11/04/2026
When every dispute becomes ‘criminal’ - is law being misused?
In recent years, a noticeable trend has emerged in litigation strategy. Purely civil disputes, especially those arising out of contracts, property transactions, or commercial dealings, are increasingly being dressed in the language of criminal law. Allegations of cheating, criminal breach of trust, or even forgery are invoked at the very inception, often alongside or even before civil remedies are pursued.
At one level, this reflects a loss of faith in the speed and effectiveness of civil adjudication. At another, it reveals a tactical choice. The criminal process, with its coercive elements such as investigation, arrest, and the stigma attached to prosecution, is sometimes perceived as a means to secure quicker settlements or to exert pressure.
However, the law has consistently drawn a clear distinction. A mere breach of contract does not amount to a criminal offence unless there is a clear and specific intention to deceive right from the beginning of the transaction. The Supreme Court has, time and again, cautioned against the criminalisation of civil disputes, emphasising that criminal law cannot be used as a tool for arm-twisting or recovery.
The consequences of this trend are not insignificant. For the accused, it means facing the anxiety and reputational damage of criminal proceedings for what may essentially be a commercial disagreement. For the system, it leads to an unnecessary burden on investigative agencies and criminal courts, diverting attention from genuine offences. For the complainant, it creates a false sense of remedy, often leading to prolonged litigation on multiple fronts.
This is not to suggest that all such complaints are mala fide. There are cases where civil transactions do involve elements of fraud or dishonest intention. The difficulty lies in drawing the line, and more importantly, in ensuring that this line is not blurred for convenience.
Perhaps the need of the hour is a more careful scrutiny at the threshold stage, both by the police and the courts. The object of criminal law is to punish wrongdoing, not to serve as a substitute for civil enforcement.
As practitioners, we must ask ourselves a difficult but necessary question. Are we aiding the cause of justice, or are we gradually normalising a practice that risks undermining the very distinction between civil wrongs and criminal offences?
The answer will shape not just litigation strategy, but the integrity of the justice system itself.
