruling penned by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul Inting, the SC's Third Division reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) that set aside the National Privacy Commission (NPC)’s recommendation to charge FCash Global Lending Inc. with violation of the Data Privacy Act of 2012 and to pay damages to complainant Grace Trimillos.

Court records revealed that Trimillos filed the complaints alleging that the lending app accessed her phone’s contacts list without her authority and sent everyone on the list messages about her loan.

She added this tarnished her reputation, as her co-workers and friends were told they were guarantors and would be forced to pay on her behalf if she did not settle her loan.

Trimillos presented screenshots of the text messages allegedly sent by FCash as evidence. When mediation failed, NPC directed FCash to file a responsive comment, which received no response.

The NPC then resolved the issue and ruled that Trimillo’s right to privacy was violated after it found that FCash gathered personal information in excess of what was necessary and processed it for purposes other than those stated in their own privacy policy.

It held that the unauthorized processing of personal information was done with malice, as the messages reveal FCash’s “unquestionable intention to shame Trimillos and jeopardize her reputation” until she settled her obligations.

The NPC awarded P15,000 in nominal damages to Trimillos and recommended to the Department of Justice the filing of criminal cases against FCash for malicious disclosure and processing of sensitive personal information for unauthorized purposes.

However, when the case was brought to the CA, it abandoned the NPC ruling, noting that Trimillos failed to have the screenshots authenticated by any of her supposed witnesses, violating the Rules on Electronic Evidence. This paved the way for Trimillos to elevate the case before the Supreme Court.

In ruling in her favor and reinstating the NPC ruling, the high court found FCash failed to timely object to the admissibility of the screenshots used as evidence in the complaint against it before the NPC.

It explained that because FCash raised the issue for the first time on appeal, it could no longer be used as a ground to reverse the NPC’s decision. The issue was deemed waived when the lending app failed to file its response during the proceedings before the NPC.

“While there had been a ground to question its admissibility, it is clear that FCash failed to make a timely objection on the presentation and offer of the screenshots,” the Supreme Court said.

It also cited a previous ruling that inadmissible evidence may be admitted if not challenged at the proper time, and such an issue may not be raised for the first time on appeal.

The highest bench underscored that Trimillos submitted the screenshots to the NPC before the discovery conference. Despite its availability for examination, FCash did not object to these when given an opportunity to comment, including its objection to the inadmissibility of evidence.

“At the risk of being repetitive, grounds for objections not raised at the proper time shall be considered waived. Thus, even on appeal, the CA may not consider any other ground of objection except those that were raised at the proper time,” it added.

26/12/2025

“The SC stressed that in criminial cases, the prosecution must not only prove the elements of the crime but also the identity of the offender.”

The has laid down guideposts for proving who owns or controls a social media account in criminal cases.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, the SC’s First Division affirmed the conviction of an individual (###) for committing psychological violence under Section 5 (i) of the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘪𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘈𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵 𝘞𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘛𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘳 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 (𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘈𝘞𝘊) 𝘈𝘤𝘵 against his ex-girlfriend (AAA) by posting derogatory statements about her on 𝘍𝘢𝘤𝘦𝘣𝘰𝘰𝘬.

The SC sentenced ### to up to eight years in prison, imposed a PHP 100,000 fine, and ordered ### to undergo psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment.

The SC stressed that in criminal cases, the prosecution must prove not only the elements of the crime but also the identity of the offender.

It explained that for crimes committed through social media, the basic features of the platform such as 𝘍𝘢𝘤𝘦𝘣𝘰𝘰𝘬, must be considered.

Noting that 𝘍𝘢𝘤𝘦𝘣𝘰𝘰𝘬 is widely used in the Philippines, the SC held that a 𝘍𝘢𝘤𝘦𝘣𝘰𝘰𝘬 account can easily be created by anyone claiming to be at least 13 years old with an email address or mobile number.

Once an account is created, the user can add friends, exchange private messages, and post statements, photos, or videos visible to others depending on the user’s privacy settings. Fake or dummy accounts can easily spread, enabling disinformation, identity theft, or crimes.

Given this, the SC ruled that guideposts are necessary to establish who owns or controls a social media account. It said the following must be shown to prove ownership or access:

1. Admission of ownership or authorship;
2. Being seen accessing the account or composing the post;
3. Containing information known only to the offender or a few people;
4. Language consistent with the offender’s characteristics;
5. Records from the internet service provider, telecommunications company, or social media site, and results from device forensic analysis showing geolocation features, and other attributes linking the account to the offender;
6. Acts consistent with previous posts; or
7. Other instances showing ownership, access, or authorship.

Applying these, the SC found that several factors proved ### wrote the 𝘍𝘢𝘤𝘦𝘣𝘰𝘰𝘬 post. The account name bore his full name, and the profile photo showed him with his child from his current live-in partner.

AAA’s sister had also received messages from the same account for years.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=158535.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=158446.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

17/12/2025

“The SC clarified that while the Bank Secrecy Law protects the confidentiality of bank deposits and their financial details, it does not prevent the disclosure of basic identifying information when allowed by law. Under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, law enforcement agencies may, with a court-issued warrant, require the disclosure of computer data necessary to investigate cybercrime offenses.”

The (SC) has held that while financial details of bank deposits remain confidential, the Cybercrime Prevention Act allows disclosure of bank account holder information for cybercrime investigations.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, the SC’s First Division denied the petition filed by EastWest Rural Bank (EastWest), which questioned the warrant to disclose computer data (WDCD) issued by the court and the subsequent Disclosure Order issued by the Philippine National Police Anti-Cybercrime Group (PNP-ACG) which required EastWest to disclose bank account holder information.

This EastWest bank account holder information sought to be disclosed is the account where Leonard Vendiola’s money was transferred after he was scammed by a caller posing as a bank employee.

Vendiola reported to the PNP-ACG that a caller who introduced herself as a bank employee deceived him by promising rewards contingent to disclosing his email and one-time password. When he checked his bank account, he discovered that an amount of PHP 10,000 was transferred to an EastWest account.

PNP-ACG applied for a WDCD to identify the EastWest account holder involved in the alleged scam. This was granted by the Regional Trial Court which authorized the PNP-ACG to compel EastWest to disclose and preserve data relating to the account holder. Pursuant to this, the PNP-ACG issued a Disclosure Order to EastWest.

EastWest filed a petition with the Court of Appeals challenging the WDCD and arguing that the Bank Secrecy Law prohibits banks from revealing any information about bank deposits, including the identity of the account holder. It maintained that this rule remains in force because it was not repealed by the Cybercrime Prevention Act.

EastWest also asserted that it should not be subject to the Cybercrime law’s disclosure rules because it is a financial institution rather than a communications service provider.

The SC rejected these arguments and upheld the validity of the WDCD and Disclosure Order.

The SC clarified that while the Bank Secrecy Law protects the confidentiality of bank deposits and their financial details, it does not prevent the disclosure of basic identifying information when allowed by law. Under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, law enforcement agencies may, with a court-issued warrant, require the disclosure of computer data necessary to investigate cybercrime offenses.

The SC ruled that EastWest is considered a service provider under the Cybercrime Prevention Act because their digital banking services, such as online banking platforms, mobile applications, and automated email notifications, allow customers to communicate and transact through computer systems. As a banking institution, EastWest also processes and stores substantial amounts of computer data both in the course of its operations and on behalf of its customers, placing it within the law’s coverage for the disclosure of computer data when authorized by a court-issued warrant.

Read the full text of the press release at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=157653

Read the full text of the Decision at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=157646

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

06/10/2025

The (SC) has nullified the foreclosure of several properties after ruling that the interest charged on the unpaid bank loan was unfair and imposed without the borrower’s consent.

In a Resolution written by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, the SC’s Special Third Division granted the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Editha Ang and Violeta Fernandez, whose properties were foreclosed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) after they failed to pay a PHP 16-million loan.

Ang and Fernandez obtained a loan from UCPB. Based on the loan documents, however, UCPB was allowed to unilaterally adjust the interest rate every quarter based on market conditions.

When Ang and Fernandez failed to pay the total loan when it fell due, UCPB began to extrajudicially foreclose their properties.

Ang and Fernandez then filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to nullify the foreclosure sale, claiming that because the bank had the sole power to set and increase the interest rate, the rate was unfair and invalid.

The SC initially agreed that the interest rate was invalid but still upheld the foreclosure sale, ruling that the borrowers remained in default.

Upon reconsideration, however, the SC ruled that if the interest rate was unconscionable or imposed unilaterally by the lender, then any foreclosure that follows is also invalid.

The Court emphasized that under the Civil Code, contracts must be fair and mutually agreed upon. A contract that depends only on one party’s will is void.

In this case, the interest rate was solely determined by UCPB. Since the interest rate was invalid, the foreclosure of the properties was void.

The SC held that the borrowers should be given a chance to pay the loan at an interest rate agreed upon by both parties. Otherwise, they would be at the mercy of the lender and risk losing their property without a fair opportunity to settle their debt.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=152735.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=152719.

Read the Dissenting Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=152726.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

25/09/2025

Since banking is a business imbued with public interest, courts have consistently ruled that the banks are required to exercise extraordinary diligence in their dealings.

The (SC) has reiterated that banks may be held liable for moral damages suffered by depositors due to negligence, even if there is no proof of bad faith or malice.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the SC’s Third Division ordered Banco de Oro (BDO) to pay Remedios and Angelita Antonino (Antoninos) the proceeds of their time deposit, including PHP 100,000 in moral damages.

The Antoninos, who are U.S. green card holders living abroad, made three time deposit placements totaling over USD 150,000 at BDO’s San Lorenzo Branch in Makati City (BDO San Lorenzo). They had an arrangement with the branch manager that if the deposits were not withdrawn at maturity, they would automatically roll over into interest-bearing savings accounts. The time deposit certificates (TDCs) were not redeemed and were stored in a Banco Filipino deposit box for safekeeping.

Later, Banco Filipino declared bankruptcy and was taken over by the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). It took the Antoninos some time to retrieve their TDCs from the PDIC.
BDO San Lorenzo then ceased operations and closed down without notifying the Antoninos, who only discovered the closure when they tried to withdraw their investments.

They sent several demand letters to BDO, but the bank claimed the deposits had already been withdrawn, citing a demand draft allegedly signed by Angelita. Angelita denied signing the document.

The Antoninos filed a complaint against BDO seeking payment of their time deposit placements.

Ruling in favor of the Antoninos, the SC cited Section 9 of BDO’s terms and conditions for time deposit placements, which requires the surrender of TDCs when withdrawing deposits. Since the Antoninos still had the certificates, the SC concluded that the funds were not withdrawn.

The SC noted that the PNP expert said the signature on the demand draft was likely forged. Immigration and passport records also showed Angelita could not have been in the country to sign the draft. Further, BDO failed to verify the identity of the person who withdrew the funds.

The SC held that these lapses showed BDO’s failure to exercise the required diligence, especially given the large amount involved.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=152203.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=152187.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

10/09/2025

The (SC) has clarified that disputes involving condominium contracts should be decided by the Human Settlements Adjudication Commission (HSAC), formerly the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), and not the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC’s Third Division nullified the RTC’s ruling that held Vivien M. Cadungog (Cadungog) and Sung Ha Jung (Sung) civilly liable to each other over a contract to sell involving a condominium unit.

Under the contract, Cadungog, a developer of a condominium building in Cebu City, agreed to deliver a unit to Sung once he completed payment of PHP 3.5 million. Sung paid a PHP 175,000 downpayment, and later PHP 3 million, leaving a balance of PHP 258,950. Because of the unpaid amount, Cadungog refused to deliver the unit.

Sung then filed a criminal complaint before the RTC against Cadungog, citing a violation of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 957 or the 𝘚𝘶𝘣𝘥𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘰𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘪𝘶𝘮 𝘉𝘶𝘺𝘦𝘳𝘴’ 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘵𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘋𝘦𝘤𝘳𝘦𝘦.

The RTC acquitted Cadungog, but ordered her to either: deliver the unit upon full payment of the purchase price, or return the amount Sung had already paid. Cadungog argued that it was the HLURB and not the RTC which had jurisdiction over the civil aspect of her case.

Ruling in Cadungog’s favor, the SC declared as null and void the RTC’s decision on the civil matter of the case.

It explained that while civil liability can be decided in a criminal case, this does not apply when the liability arises from a contract, as in this case.

The SC emphasized that the civil dispute between Cadungog and Sung stemmed from their contract to sell.

Further, under PD 957, as amended, the HLURB (now reconstituted as the HSAC) has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving contractual and legal obligations between buyers and developers of real estate projects. At the time Sung filed the complaint, it was the HLURB that had authority over such cases.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=151440.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=151432.

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09/09/2025

The (SC) has ruled that a public institution must vacate the land it occupies if it lacks permission from the rightful owner and the owner has a better right of possession.

In a Decision written by Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, the SC’s Second Division ordered the Department of Education (DepEd) to vacate and return a parcel of land to its owner, Princess Joama Marcosa A. Caleda (Caleda).

In 2014, Caleda bought a 10,637 square meter rice land in Cagayan through an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights and Sale signed by the heirs of the registered owner, Bueno Gallebo (Gallebo).

However, when Caleda later visited the land for a relocation survey, she discovered that it was being occupied by the Solana Fresh Water Fishery School (the School), a public institution under DepEd Regional Office 2.

Caleda sent several demand letters for DepEd to vacate the land, but received no reply. She then filed a case to recover possession of the land and remove any structures built on it.

DepEd argued that government agencies cannot be evicted from land already used for public purposes. It claimed it had the right to take over the property through its power of eminent domain, and that Caleda’s only remedy was to ask for just compensation.

Ruling in favor of Caleda, the SC found that the latter had clearly proven her better right to the property. Her land title was valid and accurately described the land, unlike the School’s deed of sale, which referred to an adjacent lot.

The SC emphasized that while the government can take private property for public use through its power of eminent domain, this must be done through proper legal proceedings and with payment of just compensation. Because no expropriation process was initiated in this case, the School could not retain the land simply by offering to pay for it.

The SC also clarified that a public institution can only prevent eviction if the property owner fails to assert their rights in time, which is considered an implied acceptance.

In this case, Caleda acted quickly—sending demand letters, talking to DepEd, registering her claims, and filing a case within two years of discovering the School’s occupation of the property.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://tinyurl.com/y35skjpf.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://tinyurl.com/58ja5trh.

27/08/2025

The (SC) has ruled that a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) automatically ceases upon the death of the person who granted it, and any acts carried out by the agent afterwards are void, unless covered by narrow exceptions under the law.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC’s Third Division held that Jessica Alova Uberas lost her authority under the SPA to act on behalf of her father, Meliton Alova, upon his death in 1998.

In 1998, Meliton executed an SPA in favor of Jessica over the subject conjugal property. He died later that year. Despite the death of his father, Jessica still used the same SPA in 2003 to execute a mortgage over the said property in favor of San Miguel Foods, Inc. (SMFI) to secure her loan from the company. Jessica failed to pay the loan and the property was foreclosed where SMFI emerged as the winning bidder.

Felicidad Alova and Decelyn Alova Pution, the widow and other daughter of Meliton, filed a case to nullify the mortgage and the foreclosure sale.

Both the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) determined that Meliton’s death ended the agency. However, the RTC found that because the SPA had the conformity of Felicidad, Meliton’s wife, the mortgage was valid on her ½ share of the conjugal property. On the other hand, the CA declared the mortgage invalid, citing that it was not executed on behalf of Spouses Meliton and Felicidad.

SMFI appealed to the SC, which partly ruled in its favor. The Court upheld the agency’s termination but validated the mortgage and foreclosure sale with respect to Jessica’s undivided share in the property.

The SC explained that under an SPA, which is a contract of agency, a principal authorizes an agent to act on his or her behalf in transactions with third persons. Agency is personal, representative, and derivative, and it ends upon the death of either the principal or the agent.

Any act by the agent after the principal’s death is void, unless it falls under two Civil Code exceptions: (1) when the agency was for the parties’ common interest, and (2) when the agent, unaware of the death or agency’s end, contracted with a third party in good faith.

In this case, there was no showing that these exceptions were applicable. Jessica was fully aware of her father’s death, and the SPA was not made for their mutual benefit.

The SC also reiterated that for an agent’s act to bind the principal, the deed must clearly be made, signed, and sealed in the principal’s name.

Here, although Jessica was described in the beginning of the deed as Meliton’s attorney-in-fact, the mortgage was signed by Jessica in her personal capacity, as it was neither executed nor sealed in Meliton’s name, and without indication that she was acting as attorney-in-fact.

The Court also ruled that Meliton’s wife, Felicidad, was not bound as a principal under the SPA, as she only provided her marital conformity.

However, the Court clarified that the mortgage and foreclosure sale were not entirely void. Jessica automatically became a co-owner of the property after her father’s death. When she signed the mortgage, she encumbered her share in the property to secure her obligation to SMFI. Therefore, the mortgage and foreclosure sale were valid only for Jessica’s share.

The Court remanded the case to the RTC to determine Jessica’s share in the subject property and to annotate the shares of Meliton’s other heirs, and that of SMFI which acquired Jessica’s interest.

Read the full text of the press release at https://tinyurl.com/27t9k6vy

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260071-san-miguel-foods-inc-vs-felicidad-d-alova-and-decelyn-alova-pution/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.